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THEJUDGES OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
CHIEF JUDGE
STEPHANIE K. SEYMOUR
Judge Seymour was born in Battle
Creek, Michigan in 1940. She was graduated
manna cum laudefrom Smith College in 1962,
and from Harvard Law School in 1965. Af-
ter graduating from law school, Judge
Seymour practiced law in Boston, Massachu-
setts from 1965 until 1966, in Tulsa, Okla-
homa in 1967 and in Houston, Texas from
1968 until 1969. From 1971 to 1979 she prac-
ticed with the Tulsa law firm of Doerner,
Stuart, Saunders, Daniel & Anderson. In
1979, she was appointed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
She is a member of Phi Beta Kappa and
the American and Oklahoma County Bar
Associations. Additionally, Judge Seymour
served as a bar examiner from 1973 through
1979; she served on the United StatesJudi-
cial Conference Committee on Defender
Services, 1985-87, and as chair, 1987-90.
JUDGE
JOHN J. PORFILIO
Judge Porfilio was born in Denver, Colo-
rado in 1934. He received his B.A. from the
University of Denver in 1956 and received
his LL.B. from the University of Denver Col-
lege of Lawin 1959.Judge Porfilio then prac-
ticed law with the Denver firm of Carbone
& Waismith until 1962. From 1962 until
1975, he worked in the Colorado Attorney
General's Office. SpecificallyJudge Porfilio
served as Assistant Attorney General from
1962 until 1967, as Deputy Attorney General
from 1967 to 1972, and as Attorney General
for the State of Colorado from 1972 until
1975.
Injanuary, 1975,Judge Porfilio was ap-
pointed to the Bankruptcy Court of the
United States District Court for the District
of Colorado where he served until 1982.
Judge Porfilio was then appointed to the
United States District Court for the District
of Colorado. In 1985, he was appointed to




Judge Anderson was born in 1932. He
attended Eastern Oregon College from 1949
to 1951, and Brigham Young University from
1955 to 1956 when he graduated. Judge
Anderson then attended the University of
Utah College of Law where he received his
LLB. degree in 1960. He was Editor in Chief
of the Utah Law Review, Order of the Coif,
and Phi Kappa Phi. He then served as a trial
attorney in the tax division of the United
States Department ofJustice until 1964.
Judge Anderson subsequently joined
the law firm of Ray, Quinney & Nebeker in
Salt Lake City, Utah in 1964 where he prac-
ticed until he was appointed to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Cir-
cuit in 1985.
Judge Anderson has appeared as lead
counsel in federal courts in seventeen states,
and in the United States Supreme Court. He
has served as President and Commissioner
of the Utah State Bar. Additionally, Judge
Anderson has been a member of the Utah
judicial Counsel and the UtahJudicial Con-
duct Commission, and he has served as
Chairman of the Utah Law andJustice Cen-
ter Committee. Judge Anderson's civic ac-
tivities include lectures at the University of
Utah College of Law, member of the Execu-
tive Committee of the Salt Lake Area Charn-
ber of Commerce, and director of numer-
ous corporations. He is a Master of the
Bench, American Inn of Court Number VII.
JUDGE
DEANELL R. TACHA
Judge Tacha grew up in Scandia, Kan-
sas. She received her BAL in American Stud-
ies from the University of Kansas in 1968 and
was a member of Mortar Board and Phi Beta
Kappa. Judge Tacha then attended law
school and received herJ.D. from the Uni-
versity of Michigan in 1971.
In 1971, she was selected to be a White
House Fellow. During her year as a White
House FellowJudge Tacha was sent on offi-
cial trips to southeast Asia, east and central
Africa, and the European Economic Com-
munity. After her fellowship, Judge Tacha
was an associate with the law firm of Hogan
and Hartson in Washington, D.C. In 1973,
she returned to Kansas and entered private
practice in Concordia, Kansas.
Judge Tacha was appointed to the fac-
ulty of the University of Kansas Law School
in 1974. In 1979, she became associate Vice
Chancellor of Academic Affairs, and in 1981,
she became the Vice Chancellor for Aca-
demic Affairs.
Judge Tacha was appointed to the U.S.




Judge Baldock was born in Rocky, Okla-
homa, in 1936, however, he grew up in
Hagerman and Roswell, New Mexico.Judge
Baldock attended the New Mexico Military
Institute, where he graduated in 1956. He
received hisJ.D. from the University of Ari-
zona College of Law in 1960.
From 1960 until 1983, Judge Baldock
practiced as a trial lawyer for the firm of
Sanders, Bruin & Baldock, PA In 1983, he
became a federal districtjudge in Albuquer-
que, New Mexico and was appointed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit in 1985. In 1988,Judge Baldock re-
ceived an Outstanding Judge Award from
the State Bar of New Mexico.
JUDGE
MARY BECK BRISCOE
Judge Briscoe is a CircuitJudge for the
U.S. Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit She
was born in 1947 in Council Grove, Kansas,
and received her BA degree in German and
International Relations from the University
of Kansas, herJD degree from the Univer-
sity of Kansas School of Law, and her LLM
degree from the University of Virginia
School of Law.
Judge Briscoe worked as an attorney-
examiner for the Interstate Commerce
Commission from September 1973 to March
1974, and served as an Assistant U.S. Attor-
ney from March 1974 to March 1984. She
was appointed as ChiefJudge of the Kansas
Court of Appeals in September 1990. She
assumed her present position in May 1995.
Judge Briscoe is a Fellow of the Ameri-
can Bar Foundation and the Kansas Bar
Foundation. She is a member of the Ameri-
can Bar Association and serves as Vice-chair
of the AppellateJudges Conference. She is
a member of the Kansas Bar Association and
serves on the Bench-Bar Committee. In 1992
she was awarded the KBA Outstanding Ser-
vice Award for her work as Co-Chair of the
Task Force on the Status of Women in the
Legal Profession. She is also a member of
the Topeka Bar Association, the Washburn
Law School Association, the Women Attor-
neys Association of Topeka, the American
Judicature Society, and the National Asso-
ciation of WomenJudges. She serves on the
University of Kansas Law Society Board of
Governors.
Judge Briscoe is married to Charles
Briscoe, an attorney in Topeka, and an in-
structor in the legal aid clinic at the Univer-
sity of Kansas Law School.
JUDGE
WADE BRORBY
Judge Brorby was born May 23, 1934 in
Omaha, Nebraska. He was raised in Upton
and Newcastle, Wyoming. Judge Brorby at-
tended the University of Wyoming and re-
ceived a B.S. in Business. He graduated with
a J.D. with Honor from the University of
Wyoming in 1958.
Judge Brorby served in the United
States Air Force from 1958 to 1961. He en-
gaged in the private practice of law in
Gillette, Wyoming from 1961 to 1988.Judge
Brorby was appointed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in
1988.
Judge Brorby served on the Uniform
Laws Commission and was Chairman of the
WyomingJudicial Supervisory Commission.




Judge Ebel was born in Wichita, Kansas
in 1940 and grew up in Topeka, Kansas. He
received his BA in economics from North-
western University in 1962 and received his
J.D. from the University of Michigan Law
School in 1965, where he graduated first in
his class. While at the University of Michi-
gan Law School, he was elected to the Or-
der of Coif, the Barrister Society, and he was
Editor-in-Chief of the Michigan Law Review.
Judge Ebel then clerked for Justice
Byron R. White of the United States Su-
preme Court during the 1965-66 term. From
1966 until 1988, he practiced as a trial law-
yer with the Denver law firm of Davis, Gra-
ham & Stubbs. In 1988, Judge Ebel was ap-
pointed to the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit.
Judge Ebel's civic activities include
teaching Corporations as an adjunct profes-
sor at the University of Denver College of
Law, teaching Professionalism and Ethics at
Duke University School of Law, teaching
the confirmation class at the St.James Pres-
byterian Church and participating in numer-
ous Bar Association activities. He has served
as vice-president of the Colorado Bar Asso-
ciation and is a fellow of the American Col-
lege of Trial Lawyers, a senior judge of the
Doyle Inns of Court, and a member of the
Town & Gown Society.
JUDGE
PAUL J. KELLY
Judge Paul J. Kelly, Jr. was born in
Freeport, NewYork, in 1940. He received a
B.B.A. in Economics and Finance from the
University of Notre Dame in 1963 and his
J.D. from Fordhamn University School of Law
in 1967.
From 1968 to 1992,Judge Kelly engaged
in a general litigation practice with the New
Mexico law firm of Hinkle, Cox, Elfton,
Coffield & Hensley. Judge Kelly served in
the New Mexico House of Representatives
from 1977 to 1981.
Currently, Judge Kelly is a member of
the Board of Visitors of the Fordham Uni-
versity School of Law and serves as President
of the Northern New Mexico American Inn
of Court.Judge Kelly has been active in vari-
ous Bar activities. He has served on a New
Mexico Board of Bar Examiners, the New
Mexico AppellateJudges' Nominating Com-
mission, as a reviewing officer and Hearing
Committee chair for the Disciplinary Board
of New Mexico Supreme Court, as a mem-
ber of the New Mexico Public Defender
Board, the New Mexico State Personnel
Board and as President of the Chaves
County Bar Association. Judge Kelly was
appointed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in 1992.
JUDGE
ROBERT H. HENRY
Judge Henry was born in Shawnee,
Oklahoma on April 3,1953. He received his
BA in Political Science in 1974 and hisJ.D.
in 1977, both from the University of Okla-
homa.
After graduating from law school,Judge
Henry opened a private law practice in
Shawnee and served in the Oklahoma
House of Representatives for five terms. In
1986, at the age of thirty-three, he was
elected Oklahoma Attorney General, run-
ning unopposed for re-election in 1990. In
1991, he became Dean of the Oklahoma City
University School of Law, where he taught
in the areas of state and local government
law and legislation.
Judge Henry served on numerous com-
mittees of the National Association of At-
torneys General, including the Supreme
Court Committee, which he chaired, and
the State Constitutional Law Advisory Board.
He is an American Bar Foundation Fellow,
a Commissioner for Oklahoma on the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws, and a member of the
American Law Institute. Judge Henry has
also served on numerous civic and educa-
tional boards including the Oklahoma Na-
ture Conservancy, the Board of Visitors of
the University of Oklahoma Press, and the
Western History Collection of the Univer-
sity of Oklahoma. He has received the Con-
servationist of theYearAward from the Okla-
homa Wildlife Federation, the Human
Rights Award from the Oklahoma Human
Rights Commission, and is a member of Phi
Beta Kappa
Judge Henry was appointed to the




Judge Lucero was born in Antonito,
Colorado in 1940. He received his BA from
Adams State College and his J.D. from
George Washington University. In 1995, he
was appointed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
Judge Lucero clerked forJudge William
E. Doyle of the District Court of Colorado
for the 1964-1965 term. Prior to his clerk-
ship, he was a staff aide for the United States
SenateJudiciary Subcommittee on Admin-
istrative Practice and Procedure. He en-
tered private practice in Alamosa, Colorado
where he became a senior partner in the
law firm of Lucero, Lester and Sigmund.
While in private practice,Judge Lucero
served on the Colorado Supreme Court
Board of Law Examiners, the ABA Action
Commission to Reduce Court Cost and De-
lay, the advisory board to the ABAJournal,
the ABA Committee on the Availability of
Legal Services, and the CBA Ethics Commit-
tee. He also served on President Carter's
Presidential Panel on Western State Water
Policy, the Board of Directors of Colorado
Rural Legal Services, the Colorado Histori-
cal Society and the Santa Fe Opera Associa-
tion of New Mexico. In addition, he was




Judge Michael R. Murphy was born
August 6,1947 in Denver, Colorado. He was
raised in Rawlins, Wyoming. He received a
BA from Creighton University in 1969 and
hisJ.D., with honors, from the University of
Wyoming in 1972.
He is married to Mickey Donnelly
Murphy and has two children, Amy and
Michael. In 1972-73, Judge Murphy served
as a law clerk to the late David T. Lewis, then
Chief Judge of the Tenth Circuit. Judge
Murphy began private practice in 1973 as
an associate in the Salt Lake City law firm of
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough. He
remained with that law firm until his ap-
pointment in 1986 by Governor Bangerter
to the Third District Court, a trial court of
general jurisdiction over Salt Lake, Summit
and Tooele Counties, Utah. Judge Murphy
was the presidingjudge of the Third District
Court from 1990 until his appointment to
the Tenth Circuit in 1995.
Judge Murphy has served on many
boards, commissions, and committees, in-
cluding the Utah State Sentencing Commis-
sion, the Utah Advisory Committee on Child
Support Guidelines, the Utah Child Sexual
Abuse Task Force, the Board of District
CourtJudges, and the Utah Supreme Court
Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. Judge Murphy was named Judge of
the Year by the Utah State Bar in 1992. In
1989 he was awarded the Freedom of Infor-
mation Award by the Society of Professional
Journalists and, in 1995, the Utah Minority
Bar Association award.
Judge Murphy is a Fellow of the Ameri-
can Bar Foundation, a member of the Utah
and American Bar Associations and a former
member of the Wyoming State Bar. He is
also a member and past president of
Sutherland Inn of Court II. Judge Murphy
was appointed to the Tenth Circuit of the
United States Court of Appeals by President
Clinton on August 14, 1995. His chambers
are in Salt Lake City, Utah.
SENIOR JUDGE
MONROE G. McKAY
Judge McKay was born in Huntsville,
Utah, in 1929. He graduated from Brigham
Young University in 1957 with high honors.
Judge McKay then received hisJ.D. from the
University of Chicago in 1960 and was the
law clerk forJusticejesse A. Udall of the Ari-
zona Supreme Court for the 1960-61 term.
From 1961 to 1974, Judge McKay practiced
with the law firm of Lewis and Roca in Phoe-
nix, Arizona; however, he did take a two year
leave to serve as Director of the United
States Peace Corps in Malawi, Africa.Judge
McKay was a law professor at Brigham Young
University from 1974 until 1977. In 1977,
he was appointed to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. Judge
McKay currently resides in Provo, Utah.
SENIOR JUDGE
WILLIAM J. HOLLOWAY, JR.
The son of a former Oklahoma gover-
nor, Judge Holloway was born in Hugo,
Oklahoma in 1923 and later moved to Okla-
homa City in 1927. During World War II, he
served as a First Lieutenant in the Army. Af-
ter the warJudge Holloway returned to com-
plete his undergraduate studies at the Uni-
versity of Oklahoma, receiving his B.A. in
1947. Judge Holloway then attended
Harvard Law School, where he graduated
in 1950.
In 1951 and 1952, Judge Holloway was
an attorney with the Department ofJustice
in Washington, D.C. He subsequently re-
turned to Oklahoma City and entered pri-
vate practice. Judge Holloway was appointed
to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit in 1968 and became Chief
Judge in 1984. He is a member of Phi Beta
Kappa and Phi Gamma Delta.
SENIOR JUDGE
ROBERT H. McWILLIAMS
Judge McWilliams was born in Salina,
Kansas, in 1916 and moved to Denver in
1927 where he has lived since. He received
his A.B. and LLB. degrees from the Univer-
sity of Denver. In 1971, he was awarded an
Honorary Doctor of Law degree from the
University.
During World War II,Judge McWilliams
served in the United States Army and was
with the Office of Strategic Services. He has
served as a Deputy District Attorney and as
a Colorado District CourtJudge. In 1961,
Judge McWilliams was elected to the Colo-
rado Supreme Court where he served until
he was appointed to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in 1970. In
1984, he assumed senior status.
Judge McWilliams is a member of Phi
Beta Kappa, Omicron Delta Kappa, Phi
Delta Phi, and Kappa Sigma.
SENIOR JUDGE
JAMES E. BARRETT
Judge Barrett was born in Lusk, Wyo-
ming in 1922. He is the son of the late Frank
A Barrett, who served as Wyoming's Con-
gressman, Governor and United States Sena-
tor. Judge Barrett attended the University
of Wyoming for two years prior to his ser-
vice in the Army during World War II. Fol-
lowing the war, he attended Saint
Catherine's College at Oxford University
and Catholic University of America and re-
ceived his LL.B. from the University of Wyo-
ming Law School in 1949. In 1973, he re-
ceived the Distinguished Alumni Award
from the University of Wyoming.
Judge Barrett was in private practice in
Lusk, Wyoming for eighteen years. He also
served as County and Prosecuting Attorney
for Niobrara County, Town Attorney for the
towns of Lusk and Manville and attorney for
the Niobrara County Consolidated School
District. From 1967 until 1971,Judge Barrett
served as Attorney General for the State of
Wyoming. In 1971, he was appointed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit. In 1987, he assumed senior status.
Judge Barrett was a member of the Ju-
dicial Conference Subcommittee on Federal
Jurisdiction, the United States Foreign In-
telligence Surveillance Court of Review, and




Judge Logan was born in Quenemo,
Kansas, in 1929. He received his BA. from
the University of Kansas in 1952 and was
graduated magna cum laude from Harvard
Law School in 1955. He became law clerk
for United States Circuit Judge Walter
Huxman and subsequently practiced with
the Los Angeles law firm of Gibson, Dunn
& Crutcher. Judge Logan became a profes-
sor at the University of Kansas Law School
in 1957 and was selected in 1961 as Dean of
that school. He served in that capacity until
1968. Since 1961,Judge Logan has been a
visiting professor at Harvard Law School, the
University of Texas Law School, Stanford
University School of Law, and the Univer-
sity of Michigan Law School. He lectures at
Duke University Law School. He was a spe-
cial commissioner for the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Kansas from
1964 until 1967 and was a candidate for the
United States Senate in 1968.
Judge Logan is a Rhodes Scholar, a
member of Phi Beta Kappa, Order of the
Coif, Beta Gamma Sigma, Omicron Delta
Kappa, Pi Sigma Alpha, Alpha Kappa Psi,
and Phi Delta Phi, and has co-authored
books and numerous articles on estate plan-
ning, administration and corporate law. In
1977, he was appointed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
A NOTE FROM THE EDITOR
As this issue was nearing the final production stages, I had the opportunity
to observe portions of a civil trial held in Denver District Court. Counsel for the
plaintiff and the defendant concluded voir dire of the prospective jurors, passed
the jury for cause, and began the process of selecting the six men and women who
would determine their respective clients' fate. While the bailiff passed the list of
jurors back and forth between counsel for exercise of peremptory challenges, the
judge initiated a dialogue with the jury panel focusing on the process of how judges
are selected, elected, and removed from office.
The judge began the discussion with the comment that during any given
election year a full third of the electorate votes "no" to all judges appearing on the
ballot. He then queried the jury for their thoughts on why this occurs. What opin-
ions did this jury have as to why people vote "no," or "yes" for that matter, to
retaining judges? Although no real philosophical answers surfaced that afternoon,
what shone through was a general lack of information and knowledge about the
judiciary. I would propose that this same lack of information, or familiarity, with
the working of the judiciary also fuels the cries for impeachment that sometimes
follow unpopular or controversial rulings.
This issue begins with an article that reflects upon the independence of the
judiciary. We hope that both the article and the accompanying Judicial Dialogue
will serve as a catalyst to further debate.
We would like to thank the following Advisory Board members whose time
and efforts undoubtedly enhanced the quality of this issue:
Leland Anderson Jim Griffin Kerri Pertcheck
Susan Dallas John Haas Nancy Pertcheck
Herbert "Chip" Delap Jerry Jones Kurt Petersen
Lisa Dixon Leslie Kramer Gregg Smith
Kelly Elefant Richard Laugesen Rebecca Steinebrey
Jeff Fleishner Rick Levin Tom Wolf
Jo Anna Goddard Norman Nash
Kathleen M. Kelly, Editor




The independence of judges is... requisite to guard
the Constitution and the rights of the individuals ....
- Alexander Hamilton (Federalist No. 78)
INTRODUCrION: "THE CITADEL OF PUBiC JuSTICE AND SECURITY"
In contemporary America one can scarcely imagine a federal judge forced
to choose between revoking one of her decisions at the whim of the President
or Congress, or imprisonment. However, such circumstances once existed. In
the early seventeenth century, two historic figures2 sparked a dramatic debate
that still influences American society.3 Lord Chancellor Ellesmere, one of
King James I's supporters, asserted the King's omnipotence over the English
court and metaphorically stated "Rex est lex loquens."' England's Chief Jus-
tice, Sir Edward Coke, bravely retaliated that the King could not sit in the
place of England's judges.' Specifically, Coke replied to his sovereign, "that
the King should not be under man, but under God and law.' On that day in
history, a fledgling judiciary lost its bid for autonomy as James I threatened to
cast Coke into the Tower of London if he did not cease challenging the
King.
7
Fortunately, neither the United States Congress nor the President bran-
dishes the same degree of control over the federal judiciary that James I
wielded over England's courts. However, the American political system does
not escape the controversy surrounding the amount of power afforded the
federal courts. Increasingly, unpopular decisions have led to calls for greater
political control over the judiciary.' The issue of judicial independence gained
1. THE FEDsLRUST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
2. James I of England, son of Mary Queen of Scots, born June, 19, 1566, reigned over
England from 1567 until 1625. CLARA & HARDY STEELHOLM, JAMES I. OF ENGLAND 15, 25
(1938). Sir Edward Coke, born in 1550, later served as England's Chief Justice until his indefinite
suspension in 1615. CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, THE LION AND THE THRONE, 387-88 (1957);
CUTHBERT WILJAM JOHNSON, THE LIFE OF SIR EDWARD COKE, 328 (1845).
3. On November 13, 1608, James I started this debate by claiming that "all the Judges of
England and Barons of the Exchequer" were "his shadows and ministers... and the King may, if
he please, sit and judge in Westminster Hall in any Court there and call their Judgements in ques-
tion." BERNARD ScHwARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 3 (1993).
4. "The King is the law speaking." STEPHEN B. PRESSER & JAMIL S. ZAINALDN, LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE IN AMERICAN HISTORY 2 (2d ed. 1989).
5. Coke believed that the judgment of the law required study and experience before a per-
son could understand its application. ScHWARTZ, supra note 3, at 4.
6. Id. at 4.
7. lId
8. Charles Levendosky, Religious Right Targets Justices for Impeachment over Amendment
2, DENVER POST, Oct. 16, 1996, at B7 (quoting National Legal Foundation president Steven
Fitschen announcing "the Romer six, the six Supreme Court justices who declared Amendment 2
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:2
prominence in our society as an interested public sought to understand and
articulate the scope of this autonomy.
This article provides the background for the discussion-with several
judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit-that fol-
lows.9 It does not seek to determine whether the federal court system has ob-
tained an unequivocal amount of autonomy in order to be considered "inde-
pendent." Nor does it attempt to attack or defend the concept of judicial inde-
pendence."
I. ORIGINS AND MECHANISMS OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
Article M of the United States Constitution preserves the independence of
judges in their decision making process." Article m courts are not complete-
ly detached from political machinations; rather, their autonomy depends upon
the actions of the Executive and Legislative branches of the federal govern-
ment, the achievements of the courts themselves in gaining power over their
sister branches, and the courts' credibility in the eyes of the judged. For the
purposes of this paper, the most applicable definition presumes that judicial
unconstitutional, must be impeached"). The six justices whose impeachment Fitschen demanded
are Justices Anthony M. Kennedy, David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sandra Day O'Connor,
John P. Stevens, and Stephen G. Breyer. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1623-25 (holding that
the Colorado Constitutional Amendment prohibiting governmental protection for gay and lesbian
individuals violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause). Justices Antonin
Scalia, Clarence Thomas and William Rehnquist were excluded from this call, having dissented in
Romer v. Evans. Id.
9. This article discusses judicial independence only as it applies to the federal courts.
10. Compare Charles Levendosky, Editorial, Impeach Six Justices? Really?, NEws AND OB-
SERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Oct. 11, 1996, at A23 (disapproving of some groups' calls for the Romer
Six's impeachment); L. Ralph Mecham, Introduction to Mercer Law Review Symposium on Feder-
al Judicial Independence, 46 MERCER. L. REv. 637, 638 (1995) (considering judicial indepen-
dence the "cornerstone of a free society and the rule of law"); W.F. Rylaardsam, Judicial Indepen-
dence-A Value Worth Protecting, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1653 (1993) (arguing for judicial indepen-
dence in the wake of the Rodney King decision); with Owen M. Fiss, The Limits of Judicial Inde-
pendence, 25 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 57, 66-67 (1993) (arguing for some limitation on
judicial independence); Arnold Beichman, Available Armament for Judicial Restraint, WASH.
TIMES, May 14, 1996, at A13 (describing the different control mechanisms over the judiciary).
11. See, e.g. James Zagel & Adam Winkler, The Independence of Judges, 49 MERCER L.
REV. 795-96 (1995) (stating that judicial independence originates from the separation of powers
model found in the United States Constitution); Eli M. Salzberger, A Positive Analysis of the
Doctrine of Separation of Powers, or Why Do We Have an Independent Judiciary?, 13 INT'L REV.
L. & ECON. 349, 351 (1993) (arguing that judicial independence exists as a multi-layered relation-
al system between the judges and electorate, as well as within the judiciary itself); Roger
Handberg, Judicial Accountability and Independence: Balancing Incompatibles?, 49 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 127, 130 (1994) (stating that "[Jiudicial independence refers to the notion that judges may
have physical and emotional space to render impartial decisions, without fear of retribution (either
formal or informal) for unpopular, yet sound, decisions"). Id. Mecham, supra note 10, at 638
(defining judicial independence as "a judge's ability to decide a case free from pressures or in-
ducements. Judicial independence has an institutional character, which is best seen in our consti-
tutional separation of powers. It has an individual character, which is partially protected by the
Constitution in the provisions for life tenure and the guarantee of no diminution of salary, but
which extends further to encompass those conditions in which and under which a judge decides
the case ...."). Id.
12. Mecham, supra note 10, at 638 (quoting a memorandum dated April 22, 1994, from
Judge Jane R. Roth on the Third Circuit to Steven M. Tevlowitz, Counsel to the Committee on
the Judicial Branch).
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
autonomy is not an end in itself, but an essential piece of the separation of
powers doctrine, while encompassing other factors which encroach upon judi-
cial decision making.
I1. THE ORIGINS OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
There are two constitutional sources of federal judicial independence:
Article III and the Due Process Clause. These provisions work together to
both legitimate and limit the measure of independence that Article III courts
enjoy.
A. The Constitution
The United States Constitution provides several textual protections of
judicial independence. Article I expressly vests "the judicial power" in the
judicial branch of government. 3 Under a formalist/originalist paradigm of the
separation of powers, no branch may exercise authority that the Constitution
has not delegated to it. 4 Under this model, branch authority is confined by
the parameters of the Constitution, and is curbed by the implied power of
checks and balances established by the Framers.'- Formally, then, judicial
power is preserved simply because it has not been delegated to the other
branches.
By contrast, the functionalist model of the separation of powers doctrine
posits a willingness to ignore definitional restraints on branch power in light
of the demands of the social and political context. 6 Under this theory, judi-
cial power remains conceptually separate, but greater potential exists for the
other branches to usurp that authority.
History confirms the Framers' intention to establish and maintain a dis-
tinct and independent judiciary. As Justice Brennan concluded in Northern
Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., "[Olur Constitution unambiguously
enunciates a fundamental principle-that the 'judicial Power of the United
States' must be reposed in an independent judiciary. It commands that the
independence of the judiciary be jealously guarded, and it provides clear insti-
tutional protections for that independence."'" The judiciary derives its distinc-
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
14. Martin H. Redish, Federal Judicial Independence: Constitutional and Political Perspec-
tives, 46 MERCER L. REV. 697, 709 (1995). In his concurrence to a seminal opinion, Justice Jack-
son stated: "While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates
that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon its
branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity." Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
15. "The Framers regarded the checks and balances that they had built into the tripartite
Federal Government as a self-executing safeguard against the encroachment or aggrandizement of
one branch at the expense of the other." Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,
458 U.S. 50, 57-58 (1982) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976) (per curiam)).
16. Redish, supra note 14, at 711.
17. 458 U.S. 50, 60 (1982). Montesquieu stated as well, "[There is no liberty, if the power
of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers." Jordan Fried, Student
Essay, The Constitutionality of the U.S. Sentencing Commission: An Analysis of the Role of the
Judiciary, 57 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 704, 723 n. 117 (1989) (quoting MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF
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tion as an independent branch under a separation of powers framework.
B. Due Process
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth and and Fourteenth Amendments
secure an individual's right to life, liberty and property.'8 "None of the core
values of due process... can be fulfilled without the participation of an inde-
pendent adjudicator."' 9 In other words, the procedural safeguards of due pro-
cess which attempt to assure accuracy and fair procedure-notice, hearing,
counsel, transcript, and confrontation-are unattainable without a neutral and
detached decision-maker.
Judicial independence is a prerequisite to fair procedure and is the essence
of procedural due process. ° A court must be independent, because "no judge
can be fair and impartial if he must answer to another branch for his judicial
decisions. ';  This proposition certainly implies, at the very least, that pro-
cedural due process exists for the benefit of the judged.'
IIL FORMAL METHODS OF CONTROL
As there is no shortage of commentary on the subject of judicial indepen-
dence, an in-depth examination of all mechanisms of control falls outside the
scope of this discussion.' Thus this article analyzes only those controls that
most affect judicial decision-making. A discussion of appointment, tenure and
compensation, impeachment, and jurisdiction explores their genesis within the
Constitution and the impact of their control on the judicial branch.
LAws).
18. U.S. CONST. amend. V & amend. XIV, § 1. The essential elements of the adversary pro-
cess that may be required as part of due process include: 1) sufficient notice of the charges or the
basis for state action, 2) an impartial and detached decision-maker, 3) an opportunity to present
the case to the ultimate decision-maker, 4) an occasion to confront and cross-examine adverse
witnesses, 5) the right to an attorney and 6) a fair decision founded on the evidentiary record,
including the reasons for the decision. JOHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA,
CONSTrIUTIONAL LAW § 13.8 at 548 (5th ed. 1995).
19. Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values
of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE LJ. 455, 476 (1986).
20. Redish & Marshall, supra note 19, at 475-91.
21. United States v. Mitchell, 37 MJ. 903, 906 (N-M.C.M.R. 1993). The court further stated,
"[t]he right to have one's case heard before a fair and impartial judicial body as a matter of con-
stitutional due process is firmly established in the law." Id.
22. "Mhe provisions for securing the independence of the judiciary were not created for the
benefit of the judges, but for the benefit of the judged." Philip B. Kurland, The Constitution and
the Tenure of Federal Judges: Some Notes from History, 36 U. Cn. L. REv. 665, 698 (1969).
23. For a discussion of the other checks not discussed in this article, see ALEXANDER M.
BICKEL, THE LEAsT DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962) (discussing the inconspicuous mechanisms that
control judicial decision-making); Walter Dellinger, The Legitimacy of Constitutional Change:





Possibly the most striking intrusion on judicial autonomy involves the
appointment process of federal judges. United States Supreme Court Justice
Felix Frankfurter once described the procedure as "that odd lottery where men
get picked for the Supreme Court.""2 Nonetheless, it provides insight to the
consequences of checks and balances on the Judicial branch.
One of the President's most significant powers is the ability to appoint
Justices to the United States Supreme Court.' It is well-recognized that the
appointment power influences the political direction of the Supreme Court.26
The Framers, however, imposed a restraint on the President's appointment
power by mandating the consent of the Senate. Thus, unlike other formal
controls, the appointment of a Supreme Court Justice integrates the political
convictions of a tripartite system of government.
Additionally, although the public only indirectly impacts the decision-
making process, its political interest in judicial appointments is evident. Media
coverage of Clarence Thomas' nomination to the Supreme Court, following
closely on the heels of the Senate rejection of Robert Bork, heightened public
interest and debate.'
Political motivations clearly influence these appointments. One can hardly
imagine the process without the active involvement of interest groups." As
the record suggests, the appointment process makes it highly unlikely that Su-
preme Court justices will deviate too sharply, or for too long, from the ambi-
tions or priorities of those with political power.0 The function of the Senate
cannot be disregarded either, for its power to advise and consent may affect
the composition of the Court in two ways. First, it may influence the President
to refrain from the pursuit of highly controversial appointees. Second, the
Senate may refuse to confirm presidential appointees for reasons of ideology,
corruption, or incompetence.'
24. Paul A. Freund, Appointment of Justices: Some Historical Perspectives, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 1146, 1149 (1988) (citing FELIX FRANKFURTER, Of Law and Life and Other Things That
Matter, 135 (P. Kurland. ed. 1967).
25. U.S. CONST. art I1, § 2, cl. 2.
26. HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUsTICES AND PRESIDENTS 5-7 (3d ed. 1992).
27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2.
28. See generally Anton Bell, Clarence Thomas: Evasive or Deceptive, 21 N.C. CENT. LJ.
194 (1995) (describing Clarence Thomas' confirmation); Stephen L. Carter, Bork Redux, or How
the Tempting of America Led the People to Rise and Battle for Justice, 69 TEX. L. REV. 759
(1991) (describing Bork's confirmation hearing and rejection).
29. JOHN ANTHONY MALTESE, THE SELLING OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES 36 (1995)
(providing an excellent review of various appointments from 1881 through the present involving
the active participation of interest groups).
30. Cf, ABRAHAM, supra note 26, at 41-82 (noting that political ideology is not the only
consideration in the appointment process and that region, race, gender and religion of the appoint-
ee may often influence the President's decision).
31. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT (1985) (noting
that in this century until 1985, Supreme Court nominees have been rejected on only three occa-
sions-President Nixon's appointments of Judges Haynesworth and Carswell, and President
Hoover's appointment of Judge John Parker). Rejection of President Reagan's nomination of
Judge Bork brings the total to four. Carter, supra note 28. However, one commentator argued that
the United States federal courts were "de facto" racially exclusionary from 1789 to 1949. A. Leon
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It might appear that the power and process of appointment have little to
do with the judicial branch as an entity of the federal government. In fact, the
Framers declined to articulate any criteria for the selection of the judiciary.
Furthermore, not only has the Supreme Court declined to offer constitutional
guidance on qualifications, but its nominees are not even required to be law-
yers. 2 Instead, it appears that as time passes qualifications become implied.
The judiciary as an entity is rarely, if ever, directly involved in the ap-
pointment of its peers. Instead, it is the independence the potential appointee
can bring to the bench that is of concern. Nowhere else in this discussion does
the judge, as an individual, play such a meaningful role. For in the appoint-
ment power, which primarily rests in the Legislative and Executive branches,
the institutional Court is a passive collective voice. The Justice, by contrast,
retains discrete liberty.
B. Tenure and Compensation
The institutional safeguards of life tenure and permanent salary protection
are critical to the constitutional structure which ensures separation of pow-
ers.33 In setting these requirements, the Framers intended to build a govern-
ment comprised of separate legislative, executive, and judicial branches. As
early as in the Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamilton emphasized the impor-
tance of tenure and irreducible salary protection in maintaining judicial inde-
pendence.' Hamilton and the other Federalists believed that requiring legisla-
Higginbotham, Jr., Seeking Pluralism in the Judicial Systems: The American Experience and the
South African Challenge, 42 DuKE L. J. 1028, 1035 (1993).
32. ABRAHAM supra note 26, at 49; See also Higginbotham, supra note 31, at 1051. For a
comprehensive examination of the absence of criteria for Supreme Court candidates, see Mario
Perez-Reilly & John R. Vile, The U.S. Constitution and Judicial Qualifications: A Curious Omis-
sion, 74 JUDICATuRE 198 (1991) (quoting a joke related by Benjamin Franklin wherein he notes
the Scottish practice, "in which the nomination proceeded from the Lawyers, who always selected
the ablest of the profession in order to get rid of him, and share his practice among themselves.")
(citing THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CoN 'v EMoN OF 1787, 120 (Max Farand ed.) (1937)).
In contrast to the absence of criteria for selection of the judiciary in Article IMI the Framers
established explicit requirements in Articles I and U1 for securing the offices of the President, sena-
tors and representatives.
33. "The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during
good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which
shall not he diminished during their Continuance in Office." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. Life tenure
and a guaranteed salary are considered essential attributes of an Article m judge and the strongest
link to an independent federal judiciary. Thomas A. Curtis, Note, Recess Appointments to Article
111 Courts: The Use of Historical Practice in Constitutional Interpretation, 84 CoLum. L. REv.
1758, 1758 (1984). This commentator argued that the language of Article M demonstrates the
Framers careful deliberation about guaranteeing judicial independence. Id. at 1765. See United
States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200 (1980) (reviewing an action challenging Congress' power to reduce
cost-of-living increases previously authorized by statute); see also Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of
America, Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc., 725 F.2d 537, 541 (9th Cir. 1984) (stating that "[a) separate
and independent judiciary, and the guarantees that assure it, are present constitutional necessities,
not relics of antique ideas").
34. Curtis, supra note 33, at 1767 (citing THE FEDERALST Nos. 78 & 79 (Alexander Ham-
ilton)). Hamilton wrote that "[n]ext to permanency in office, nothing can contribute more to the
independence of the judges, than a fixed provision for their support .... In the general course of
human nature, a power over a man's subsistence amounts to a power over his will." THE FEDER-
AUsST No. 79 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasis omitted); see also Steve W. Gold, Note, Temporary
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ive or executive enforcement of the Article I provisions would frustrate the
purpose of judicial independence.35
The Constitution presents a separate and seemingly contradictory provi-
sion. In Article II, the Constitution conferred to the Executive branch the pow-
er to make interim judicial appointments.' A "recess appointee," however,
receives neither life tenure nor protection against salary diminution. 7 Al-
though such an appointee is subject to greater political pressure than a judge
whose nomination has been confirmed by the Senate, the President's power to
appoint in these positions is limited: 1) it may only be invoked while the Sen-
ate is in recess, and 2) recess commissions expire at the end of the next con-
gressional session."
The Supreme Court has stressed that the constitutional safeguards remain
necessary to judicial independence.39 However, the judicial recess appointee
who, like Article l judges, has sworn to uphold the Constitution, fills a void
and allows the perpetual functioning of the judicial system. The recess ap-
pointee, therefore, is not a threat to the autonomy of the judiciary at ajl; in-
stead, it is an "extraordinary exception to the prescriptions of Article 1H."
The guarantees of Article II guarantees secure independence from legis-
lative and executive persuasion while they promote public confidence in the
judiciary, lure qualified jurists to the bench, and insulate judges from influence
by their peers.4' Ultimately, these constitutional protections serve as a shield
and a sword for the judiciary, and perhaps provide the greatest tangible securi-
ty for its perpetual independence.
C. Impeachment
If appointment is idiosyncratic, the impeachment of a federal judge is
nothing short of dramatic, as seen in the classic question from the President
Criminal Immunity for Federal Judges: A Constitutional Requirement, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 699,
714 (1987) (alleging that judicial life tenure is the buttress of the Framer's theory of judicial inde-
pendence; this supports the implication that removal of a judge through any method other than
impeachment is constitutionally unfounded).
35. Hatter v. United States, 953 F.2d 626, 628-29 (Fed. Cir. 1992), rev'd on other grounds,
64 F.3d 647, 653 (Fed. Cir. 1995). For a discussion of the opinion that the insulation of the judi-
ciary from the political departments also enhances judicial independence within the judicial branch
itself, see Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 U.S. 74, 136-37 (1970) (Douglas, J. dissenting);
Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Article III and Judicial Independence: Why the New Bankruptcy Courts
Are Unconstitutional, 70 GEO. L. J. 297, 302-03 (1981).
36. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 provides that "[t]he President shall have the Power to fill
up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions
which shall expire at the End of their next Session." Id.
37. United States v. Woodley, 751 F.2d 1008, 1014 (9th Cir. 1985).
38. U.S. CONST. art. H, §2, cl. 3.
39. Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 60 (1982) ("In sum, our
Constitution unambiguously enunciates a fundamental principle-that the 'judicial Power of the
United States' must be reposed in an independent judiciary. It commands that the independence of
the judiciary be jealously guarded, and it provides clear institutional protection for that indepen-
dence.").
40. Woodley, 751 F.2d at 1014 (recognizing that the power to appoint a recess appointee
rests in the Constitution itself, and thus, cannot be rewritten even if the provision is unwise).
41. In re Clay, 35 F.3d 190, 192 (5th Cir. 1994).
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Pro Tempore to a respondent judge---"[how say you: is the respondent guilty
or not guilty?"'42 Recently, Congressional use of the impeachment process has
escalated. For instance, until 1986 thirteen impeachments passed from the
House and were forwarded for trial to the Senate.43 Of that number, only four
impeachments involved federal judges." This situation changed in the 1980's,
however, when three federal judges were "impeached, tried, and removed" in
three years."'
The text of the United States Constitution establishes the procedure' and
sanctions47 for judicial impeachment.' Further, these provisions offer, as a
guarantee, the sole mechanism for removing Article Ill judges from office. '
The purpose of this guarantee is to shield the judge "from improper influences
not only by other branches but by colleagues as well," in order to maintain
judicial autonomy and individualism.' Procedurally, impeachment is cumber-
some, and requires a majority vote by the House of Representatives and a
Senate conviction by a two-thirds super-majority vote."
Commentators have argued that the impeachment process is inefficient.
Indeed, Thomas Jefferson described the impeachment process as a "bungling
way of removing Judges,"'2  equating its effectiveness to that of a
42. MARY L. VOL..CANSEK, JUDICIAL IMPEA MENT: NONE CALLED FOR JusTIcE 1 (1993).
43. Id. Interestingly, although congressional use of impeachment is increasing, the ratio of
house impeachment investigations to the number of federal judges is decreasing. Warren S.
Grimes, Hundred-Ton-Gun Control: Preserving Impeachment as the Exclusive Removal Mecha-
nism for Federal Judges, 38 UCLA L. REv. 209, 1215 (1991).
44. VoirANsEK, supra note 42, at 1.
45. Id. The three recent federal judges impeached include: Harry Clairborne of the District of
Nevada, Alcee Hastings of the Southern District of Florida, and Walter Nixon of the Southern
District of Mississippi. li at 1-2; Melissa H. Maxman, Note, In Defense of the Constitution's
Judicial Impeachment Standard, 86 MICH. L. REv. 420, 420-24 (1987) (examining the use of
impeachment and other mechanisms for removing federal judges).
46. The House of Representatives "shall have the sole power of impeachment" U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 2, cl. 5. The Senate "shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting for
that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the President of the United States is
tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of
two-thirds of the Members present." Id. art. I, § 3, cl.6.
47. The only sanction against an impeached judge is removal from "the office of Honor,
Trust, or Profit, under the United States." Id. art.I, § 3, cl. 7. Furthermore, a judge is still "liable
and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment, and Punishment according to Law." Id.
48. 'The President, Vice-President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be re-
moved from Office on Impeachment for, and conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high
Crimes and Misdemeanors." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
49. Courts have determined the scope of application of the protections afforded under Article
Ell. See generally Northern Pipeline Constr. v. Marathon Pipeline, 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (declaring
an act unconstitutional that confers federal judicial powers on bankruptcy judges, but fails to con-
fer Article In protection to such judges); Geras v. Lafayette Fixtures, Inc. 742 F.2d 1037 (7th Cir.
1984) (holding that Article III protection does not apply to United States Magistrates).
Different removal procedures for Article I and Article IV judges are governed by statute.
Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 53 (identifying the removal procedures for an Article I bankruptcy
judge by citing 28 U.S.C. § 153(b) (1976 ed., Supp. IV)); Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of
the Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-Day Saints v. Hodel, 830 F.2d 374, 377, n.4 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (discussing the removal procedures for an Article IV territorial judge by citing Am. Samoa
Code § 3.1001)).
50. NOWAK & ROTuNDA, supra note 18, §2.8; see also, LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTrriUONAL LAW 64 n.7, § 3-6 (1988) (citing Kurland, supra note 22).
51. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5-6.
52. CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY, 295 (1922).
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scarecrow.53 Admittedly, the most frequent modem challenge to the impeach-
ment process is its inefficacy,54 as each hearing "monopolizes weeks of limit-
ed Congressional session time."" For example, a 1986 impeachment lasted
three months from House approval to final conviction.56 Several incorrect
assumptions, however, weaken the inefficiency argument. First, statistical data
indicates that impeachments are uncommon. For instance, although three im-
peachments occurred in the 1980's, the sheer volume of Congressional im-
peachment investigations has decreased over the last fifty years. In fact, the
likelihood of a judicial impeachment investigation initiated by Congress re-
mains at only two inquiries for every one hundred judges appointed. The
unwieldy impeachment process protects federal judges from the political rami-
fications of their decisions.59 Thus, were the impeachment process to become
manageable, judges would receive less protection from politically unpopular
decisions.
Although impeachment is the exclusive method of judicial removal, judges
remain susceptible to other pressures.' For instance, the court in Hastings v.
Judicial Conference of the United States6' discussed the "certification" pro-
cess whereby a judicial council initially receives an investigating committee's
report on judicial misconduct.' If the Council determines that the judge "en-
gaged in conduct which might constitute... grounds for impeachment under
[A]rticle I of the Constitution... "' it forwards the certified determination to
the Judicial Conference of the United States.' After making its own determi-
nation, the Conference forwards the information to the House of Representa-
tives to conclude whether impeachment is appropriate.'
In general, the impeachment process serves two functions: it limits judi-
cial authority and insulates judges from negative reactions to unpopular deci-
sions. As burdensome as this process is on the legislative branch, it acts as a
breaker against the tides of popular discontent. Congress' reluctance to provide
53. Id.
54. Maxman, supra note 45, at 423.
55. Id. at 447.
56. Id. at 421.
57. Grimes, supra note 43, at 215.
58. Id. This ratio is thirty times lower than the ratio of impeachment investigations of federal
judges in the first fifty years of the Constitution's existence. Id. As of 1990, 829 federal judges sit
throughout United States courts. Id.
59. Maxman, supra note 45, at 440.
60. In addition to the mechanisms mentioned in this paper, the American Bar Association
has promulgated a Model Code for Judicial Conduct. See generally MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUcT (1990). Another proceeding that could potentially influence judicial decision-making
involves the Attorney General instituting a criminal prosecution against a sitting judge. See gener-
ally Reid H. Weingarten, Judicial Misconduct: A View from the Department of Justice, 76 Ky.
LJ. 799, 800 (1988) (discussing the procedures for investigating, prosecuting and trying a federal
judge). This mechanism is significant to the impeachment process only in that Congress may ex-
pect cooperation from the Department of Justice in the latter proceeding. Id. at 808 (discussing
Congress' power to compel the Department of Justice to turn over the evidence).
61. 829 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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alternative means of removal indicates that the impeachment process will re-
main a meaningful constitutional safeguard to federal judicial independence.'
D. Jurisdiction
1. Textual Directive and Other Sources of Authority
The Constitution defines the parameters of the Supreme Court's ability to
preside over certain types of cases. Specifically, Article ll vests the judicial
power of the United States in the Supreme Court and such other federal courts
as Congress may create.67 This provision mandates that the Court shall have
original jurisdiction over all cases involving Ambassadors, Public Ministers,
and Consuls, and those involving a State as a party.' In all other cases, the
Court has appellate jurisdiction as Congress sees fit.' To comprehend the
strength of congressional control over the judiciary, the issues underlying both
the Court's original and appellate jurisdiction must be addressed.
It is probable that the Framers of the Constitution intended that cases
arising under original jurisdiction comprise the majority of the Court's dock-
et.7" In practice, however, such cases constitute only a modest part of the
Court's case load.1 The awkwardness of gaining access to the Court may
produce this result. When a party seeks to obtain original jurisdiction, they file
a motion seeking leave to file a complaint.72 This requirement disregards the
implied rule in American jurisprudence that a court must hear all cases falling
within its jurisdiction.73 Indirectly, then, the Court limits its own original ju-
risdiction."
Within the above description of appellate jurisdiction, the legislature may
still encroach upon the judiciary's inherent independence." The Political Ac-
countability Doctrine supplies a limitation on the legislative branch. 6 This
canon mandates that Congress affirmatively address the "underlying policy
66. See TRIaE, supra note 50, at 64 n.7 (citing Kurland, supra note 22) (discussing the vari-
ous historical instances where Congress examined alternative means of removal).
67. U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 1; Mecham, supra note 10, at 639 (1995).
68. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2.
69. Id.
70. Vincent L. McKusick, Discretionary Gatekeeping: The Supreme Court's Management of
its Original Jurisdiction Docket Since 1961, 45 ME. L. REV. 185, 187.
71. Id. at 187-88 (noting that as of 1993, the total number of original jurisdiction cases was
172).
72. Sup. CT. R. 17.
73. McKusick, supra note 70, at 188.
74. Id.
75. See infra Part IV. Congress has successfully limited the Supreme Court's appellate juris-
diction only once. See Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868). Despite this fact, Con-
gress has recently made several attempts to limit the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. See
Christopher T. Handman, The Doctrine of Political Accountability and Supreme Court Jurisdic-
tion: Applying a New External Constraint to Congress's Exceptions Clause Power, 106 YALE LJ.
197 (1996) (discussing the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act's limitation on succes-
sive appeals of habeas corpus application to the Supreme Court).
76. This doctrine is rooted within the Exceptions Clause of the United States Constitution.
Handman, supra note 75, at 200 (stating that political accountability militates against Congress in-




concerns [of a legal action or issue] when it seeks to reduce the Court's juris-
diction." However, the doctrine only applies to laws that would otherwise
insulate an appeal from state actions. 8 The rationale is that Congress has al-
ready addressed the policy by refuting the specific act that is being legislated;
but where Congress allows the state to act, rather than prevents it from ad-
dressing a legal issue, this attention is not necessarily provided.79
Textually, though, the judiciary's jurisdiction is still limited. First, as dis-
cussed, Congress' substantial control over federal court jurisdiction potentially
undermines the very independence expressly appropriated to those judges. °
Furthermore, it is axiomatic that the Constitution grants Congress the authority
to create the lower federal courts and assign their appropriate jurisdiction.8
However, the Constitution does not require Congress to create inferior Article
III courts or to invest them with all of the jurisdiction allowable under the
Constitution.82 This is left to the discretion of Congress, again implying that
judicial autonomy, if it exists at all, does not endure in a vacuum.
A broader limitation on the exercise of jurisdiction is encompassed by the
doctrine of justiciability. Since its genesis in Marbury v. Madison,83 judicial
review has operated as the point of departure for all federal cases. For in-
stance, Article IH, section 2 directs that the federal judiciary may only hear
"cases or controversies. ' 's4 In other words, the judiciary has no authority to
exercise power beyond that traditionally considered to be judicial or accorded
to it by the Constitution.85
Furthermore, political questions are exempt from judicial consideration,s'
as are parties or disputes that do not satisfy the requirements of standing,87
mootness" or ripeness." From an interbranch conflict of interest perspec-
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. In other words, when Congress allows the state to act without contending the under-
lying action, the issue has not been fully addressed, or even discussed at all.
80. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. See MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN
THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 29-44 (2d ed. 1990).
81. See generally, In re Application of County Collector, 96 F.3d 890, 895 (7th Cir. 1996);
Castaneda v. INS, 23 F.3d 1576, 1580 (10th Cir. 1994).
82. Umanzor v. Lambert, 782 F.2d 1299, 1304 (5th Cir. 1986).
83. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803) (establishing judicial review over its sister
branches regarding actions conflicting with the Constitution).
84. "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution ... to Controversies. . . ." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
85. Jordan Fried, Student Essay, The Constitutionality of the U.S. Sentencing Commission:
An Analysis of the Role of the Judiciary, 57 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 704, 714 (1989).
86. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (holding that apportionment is not a political ques-
tion, and is therefore justiciable, as the issue includes an equal protection component as well).
87. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755 (1981) (holding that "injury accords a basis for
standing only to 'those persons who are personally denied equal treatment' by the challenged
discriminatory conduct .. ").
88. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (discussing the mootness doctrine as pre-
venting courts from hearing cases when events subsequent to the institution of the lawsuit have
deprived the plaintiff of a stake in the action).
89. United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89-91 (1947) ("A hypothetical threat is
not enough. We can only speculate as to the kinds of political activity the appellants desire to en-
gage in or as to the contents of their proposed public statements or the circumstances of their
publication.... Should the courts seek to expand their power so as to bring under their
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tive, these requirements ensure that judges will restrict themselves to solid
cases and not decide matters that belong with the political branches."
Stating that "it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial de-
partment to say what the law is,"' Justice Marshall, nearly two centuries ago,
established the judiciary's final authority on matters of constitutional interpre-
tation. Although rthis holding is the cornerstone of judicial review, the judicia-
ry lacks the authority to enforce its decisions.' The judicial autonomy as es-
tablished by Marbury remains, but without much force.
Finally, just as the jurisdiction of the federal courts is determined by Con-
gress, the judiciary also depends upon the appropriation of money by the legis-
lature to conduct daily operations." This indirect restraint could potentially
thwart the jurisdiction of the federal judiciary.
2. Creation and Jurisdiction of Non-Article M Courts
Although it is not clear whether the Framers anticipated the creation of
non-article I judges at the drafting of the Constitution, over time the Legis-
lative branch assumed that authority. For instance, through authority vested in
Articles I and IV, legislative and territorial courts are empowered with the
responsibility to adjudicate particular disputes under the guise of defined pa-
rameters." This suggests that the Constitution granted to Congress the ability
to supplant the jurisdiction and independence of Article III courts. Specifically,
through the "Necessary and Proper Clause," the Constitution authorizes the
legislative branch to ensconce these non-article III tribunals.
However, these judges do not necessarily have the same authority as that
wielded by Article I courts. Neither bankruptcy judges nor magistrates re-
ceive authorization to try Article M cases directly from Congress. Rather, their
jurisdiction lies initially with the district courts who then transfer the case to
the auxiliary legislative courts." This transfer is mandatory under the Bank-
ruptcy Act!' and discretionary under the Magistrate Act."
jurisdcition ill-defined controversies over constitutional issues, they would become the organ of
political theories.")
90. Paul R. Verkull, Separation of Powers, the Rule of Law and the Idea of Independence,
30 WM. & MARY L. REv. 301, 308 (1989).
91. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.
92. For instance, the 1955 ruling of Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), over-
turned the doctrine of "separate but equal" facilities, specifically in education, and generally, be-
tween races. However, the Supreme Court mandate was not enforced until the judiciary promul-
gated means and guidelines for implementation, requiring integration "with all deliberate
speed... "Brown, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
93. Mecham, supra note 10, at 640 (citing WIUU1AM H. REHNQULsT, 1994 YEAR-END RE-
PORT ON THE FED. JUDICIARY 1 (December 30, 1994)) (reviewing the payment of salaries of judi-
cial officers and employees, payment of jurors, and supplies made with funds appropriated by
Congress). Arguably, if Congress controls these purse strings, and reduces appropriations to the
judiciary, further docket restrictions could occur. This is not necessarily a "jurisdictional" issue in
the strict sense of the word, however, it could effect the number of grants of certiorari.
94. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (granting Congress authority to establish bankruptcy
courts).
95. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
96. Lucinda M. Finley, Note, Article III Limits on Article I Courts: The Constitutionality of
the Bankruptcy Court and the 1979 Magistrate Act, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 560, 569 (1980).
97. 11 U.S.C.S. § 101 et seq. (1996) (providing that the bankruptcy courts "shall exercise all
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In comparison, the plenary authority of Article IV specifically empowers
the Legislative branch to institute Territorial Courts." Therefore, in contrast
to the jurisdictional issues surrounding Article I courts, the judicial branch has
little license to argue encroachment by Article IV legislative courts. The Court
in, American Insurance Company v. 357 Bales of Cotton,t0 established that,
"[i]n the territories, cases and controversies falling within the enumeration of
Article I1 may be heard and decided in courts constituted without regard to
the limitations of that Article; courts, that is, having judges of limited ten-
ure."' 0'
Unfortunately, the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy and territorial courts and
magistrates will inevitably encompass a broad range of Article El subject
matters, so these systems may threaten the framework of federalism and sepa-
ration of powers. Furthermore, as Justice Douglas so eloquently dissented, if
the standards and procedures employed by legislatively created courts do not
conform to Article III, this constitutes nothing more than "polite blackmail"
against the independent judiciary (Article Ell) as we know it."°
IV. AN HISTORICAL PERSPECrIVE
Each method of limiting judicial independence has played an important
role in defining the powers of the judiciary. The limitations placed on this
article, however, compel an examination of a limited set of historical examples
where the sister branches have encroached on the judiciary. This section be-
gins with the 1787 constitutional debates, and sets the stage for a discussion of
the political climate as it affected the judges and their decisions.
Although one might imagine the Framers of the Constitution furiously
debating and refining federal judicial power, historical evidence proves the
contrary. Compared with discussion about the other branches of the federal
government, historical dialogue about the judiciary was scant at the Conven-
tion. 3 To illustrate, James Madison promoted separation of powers,'14 and
asserted that judicial review "makes the judiciary Department paramount in
of the jurisdiction [so] conferred").
98. Federal Magistrate Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-82, 93 Stat. 643 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 631, 633, 636; 18 U.S.C. § 3401 (1994) (authorizing district judges to designate a magistrate to
exercise jurisdiction in any given case, provided the parties consent).
99. U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. This section provides "Congress shall have Power to
dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory.. . . "Id.
100. 26 U.S. (I Pet.) 511 (1828).
101. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-Day
Saints v. Hodel, 830 F.2d 374, 384 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (quoting Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S.
530, 545 (1962)).
102. Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 420 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("Those
who hold the gun at the heads of Superior Court judges can retaliate against those who respect the
spirit of the Fourth Amendment and the Fifth Amendment and who stand firmly against the an-
cient practice of using the third degree to get confessions and who fervently believe that the end
does not justify the means."). Id. at 422.
103. SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, at 11 (citing Farrand, The Framing of the Constitution 154
(1913)).
104. SCHWART, supra note 3, at 11. Specifically, Madison argued that it was "essential ...
that the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial powers be separate ... [and] independent of each
other." Id. (alterations in original).
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fact to the Legislature, which was never intended and can never be prop-
er.,"' Alexander Hamilton contested that the legitimacy of the judiciary ulti-
mately depends on the executive branch for the efficacy of its judgments.'"
These arguments though, were infrequent. Instead, the Framers focused
upon the powerful legislative and executive branches, and the relationship
between potential federalism issues."l This conclusion begs the question -
why did the founders of the American government fail to particularly define
the parameters of judicial power?
The Framers' indifference is best explained by a reflection on the pre-
constitutional American courts. The evolution of the judicial system in the
American Colonies fared no differently than that of England during King
James' reign. At the very most, little separation existed between the courts and
the general public's business." The same individuals who promulgated and
enforced laws also adjudicated cases.'" These seemingly draconian proce-
dures originated not from governmental oppression, but rather from early
colonists' survival needs. The small population, coupled with the demand for
military order to combat the violent ways of the earlier settlers, commanded
strict discipline and quick justice."' However, as the colonies were settled in
both population and organization, their respective governments established
complex court systems."'
These colonial courts resembled contemporary English courts. As England
introduced a new policy of constructive imperialism, supplanting charter colo-
nies with royal governments, the colonial courts contemplated a semblance of
their English counterparts." 2 For example, England controlled the colonial
judiciary by initiating an appellate process. If the dispute involved more than
three hundred pounds of sterling, the litigants had a right to appeal to Lon-
don."3 Ultimately, the rising tide of the revolution altered this similarity be-
tween the court systems.
Although Americans relied on their rights as Englishmen throughout the
Revolutionary War,"4 they did not articulate their rights as Americans until
adopting a written document."' Prior to the ratification of the Constitution,
intellectuals toyed with the idea that the judiciary had held independent power
to make void the laws passed by the sovereign."6 Indeed, even before the
105. Id. at 12.
106. THE FaDELisT No. 78, at 575 (Alexander Hamilton) (John C. Hamilton ed., 1864).
107. See ABRAHAM, supra note 26, at 25; Mario Perez-Reilly & Vile, supra note 32, at 198.
108. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAw 37 (2d ed. 1985).
109. Id. at 37-38.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 38, 45. Although a few of these courts structurally resembled our present courts,
some of the colonies established exceptional courts. Id. For instance, certain communities in Penn-
sylvania and Massachusetts appointed "common peacemakers" and "judicious men" to hear dis-
putes within the community. Id.
112. Id. at 48.
113. d at 49.





adoption of the Constitution, state courts recognized judicial independence."7
Specifically, the states of New Jersey, Virginia, and Rhode Island determined
that certain statutes were invalid under their respective state constitutions." 8
When ratified, though, the United States Constitution failed to define the
parameters of the federal judiciary's independence. As drafted, the text of
Article II provided scant authority for judicial review of the other branches. It
was not until the landmark decision of Marbury v. Madison"9 that the Su-
preme Court established this authority. This power was limited to situations of
conflict between the Constitution and legislative statutes or executive deci-
sions. Nonetheless, Marbury generally established that the judicial branch,
through the Supreme Court, was the final arbiter and interpreter of the United
States Constitution. 2 In this same era, the Supreme Court again extended its
jurisdiction, holding that Article ImI grants the Court the power of appellate
review over all cases involving federal law, including state court decisions
concerning federal questions."
The Court's expanded jurisdiction was not the only test this young nation
experienced at the turn of the eighteenth century. An attempt to impeach Jus-
tice Samuel Chase was one of Congress' most direct attacks on the judiciary.
Historical evidence indicates that Congress initiated the impeachment for polit-
ical purposes only; rather than for the purpose intended by the Constitu-
tion." In fact, John Quincy Adams wrote that Justice Chase's attempted im-
peachment was the initial step in a plan to eradicate the entire Supreme
Court. " Ultimately, a narrow majority of Senators decided not to impeach,
contending that only judges could effectively secure their life, liberty and
property.
24
As the American population expanded, the nation continued to establish
courts. While eastern judges and lawyers filled the courtrooms, territorial
courts further departed from their predecessors. In a leading case determining
the powers of territorial courts," Justice Marshall concluded that they had
jurisdiction over federal question cases. 26 However, because the judges of
these courts had limited tenures and did not hold office for a term of good
117. Id. at 7-8.
118. 1d. at 7-9 (citing the following unreported decisions: Holmes v. Walton (1780), Com-
monwealth v. Caton (1782), and Trevett v. Weeden (1786)).
119. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
120. Id.
121. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Stet.) 304 (1816).
122. SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, at 57. Article Il of the Constitution provides that Judges shall
hold their offices during good behavior. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 1. Furthermore, federal judges may
only be impeached for treason, bribery and other high crimes. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.
123. SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, at 57.
124. SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, at 58 (citing ADAMS, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA DURING THE FIRsT ADMINISTRATION OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 275 (1903)). Ultimately,
Justice Chase retained his office.
125. American Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546 (establishing the
jurisdiction of the Florida territorial courts). For a discussion of this case, see William Baskerville
Hamilton, Anglo-American Law on the Frontier: Thomas Rodney & His Territorial Cases, 105
(1953).
126. American Ins. Co., 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) at 511.
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behavior, they were not "federal" in nature, nor governed by Article In.'"
Although this issue seems archaic, federal court adjudication over Article IV
courts is still prevalent.'"
The Civil War inspired unique problems involving judicial independence.
The federal government, concerned with those judges who supported the Con-
federacy, contemplated impeachment at least once."2 Congress removed
Judge West H. Humphreys for abandoning his post to work for the Confeder-
acy.'O Such events demonstrate that a hostile political climate provides little
protection for judicial autonomy.
From the end of the Civil War until the Great Depression our tripartite
system of government refined itself further. Arguably, the most significant
decision of this period was Ex Parte McCardle,"' in which the Supreme
Court held that the Constitution, rather than Congressional mandates, estab-
lished the Court's appellate jurisdiction;"' however, the Court recognized
that Congress possessed the power to limit or expand that jurisdiction. 33 Lat-
er, Congress exercised its jurisdictional power over the lower courts by eradi-
cating the Commerce Courts in the second decade of the twentieth centu-
ry.
134
Although the events of the twentieth century have impacted judicial auton-
omy, there is little doubt that the judiciary has made strong advances. Franklin
D. Roosevelt's court-packing plan, for example, remains notorious. During the
early 1930s, President Roosevelt persistently attempted to pass legislative pro-
grams to lead America through the Great Depression. Responding to a deci-
sion labeling New Deal legislation unconstitutional, the President developed a
plan to increase his influence on the highest court." Roosevelt's proposed
scheme would have allowed the President to appoint one justice for every
justice on the Court over the age of seventy."3 Since many of the Justices at
the time fit this description, President Roosevelt would have been able to ap-
point six new Supreme Court Justices.' Obviously, the plan would have
produced a Court more deferential to New Deal legislation. Fortunately, the
Senate Judiciary Committee rejected Roosevelt's plan."3
Although the plan was never realized, these political rumblings charted a
different course for Supreme Court decisions regarding New Deal legisla-
tion.'" The court-packing plan did not alter the Court's perspective of New
127. Id. at 546.
128. See, e.g., Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of the Lat-
ter-Day Saints v. Hodel, 830 F.2d 374 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (discussing jurisdiction of territorial
courts).
129. Grimes, supra note 43, at 1213-14.
130. ld.
131. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869).
132. Id. at 512-13.
133. Id. at 512-14.
134. Kurland, supra note 22, at 683-87 (providing an excellent historical source regarding the
abolition of the Commerce Courts).
135. ScHwAR1z, supra note 3, at 232-33.
136. Id. at 233.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 234.
139. Id. Within a few years, several opinions reflected this changing attitude. See West Coast
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Deal policies; rather, its changing political ideals added a different position for
the fate of America. For instance, in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish'40 Jus-
tice Roberts provided the "switch in time that saved nine," defending his ideo-
logical shift because the Court sought to overrule precedent rather than "distin-
guish" as usual.4
This "switch in time" addresses another interesting issue. Even though a
President might succeed in appointing the judge of his or her choice, the latter,
by virtue of the appointment, does not necessarily mirror the political views of
the President. Long after the political forces leading to their appointment have
scattered, justices remain on the bench." Thus, the rationale for the
President's choice dies long before the judge retires. Consequently, Presiden-
tial expectations often lead to disappointment.
For instance, President Eisenhower once remarked that appointing Earl
Warren to the Court was one of his worst mistakes.'43 In conversation with
Warren, Eisenhower had apparently concluded that they shared similar politi-
cal ideologies.'" Thus, Eisenhower appointed Warren in the mistaken belief
that he was an Eisenhower Republican.'" No one sensed Warren's progres-
sive spirit,'" but by 1956 it was clear that he "was in the process of provid-
ing leadership for a libertarian-activist approach to public law and personal
rights ....
Today, the Presidential power of judicial appointment remains controver-
sial. One of the most unique Presidential appointments was that of Robert
Bork." Some commentators argue that the most interesting aspect of Bork's
appointment process lies within the questions asked and answered.'" In con-
trast to the nomination of Justice Clarence Thomas, which arguably focused on
the traditional question of fitness of office,'" the Bork proceedings focused
Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding a minimum wage law during the political
court- packing plan controversy), United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938) (de-
claring Congressional act regulating interstate commerce of milk constitutional).
140. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
141. Id. Justice Roberts was the switch vote in the West Coast opinion that allegedly caused
the "switch in time that saved nine." GEOFFREY R. STONE EL AL, CONSTTUTIONAL LAW 215
(1996).
142. For example, by 1985 four of President Nixon's appointments to the United States Su-
preme Court remained on the bench. TRIM, supra note 31, at xvi-xvii (1985).
143. Stephen J. Wermiel, The Nomination of Justice Brennan: Eisenhower's Mistake? A Look
at the Historical Record, 11 CONST. COMMENT 515, 535-36 (1994-95).
144. ABRAHAM, supra note 26, at 255.
145. 1d at 258.
146. 1d.
147. Id.
148. Frank Guliuzza, l et al., Character, Competency, and Constitutionalism: Did the Bork
Nomination Represent a Fundamental Shift in Confirmation Criteria?, 75 MARQ. L. REV. 27 409
(1992) (stating that no other judicial appointment had so much media attention, interest group
participation, and the same range of questions asked).
149. Id. at 421 (observing that Bork's hearings "opened the door for intensive screening of
candidate's ideological beliefs"); Carter, supra note 28, at 774-75 (stating that the Senate and the
American public chose not to accept Bork's originalist views).
150. Anton Bell, Clarence Thomas: Evasive or Deceptive, 21 N.C. CENT. LJ. 194, 206-07
(1995) (describing the testimony of Anita Hill as creating a media frenzy and an uproar in the
nation, and how Thomas failed to give a definitive answer regarding his view on the right to abor-
tion); Estelle B. Freedman, The Manipulation of History at the Clarence Thomas Hearings, 65 S.
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on his originalist constitutional interpretation."'
Although one might surmise that Bork's rejection was rooted in his per-
sonal ideology and interpretation, statistical evidence shows the contrary.
52
Specifically, one commentator suggested that 92.6% of the Senate questions
proffered to Bork regarded constitutional issues.'53 However, Justices Mar-
shall (95.4%), Rehnquist (92.6%), O'Connor (90.8%), Stewart (84.9%), and
Kennedy (83.5%) were appointed to the court and endured the same type of
questioning in nearly the same proportion as Bork.1
4
CONCLUSION
Current legal events reflect traditional inter-branch tensions that have
existed since the birth of our nation. The recent impeachments of three judg-
es-Hastings, Nixon and Clairborne' 5 -indicate Congress' reluctance to part
with traditional methods of control over the judicial branch. As we near the
end of the twentieth century, our federal courts listen to issues of greater con-
sequence to America's political system and public dialogue,"5s as well as to
individual rights.'57 Arguably, judicial independence plays a greater role in
our society.'58 Voters ultimately determine the course of the nation, and such
a privilege entitles its citizens to define and determine the destiny of the feder-
al judiciary.
This liberty, like so many others, carries with it the responsibility to not
only understand and utilize its flexibility, but also to safeguard its existence.
As a dissenting Justice Douglas so eloquently expressed, the ideals of judicial
independence provide "the mucilage which holds majorities and minorities
together in the federal segment of our Nation, and make tolerable the existence
of nonconformists who do not walk to the beat of the Chief Drummer."' 59
Burkeley N. Riggs
Tamera D. Westerberg
CAL. L. REv. 1361, 1361-63 (1992) (comparing the Senate appointment hearings to historical inci-
dents of racial lynching). Apparently, Thomas took Bork's dilemma as a lesson.
151. Carter, supra note 28, at 774-75.
152. Guliuzza, et. al. supra note 148, at 427-28 (indicating that other nominees suffered at
least the same proportion of Constitutional questioning).
153. Id. at 427.
154. Id. at 429. Of course, it can be argued that none of these Justices have a political ideol-
ogy as radical as Robert Bork.
155. VOLcANSEK, supra note 42, at 1-2.
156. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714
(1986); Adarand Constr., Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. CL 2097 (1995).
157. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Adarand, 115 S. CL at 2097.
158. Irving R. Kaufman, Chilling Judicial Independence, 88 YALE LJ. 681, 682 (1979).
159. Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 419 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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INTRODUCTION
The following is an edited and condensed version of discussions between
members of the Denver University Law Review and seven judges of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit These members of the judicia-
ry share their thoughts and opinions on the topic of judicial independence.
Members of the Denver University Law Review posed questions to the
Tenth Circuit judges to better understand how judicial independence serves the
federal political system. The participants wish to emphasize that they are re-
sponding to the questions in a general way and that they are in no way intend-
ing to prejudge issues that may come before them. In future cases, the judges
will analyze these issues on a case by case basis.
1. Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit; J.D., University of Arizona
College of Law, 1960.
2. Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit; B.A., Northwestern Uni-
versity, 1962; J.D., University of Michigan Law School, 1965.
3. Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit; B.B.A., University of Notre
Dame, 1963; J.D., Fordhan University School of Law, 1967.
4. Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit; B.A., Adams State College,
1961; J.D., George Washington University Law School, 1964.
5. Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit; B.A., Creighton University,
1969; J.D., University of Wyoming College of Law, 1972.
6. Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit; B.A., University of Denver,
1956; LL.B., University of Denver College of Law, 1959.
7. Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit; B.A., Smith College,
1962; J.D., Harvard University, 1965.
8. The interviews were conducted from March 27 through April 17, 1997, by Burkeley N.
Riggs and Tamera D. Westerberg. Tarek Younes, Tara T. Cavanaugh, and Kent M. Kostka also
assisted in the preparation of this article.
The Denver University Law Review gratefully acknowledges the generosity of the partici-
pating judges, who donated their time and advice despite busy schedules. The Law Review would
also like to thank the law firm of Netzorg and McKeever, P.C., for the use of its conference room
facilities.
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THE DIscussIoN
Law Review: As part of this year's Tenth Circuit Survey, the Denver Uni-
versity Law Review is preparing a feature on judicial independence. The
article focuses on the various constitutional and non-constitutional sources of,
and limitations on, judicial autonomy. We are here to ask your views on the
role of the judiciary in the United States political system and the effect and
scope of your independence. To begin with, how do you perceive your role in
our system of separation of powers and checks and balances? Has judicial
independence helped that balance?
JUDGE EBEL: The judiciary is the main institution that enforces the sepa-
ration of powers, and the checks and balances of the Constitution. This role
uniquely requires us to be independent of the other institutions whose powers
are being separated or checked. Judicial independence is indispensable. Years
ago, I tried to identify provisions in the U.S. Constitution that were unique and
could not be found in any predecessor constitution. The only truly unique
characteristic of our structure of government is the independence of the judi-
ciary, which is independent even of a democratically-elected and representative
legislative branch. Interestingly, many of the judiciary's powers to serve in a
checks and balance role are not expressly stated in the Constitution, but rather
have had to be inferred.
JUDGE KELLY: I see the role of the judiciary to independently review the
particular law and the manner in which that law is being applied. Being truly
independent means that we can make our ruling, or conduct our review based
on the backdrop of the Constitution and precedent without fear of retribution
by either the legislative or executive branches.
In the federal system, the fact that a decision might be distasteful to the
general public is no reason to detour in our search for what is right. I do think
that state judges who are elected could be influenced by the views of the elec-
torate. The fact that the perception at the state level is one of independence
too, is a tribute to those who are elected.
JUDGE BALDOCK: Our role is as a co-equal branch of government. Each
branch must act independently of the others to ensure liberty. Remember that
each branch, not just the judiciary, is bound by the Constitution. Judicial inde-
pendence is imperative to maintain the balance of governmental powers be-
cause the judiciary is isolated, with our independence coming largely from the
constitutional provisions regarding life tenure and guaranteed compensation.
This permits the judiciary to stand equal with the legislative and executive
branches of government. While the separation of powers generally shields the
judiciary from encroachment by the other branches of government, one prob-
lem area arising from this separation is funding of the judiciary, which rests
solely in the hands of the legislature.
Yes, judicial independence is imperative.
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JUDGE PORFILIO: There are so many different ways the judiciary acts not
only within the government, but within society as a whole. My role essentially
is one of public service. I ensure that the other two branches act within the
framework of the Constitution. Historically, the other two branches of the
government are stronger.
The use of the word "balance" in your question suggests equal-distance
points. However, the separation of powers is sometimes more of a concept
than a reality. In today's context, I see the political branches striving to con-
trol the judiciary, and they see the judiciary as an implement of public will. If
they perceive that the public will is not being enforced by the judiciary, some-
thing is wrong in their eyes. The framers intended the judiciary to be the final
arbiter of the Constitution. The balance still exists as far as the courts are
concerned because we not only observe, but consciously enforce separation of
powers-whether the political branches believe that or not--because in the
process we sometimes have to make unpopular decisions.
JUDGE SEYMOUR: I see the role of the federal judiciary as the guarantors
and dispensers of impartial justice in our system. It's the bulwark against arbi-
trary action by the other branches.
I absolutely agree that judicial independence has helped the system of
separation of powers and checks and balances. It certainly has helped the bal-
ance of power in government because the independent judiciary has kept Con-
gress and the Executive Branch in check. The courts have the power to hold
the acts of Congress unconstitutional. The Executive Branch can't commit
arbitrary acts without a check by the court. Those branches maintain a check
on the judiciary. Over time, it has worked out to be a fairly balanced system.
JUDGE MURPHY: My role is really defined in Article EI. It is a decisional
role, and in a decisional role, decisional independence is protected by Article
Ill. Additionally, I have an administrative role in the judiciary to make sure
that my staff and I have the proper facilities to perform in a decision-making
role. There is a very clear relationship. From an administrative perspective,
courts must have facilities through which to perform judicial functions. The
federal judiciary is dependent on the executive and legislative budget process
for court personnel and facilities. That dependence is a factor which relates to
judicial decision-making independence and is connected to secure tenure and
salary.
JUDGE LuCmo: Constitutionally, the separation of powers flows from the
concept of checks and balances. Madison specifically was concerned that there
not be a merger of the three branches of government. Today, I think it is part
of the common vernacular of a basic civics class that the wisdom of our Con-
stitution flows from this system of shared power. Madison may not have antic-
ipated the bureaucratic state and specifically, independent regulatory agency
threat to the concept of separation of powers. Hence, "separation of functions."
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At our level, our independence flows from the role we play in this constitu-
tional conception.
Law Review: Do you agree with the oft-quoted statement that the judicia-
ry is the "least dangerous branch?"
JUDGE EBEL: No, I think each branch is dangerous in its own unique way.
In terms of unilaterally enforcing decisions, courts are the least dangerous
because the courts have no access to enforcement. However, the judicial
branch has off-setting powers that make it a dangerous branch.
First, the judiciary is the final arbiter of constitutional issues, subject only
to the very difficult process of constitutional amendment, and the role of final
arbiter gives the judiciary power not enjoyed by other branches. Second, the
federal judiciary is the only branch not accountable to the voters through elec-
tions. This non-accountability removes an important restraint on the power of
the judiciary that exists for the other two branches.
JUDGE KELLY: (laughter) I am sure you have read by my chuckle how I
feel about the proposition that the judiciary is "the least dangerous branch." If
Hamilton lived today, he might reconsider his statement because we have gone
through periods of time where many people would think we are the most dan-
gerous branch. If the judiciary plays the role which I think was intended, it
will not be out there at the front of the pack, legislating. That is one of the
criticisms that our judiciary has been subjected to from time to time and in
some cases that criticism may well be justified.
JUDGE BALDOCK: Yes, with this caveat; if a judge acts not in accordance
with law, but with his or her own personal views and agenda, that judge in-
vades the political process and causes harm to us all.
JUDGE PORFIUO: Yes, because the constitutional role of the judiciary is to
protect the public from the exercises of the other two branches when the popu-
lar notion of what is lawful or should be lawful goes beyond the Constitution.
The judiciary is not supposed to be a popular form of government.
JUDGE SEYMOUR: I think so for the reasons stated above. Even though we
have lifetime appointments, it is a two-way street; judges have to abide by the
canons of ethics and we give up our right to be involved in politics, and to
have certain economic ties. We also give up ties to groups we believe in. The
federal courts have done a good job with the system of checks and balances.
Some people would disagree, of course, especially a congressman who wants
to impeach "activist" judges. I believe, however, that activism is in the eye of
the beholder.
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JUDGE MURPHY: Well, the reason it is often quoted is because it emanated
from Alexander Hamilton proclaiming that the judiciary is absolutely the least
powerful and least threatening branch because there is no constituency and no
control over purse and sword. The judiciary is dependent on the legislative and
executive branches to fund its ability to decide. Nobody elects judges. Few
people love them-hopefully their children and their partners.
How dangerous can a branch be that can't enforce its own orders and that
can only tell the executive branch that it has violated the Constitution after the
fact. For example, only after Truman nationalized the steel industry, only after
the fact, when the thing was effectively over, did the judiciary have some say.
Another example is where Justice Marshall issued a decision holding that
Georgia violated the rights of the Cherokees by taking thousands of acres of
land. In that case, the judiciary was dependent on the executive branch to
enforce their holding. And we all know President Jackson did nothing. If you
can speak powerful words but you can't enforce them, you are the least dan-
gerous branch.
JUDGE LUCERO: I think the public's worst fear is that government is run
by the federal courts. No, I think experience, and most notably, historical
constitutional confrontation, such as the Nixon tapes case, do underline the
proposition that the branches are equal. For the most part, the perception is
that the courts are in the background and therefore the least dangerous. It
should be that way because nobody elects us.
Law Review: One commentator has noted that the Article III provision of
life tenure and guaranteed compensation are essential attributes to an inde-
pendent judiciary. Do you agree or disagree and why?
JUDGE EBEL: I agree. Periodic elections would be a severe constraint on
the ability of judges to enforce unpopular constitutional guarantees. Further, if
judges' compensation could be reduced that would be a very powerful bar-
gaining chip that could be abused. Theoretically it is possible that Congress
could reduce the general budget of the entire judicial branch to a point where
judges would be emasculated even though judges' salaries were not actually
reduced. However, I think public opinion would restrain the likelihood of such
abuse.
Also, failure to grant COLA adjustments to the judicial branch to adjust
for inflation has resulted in significant deterioration of judges' true compensa-
tion. Federal judges typically take a very significant pay cut when they assume
the federal bench. There is talk of a possible lawsuit by certain judges ad-
dressing whether this erosion of real earning power is unconstitutional. I ex-
press no opinion on the merits, or the potential merits, of such a lawsuit.
JUDGE KELLY: I do agree in principle. Life tenure, on good behavior, is
certainly the strongest pillar to an independent judiciary. The fact that the
compensation does not change is also a very real factor. I would point out,
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however, that inflation changes compensation in a very real sense and the
failure of Congress to recognize that fact has adversely affected the judiciary.
There is a real difference between someone going to Washington for several
years and then returning to the private sector and a person who leaves private
practice to spend the rest of his or her productive life in the judiciary.
As a practical matter, everybody knows that if you cross the guy that pays
your salary, he might fire you. If you cross the people that voted you in they
might vote you out. That is the difference between the legislative branch and
the judiciary - the members of Congress are elected to represent the views of
their constituents. Judges are not elected or appointed to espouse the view of
the electorate but to make the right decisions, based on the Constitution and
laws.
JUDGE BALDOCK: Yes, I agree with that statement. The guarantees are
necessary not only to ensure that the judiciary actually is independent, but that
the public perceives the judiciary as independent.
JUDGE PORFILo: I strongly agree. Hamilton said that the purpose is to
prevent the judges from having to toady to legislative notions in order to re-
ceive reasonable compensation for their services. It's not too far from today's
context, that Congress is very apt to appropriate judges' salaries consistent
with the legislative view regarding the propriety of judicial decisions. Article
IIm prevents that, so as to not have a carrot and stick jurisprudence.
The Supreme Court has said that it amounts to a pay reduction when pay
adjustments do not reflect inflation. A reduction in spending power affects
judicial morale, and makes it more difficult to attract competent people to the
bench. Now, having said that, I recognize that for most people, federal judges
make a lot of money. But in the general scheme of things, for a professional
at that level, it's a rather average income.
JUDGE SEYMOUR: I agree absolutely because those are the two things that
give judges complete independence to decide cases solely on the evidence and
the law without worrying about what is politically correct or popular. If you
look at judges in state courts who have to stand for election and who lose
because of an unpopular decision, I think the fact that we don't enables us
greater independence---because the security of our jobs and compensation
allows us to decide cases in the way our judgment dictates they should be
decided.
JUDGE MURPHY: I do agree and I think history has indicated that is so.
For instance, in ancient Babylon if a judge was reversed on a decision, that
judge could be tried for his mistaken judgment. If convicted, he could be re-
quired to pay 12 times the penalties he had imposed and be barred from the
bench. We've progressed from that in some aspects.
I have a different perspective. I was a state trial judge for nine years. I
was up for retention or election every six years. The salary wasn't insecure. It
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was protected. Still, even from the perspective of a state trial judge who had
independence, being secure in Article III has a great deal of importance.
JUDGE LUCERO: I absolutely agree. The power of the purse strings con-
tinues to be the ultimate power in any government structure. If Congress had
the ability, by virtue of disagreement with an opinion, to withhold our pay or
to seek our removal, the whole system of checks and balances would be de-
stroyed. We now have the anomalous situation of cost of living adjustments
being withheld which is a de facto of compensation. I have been told that
bankruptcy judges now earn less than some court administrators. If true, I
think that tests the principle.
Law Review: It is recognized that public perception and special interest
groups, through the Executive and Legislative branches' control over appoint-
ment, jurisdiction, compensation, budget, and impeachment, can bring pres-
sure to bear on the judiciary. The pressure becomes apparent in the appoint-
ment process, but likely does not cease entirely once the judge is on the
bench. Do you perceive a difference in the amount of such pressure in election
vs. non-election years, and, if so, why is there a difference?
JUDGE EBEL: I think there is greater pressure from special interest groups
in election years because the performance of particular judges is sought to be
attributed to various candidates for political office. Further, there are efforts by
special interest, or, more broadly, from groups holding various ideological
positions, that continue even in non-election years. I believe there are those
who attempt to influence the judiciary directly through public intimidation.
I perceive pressure from across the whole spectrum of ideologies. I do not
think any one particular ideology has a monopoly of the strategy of attempting
to utilize public intimidation to influence judicial behavior.
JUDGE KELLY: I agree that at least in the appointment process there is
certainly an element of politics. It would be a rare situation for a person to be
appointed to a federal court who received the appointment by being a wall-
flower or by not being involved. At the District Court level, the politics are
more local in that the senior senator of the party in power has a free hand in
who is recommended to the President. At the circuit level, it is the President
who has the prerogative. Once a person is appointed, I disagree that they are
subjected to further political pressure during either campaign or non-campaign
years. I have been on the bench for over five years and I have seen examples
of individuals who get irate at a particular decision but I have not seen any
political pressure brought to bear on the judge to change a ruling.
JUDGE BALDOCK: I do not perceive a difference. Political pressure on the
judiciary comes from public opinion in times of national division or crisis.
Issues such as racism and abortion place intense public scrutiny upon the judi-
ciary and on such issues the judiciary must render decisions which are per-
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ceived as legitimate. While a judge must follow and adhere to the law, judges,
like everyone else, watch the news and are aware of public sentiment.
JUDGE PORFILIo: No, I have not felt the consequences or even a sugges-
tion of pressure from politicians or interest groups in twenty-two years on the
bench.
JUDGE SEYMOUR: I think the strength of the voices out there increases in
an election year simply because politicians enjoy "judge bashing" based on
decisionsin cases. Personally, and I believe this holds true for my colleagues,
I don't feel those pressures and I don't have to because of my secure opinion.
Therefore, although those voices get louder, they don't impact the federal
courts.
JUDGE MURPHY: In terms of pressure, no. I would hope I don't feel that
type of pressure from clamor. Election year is a time to beat up on the least
powerful branch. It makes for great press. Some special interest groups have a
great ability to synthesize and articulate the very best sound bite for electronic
media and talk in terms of outcome instead of reasoning in a case. Then, they
select 1 out of 100 decisions decided by a particular judge and use them as a
vehicle in the electronic media. They're either unwilling or unable to speak in
anything other than sound bites. The media is one of the vehicles that makes
challenges of the judiciary more dangerous, or at least more frequent.
JUDGE LUCERO: No. The level of rhetoric may increase, the "pressure"
remains constant. I'd like to reflect on a comment that Justice White once
made. He said that he didn't mind public criticism of the court and Congress
joining in on it, as long as they didn't think they could do something about it.
He said this to underline the fact that our branch of government is open as
much to criticism as other branches, but that a judge shouldn't be expected to
change an opinion by the "heat" of public discourse.
When one branch seeks to put pressure on the courts, history has taught
us that the results can be disastrous. I point to the Dred Scott decision as a
case in which the Supreme Court was under extreme pressure to arrive at a
determined result. I do think it's unfortunate when "federal" judges become
the political issue. It's happened before historically--the "court packing" plan
during Roosevelt's administration. It is likely to happen again.
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Law Review: There is a current trend in the Supreme Court towards judi-
cial restraint. How active or restrained are the Federal Circuit courts? Is the
Tenth Circuit more or less active than the other circuit courts?
JUDGE EBEL: I think the lower federal courts genuinely try to follow the
lead set by the U.S. Supreme Court. To the extent that the U.S. Supreme
Court has shown more judicial restraint in recent years, I think it is also re-
flected in the decisions of the lower federal courts.
No, I perceive we are fairly representative of most federal circuits.
JUDGE KELLY: I think it depends on the personnel. For example, in the
Tenth Circuit, I think, as a general rule, no one would consider us an activist
court, making up law. There are individuals on the court who have a bit of an
imagination. And I think that depending on how many of them are gathered
together at any one time will determine how activist they are. The Ninth Cir-
cuit is extremely active. They found a new constitutional right-the right to
assisted suicide. Interestingly enough, in the Second Circuit, they reached the
same result through an entirely different analysis. I do not think the Tenth
Circuit fits within the definition of an activist court.
JUDGE BALDOCK: This question ascribes to the judiciary the practice of
following a personal agenda rather than following the law. Courts should fol-
low the law, not trends. The Tenth Circuit is no more active or restrained than
its sister circuits. Across the entire judiciary, there are judges who appear to
follow their own personal views and agendas, rather than the law. That has
been the case since the beginning of the republic and I expect it will continue.
JUDGE PORFILIO: I do not know what judicial restraint means. I think this
is a politician's term. Restraint is in the eyes of the beholder. I do not know a
judge who consciously undertakes to exceed the bounds of judicial authority.
Judges sometimes interpret those bounds differently, but I sincerely believe
that they consciously render decision within those bounds as they see them.
There are some specifics, however where concepts of restraint are apparent.
For example, where a matter involving state law could be decided in federal or
state court on a case of first impression, most federal courts would defer to the
state as a matter of policy; that is a form of restraint I endorse.
In the 1960s, the Supreme Court was called activist because of its empha-
sis on individual rights. Well, what they said in Miranda, for example, was
that individuals had certain rights. We regard such rights now as a given. Any
time some new concept arises or people not like the judicial decision they call
the rendering court activist.
The Constitution is a document of vitality that should be interpreted in
terms of today's needs. Certain politicians say judges should always attempt to
determine what the framers of the Constitution intended, in other words they
should interpret the Constitution from an Originalist perspective. The problem
is that what the framers intended in the Constitution, from a historical perspec-
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ive, is sometimes unclear.
JUDGE SEYMOUR: Like I said, I think judicial activism is in the eyes of
the beholder. For example, was Justice Burger an activist judge in 1971 when
he authored the opinion in Reed v. Reed,9 holding for the first time that gen-
der bias is prohibited by the 14th Amendment? Was it judicial activism when
the Rehnquist court limited habeas corpus rights through judicial decision
making, creating procedural hoops that had to be jumped through before one
could get into the federal courts? Was that judicial restraint? I don't think so.
It all depends on how you characterize the issue. I can't say unequivocally that
the federal courts are activist or restrained. Those are political buzzwords. For
the most part, the federal judges simply decide the cases in accordance with
the evidence and the law.
I think the Tenth Circuit is less an activist court than, for example the
Ninth Circuit which seems to have some judges who are lightning rods for the
Supreme Court. We have a very balanced court with judges who get along
exceptionally well and work hard to maintain collegiality. Because we have
this rapport, we have judges who are interested in working out the aspects of
an opinion rather than being activists.
JUDGE MURPHY: There is difficulty in dealing with an articulation in an
ideological sense of a restrained or active judiciary. My personal style makes
it very difficult for me to respond to that. The perspective I take, not that I su-
perimpose any activist, restrictive, or ideological view, is to determine each
case on a case-by-case basis. Any type of restraint or activism, however, does
not factor in to my case-by-case process. Maybe that is just a bad habit I
picked up as a trial judge.
JUDGE LUCERO: The circuit courts basically test cases against established
court precedent. We are basically followers in that sense. It's the rare case for
which there is no precedent either by statute or United States Supreme Court
case law. Within that guidance, however, there is a nuanced opportunity for
activism or restraint. My view is that the law is like a pendulum. There are
great forces to move it to the left or to the right. So the law is always in oscil-
lation. The trick is to keep the pendulum in the center.
The Tenth Circuit, from my perspective, is pretty much on the main line.
9. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
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Law Review: One commentator has stated, "The provisions for securing
the independence of the judiciary were not created for the benefit of the judg-
es, but rather for the benefit of the judged." Do you agree or disagree with
this proposition and why?
JUDGE EBEL: I agree. The role of the judiciary is to provide a fair and
balanced adjudication of real disputes involving real parties. It is the parties'
rights that are primarily protected, and the judiciary's independence is protect-
ed as a means to achieve the end result of insuring that the parties receive
impartial justice.
JUDGE KELLY: I do. When you appear in a federal court, whether in a
civil, criminal, or administrative matter, I think you have to have the confi-
dence that those who will be sitting in judgment on your case will not be
influenced simply because you are a member of a minority or because you are
rich or poor, that they will decide on the basis of the facts and the law. That is
the essence of judicial independence. I think perception is the most important
part of the whole equation. I think it plays into how the system is judged by
the public. Where there is the perception that a court is being manipulated or
being pressured by people who are appearing before it, the public confidence
is lost. If you ever lose the perception of fairness the judicial system ceases to
be an effective branch of government. Even though not every decision may be
correct, if it is seen as fair, the system is deemed to be independent and it will
work.
JUDGE BALDOCK: As I explained in my response to question three, inde-
pendence works both ways. Judges must be independent. The public also must
perceive judges as independent. This ensures the public's willingness to adhere
to judicial decisions.
JUDGE PORFILIO: I absolutely agree, judicial independence not only works
to the benefit of the litigants, but to the public as a whole. As we are the last
bastion against political acts as far as a litigant is concerned, but judicial inde-
pendence benefits more than just litigants, as the public as a whole takes com-
fort from the knowledge that the public's business is being done correctly.
JUDGE SEYMOUR: I agree because the theory was that you wanted a court
that would protect minority views from the excesses of government. It's pre-
cisely that judicial independence that protects those views because it allows
the court to decide issues without worrying about popular views.
JUDGE MURPHY: The concept of secure tenure and salary, to those in need
of a civics lesson, would suggest the purpose is to benefit a particular judge. I
don't think it needs a great deal of elaboration that it has meaning far beyond
any individual judge who might benefit from it.
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JUDGE LucERO: I absolutely agree with the proposition that the system of
checks and balances was not created for the benefit of the judges. I agree
somewhat with the proposition that it was created for the judged. But as I said
before, it has a much higher and aspirational purpose. I believe the founders
intended to make sure that no one branch would get an armlock over the oth-
er. By vesting independent power in the third branch, the judiciary, this laud-
able goal was achieved.
Law Review: As noted at the beginning of this discussion, the preceding
article outlines and analyzes the various sources of judicial independence, as
well as mechanisms of control over the judicial branch. Some of these include
appointment, jurisdiction, life tenure and compensation, and impeachment. In
your opinion what is the most significant source of judicial independence?
JUDGE EBEL: I think it is life tenure and no reduction of compensation.
JUDGE KELLY: Clearly, the most significant source of judicial indepen-
dence is Article m of the Constitution. As I do my job to the best of my abil-
ity I am assured that merely because someone disagrees with me my job will
not be eliminated and my salary will not be reduced.
JUDGE BALDOCK: The most important source of judicial independence is
the oath a judge takes to uphold the Constitution and adhere to the law. While
Article M's case or controversy requirement limits the judiciary's power, the
life tenure and guaranteed compensation provisions permit us to exercise that
power independently.
JUDGE PORFiuo: The greatest source of judicial independence lies within
the willingness of the judges to subject personal ideals to the Constitution.
This is the keystone of judicial independence. Judicial independence comes
from within the judges and sublimes all other sources. Judges do not react to
negative stimulus, they act because of positive stimulus. The foundation of
judicial independence exists because judges want to do the right and just
things.
JUDGE SEYMOUR: Some of the things in your list interfere with, and oth-
ers promote, judicial independence. Life tenure an compensation go hand in
hand. They are what give us judicial independence. The other things that you
mentioned, with the possible exception of the appointment process, are limit-
ers. The ability of Congress to expand or limit our jurisdiction and the possi-
bility of impeachment are so rare, however, that I do not think they impact our
independence.
JUDGE MURPHY: The source of judicial independence is very clearly Arti-
cle Ill, § 1. Its brevity belies its significance. It is truly a good piece of draft-
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ing. I wish more law students would pay closer attention to it. Their future
briefs would truly be brief.
JUDGE LUCERO: The Constitution is the most important source. I think the
most important vestige is life tenure. I
Law Review: Many of the limiters on judicial independence focus on the
judiciary as an institution. Within the appointment process, however, the focus
changes from the institution to the individual candidate. How do you feel
about the focus of the individual in the judicial appointment process?
JUDGE EBEL: I think it is appropriate. The President and the Senate have
explicit constitutional authority to make political decisions as to who should be
nominated and confirmed to be federal judges. I think focusing on the personal
characteristics of the nominee is completely appropriate and contemplated by
the constitutional process.
However, when a sitting judge is being nominated for a different or high-
er judicial appointment, the problem is more complicated. Although the judge
is properly the subject of individual interrogation for the judicial nomination,
care must be exercised by all parties (that is the judge, the Senate and the
President) not to invade or compromise the independence of the judge in his
or her current or previous judicial duties.
JUDGE KELLY: It is necessary. I think you have to look at the fact that
every district judge, whether chief or otherwise, is totally independent and is
not beholden to anyone. Likewise, at the circuit level, each one of the circuit
judges is an independent entity and while you attempt to work with your col-
leagues, you do not surrender your individuality. It is clearly important to
focus on the individual. Is the person knowledgeable, has the person had the
life experiences to do the job?
On the other hand, I do not think it is proper for a person to be turned
down simply because the majority in power do not agree with the past polit-
cal statements of that individual. I think there is a tension there and we have
seen it in both state and federal confirmation processes. Oftentimes, the Senath
loses sight of what "advice and consent" really mean. I believe that it is a
mistake to prejudge the philosophy and not the ability of the individual. As a
result of this trend, I think that several very good candidates have been lost.
JUDGE BALDOCK: The focus is unavoidable. The individual must be scru-
tinized carefully because appointment by the President with the advice and
consent of the Senate is for life. I believe the process is adequate.
JUDGE PORFILIO: You mean being "Borked"? That's absolutely horrid.
The relevant questions are of ability and character and understanding of the
judicial role. To ask a person--and expect them to answer-how they would
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rule in a given situation is absurd, because until you become a judge and are
faced with the real circumstances, you don't know how you would rule. So
character and integrity are fair game for query. Some have suggested every
candidate take an oath to follow the Constitution as written and interpreted
over time. This to me is meaningless: it sounds good, but is not really sound.
JUDGE SEYMOUR: Well, it's hard to say. Everyone has such a fit about the
so called "litmus test." I think every President has had certain notions about
what he wants in a judge and the people who advise the President also have
notions. So the President is looking for particular attributes. There has always
been a focus on the individual. For example, President Carter's Nominating
Commission asked specific questions regarding stands on abortion and the
promotion of equal justice; they were looking for different answers than Presi-
dent Reagan on those views. There has just been more publicity recently, and
the public is more involved in the process and has voiced an opinion on it.
Public perception drives the argument. Historically, the process hasn't
changed.
Probably the difference now is that our society has become more divided,
as are politicians and Congress. So instead of having more people in the mid-
dle who don't care that much, who aren't at one fringe of another, there is
more of an agenda. That's what has changed. The Senate has become much
more active in voting on individual judge candidates.
JUDGE MURPHY: In the appointment process, clearly the President and
Senate are presented with an individual and it is their obligation to make a
judgment if that person can perform the duties and have respect as a judge
within the institution of the judiciary. They always have to go through a
nominee's baggage.
Everyone's experience has been different. Mine was quite smooth, but it
could have been more difficult because the seat had been open for a year and
a half. There has been a lot of blood shed over other nominees. It could have
been that they wanted to get mine finished. However, to be trite, one should
follow the admonition of Truman, if you can't take the heat, don't go in the
kitchen. If you're unwilling to have someone go through your baggage, don't
do it. There are many more lucrative things to do in this life, especially as a
lawyer.
JUDGE LUCERO: The ad hominem approach to confirmation is unfortunate.
I don't think it's particularly helpful and it has a great potential for abuse in
order to achieve ulterior motives. There has to be a better way to conduct the
appointment process than to get into character assassination.
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Law Review: In the last two decades, the Executive Branch has initiated
pre-impeachment disciplinary action against judges, in the form of formal
prosecutions. Do you believe that this unprecedented action by another branch
of government compromises the independence of the judiciary?
JUDGE KELLY: No, I do not. I do not think there has been one judge that
has been pursued for his or her philosophical views. One judge I am aware of
was accused of bribery, and while acquitted, he was still impeached. I would
attribute this to differing burdens of proof. Judges who have cheated on in-
come tax or have taken bribes are certainly not above the law.
JUDGE BALDOCK: Absolutely not. Judges are not above the law. A judge
who violates the law should be prosecuted. Even the appearance of impropri-
ety cannot be accepted in the judiciary. The judiciary must be held to the
highest standards of conduct.
JUDGE Poamuo: Absolutely not. No one, including judges, is above the
law. If they violate the law they should be prosecuted. Theoretically, however,
Congress using evidence gathered by the Justice Department touches on sepa-
ration of powers. Congress should wait to impeach until afterwards. To do
otherwise would create the appearance of interference.
JUDGE SEYMOUR: Of course you could look at that from two sides. Prob-
ably in the past there wouldn't have been prosecution but the information
would have been given to the Senate for impeachment purposes. Congress
practically mandated the judiciary to come up with a disciplinary system for
itself, which the judiciary did. Some people think that imposes on the separa-
tion of powers. I personally think that if judges violate the law, they should
except to be prosecuted. Moreover, in exchange for lifetime tenure and com-
pensation, we agree that we will abide by the judicial codes of conduct and
canons of ethics, and we have an obligation to do that.
JUDGE MURPHY: It is very clear that the impeachment process is very
different than court prosecution and I don't believe that one necessarily comes
before the other. In addition, because political matters can more easily creep
into impeachment, and because impeachment is very different and cumber-
some, such matters could tie up a branch of government. While the practical
approach has indicated that is not a problem, the theoretical approach poses
the possibility of a problem.
Law Review: Article III vest the judicial power of the United States in
such federal courts as Congress sees fit to create. Although it is not clear
whether the framers anticipated the creation of non-Article III judges, Con-
gress has established Bankruptcy and Territorial courts as well as authority
through the Magistrates Act. How has this delegation affected the Tenth
Circuit's jurisdiction? Do you believe this delegation upsets the equilibrium in
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the separation of powers model?
JUDGE EBEL: I do not think it has had a major effect on the Tenth Circuit
jurisdiction because non-Article I courts and judges are reviewed by Article
Im courts and judges. By the time issues have gotten to the Tenth Circuit they
have ordinarily been reviewed by an Article I court. Therefore, for the most
part, the Tenth Circuit still must review non-Article I decisions.
JUDGE KELLY: I do not really think it has affected the Tenth Circuit's
jurisdiction. The district court, for example, assigns cases to magistrates and
can remove cases from the bankruptcy courts. The District Court sits in review
of decisions of the magistrate and bankruptcy courts and its decisions are re-
viewable by the circuit. The circuit court is the body that appoints the bank-
ruptcy judges, while the District Court appoints the magistrates. I think these
non-Article H judges are an invaluable aid, especially considering the increas-
ing number of cases and the increasing complexity of both civil and criminal
litigation.
I do not believe the delegation upsets the equilibrium. If, for example,
Congress had said we will set up these non-Article Il judgeships and take
away a particular type of case from the Article 111 judges, a tension would
exist. This is not what occurred. The magistrates and bankruptcy judges are
answerable to Article I judges. Without their services we would have a much
less efficient judiciary.
JUDGE BALDOCK: Bankruptcy and magistrate courts do not impede upon
our jurisdiction. Rather these courts help us manage a case load which in the
last quarter of a century has become increasingly unmanageable. Our power to
review decisions of the bankruptcy and magistrate courts helps preserve our
jurisdiction to the extent necessary.
However, I do see a limiting of the court's jurisdiction in the area of
administrative law. Our standard of review in administrative matters is very
limited. For example, often we must uphold an agency decision because it is
not arbitrary or capricious. This is a very deferential standard.
JUDGE PORFILIO: Article 1H judges still review the decision of Article I
judges. The same is true for the judgment of the bankruptcy court. In fact, we
now have a bankruptcy appellate court panel. Even the tax court regards them-
selves as part of the judiciary.
I was a bankruptcy judge and did not feel constraints on my authority and
did not feel my authority diminish by a lack of life tenure; and I think this
holds true of any of the judges who have been appointed to Article I courts.
As a practical matter, under the Bankruptcy Code an appointment is virtu-
ally of life tenure as one or two 14 year terms is a long time. I do not suggest,
however, that Article I should be changed as it still grants the greatest inde-
pendence.
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JUDGE SEYMOUR: Since individual district courts have the right to decide
how they will use their magistrates, it hasn't affected the jurisdiction in any
way-except when the court wants it to. For instance, the Colorado district
court do not give the magistrates the authority to hear trial upon consent of the
parties; whereas in the Northern District of Oklahoma, where I am from, they
do. Bankruptcy is really a specialty all its own. Now we have a mandate from
Congress to create bankruptcy panels, for appeals. The parties may agree to
have their appeal go to a bankruptcy appellate panel, instead of to the district
court. There are safeguards built into the system, however, including review
by an Article II court.
Such a delegation has not really upset the equilibrium. The decisions of
those non-Article III judges come up through the Article III branch. It's not a
though they are out there on their own. For instance, if an appeal goes to the
Bankruptcy Appellate panel, there is a further right of appeal to the Tenth
Circuit. So, as long as the decision-making ultimately comes through Article
Ill judges, I don't see a problem.
JUDGE MURPHY: I know there was a serious jurisdictional problem in the
Bankruptcy Act long ago which was resolved in the Marathon case. I was a
practicing lawyer at the time and avoided bankruptcy if I could, but I got
dragged in a few times. Article I judges don't have life-time appointment like
Article Ill judges do. I'm not sure Congress would have the power to suffi-
ciently assign non-Article I courts the type of work that would cut into the
decisional prerogative of Article III courts. I haven't studied the theory of
whether Congress has the power and if so, the extent of their power to dele-
gate to non-Article III courts.
JUDGE LuCERO: We ourselves are jurisdictional creatures and can only
review those cases for which Congress has provided jurisdiction. To the extent
your question suggest case load considerations is significant.
Is the equilibrium upset? Not really, because ultimately trial responsibility
and power lies with the district courts. Intrabranch delegation is just part of
the reality of the explosion of our population. You can't do business any other
way, short of creating more and more district and appellate judges. Some have
argued somewhat persuasively that an increase in the number of judges has a
greater effect on dilution of that authority. In the Tenth Circuit, there are
twelve active judges. If the caseload were handled by creating more judges,
rather than by allowing us to do our work more effectively with an increased
number of law clerks and staff counsel, the clear effect would be a dilution of
our authority.
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Law Review: As we near the end of the 20th Century, our federal courts
adjudicate issues of increasing importance to America's political system as
well as to individual rights. What trends do you see with regards to the inter-
play between such issues and judicial independence?
JUDGE EBEL: I am not sure I agree with the premise that issues are more
significant now than the issues decided earlier this century particularly in the
1960's and the 1970's. If, however, your premise is correct I believe that the
more controversial the issue addressed by the federal courts, the more risk to
the judicial independence, and thus on the most controversial issues it is pru-
dent for the courts to proceed slowly and in measured steps. This increased
risk to judicial independence when the courts are called upon to decide highly
controverted issues comes from many different directions. It comes from
heightened public intimidations resulting from public criticism, and attacks on
judicial decisions become more focused and intense when judicial decisions
deal with fundamental issues. Sustained public criticism may result in a loss of
judicial goodwill which is, in fact, the most important protection of judicial
independence.
Also, if political ideology plays too large a role in the appointment and
confirmation process for judges, then there is a risk that we may get judges
who themselves become more committed to a political ideology than to the
concept of an independent and neutral judiciary. If that were to happen, it
would constitute the gravest threat possible to the independence of the judicia-
ry and, in the end, everyone in America will have lost more than anyone could
gain from the advancement of the particular political philosophy.
JUDGE KELLY: I do not see any change. I expect that the most important
and difficult issues will continue to be adjudicated in federal courts. With any
kind of luck the caliber of the people that serve at the federal level will con-
tinue to excel. I do not believe that the next decade or century will result in
any diminution in stature or independence of the federal judiciary.
JUDGE BALDOCK: Any dispute which gives rise to a case or controversy
under federal law must be heard-easy or difficult, mundane or controversial.
As I indicated in my response to question four, judges are exposed to-and to
some extent, by-public sentiment. In the end, however, a judge should strive
to follow the law regardless of the nature of the controversy. If a judge does
so, then the nature of the issue before the court should not affect judicial inde-
pendence.
JUDGE PORFMlO: I am not a seer. I have enough problems handling
today's problems without worrying over tomorrow's. But given today's views
vis A vis judicial authority, I am concerned that we as a judiciary do not make
clear to the public what our role is and this could be a problem for the public
as whole. We have a responsibility to make the public understand why we
have authority to declare governmental actions constitutional or not. If not, we
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could have a crisis in the public's perception of the judiciary.
JUDGE MURPHY: There will be much louder hues and cries with much
more frequency. There will be, I suspect, many more campaigns mounted
against state judges standing for retention or re-election. I see a great deal
more impact on the state than federal judiciary. In an election year in which
the President or just Congress is being elected, there is almost an assurance
that the judiciary will be an issue, whether great or small.
JUDGE LUCERO: I don't. In my view, the federal courts work best when
they resolve issues on a case-by-case basis rather than when we try to set
trends. It is appropriately the role of the elected branches of government to set




Although each state within the jurisdiction of the Tenth Circuit may im-
pose a death sentence on eligible defendants,' only cases originating in the
state and federal courts of Oklahoma reached the Tenth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals during the 1995-1996 survey period.2 This Survey explores the death
penalty issues addressed by the court in these cases. Part I summarizes the
history of the death penalty and the treatment of capital punishment in the
American judicial system. Part II examines issues raised in the sentencing
phase of a capital case after determination of guilt. Part m1 explores the impact
of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 on a
defendant's petitions for habeas corpus, the fundamental process by which
state and federal courts evaluate the constitutionality of particular death sen-
tences.
I. GENERAL BACKGROUND
Death has been inflicted as a punishment throughout history? In ancient
times, torture and death were compounded, because death was considered
insufficient as a punishment." Most scholars seem to agree that prior to the
development of organized civilizations, individuals killed to avenge wrongs
done to them and their families.5 The first formal criminal codes reflected
organized society's recognition of this private form of justice. They incorporat-
ed in their criminal laws a distinction between public wrongs, such as treason
which was punishable by the state, and private wrongs, for which retribution
could be sought by the individual harmed.6 Eventually, this distinction disap-
peared, and many criminal codes established death as a standard punishment
for a wide variety of offenses.7 In seventh century Athens, death was
considered the appropriate penalty for most crimes.' During the Middle Ages,
1. Each state has legislation establishing the standards that must be met before a defendant
may be sentenced to death. See CoLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-103 (1986 & Supp. 1996); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 21-4624 (1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-14-1 to -16 (Michie 1984); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21,
§ 701.7 (1983 & Supp. 1997); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207 (1995 & Supp. 1996); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 6-2-101(b) (Michie 1996).
2. The survey period extended from September 1, 1995 through August 31, 1996. The capi-
tal cases heard by the Tenth Circuit during this period include: Hatch v. Oklahoma, 92 F.3d 1012
(10th Cir. 1996); United States v. McCullah, 87 F.3d 1136 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v.
McCullah, 76 F.3d 1087 (10th Cir. 1996); Castro v. Oklahoma, 71 F.3d 1502 (10th Cir. 1995).
3. GARY E. MCCUEN & R.A. BAUMGART, REvIVING THE DEATH PENALTY 8 (1985).
4. 1d.
5. Rudolph J. Gerber, Death Is Not Worth It, 28 ARiz. ST. LJ. 335, 335 (1996).
6. STEPHEN A. FLANDERS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 4 (1991).
7. Id.; Gerber, supra note 5, at 336.
8. FLANDERS, supra note 6, at 4; Gerber, supra note 5, at 336.
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it was a common form of punishment throughout Europe and Asia.9 Over the
next several centuries, the infliction of death became even more widespread.
By 1780, British criminal laws, called the "Bloody Code," contained three
hundred and fifty capital crimes." Due to active reform movements in
Britain, however, the number of capital crimes was drastically reduced by the
mid 1800s."
Although the American colonies adopted the death penalty in their crimi-
nal codes, historians, citing low rates of executions, conclude that it was rarely
practiced. 2 When a hanging did occur, however, the body of the dead was
displayed for days, or even months, following the execution." The establish-
ment of the first modem prison in 1790 helped alleviate the state's need for
capital punishment; confinement of convicts in prisons provided a new alter-
native to execution. 4 Many states abolished public executions by 1845; in-
stead, death sentences were carried out in the prison yard or inside the prison
building. 5 Despite consistent efforts by abolitionist and reform movements,
the death penalty remained entrenched in American jurisprudence. 6
In 1972, the United States Supreme Court decision in Furman v.
Georgia7 temporarily bolstered the abolitionists' campaign to terminate
executions. In a five-four decision, the Court held that the death sentence
issued by a jury, which was given no guidance in its determination, was
unconstitutional. 8 The Court determined that Georgia's capital sentencing
statute (and indirectly, the death penalty statutes of virtually all other states)
invariably led to the arbitrary execution of prisoners because the system lacked
guidelines, leaving juries to determine the crucial decision between life and
death without structure." Unbridled jury discretion, according to the Court,
allowed racism to infect the decision-making process, creating a system in
which the race of the victim and the race of the defendant affected whether
the defendant was executed.' Death sentences were "so wantonly and so
9. FLANDERS, supra note 6, at 5; Gerber, supra note 5, at 336.
10. FLANDERS, supra note 6, at 5.
11. Id. at 5-6; FRANKLIN E. ZIMPRiO & GORDON HAwKINs, CAPrrAL PUNiSHMENT AND THE
AMERICAN AGENDA 12 (1986); see also Gerber, supra note 5, at 337-41.
12. ZIMRiNG & HAwKINs, supra note 11, at 28. Some colonies adopted harsh criminal codes
during colonization, including death as an appropriate punishment for witchcraft, blasphemy and
adultery. The codes grew even more harsh until the Revolutionary War, though execution was
rarely practiced. FLANDERS, supra note 6, at 6. In addition, historians assert that several states,
including Michigan, Rhode Island and Wisconsin, had eliminated the death penalty for all crimes
except treason by 1853, long before the first European countries voted to eradicate the death pen-
alty. ZIMRINO & HAwKiNs, supra note 11, at 28.
13. Jonathan S. Abernethy, The Methodology of Death: Reexamining the Deterrence Ratio-
nale, 27 COLUM. HuM. RTs. L. REv. 379, 389 (1996).
14. FLANDERS, supra note 6, at 6.
15. Abernethy, supra note 13, at 390.
16. FLANDERS, supra note 6, at 7; Gerber, supra note 5, at 340-41.
17. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
18. Furman, 408 U.S. at 239-40. Nine separate opinions were filed in Furman, none clearly
indicating the direction that the law would take. Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober
Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punish-
ment, 109 HARv. L. REV. 355, 362-63 (1995).




freakishly imposed"' that the executions violated the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.' By rejecting Georgia's
established criminal sentencing code, the Supreme Court avoided determining
whether capital punishment itself was constitutional. '
More than thirty states reacted to this ruling by revising their capital
sentencing statutes to include guidelines to assist the jury in consideration of
the particular nature of the defendant and the offense.24 In 1976, the Supreme
Court impliedly upheld many of these statutes in Gregg v. Georgia,' finding
that the death penalty was not invariably unconstitutional.26 The Court,
however, required that adequate sentencing information and guidance must be
provided to the sentencing body in order to avoid the arbitrariness rejected by
the Furman Court. In addition, the Gregg Court held that the sentencing
authority must find the existence of at least one statutory aggravating factor
before sentencing the defendant to death, thereby further limiting the risk that
the jury's decision-making process would be infected by arbitrariness.'
II. DUE PROCESS CONCERNS IN THE SENTENCING PHASE
A. The Weighing of Aggravating and Mitigating Factors in the Sentencing
Phase
1. Background
During the sentencing phase of trial, the jury considers all of the relevant
aggravating and mitigating circumstances surrounding the offense. Aggravating
factors refer to those aspects related to the crime which make the offense com-
mitted more severe than the offense by itself." The jury considers statutory
aggravators (enumerated in the capital sentencing statute) in addition to the
non-statutory factors presented by the prosecution." These aggravating fac-
tors cannot be vague;3 rather they must help the jury narrow the class of
death-eligible defendants so that only those deserving of the death penalty are
executed. 2 The jury also considers evidence of all relevant statutory and non-
21. Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring).
22. The Eighth Amendment provides excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII.
23. Furman, 408 U.S. at 240.
24. BARRY NAKEUL & KENNETH A. HARDY, THE ARBrrRARINEss OF THE DEATH PENALTY
28 (1987).
25. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
26. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 206-07.
27. 1d. at 195.
28. Id. at 206-07.
29. FLANDEns, supra note 6, at 12. Aggravators may include commission of murder for
pecuniary gain (OKLA STAT. tit. 21, § 701.12(3) (1983)), commission of a felony at the time of
the murder (UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202(1)(d) (1995 & Supp. 1996)), and commission of mur-
der by an individual previously convicted of a felony (COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-103(5)(b) (1986
& Supp. 1996)).
30. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 878 (1983).
31. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 420 (1980).
32. Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 360 (1988). The narrowing function of the aggra-
vating circumstance may occur at either the guilt or the penalty phase of the trial. Lowenfield v.
Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244-45 (1988).
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statutory mitigating circumstances presented by the defense.33 The prosecu-
tion and the defense offer a great deal of information for the jury to weigh in
its deliberations, however, the jury must conclude that at least one statutory
aggravating factor exists beyond a reasonable doubt before the defendant can
be executed.'
Some states have established a system in which jurors balance the
aggravators against the mitigators.35 In those so-called weighing states, when
the jury determines the aggravators outweigh the mitigators, it may sentence
the defendant to death. Other states, non-weighing or threshold states, must
merely determine that one statutory aggravating factor was proven beyond a
reasonable doubt; once this determination is made, the defendant becomes
death-eligible.'
2. United States v. McCullah
3 7
a. Facts
A California drug-trafficking organization had recruited McCullah to help
kill a man whom they suspected of stealing drugs from them.' McCullah's
role included luring the intended victim to an ambush site where the man
would be killed. 9 Unable to lure the suspect away, McCullah substituted an
employee of the intended victim and took him to the ambush site, where he
was executed by another member of McCulah's team.' Several months later,
members of the drug-trafficking organization cooperated with police, providing
information leading to McCullah's arrest for his involvement in the drug con-
spiracy and murder.' McCullah was convicted.' During the sentencing
phase, the jury determined that there was enough evidence to prove that the
statutory aggravators existed beyond a reasonable doubt, and that this evi-
dence, coupled with evidence of non-statutory aggravators, outweighed the
mitigating factors which the defense presented. 3 Based on these findings, the
33. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-05 (1978). Mitigating factors may include evidence
that, among others, the defendant was acting under another's control (UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-
207(3)(c) (1995 & Supp. 1996)), that the defendant did not have the capacity to appreciate the
criminality of his or her conduct (WYo. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102(j)(vi) (Michie 1996)), and tend to
cause the jury to resist imposing the harshest punishment possible.
34. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 206-07.
35. Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222 (1992); Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738 (1990).
36. For the Supreme Court's explanation of the distinction between weighing and threshold
states, and the effect on appellate reweighing of aggravating and mitigating factors, see Stringer v.
Black, 503 U.S. 222, 229-32 (1992); Srikanth Srinivasan, Capital Sentencing Doctrine and the
Weighing-NonWeighing Distinction, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1347, 1365-67 (1995).
37. 76 F.3d 1087 (10th Cir. 1996).
38. McCullah, 76 F.3d at 1095.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1097.
42. Id.
43. l The prosecution submitted four statutory and four non-statutory aggravating factors
for the jury to consider during the penalty phase of the trial. The jury determined that all eight
aggravating factors existed. The statutory factors included that 1) the defendant "intentionally
engaged in conduct intending that the victim be killed or that lethal force he employed against the
victim, which resulted in the death of the victim" (21 U.S.C. § 848(n)(1)(C) (1994)); 2) the defen-
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jury sentenced McCullah to death. 4 McCullah appealed this decision, among
others, to the Tenth Circuit, arguing that multiple errors at the trial level led to
his convictions and death sentence.' He asserted that the aggravating factors
presented by the prosecution overlapped, skewing the weighing process con-
ducted by the jury during the penalty phase.4
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit agreed with McCullah's claim that some of the
aggravators overlapped.' The court found that "intentionally engag[ing] in
conduct intending that the victim be killed... which resulted in the death of
the victim"4 significantly overlapped with the non-statutory aggravator that
the defendant committed the acts with which he was charged in the indict-
ment, including that the defendant intentionally killed or caused the killing of
an individual.' Similarly, the court asserted that the statutory aggravator
relating to the defendant's intentional conduct, which was aimed at causing the
death of the victim," also duplicated the requirement set forth in the statutory
aggravator that the defendant acted with intent, knowingly creating a grave
risk of death to the victim, which resulted in the death of the victim."1 The
court held that such "double counting of aggravating factors, especially under
a weighing scheme, has a tendency to skew the weighing process and creates
the risk that the death sentence will be imposed arbitrarily and thus, uncon-
stitutionally."'52 Weighing duplicative factors creates the risk that one aggra-
vating circumstance will be given undue weight, essentially penalizing the
defendant twice for the same act.53 The court determined that this was im-
proper and necessitated the reweighing of aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances.' Although the court affirmed each of McCullah's convictions, it re-
manded his case for resentencing.55
Four months later, the Tenth Circuit denied the defendant's request for a
dant intentionally engaged in conduct which the defendant knew would create a grave risk of
death to an individual, and that conduct did result in the death of an individual (21 U.S.C. §
848(n)(1)(D) (1994)); 3) the defendant committed the act with the expectation of some type of
pecuniary gain (21 U.S.C. § 848(n)(7) (1994)); and 4) the defendant committed the act after sub-
stantial planning (21 U.S.C. § 848(n)(8) (1994)). McCu/lah, 76 F.3d at 1108. In addition, the non-
statutory factors submitted by the prosecution and found by the jury included 1) use of a deadly
weapon in the murder, 2) the defendant had a record of prior felony convictions; 3) the defendant
had committed the acts detailed in the indictment; and 4) previous attempts to rehabilitate the
defendant had been unsuccessful. Id. at 1106.
44. McCullah, 76 F.3d at 1097.
45. Id. at 1087.
46. Id. at 1111.
47. Id.
48. 21 U.S.C. § 848(n)(1)(C) (1994).
49. McCullah, 76 F.3d at 1111; United States v. McCullah, 87 F.3d 1136, 1138 (10th Cir.
1996).
50. 21 U.S.C. § 848(n)(1)(C).
51. 21 U.S.C. § 848(nXI)(D) (1994).
52. McCullah, 76 F.3d at 1111.
53. I
54. Id at 1112.
55. Id at 1114.
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rehearing, as well as the government's request for a rehearing en banc, and
affirmed its earlier decision that some of the aggravating circumstances were
duplicative.' The court reiterated that the multiple aggravators were predicat-
ed on the same act of identifying the victim and driving him to the ambush
site, and therefore could not be the basis for two separate aggravating circum-
stances.57
3. Other Circuits
The issue of duplicative aggravators was raised before the Eighth Circuit
in Ruiz v. Norris," where the defendant asserted that an aggravating circum-
stance duplicated an element of the definition of death-eligible homicides
presented to the jury. 9 Relying on Lowenfield v. Phelps," the Eighth Circuit
held that the narrowing of the class of death-eligible defendants occurred in
the definition of the crime, which was so specific that the duplication of the
element of the offense and the aggravator was inconsequential. 6 The court
asserted that this mere duplication "does not render Arkansas's death-penalty
scheme unconstitutional or violate the petitioners' rights."
In the Fifth Circuit, United States v. Florese also raised the issue of re-
dundancy among aggravating factors." As in McCullah, the jury sentenced
the defendant to death upon finding that evidence beyond a reasonable doubt
proved that the defendant intentionally killed and intentionally engaged in
conduct, intending that the victim be killed, for two of the murders with which
the defendant was charged. They also found that the defendant engaged in
conduct intending the victim to be killed in a third murder.61 The defendant
argued that two of his death sentences were invalid because they relied on
duplicative aggravating factors.' The Fifth Circuit determined, however, that
the aggravators did not simply describe the same conduct in two different
ways; rather, according to the court, an individual who personally murders a
victim and pays another individual to kill has a "dual intent."  The jury's
weighing of duplicative factors, according to the court, is permissible when
those factors are supported by separate acts.' The court upheld the validity
56. McCullah, 87 F.3d at 1137.
57. 1d at 1137. The court argued that
"[diriving the victim to the murder site (intentionally engaging in conduct intending the
victim be killed) and driving the victim to the murder site (engaging in conduct which
creates a grave risk of death) is still the same conduct .... The same act can be de-
scribed in several ways, but it is still the same act."
I& at 1138.
58. 71 F.3d 1404 (8th Cir. 1995).
59. Ruiz, 71 F.3d at 1407-08.
60. 484 U.S. 231, 244-45 (1988) (asserting that the narrowing function of an aggravating
circumstance may occur at either the guilt or penalty phase of a trial).
61. Ruz, 71 F.3d at 1408.
62. 1M
63. 63 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir. 1995).
64. Flores, 63 F.3d at 1372.
65. Id. at 1366-67.





of the aggravators and affirmed the death sentences.'
4. Analysis
When a jury undertakes the process of weighing mitigating factors against
aggravating factors of a crime, the jury must consider all relevant evidence to
best understand the character of the defendant and the circumstances of the
offense. 70 One scholar argues that the jury's consideration of aggravators and
mitigators, however, has the tendency to make the decision both easier and
harder.7' The decision is harder because the jury is required to master diffi-
cult statutory language and apply it; the decision is easier because the jury
rationalizes it based on the capital sentencing framework provided by the state,
which requires the weighing of mitigating and aggravating factors.' In reali-
ty, however, these factors are often essentially incommensurate with one an-
other, requiring the jury to make a virtually impossible determination. 7 A
decision that requires the jury to conclude that amount of viciousness which is
offset by the defendant's limitations gives "the illusion that the decision can
be reduced to a formula that obviates the need for the exercise of moral judg-
ment."74
While the Tenth Circuit Court asserts that duplicative factors will likely
produce a "skewed" result, that notion presupposes a result that is not
"skewed." The court's discussion of a "skewed" result indicates that there is a
correct, or scientifically accurate, result possible; however, in pitting a mitiga-
tor against an aggravator, a jury is compelled to make a subjective, deeply
personal evaluation.
Although some aggravating factors enumerated in 21 U.S.C. § 848(n), the
statute applied in McCullah, may permit an objective evaluation other factors
are less objective." Whether the defendant knew that he would create a
"grave" risk of harm to a person requires a subjective analysis of "gravity,"
"risk," and "harm." While examining the weight of duplicative factors may
disrupt a balance perceived by the court, that "balance" is little more than an
illusion.
69. Id. at 1378.
70. Eric Wade Richardson, Note, Due Process Requirements of Jury Charges in Capital
Cases: Simmons v. South Carolina, 114 S.Ct. 2187 (1994), 64 U. CIN. L. REv. 755, 759 (1996)
(citing Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 603 (1978)).
71. Jordan M. Steiker, The Limits of Legal Language: Decisionmaking in Capital Cases, 94
MicH. L. REv. 2590, 2613-14 (1996).
72. ld. at 2614.
73. Id.
74. ld.
75. Objective factors may include an analysis of whether the defendant has ever been con-
victed of a felony, 21 U.S.C. § 848 (n)(3), as compared to an evaluation of the risk that a defen-
dant may constitute a danger to society in the future.
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B. Psychiatric Evaluations for Capital Defendants
1. Background
In Ake v. Oklahoma,76 the. Supreme Court established the indigent
defendant's right to the assistance of a psychiatric expert when the defendant
makes a threshold showing that "his sanity is likely to be a significant factor
in his defense." Under those circumstances, the state must provide the de-
fendant access to a competent psychiatrist who will examine the defendant and
assist in preparation and presentation of the defense at trial. 8 In addition, the
Ake Court asserted that due process standards require that when the state pres-
ents the defendant's continuing threat to society as an aggravating circum-
stance, the defendant is entitled to a court-appointed psychiatrist to rebut the
state's assertions.' Several years later, the Tenth Circuit reiterated these re-
quirements, and affirmed that the defendant's claim that his or her sanity will
be an issue at trial must be "clear and genuine, one that constitutes a 'close'
question which may well be decided one way or the other."
2. Castro v. Oklahomas'
a. Facts
Castro was charged with felony murder and armed robbery of a fast food
restaurant in 19 8 4 .' When the police apprehended him, he confessed to rob-
bing the restaurant with an unloaded gun." He also admitted that the restau-
rant manager attempted to defend herself with a knife during the middle of the
robbery and that he gained control of the knife, stabbed the manager multiple
t*nes, and killed her.4 Prior to trial, Castro's court-appointed attorney re-
peatedly expressed concern that the defendant's depression and confusion
about the murder hindered his ability to assist in his own defense.' Castro's
attorney requested a psychological review of his client, and made repeated
requests for money to enable Castro to pursue an expert psychiatric exam,
though no funds were provided.'M Instead, defense counsel arranged for a
psychiatrist, who was a specialist in pediatric and geriatric analysis, as well as
a friend of counsel, to examine Castro.' Although the psychiatrist agreed to
evaluate the defendant, he refused to testify on Castro's behalf.' At trial, the
jury convicted Castro and sentenced him to death for the murder.89
76. 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
'77. Ake, 470 U.S. at 82-83.
78. Id. at 83.
79. Id. at 83-84.
80. Liles v. Saffle, 945 F.2d 333, 336 (10th Cir. 1991) (quoting Cartwright v. Maynard, 802
F.2d 1203, 1211 (10th Cir. 1986)).
81. 71 F.3d 1502 (10th Cir. 1995).
82. Castro, 71 F.3d at 1504.
83. Id. at 1505.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1506.
86. Id. at 1507.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1507 n.6.
v 89. During the penalty phase, the state presented two statutory aggravators to justify Castro's
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In preparation for the petition for habeas corpus, Castro submitted to a
comprehensive psychological and neurological exam.'o Examination results
indicated that Castro suffered from paranoid thought disorder and brain dam-
age.9' A social worker's examination of the defendant uncovered new issues
as well.' Castro's habeas petition to the Tenth Circuit asserted that he was
denied due process when the court refused to grant him access to an expert
psychiatrist.93
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit determined that the denial of expert psychiatric assis-
tance during the penalty phase of Castro's trial did not constitute harmless
error.94 The court maintained that Castro had established that his sanity could
be a significant mitigating factor at trial, and therefore should have been ap-
pointed an expert psychiatrist.95 According to the court, the state's presenta-
tion of future dangerousness triggered the Ake duty to appoint expert assis-
tance. 96
The court found that the testimony of both a forensic psychiatrist and
social worker would have framed the mitigating testimony in a manner not
achieved at trial.' This different framework might have allowed the jury
greater insight into the defendant's circumstances, placing the defendant's
crime "in an altogether different and appropriate context." g In addition, the
execution: "(1) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel; and (2) Mr. Castro consti-
tuted a continuing threat to society." d. at 1506; OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §§ 701.12(4),(7) (1983 &
Supp. 1997). Castro's presentation of mitigating evidence included his rationale for committing the
murder. He stated that "something [was] wrong with [his] mind." In addition, Castro described his
unhappy childhood, which included his devastation upon learning that his mother worked as a
prostitute, being seduced by his mother, and witnessing his brother bludgeon their father to death.
The jury determined that both aggravating factors were present, justifying the imposition of a
death sentence.
On direct appeal, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals struck down the "especially
heinous, atrocious or cruel" aggravator for insufficient grounds. Castro, 71 F.3d at 1506 (citing
Castro v. State, 745 P.2d 394, 408 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987)). In determining that Castro was a
future danger, the jury relied on three factors: Castro's pretrial escape from jail, his confession to
the commission of a prior murder, and his confession to the commission of two prior armed rob-
beries. Castro spoke extensively of these other crimes during the penalty phase of his trial. Id. at
1506.
90. Castro, 71 F.3d at 1509.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1510. According to the examining social worker, the pervasive addiction to drugs
and alcohol among Castro's family members was an important issue that should have been raised
at trial. Id. In addition, the possibility that Castro suffered from Fetal Alcohol Syndrome, the lack
of positive male role models in the defendant's life, and his diagnostic classification of Paranoid
Personality Disorder were all issues that should have been made known to the jury. According to
the social worker, without this information the jury could not make an accurate determination to
sentence the defendant to death. Id.
93. Id. at 1513.
94. Id. at 1515-16. The court conducted a harmless error analysis and determined the error
had "substantial and injurious effect" on the jury's determination (quoting Kotteakos v. United
States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)).
95. Id. at 1515.
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Tenth Circuit concluded that the psychiatrist's refusal to testify on the
defendant's behalf made his assistance to Castro inadequate." The expert's
role in taking the stand on the defendant's behalf is inherent in Ake.'0
3. Other Circuits
In a similar case,'' the Fourth Circuit determined that the trial court
committed two errors in the sentencing phase of a capital murder case. Spe-
cifically, the trial court erred in admitting the prosector's evidence that the
defendant constituted a future danger to society and by depriving the defendant
of expert psychiatric testimony to rebut the future dangerousness claim."°
Citing the Tenth Circuit's decision in Castro,"3 the Fourth Circuit applied
the harmless error test to the trial court's mistakes.'" Because Virginia is a
non-weighing state, the court determined that despite the errors made at the
trial level, "there [was] no constitutional violation."
'10
4. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit correctly determined that Castro was denied due pro-
cess when the trial court failed to appoint an expert to assist him in his de-
fense. The jury's consideration of all relevant mitigating evidence, including
an explanation by a psychiatrist, is a well-settled principle in capital punish-
ment jurisprudence." 6 Additionally, the Supreme Court has recognized that a
capital defendant must be permitted to rebut or deny evidence presented
against him at trial." Therefore, when the state presented evidence that Cas-
tro constituted a future danger to the community--an elusive claim-the de-
fendant should have been permitted to rebut this evidence." Due to the am-
biguity of a claim of future dangerousness, juries must make difficult determi-
nations, and must therefore be afforded accurate and relevant information from
both the defense and the prosecution."
The Ake Court asserted that an individual's poverty should not be determi-
native of whether the defendant has an "opportunity to participate meaning-
fully in a judicial proceeding in which his liberty is at stake."'"' Access "to
99. Id. at 1515. The court also suggested that the doctor's expertise in child and gerialric
psychiatry may have rendered him unqualified as an expert in a capital murder trial. Id.
100. Id.
101. Tuggle v. Netherland, 79 F.3d 1386 (4th Cir. 1996).
102. Tuggle, 79 F.3d at 1389.
103. Castro, 71 F.3d at 1502.
104. Tuggle, 79 F.3d at 1392-93.
105. Id. at 1393 (citing Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 232 (1992)).
106. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
107. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
108. Joseph T. McCann, Standards for Expert Testimony in New York Death Penalty Cases,
N.Y. ST. BJ., July-Aug. 1996, at 30. Juries rely on evidence presented by both sides to determine
whether the defendant constitutes a continuing threat to society; however, these projections may
be unreliable. "Predictions by mental health professionals have been shown to be highly inaccu-
rate." Id.; see Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 81 (1985).
109. Ake, 470 U.S. at 81-82.
110. Id. at 76; see also Karla C. McGrath, Sommers v. Commonwealth: An Indigent Criminal
Defendant's Right to Publicly Funded Expert Assistance Other Than the Assistance of Counsel, 84
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the raw materials integral to the building of an effective defense," and not
simply to the courthouse doors, is required to meet the standards of the Due
Process Clause of the United States Constitution."' By compelling the ap-
pointment of an expert psychiatrist to assist in Castro's defense, the Tenth Cir-
cuit appropriately upheld the requirements of Ake and the Due Process Clause
of the Constitution.
m. THE IMPACT OF THE ANTI-TERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY
ACT OF 1996 ON CAPITAL CASES
A. Background
The Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged the uniqueness of a
death sentence;"2 the irrevocability of execution demands procedural safe-
guards to ensure that the death penalty is administered according to constitu-
tional standards." 3 In addition to safeguards established at the trial level, the
appeals process helps to protect against the unconstitutional administration of
the death penalty."4
Two avenues are available for the capital defendant challenging a death
sentence. Initially, the defendant appeals the conviction in state court, a pro-
cess called direct appeal."' If there is a federal question, the direct appeal
terminates when the Supreme Court acts on the defendant's petition for writ of
certiorari. When this occurs, a "presumption of finality and legality attaches to
the conviction and sentence."
'" 6
The defendant may then file a petition for relief under the writ of habeas
corpus, a civil claim that allows post-conviction review. A convicted defen-
dant, "restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the constitution, or of any
treaty or law of the United States," may petition the court for relief under the
doctrine of habeas corpus."7 This petition for review allows the defendant an
opportunity to contest those convictions and sentences that are illegally ob-
tained at the trial level.""
KY. LJ. 387 (1995) (discussing the rights of indigent defendants).
111. Ake, 470 U.S. at 77; U.S. CONST. ART. XIV, § 1.
112. Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 329 (1985); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 280, 305 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238, 270 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
113. FLANDERS, supra note 7, at 26.
114. Mark Miller, Twenty-Fifth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: Appellate Review of
Sentences, 84 GEo. LJ. 1389, 1389-91 (1996).
115. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983). When a defendant is convicted and sentenced
under federal law in federal court, the defendant pursues his direct appeal in the federal courts. Id.
116. Id. at 887.
117. The Judiciary Act of 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 StaL 385; The United States Constitution
provides that "the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in
Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. In
Latin, "habeas corpus" means "you have the body." BLACK's LAw DIcnoNARY 709 (6th ed.
1990).
118. Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat.
1214 (to be codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2266) [hereinafter Anti-Terrorism Act]. In
addition to altering the provisions for habeas corpus procedures, the Anti-Terrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 also added 28 U.S.C. §§ 2261-66, which contain rules for special
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Concerns for finality of convictions and federalism have limited the po-
tentially broad scope of the habeas corpus doctrine."9 Although habeas re-
view is not conducted to correct errors of fact, factual allegations may be re-
viewed if they pertain to a constitutional violation.' ° With few exceptions,
the petitioner may rely only on law available at the time his conviction be-
came final.' In addition, a defendant may be procedurally barred from rais-
ing a claim if he failed to raise it first in state court." When a reviewing
court determines that an error did occur at the trial level, relief will only be
granted to the petitioner if the error caused a "substantial and injurious effect
or influence in determining the jury's verdict."'"
Post-conviction review is available at both the state and federal levels. A
petitioner's post-conviction review at the state level focuses on violations of
the state and federal constitution.'24 When state habeas procedures terminate,
federal habeas corpus proceedings are the next available means of appeal for
the capital defendant."2 Filing of a second or successive petition for habeas
relief is permissible; however, the standard for acceptance of those petitions
was recently modified by Congress."
The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 significantly
reduced the breadth of habeas corpus."2 The Act established a statute of lim-
habeas corpus procedures, applicable when states appoint counsel for the indigent defendant. Un-
der those circumstances, the statute of limitations for filing of a habeas petition is six months.
John H. Blume & David P. Voisin, An Introduction to Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Pro-
cedure, 47 S.C. L. REV. 271, 278 (1996).
119. Blume & Voisin, supra note 118, at 273.
120. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993).
121. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 290 (1989). "New" constitutional laws were defined by
the Teague Court as those which were not dictated by precedent at the time the defendant's con-
viction became final. Teague, 489 U.S. at 290. Retroactive application of a new constitutional rule
is permissible only when 1) the new rule decriminalizes behavior which had been previously con-
sidered criminal; or 2) if application of the new rule is required by the observance of "'those
procedures that... are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.'" Id at 307 (quoting Desist v.
United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). In 1991, the Supreme Court refined
the definition of a new rule as one that is "susceptible to debate among reasonable minds." Butier
v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 415 (1990); see Alan W. Clarke, Procedural Labyrinths and the Injus-
tice of Death: A Critique of Death Penalty Habeas Corpus, 30 U. RICH. L. REv. 303, 304-27
(1996).
122. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90-91 (1977).
123. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 619 (1993).
124. While the petitioner used to have to exhaust all available state remedies before filing a
petition for habeas relief in federal court in deference to state court proceedings, Congress has
modified this requirement in the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. Prior to the
passage of the Act, the dismissal of a mixed petition, one containing both claims that were ex-
hausted in state courts and those that were not, was without prejudice (Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S.
509, 510 (1982)). Under the new habeas statute, however, federal courts are permitted to dismiss a
mixed petition on the merits, thereby barring the petitioner from raising those claims again. Anti-
Terrorism Act § 106(b).
125. Many scholars assert that federal courts provide the best opportunity for vacating a
defendant's death sentence. Some of the possible reasons for reliance on federal courts were ad-
dressed at a recent American Bar Association panel discussion, which included timidity of elected
judges in state court to reverse the decision, ineffective assistance of counsel at the state level, and
judicial unwillingness to correct prosecutorial and state court errors. Ronald J. Tabak, Capital
Punishment: Is There Any Habeas Left in this Corpus?, 27 LoY. U. Cm. LJ. 523, 529-30 (1996).
126. Anti-Terrorism Act §§ 101,105. See infra notes 131-37 and accompanying text.
127. Anti-Terrorism Act § 106(b). See Tom C. Smith, Crime Legislation Passes in Election
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itations for the filing of habeas petitions," specified that federal courts will
defer to the conclusions of state courts,' and modified the requirements of
the filing of second or successive habeas petitions. 3
Under the Anti-Terrorism Act, a petitioner seeking to have a second or
successive habeas corpus petition heard by the district court must initially
apply for the ability to have that petition considered by a three-judge panel in
the appropriate federal Court of Appeals. 3' The Court of Appeals fulfills a
"gatekeeper" function; if the original application is denied by the court, all
successive petitions are automatically rejected by the district court.'32 The
three-judge panel's decision regarding the acceptability of subsequent petitions
is not appealable by the defendant, eliminating the appellate power of the
courts of appeal and the Supreme Court.'33 The new standards a habeas peti-
tioner must meet to file a successive habeas petition are stringent. A second or
successive petition will be dismissed unless the defendant is able to show that
he or she relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive accord-
ing to the standards established in Teague v. Lane." The petition may also
be accepted by the court when the petitioner is able to show that despite due
diligence, the factual foundation for a claim was not discoverable at the time
of trial. Based on those newly discovered facts, the defendant must show that
no reasonable factfinder could have found the defendant guilty of the underly-
ing offense.'35 The Supreme Court upheld these provisions in the Anti-Ter-
rorism Act in recent decision of Felker v. Turpin."
Year, 11 CRiM. JusT. 50 (1996); see generally Note, Blown Away? The Bill of Rights After Okla-
homa City, 109 HARv. L. REv. 2074 (1996) (discussing habeas corpus reform movements).
128. Anti-Terrorism Act §§ 101, 105. The petitioner in state custody has one year to file a
petition for habeas corpus after the latest of the following: conclusion of direct review; the remov-
al of an impediment created by state action which prevents the petitioner from filing a petition;
the Supreme Court's recognition of a new constitutional right, combined with the Court's determi-
nation that the right should be retroactively applied; or the date on which the factual basis of a
claim was discoverable. Id.
129. Id. at § 104(3).
130. Id. at § 104(4)(e)(1).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at § 106(b)(3)(E). This section indicates that "the grant or denial of an authorization
by a court of appeals to file a second or successive application shall not be appealable and shall
not be the subject of a petition for rehearing or for a writ of certiorari." Id.
134. 489 U.S. 288 (1989). For a description of retroactivity, see supra note 122.
135. Anti-Terrorism Act § 106.
136. 116 S. Ct. 2333 (1996). In Felker, the Supreme Court speedily reviewed the constitution-
ality of the Anti-Terrorism Act. See Smith, supra note 127. In an unusual decision, the Supreme
Court agreed to consider the constitutionality of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act on an expedited schedule. Id. The defendant-petitioner had been convicted of multiple offens-
es and sentenced to death. Felker, 116 S.Ct. at 2336. The Court asserted that although its review
of a judgment on an application for leave to file a successive petition for habeas was limited by
the Act, it was still able to review habeas petitions filed as original matters, thus granting the
Court original jurisdiction. Id. at 2338-39. In addition, the Court held that the gatekeeping mecha-
nism was not a new tool to evaluate petitions for habeas relief. Id. at 2340. The Court asserted
that the provision in the Act merely transferred the screening function, formerly performed by the
district court, to the courts of appeals. Id.
19971
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B. Hatch v. Oklahoma'37
1. Facts
An Oklahoma state court convicted Hatch of two counts of first degree
murder."3 Two sentencing procedures were declared invalid. In the third at-
tempt, however, Hatch was sentenced to die by lethal injection, a decision af-
firmed by the appellate court. 39 Hatch's petitions for habeas relief were de-
nied by state and federal courts. 4
After the passage of the Anti-Terrorism Act, Hatch filed applications for a
stay of execution and for the ability to file successive habeas petitions in the
Tenth Circuit, in compliance with the Act. 4' Hatch initially asserted, howev-
er, that the Act did not apply to him because it would constitute a retroactive
application of penal legislation, prohibited by the Ex Post Facto Clause of the
Constitution.'42
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit denied the defendant's application to file subsequent
habeas petitions, as well as the application for the stay of execution."'4 The
Court determined that none of Hatch's claims met the standards established by
the Anti-Terrorism Act's requirements for second or successive petitions.'"
Hatch was executed by lethal injection on August 10, 1996."
3. Analysis
The writ of habeas corpus has been celebrated as one of the fundamental
components of the American criminal justice system.'4 In 1961, the Su-
preme Court cautioned that "there is no higher duty than to maintain [the writ]
unimpaired."'" Yet, Congress' Anti-Terrorism Act--relied on in Hatch-and
the "procedural maze" created by the Supreme Court have profoundly altered
the breadth of habeas review.'"
137. 92 F.3d 1012 (10th Cir. 1996).




142. Id. at 1014. The Ex Post Facto Clause provides that "No Bill of Attainder or ex post
facto Law shall be passed." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. The Tenth Circuit determined that
Hatch's claim did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because his application was filed two
months after the passage of the Anti-Terrorism Act. Hatch, 92 F.3d at 1014.
143. Hatch. 92 F.3d at 1017.
144. Id. at 1014-17.
145. Lois Romano, Execution Closes A Tragic Circle: Douglas's Children Watch Their
Parents' Killer Die, WASH. PosT, August 10, 1996, at A3. Interestingly, State Senator Brooks
Douglass, who witnessed Hatch's execution for the murder of his parents, authored legislation
allowing surviving relatives to witness the execution of individuals convicted of murdering their
family members. Id.
146. Stephen B. Bright, Does the Bill of Rights Apply Here Anymore? Evisceration of Habeas
Corpus and Denial of Counsel to Those Under Sentence of Death, CHAMPION, Nov., 1996, at 25.
147. Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 712-13 (1961) (quoting Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S.
19, 26 (1939)).
148. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 541 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Hatch's application for successive petitions was dismissed because it
failed to meet the requirements of the new Anti-Terrorism Act, provisions
which the White House publicly acknowledged may be unconstitutional."
By adhering to those requirements, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, like
the Supreme Court in Felker, chose brevity over thoroughness in its review of
capital cases.
The Tenth Circuit's preference for efficiency in Hatch directly contra-
venes the otherwise-settled doctrine that death is different, and because of the
uniqueness of the sentence, heightened procedural safeguards are necessary to
ensure that executions are not administered in an unconstitutional manner.
Supporters of the Act maintain that without limits, death row prisoners file
seemingly endless habeas petitions, thereby abusing the court system. The effi-
ciency of the new Act, however, has detrimental effects."5 By emphasizing
speed, the criminal justice system risks the likelihood that innocent defendants
will be executed, 5' that race will continue to infect the determination made
in the sentencing phase, 52 and that a defendant may suffer fatal conse-
quences because of an attorney's error.'3
CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals' decisions in McCullah and Castro
illustrate a strong commitment to ensuring that capital defendants are afforded
due process throughout the sentencing phase of a capital case. The recent pas-
sage of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, however, may
threaten that commitment if the court sacrifices thoroughness of review for
efficiency. If the Act survives challenges to its constitutionality,'54 its amend-
ments to the habeas corpus statutes, coupled with its new provisions, will have
a significant impact on the outcome of cases brought before the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals in the future.
Cathleen Coffey
149. Tabak, supra note 125, at 523 n.1 (citing Alison Mitchell, Clinton Signs Measure on
Terrorism and Death Penalty Appeals, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1995, at A18); Stephen Labaton,
Senate Easily Passes Counterterrorism Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1996, at B7.
150. Supreme Court Hands Prosecutors Two Victories, 30 PROSECUrOR, Sept.-Oct. 1996, at
34.
151. See MICHAEL L. RADELET, E" AL IN SPITE OF INNOCENCE (1992) (documenting the
execution of over 400 innocent defendants in the United States since 1900).
152. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). Statistics offered on behalf of the defen-
dant indicating that black defendants were over four times more likely to be executed than white
defendants were insufficient to "demonstrate a constitutionally significant risk of racial bias."
McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 313.
153. Bright, supra note 146; see Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991). In Coleman,
the Court determined that the filing of a notice of appeal three days late in state court by the
defendant's attorney constituted a default by the defendant, thereby barring the defendant from
raising those issues in federal court. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. Bright asserts that Congress has
revealed its indifference to injustice most remarkably in the combination of the denial of assis-
tance of counsel for post-conviction review, coupled with the imposition of a statute of limitations





CRIMINAL LAW: DEFENDANTS' RIGHTS
INTRODUCTION
The United States Constitution and various federal statutes prescribe the
minimal protections that the government must give to criminal defendants. Al-
though the concept of criminal defendants' rights implicates many aspects of
criminal procedure, this Survey features cases decided by the Tenth Circuit
from September 1995 to September 1996 addressing three specific areas. Part
I examines the relationship between defendants and the judges presiding over
their cases, and the extent to which a defendant may challenge the authority of
a judge. Part II explores the rights of indigent defendants under the Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution, as
related to presentence confinement credit resulting from an inability to post
bail. Finally, Part I discusses the various claims made by defendants to in-
yoke the protections of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution
for the purpose of suppressing self-incriminating statements.
I. POWER OF JUDGES OVER DEFENDANTS
A. Background
Criminal defendants have the right to challenge the authority of a trial
judge as required by due process guarantees.' A defendant may move to re-
cuse the judge based on the appearance of bias or prejudice pursuant to either
28 U.S.C. § 144 or § 455,2 or the defendant may, pursuant to the Federal




The Federal Magistrates Act, enacted by Congress in 1968, created the
system of United States Magistrates to replace the United States Commission-
ers.5 Congress viewed the commissioner system as defective in part because
its fee-for-service system restricted its effectiveness by limiting earnings and
1. See Maria Eisland. Note, The Federal Magistrates Act: Are Defendants' Rights Violated
when Magistrates Preside over Jury Selection in Felony Cases?, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 783, 793-
96 (1988).
2. For an analysis of the relationship between these recusal statutes, see Thomas McKevitt,
Note, The Rule of Necessity: Is Judicial Non-Disqualification Really Necessary?, 24 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 817, 822-26 (1996).
3. Federal Magistrates Act, Pub. L. No. 90-578, 82 Stat. 1107 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. §§ 631-639 (1994)).
4. See 28 U.S.C. § 636 (describing the jurisdiction and powers granted to a magistrate).
5. See id. § 631. See generally Thomas R. Garcia, Note, Federal Courts-In Re United
States-Should Federal Magistrates Be Delegated the Authority to Approve Electronic Surveil-
lance Applications?, 18 W. NEw ENG. L. REV. 271 (1996) (discussing the history of the Federal
Magistrates Act and cases interpreting magistrates' authority under the Act).
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deterring highly qualified people from serving.6 The Federal Magistrates Act
delegated all the powers of the commissioners to the magistrates, and addi-
tionally, granted magistrates the power to determine certain pretrial matters
and conduct preliminary hearings on post-trial motions.7 In 1976, Congress
amended the Act by expanding and clarifying the duties that magistrates could
perform s The amendment added a new clause that stated, "[a] magistrate may
be assigned such additional duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution
and the laws of the United States." Extensive litigation followed in an at-
tempt to define the precise scope of magistrate authority.
For example, in United States v. Raddatz,'° the Supreme Court deter-
mined that a magistrate may conduct a hearing on a motion to suppress evi-
dence in a felony trial without an automatic de novo review by the district
court judge of the testimony presented." The Court emphasized that the
safeguards in the Act which allow the parties to object to the findings and
recommendations by the magistrate, will also trigger de novo review by the
district court judge. 2 Later, in Gomez v. United States, 3 the Court ad-
dressed the issue of whether a magistrate could conduct voir dire without the
consent of the defendant. 4 Because the Act does not specify that a magistrate
may conduct voir dire, the Court found that the defendant had a constitutional
right to have a district judge preside.'" Two years later, in Peretz v. United
States,6 the Court reconsidered the issue. The two cases differ in that the
defendant in Peretz expressly consented to the magistrate's authority and
failed to raise an objection until after the conviction.' The Court narrowed
the holding in Gomez to allow magistrates to conduct voir dire with the con-
sent of the defendant. 9
2. Recusal
The statutes governing recusal of a trial judge for personal bias or preju-
dice overlap substantively,' but differ procedurally.2' Substantively, either a
6. See Garcia, supra note 5, at 278.
7. 28 U.S.C. § 636.
8. See Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-577, 90 Stat. 2729 (1976) (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)).
9. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3).
10. 447 U.S. 667 (1980).
11. Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 673-84.
12. ld. at 680-81. For a constitutional analysis of Raddatz, see Eisland, supra note 1, at 788-
96.
13. 490 U.S. 858 (1989).
14. Gomez, 490 U.S. at 861-62; see also Eisland, supra note 1 (discussing the constitutional
issues involved when a magistrate presides over the jury selection in a felony case).
15. Gomez, 490 U.S. at 874-76.
16. 501 U.S. 923 (1991).
17. Peretz, 501 U.S. at 924-25.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 933.
20. Section 144 provides:
Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and files a timely and
sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending has a personal bias
or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party, such judge shall proceed
no further therein, but another judge shall be assigned to hear such proceeding.
[Vol. 74.2
DEFENDANTS' RIGHTS
§ 144 or § 455 motion challenges the impartiality of the presiding judge,'
but procedurally, only a § 455 motion allows a sua sponte recusal. 2 General-
ly, the recusal motion is based on bias from an extrajudicial source, such as
personal knowledge of the evidentiary facts or a personal relationship with a
party or attorney in the case.24 After filing a § 455 motion, the judge whose
impartiality is questioned issues a decision. If the judge determines that the
facts warrant recusal, another judge is assigned to the proceeding;' if the
judge denies the motion, the decision is immediately reviewable by the appel-
late court to determine whether the trial judge abused his discretion.'
In Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp.,' the Supreme Court
established the proper inquiry to determine whether a judgment should be
28 U.S.C. § 144 (1994). Section 455(b) states:
He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances:
(1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal
knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;
(2) Where in private practice he served as lawyer in the matter in controversy,
or a lawyer with whom he previously practiced law served during such associ-
ation as a lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge or such lawyer has been
a material witness concerning it;
(3) Where he has served in governmental employment and in such capacity
participated as counsel, advisor or material witness concerning the proceeding
or expressed an opinion concerning the merits of the particular case in contro-
versy;
(4) He knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or minor
child residing in his household, has a financial interest in the subject matter in
controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be
substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding;
(5) He or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship to
either of them, or the spouse of such a person:
(i) Is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee of a
party;
(ii) Is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;
(iii) Is known by the judge to have an interest that could be substan-
tially affected by the outcome of the proceeding;
(iv) Is to the judge's knowledge likely to be a material witness in the
proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 455(b). See generally Amy J. Shimek, Professional Responsibility Survey: Recusal,
73 DEN . U. L. REv. 903, 903-05 (1996) (discussing § 455 and Tenth Circuit decisions interpret-
ing this provision).
21. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 144 (requiring a motion for recusal to be filed at least ten days
before the beginning of the term during which the proceeding is to be heard) with 28 U.S.C. § 455
(providing no explicit time limitation on filing a motion). See also James Oleske, Authority of the
Trial Judge, 84 GEo. LJ. 1179, 1179-85 (1996) (dicussing § 144 and § 455).
While § 455 provides no explicit time limitation, the Tenth Circuit has required this motion
to be made in a timely manner. See Willner v. University of Kan., 848 F.2d 1020, 1022-23 (10th
Cir. 1988); see also Shimek, supra note 20, at 913-15.
22. See supra note 20.
23. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (stating that a judge "shall disqualify himself in any proceeding
in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned").
24. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(b); see also David Blanck, The Appearance of Justice Revisited, 86
J. Cium. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 887, 908-11 (1996) (detailing the debate among federal courts of
appeal regarding whether § 455(a) is subject to an extrajudicial source limitation).
25. See El Fenix de P.R. v. The M/Y Johanny, 36 F.3d 136, 141-42 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding
that a judge may not reconsider her recusal order, but only tansfer the case to another judge).
26. See also Oleske, supra note 21, at 1185.
27. 486 U.S. 847 (1988).
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vacated based on the trial judge's failure to recuse himself when appropri-
ate.' The reviewing court must consider "the risk of injustice to the parties
in the particular case, the risk that the denial of relief will produce injustice in
other cases, and the risk of undermining the public's confidence in the judicial
process."' Recently, the Supreme Court rejected the doctrine that only extra-
judicial sources can support a bias determination," and conceded that recusal
may be warranted by a display of judicial bias or prejudice within the court-
room.
31
B. Tenth Circuit Decisions
1. United States v. Ciapponi32
a. Facts
Defendant George M. Ciapponi was arrested at a border checkpoint in
New Mexico when authorities discovered ten kilograms of marijuana in the
vehicle Ciapponi was driving. 33 Ciapponi's court-appointed attorney arranged
a plea bargain with the government in which Ciapponi exchanged a guilty plea
for a reduced sentence. 4 The district court judge assigned to the case desig-
nated a magistrate to hear and accept Ciapponi's plea. 35 At the hearing,
Ciapponi waived his right to enter his guilty plea before a district judge, and
proceeded to enter his plea before the magistrate.' However, at his sentenc-
ing hearing before the district judge, Ciapponi received a higher sentence due
to his criminal history.37 He appealed on the basis that the magistrate judge
did not have the jurisdiction to accept his plea.38
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit analyzed Ciapponi's challenge by examining the au-
thority given to magistrate judges both statutorily by the Federal Magistrates
Act and constitutionally by Article li.39 The court noted that Congress
amended the Magistrates Act in 1976 to expand the duties of magistrate judg-
28. Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 862-64.
29. Id. at 864.
30. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540. 554 (1994); see also Blanck, supra note 24, at
910-23 (discussing the relationship between extrajudicial and intrajudicial source bias).
31. Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555-56 (acknowledging that although intrajudicial sources of bias are
possible, the judge in question was not biased based simply on comments he made about the peti-
tioner during a prior trial).
32. 77 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1839 (1996).





38. Id. Ciapponi also contended that the court's use of his criminal history was erroneous
because it should not have considered his two previous convictions "related" offenses. Id. at 1252-
53. The Tenth Circuit found that the two convictions did not constitute a common scheme, and the
district court made no error in counting them as separate offenses for sentencing purposes. Id.
39. Id. at 1249-52 (discussing 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-639 (1994) and Article III of the Constitu-
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es as authorized by district court judges in response to the burdens of increas-
ing caseloads.4 Ciapponi argued that the magistrate's authority to accept his
plea did not fall within the definition of delegable duties under the statute.4
Additionally, the court reviewed the constitutionality of delegating duties to a
magistrate when the defendant has the right to have a district court judge
preside at "all critical stages of a felony trial."'2
The Tenth Circuit relied upon the United States Supreme Court's Peretz v.
United States decision in holding that a magistrate's expanded duties do not
violate the statute or the Constitution when the defendant expressly consents to
a magistrate's authority."3 The court found it significant that Ciapponi did not
object to the use of the magistrate, move to withdraw his plea, or request
review of the plea proceeding by the district court." The court also held that
there is no requirement for the district court to review the plea proceedings
conducted by a magistrate unless the defendant raises an objection or requests
review.'
2. Nichols v. Alley'
a. Facts
On April 19, 1995, a bomb destroyed the Murrah Federal Building in
Oklahoma City.' The massive explosion killed 169 people, and caused se-
vere damage and injuries in the vicinity of the federal building.' Terry
Nichols, and co-defendant Timothy McVeigh, were charged with the explosion
in an eleven count indictment that included eight counts of first degree mur-
der.' The first issue decided by the Tenth Circuit in the highly publicized
"Oklahoma City Bombing Case" involved defendant Terry Nichols' writ of
mandamus petition for the disqualification of all judges of the Western District
of Oklahoma, including the assigned judge, Wayne Alley. ° The explosion
damaged Judge Alley's courtroom and offices, although Judge Alley sustained
no injuries and was not personally acquainted with any of the deceased vic-
tims." Both Nichols and McVeigh filed motions for recusal of Judge Alley,
who denied the motions. 2 Nichols then filed a petition for a writ of manda-
mus with the Tenth Circuit for the purpose of disqualifying Judge Alley, as
40. Id. at 1250.
41. Id.
42. Id
43. Id. at 1250-52 (discussing Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923 (1991), which held a
magistrate judge may preside over jury selection of a felony case with the defendant's consent).
44. Id. at 1251 (comparing Ciapponi's situation to that in United States v. Williams, 23 F.3d
629 (2d Cir. 1994), which held a magistrate may accept a defendant's plea with his consent even
when the defendant challenged the magistrate's authority before the district judge and moved to
withdraw his plea).
45. Id.
46. 71 F.3d 347 (10th Cir. 1995).
47. Nichols, 71 F.3d at 349.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 350.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 349-50.
52. Id. at 350.
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well as all judges in the Western District of Oklahoma, or alternatively, to
order that Judge Alley hold an evidentiary hearing for the recusal motions.'




The Tenth Circuit found that the reasonable appearance of bias mandated
Judge Alley's recusal from the case.55 After analyzing the legal standards
governing mandamus,' the court addressed the statutory authority of
Nichols's argument.57 The statute requires the disqualification of a judge
when the judge fails an objective test of the appearance of impartiality." The
inquiry turns on the factual basis of the case and any outward appearance of
bias, not on the specific judge's "actual state of mind, purity of heart, incor-
ruptibility, or lack of partiality." 9
The government argued that recusal was not required when the judge's
bias was not reasonably questionable.' The court rejected these arguments
due to the unique and extraordinary facts surrounding this case, and noted that
the law favors recusal when the issue is a close one.6' While conceding that
Judge Alley had conducted himself in a purely professional and unbiased man-
ner, the court held that a reasonable person would question the partiality of the
judge in light of the facts surrounding the case.' The holding, however, per-
tained only to Judge Alley and the court referred the matter to the Chief Judge
of the Tenth Circuit for reassignment.'
C. Analysis
The 1976 amendments to the Federal Magistrates Act reflect the intent of
Congress to expand the authority of United States magistrates." The federal
district courts broadly interpret magistrate duties to include all proceedings
that do not violate any specific right of the defendant.' Failure of the defen-
53. Id
54. Id.
55. Id at 352.
56. Id. at 350. Mandamus requires a higher standard of review, therefore the petitioner must
show a "clear and undisputable right to relief" by demonstrating a clear abuse of discretion by the
district court and no adequate alternative for relief. Id.
57. Id at 350-52 (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1994)). Nichols also argued that Judge
Alley's recusal was warranted by actual bias under 28 U.S.C. § 144 and prejudice under 28 U.S.C.
§ 455(b)(1), but the court did not decide these arguments in light of their holding based on 28
U.S.C. § 455(a). Id. at 351 n.1.
58. Id at 350-51.
59. Id. at 351 (quoting Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 860
(1988)).
60. Id. at 352.
61. Id. (citing United States v. Dandy, 998 F.2d 1344 (6th Cir. 1993)).
62. Id Additionally, the court found that Nichols met the increased burden required of those
petitioning for mandamus relief. Id. See also supra note 56 (discussing the standard of review for
a writ of mandamus).
63. Nichols, 71 F.3d at 352-53.
64. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
65. See Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923 (1991); Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858
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dant to consent to magistrate authority provides the only limitation to the mag-
istrate presiding over the case.'t
The circuit courts are reluctant to order a trial judge's recusal due to per-
sonal bias or prejudice.' This year, the Tenth Circuit overcame this reluc-
tance in part due to the enormous publicity of the Oklahoma City Bombing
trial.
D. Other Circuits
In determining the powers of magistrate judges under the Federal Magis-
trates Act, the Ninth Circuit ruled that magistrates lack the power to conduct
probation revocation hearings without the express consent of the defendant.'
In general, magistrates may assume limited power, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(3), without the consent of the parties if the power relates to procedural
or administrative matters.'
Other circuits are reluctant to grant a recusal motion to disqualify the trial
judge, especially in instances where the foundation of the defendant's argu-
ment for recusal is the judge's connection to the defendant's previous, unre-
lated trial, or in the case of a retrial, the fact that the judge presided over the
defendant's first trial."' The Second Circuit established a procedural rule that
a defendant who entered an unconditional guilty plea could still appeal an
order denying his motion for recusal.7 The Eighth Circuit, however, allowed
the recusal of the trial judge in another highly publicized trial, United States v.
Tucker.72 This case involved the prosecution of the governor of Arkansas was
prosecuted for tax fraud, bankruptcy fraud, making false material statements,
and conspiracy." The court disqualified the trial judge because to the judge's
personal relationship with Hillary Rodham Clinton, coupled with the Clintons'
support for the defendant.
4
(1989); United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980).
66. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
67. See infra note 74 and accompanying text.
68. United States v. Colacurcio, 84 F.3d 326, 334 (9th Cir. 1996).
69. See Colacurcio, 84 F.3d at 332-33; see also supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
70. See United States v. Thompson, 76 F.3d 442, 450-51 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that a trial
judge is not required to recuse himself when he worked in the U.S. Attorney's office prior to the
defendant's previous prosecution); United States v. Wilson, 77 F.3d 105, 110-11 (5th Cir. 1996)
(holding that recusal was not warranted because the trial judge presided over the trial of the co-
defendants and had made rulings on the same motions brought by the defendant); United States v.
Mizell, 88 F.3d 288, 298-300 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. CL 620 (1996) (holding that the trial
judge was not required to recuse himself from the defendant's retrial simply because the judge had
made adverse pre- and post-trial decisions in the defendant's earlier trial); United States v. Griffin,
84 F.3d 820, 829-31 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that recusal was not required in an attorney's con-
tempt hearing because of the judge's frustration with the attorney in the trial that led to the hear-
ing); Hook v. McDade, 89 F.3d 350, 354-55 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. CL 718 (1997)
(holding that recusal was not required when the judge's wife was the opposing counsel in a civil
case against the defendant); Poland v. Stewart, No. 95-99022, 1996 WL 764695, at *47-*52 (9th
Cir. Dec. 31, 1996) (holding that the fact that the same judge presided over both trial and retrial
was insufficient to meet the standard for recusal).
71. United States v. Brinkworth, 68 F.3d 633, 638 (2d Cir. 1995).
72. 78 F.3d 1313 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. CL 76 (1996).
73. Tucker, 78 F.3d at 1316.
74. ld. at 1324-25. However, in an unrelated case, the Ninth Circuit denied the recusal mo-
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H. FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
A. Background
The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States pro-
vides that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws." In the
landmark case of Griffin v. Illinois,"' the United States Supreme Court held
that practices in the criminal justice system which result in discrimination
against defendants based on their inability to pay violate the Equal Protection
Clause." Following Griffin, indigent defendants have frequently invoked the
Equal Protection Clause to challenge unfair practices, and the Supreme Court
has usually invalidated those practices."'
While most states allow persons convicted of lesser crimes to choose
imprisonment as an alternative to paying a fine, 9 the Supreme Court first
decided the issue of imprisonment beyond the statutory maximum in Williams
v. Illinois." The Court found it unconstitutional to imprison a defendant lon-
ger than the maximum punishment allowed for a crime because of an inability
to pay a fine."' However, the fact that an indigent person may be imprisoned
longer than a non-indigent person convicted of the same offense does not
violate the Equal Protection Clause.' The Court concluded that the Constitu-
tion required this ruling and that adequate alternative methods for satisfying
the state's interest in enforcing the fine justified the decision. 3
tion in United States v. Treiber, 84 F.3d 1549, 1559-60 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 117 S. CL 267
(1996), which was brought because of the judge's published views on legal issues.
75. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
76. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
77. Griffin, 351 U.S. at 19. Specifically, the Court declared that an indigent defendant is
entitled to receive trial transcripts at public expense when required for appeals. Id.
78. See generally David A. Harris, The Constitution and Truth Seeking: A New Theory on
Expert Services for Indigent Defendants, 83 J. CIUM. L. & CRIMiOLOGY 469 (1992) (advocating
a "truth-seeking theory" as a way to determine if indigents are entitled to expert services in their
defense); Fred Lautz, Note, Equal Protection and Revocation of an Indigent's Probation for Fail-
ure to Meet Monetary Conditions: Bearden v. Georgia, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 121 (1985) (analyzing
the effect of the Court's decision on the financial conditions a trial court can impose when setting
probation for indigents); Michael James Todd, Case Note, Criminal Procedure - Due Process
and Indigent Defendants: Extending Fundamental Fairness to Include the Right to Expert Assis-
tance, 29 How. LJ. 609 (1986) (applauding the Supreme Court's decision to expand indigent's
rights to include a right to a psychiatric evaluation when there has been a showing that insanity is
an issue).
79. Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 239-40 (1970).
80. Id. at 235, 236. See generally Joseph L. Hendrickson, Note, The Use of Uncounseled
Misdemeanor Convictions to Enhance a Penalty for a Subsequent Offense After Nichols v. United
States, 39 ST. Louis U. LJ. 669 (1995) (analyzing recent Supreme Court decisions dealing with
the collateral use of uncounseled convictions in setting standards); The Supreme Court, 1982
Term-Criminal Sentencing of Indigents, 97 HARv. L. REv. 86 (1983) (analyzing the Supreme
Court's Court's Bearden decision and concluding that the Court's analysis of indigent rights in the
judicial process had shifted from a focus on equal protection to fundamental fairness).
81. Williams, 399 U.S. at 240-41.
82. Id. at 243.
83. Id. at 244-45.
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B. Hall v. Furlong"
1. Facts
Defendant James Edward Hall was arrested for violating Colorado law
and confined to jail in August, 1977.' Because of his indigency, Hall was
not able to post bail, and remained confined until his sentencing hearing for a
total of 219 days. 6 Hall pleaded guilty to first degree sexual assault and re-
ceived the maximum authorized sentence of twenty-seven to fifty years."
Hall moved to obtain credit for time served prior to sentencing." The state
trial court granted him an eighty-four day credit applicable to Hall's minimum
sentence, but no credit toward Hall's maximum sentence.'9 Hall filed a writ
of habeas corpus ° as a pro se petitioner, and the district court determined
that no justiciable controversy existed.9' Hall then appealed to the Tenth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals.
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit reviewed the denial of the writ of habeas corpus and
found in favor of granting presentence confinement credit to Hall.' The issue
before the court was whether denying credit to an indigent prisoner violated
the prisoner's rights to equal protection and due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment.93 In its decision, the court relied on the Supreme Court's rule
from Williams v. Illinois which determined that the Equal Protection Clause
requires that maximum authorized sentences for any crime be the same for all
defendants regardless of their economic status." The court noted that other
circuits had previously applied the rule in Williams to factually similar situa-
tions,9" although the Tenth Circuit had not previously done so.' Referring to
the rulings of the other circuits, the court held that Hall must receive full cred-
it for presentence incarceration due to his indigency as mandated by the Equal
Protection Clause.'
84. 77 F.3d 361 (10th Cir. 1996).
85. Hall, 77 F.3d at 362.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 362-63.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 363.
90. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1994).
91. Hall, 77 F.3d at 363.
92. Id. at 364.
93. Id. at 363.
94. Id. at 363 (citing Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 240-41 (1970)).
95. Id. (citing Johnson v. Riveland, 855 F.2d 1477, 1484 n.7 (10th Cir. 1988)).
96. Id. In particular, the Hall court observed that in Vasquez v. Cooper, 862 F.2d 250 (.10th
Cir. 1988), the court did not extend the rule in Williams to apply to indigent defendants who re-
ceived less than the statutory maximum term, and declined to determine whether the rule would
apply to those who did receive the maximum. Hall, 77 F.3d at 363.
97. Hall, 77 F.3d at 364. The court also analyzed the district court's denial of the habeas
corpus petition. The district court denied his petition because Hall could be released before serving
the maximum sentence. Id. The court found that the district court too narrowly applied the rule
from Williams. Id. It reasoned that early release did not have any relevance to the constitutional
issue at hand. Id. Furthermore, under the district court's analysis, Hall would have to exceed the
statutory maximum for his sentence before bringing the petition. Id. at 363-64.
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C. Analysis
Given the large number of indigent criminal defendants, the courts must
regularly analyze whether procedural discrimination constitutes a violation of
the Equal Protection Clause." Although the factual circumstances differ in
the various cases, courts appear to have settled the issue by deciding whether
the result would be the same if the defendant was able to pay. As evidenced
by Hall, the Tenth Circuit followed this test as it related to the ability to post
bail.
D. Other Circuits
Other circuits have upheld the rights of indigent defendants under the
Equal Protection Clause. The Sixth Circuit ruled that a defendant's equal pro-
tection rights were violated when the court denied the defense counsel access
to the transcripts from the defendant's two previous trials due to an inability to
pay, and only provided access to the court reporter's tapes." The Ninth Cir-
cuit found that a court's enhancement of a defendant's criminal history points,
due to the defendant's inability to pay fines from a previous conviction, violat-
ed the defendant's rights absent a showing of willful failure to pay." The
Seventh Circuit, however, ruled that awarding costs against an indigent
prisoner who has filed numerous civil lawsuits is permissible."'
The Ninth Circuit rejected a defendant's equal protection claim when the
court denied the defendant presentence credit after sentencing for one convic-
tion, but before sentencing for another.'" The court noted that indigent de-
fendants are entitled to presentence confinement credit, but only upon a show-
ing that the defendant could have been released from custody if not for the
inability to pay. 03
El. SELF-INCRIMINATING STATEMENTS
A. Background
The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States provides
that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself."'" Thus, self-incriminating statements procured through government
coercion are excluded from evidence. Five criteria must exist in order for the
defendant to invoke the privilege: "(1) the privilege must be personal to the
individual; (2) the proceeding must be criminal or have criminal consequences;
(3) the information must be self-incriminating; (4) the information must be
98. See Harris, supra note 75, at 474-91.
99. Riggins v. Rees, 74 F.3d 732, 737-38 (6th Cir. 1996).
100. United States v. Parks, 89 F.3d 570, 572 (9th Cir. 1996).
101. Montgomery v. Meloy, 90 F.3d 1200, 1206 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. CL 266
(1996); See also FED. R. Civ. P. 54(d) (allowing costs to be awarded to the prevailing party in a
civil lawsuit).
102. Robinson v. Marshall, 66 F.3d 249, 250-51 (9th Cir. 1995).
103. Robinson, 66 F.3d at 250.
104. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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compelled by the government; and (5) the information must be testimonial in
nature."'"6 A defendant may invoke the privilege at all stages of the criminal
process including circumstances prior to arrest triggered by custodial interroga-
tion.10
Courts frequently address the issue of defining protected, self-incriminat-
ing statements. The Supreme Court held in Simmons v. United States,"7 that
although a defendant may choose to waive his Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination at any time, conflicting laws cannot compel him to
choose between that right and another constitutional privilege." More spe-
cifically, the Court determined that a defendant's testimony at a pretrial hear-
ing for a motion to suppress evidence is inadmissible at trial.'0 9 In contrast,
the Court held in Crampton v. Ohio"' that a defendant's allocution statement
made at the penalty phase may be used against the defendant regarding issues
of guilt."' Because the defendant may voluntarily choose whether to make
any statement at sentencing, allocution statements fall outside the scope of the
Fifth Amendment. 2
The issue of Fifth Amendment protection becomes more complicated
when the defendant enters into a plea agreement with the prosecution. Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 (e)(6) provides that the statements made during
plea negotiations are generally inadmissible in a proceeding against the defen-
dant."3 Courts, however, analogize a final plea agreement with a contract,
and if violated, the terms are void and the incriminating statements are admis-
sible against the defendant. In United States v. Mezzanatto,"4 the Supreme
Court held that a defendant may voluntarily waive the plea agreement rules for
the purposes of impeachment without violating the defendant's Fifth
Amendment privilege."'
105. Survey of Recent Cases, 44 U. KAN. L. REv. 895, 917-18 (1996); see also Michael A.
Conner, Comment, The Constitutional Framework Limiting Compelled Voice Exemplars: Explora-
tion of the Current Constitutional Boundaries of Governmental Power over a Criminal Defendant,
33 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 349, 360-65 (1996) (reviewing traditional rationales for limiting compelled
exemplars and proposing new rationales). See generally Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege
in Historical Perspective: The Right to Remain Silent, 94 MicH. L. REv. 2625 (1996) (contrasting
modem views regarding the rule against self-incrimination with historical perspectives); Akhil
Reed Amar & Renee B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The Self-Incrimination Clause,
93 MCH. L. REV. 857 (1995) (analyzing prior interpretations of the Self-Incrimination Clause and
offering new views); John H. Langbein, Essay, The Historical Origins of the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination at Common Law, 92 MIcH. L. REv. 1047 (1994) (critiquing prior scholarly
analysis as to how and when the privilege against self-incrimination arose); Mary A. Shein, Com-
ment, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination Under Siege: Asherman v. Meachum, 59 BROOK.
L. REv. 503 (1993) (criticizing the Second Circuit's decision in Asherman as incompatible with
the Supreme Court's broad judicial interpretation of the Self-Incrimination Clause).
106. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966).
107. 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
108. Simmons, 390 U.S. at 394.
109. Id
110. 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
111. Crampton, 402 U.S. at 216-17.
112. Id.
113. FED. R. CRum. P. 1l(e)(6).
114. 115 S. Ct. 797 (1995).
115. Mezzanatto, 115 S. Ct at 800. See also Michael S. Gershowitz, Note, Waiver of the
Plea-Statement Rules, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1439 (1996) (arguing that the Supreme
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B. Tenth Circuit Decisions
1. United States v. Hardwell"6
a. Facts
Defendant Marcel Hardwell was convicted of conspiracy and money laun-
dering after a Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) investigation implicated him
and six other defendants." 7 The DEA sting occurred when an undercover
agent arranged to buy two kilograms of cocaine from the defendants, including
Hardwell."' The evidence supporting the money laundering conviction sug-
gested that Hardwell had insufficient legitimate income to purchase the co-
caine, leading to the inference that he procured the money through drug distri-
bution." 9 On appeal, Hardwell argued that because the government's infor-
mation regarding his lack of income came solely from financial affidavits that
he was compelled to provide in order to establish his eligibility for court-ap-
pointed counsel, the unintended use of this information violated his Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination and his Sixth Amendment right to
counsel."2
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit reversed Hardwell's conviction for money laundering
due to the violation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination. 2 '
The Supreme Court has ruled that it is unconstitutional to require a defendant
to choose between his Fifth Amendment right to silence and his Fourth
Amendment protection from illegal search and seizure.'" The conflict at
issue, however, presented a matter of first impression for the Tenth Cir-
cuit.' The court noted that other circuits have extended some types of pro-
tection to disclosures made for determining financial eligibility for counsel, but
usually through a pretrial protection hearing. 24 The Tenth Circuit, in United
Court's decision in Mezzanatto undermines the rule that a criminal defendant's plea negotiations
are inadmissible); Waiver - Plea Negotiation Statements, 109 HARv. L. REv. 249 (1995) (con-
tending that in its Mezzanatto decision, the Supreme Court created a de facto rule of waivability
with regard to a criminal defendant's right to have plea negotiations held inadmissible).
116. 80F.3d 1471 (10th Cir. 1996).
117. Hardwell, 80 F.3d at 1479. Of the other six defendants implicated with Hardwell, three
defendants were acquitted, two were convicted of conspiracy, and one was convicted of conspira-
cy, money laundering, and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. Id.
118. Id. at 1479-83.
119. Id. at 1483. For the elements of money laundering, see 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(AXi)
(1994).
120. ld. Hardwell argued unsuccessfully that there was insufficient evidence to support his
conviction for money laundering; id. at 1482-83; double jeopardy violations with regard to his
prosecution for money laundering and conspiracy to distribute cocaine, id. at 1484-85; abuse of
discretion by the court in admitting evidence of prior bad acts and irrelevant evidence, id. at 1488-
89, 1492; ineffective assistance of counsel, id. at 1495; and incorrect determination of drug quan-
tity for the purpose of sentencing. Id. at 1496-98.
121. Id. at 1484.
122. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968).
123. Hardwell, 80 F.3d at 1483-84.
124. Id. (citing United States v. Pavelko, 992 F.2d 32, 34-35 (3d Cir. 1993); United States v.
Hitchcock, 992 F.2d 236, 239 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Gravatt, 868 F.2d 585, 589-92 (3d
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States v. Peister,'" had previously rejected the pretrial protection approach,
but declined to resolve the issue of whether the use of a defendant's financial
statement violates the Fifth Amendment, because the prosecution did not use
the financial information at tria1.'" In Hardwell, in which the information
was used against the defendant at trial, the court held that Hardwell's Fifth
Amendment rights were violated, and that the error was sufficiently prejudi-
cial as to require reversal.1"




Defendant Jetty Lee Harvey was convicted in Wyoming state court for
kidnapping and first degree sexual assault."n At sentencing, Harvey chose to
make an allocution statement in mitigation of his punishment, and in doing so,
admitted to details of the crime.'O The Wyoming Supreme Court vacated the
conviction for violations of the defendant's right to a speedy trial. 3' Subse-
quently, the government charged and convicted Harvey of conspiracy to com-
mit kidnapping and conspiracy to commit sexual assault for the same offend-
ing acts. 3 2 The prosecution used the allocution statement Harvey made at his
first sentencing hearing as evidence against him.'33 Harvey filed a writ of ha-
beas corpus in federal district court, which the court dismissed." On appeal
from the dismissal, Harvey argued that the use of his allocution statement
violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. 3 '
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Harvey's petition for a writ of
habeas corpus." The State of Wyoming recognizes that statements made in
mitigation of punishment are constitutionally protected, but federal law does
not protect allocution statements, and federal law must support the habeas
Cir. 1989); United States v. Sarsoun, 834 F.2d 1358, 1363-64 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Harris, 707 F.2d 653, 662-63 (2d Cir. 1983)).
125. 631 F.2d 658 (10th Cir. 1980).
126. Hardwell, 80 F.3d at 1484 (citing Peister, 631 F.2d at 661-62).
127. Id. Following this holding, co-defendant Dennis Hardwell appealed his conviction of
money laundering on the same grounds, and based on the new rule developed in Marcel
Hardwell's reversal, the Tenth Circuit reversed Dennis Hardwell's conviction. United States v.
Hardwell, 88 F.3d 897, 898 (10th Cir. 1996).
128. 76 F.3d 1528 (10th Cir. 1996).
129. Harvey, 76 F.3d at 1531.
130. Id. at 1531-32.
131. Id. at 1531.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1532.
134. Id. (citing Harvey v. Shillinger (Harvey 111), 893 F. Supp. 1021 (D. Wyo. 1995)).
135. Id. Harvey also appealed on the grounds that his conspiracy conviction violated double
jeopardy, the Sixth Amendment right to speedy trial, and the Sixth Amendment right to effective
assistance of counsel because he had not been advised that his allocution statement could later be
used against him. Id.
136. Id. at 1537.
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corpus petition.'37 In forming its opinion, the Tenth Circuit examined
whether the government violated Harvey's due process rights by forcing him
to choose between his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent and his statuto-
ry right to speak on his own behalf at sentencing. 3 The court relied on the
Supreme Court case of Crampton v. Ohio,39 which held that pressuring a
defendant into making an allocution statement during the punishment phase of
trail did not violate the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights. 4 ' Because
Harvey freely chose to make a statement at sentencing, the court held there
was no due process violation. 4' Harvey's choice to testify on his own behalf
constituted "an effective waiver of his Fifth Amendment" right against self-
incrimination. 42 Additionally, the court found it irrelevant that Harvey did
not understand that his statement could be used against him because no consti-
tutional right requires knowledge of the consequences of waiver. 43
3. United States v. Watkins' 44
a. Facts
Defendant Carlton J. Watkins was arrested and indicted for conspiracy to
distribute and distributing crack cocaine.4 Watkins entered into a plea
agreement with the government in which he agreed to reveal his source for the
crack cocaine in exchange for supervised release to a halfway house.' 4 The
agreement also provided that the government would not bring a case against
Watkins unless he violated the terms of the agreement." During the negotia-
tions, the government informed Watkins that his statements were protected by
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.' 48 Subsequent to enter-
ing into the plea agreement, Watkins spoke with agents at the DEA office and
repeated his earlier incriminating statements, which included the fact that he
had sold crack cocaine and provided the identity of his source.' The day
following his meeting with the DEA agents, Watkins escaped from the half-
way house, thus violating the terms of the agreement." The government
prosecuted Watkins for conspiracy and distribution of crack cocaine, using the
incriminating statements made during the plea negotiations and later at the
DEA office.' 5 The district court suppressed the first statements made during
137. Id. at 1534.
138. Id. at 1534-35.
139. 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
140. Harvey, 76 F.3d at 1535 (citing Crampton, 402 U.S. at 217); see supra notes 108-09 and
accompanying text.
141. Id. at 1536-37.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1536 (citing Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 574 (1987)).
144. 85 F.3d 498 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 269 (1996).
145. Watkins, 85 F.3d at 499. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) & 846 are the relevant statutes in viola-
tion.
146. Watkins, 85 F.3d at 499.
147. Id.
148. Id. See generally FED. R. CRIM. P. II (providing the rules regarding pleas).





negotiations, pursuant to Rule 1 l(e)(6), but allowed the statements made at the
DEA office to be used against Watkins at trial."2
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit analyzed the purpose and language of Rule 11 (e)(6) and
found that any and all statements made after the finalization of the plea agree-
ment are admissible in court."3 The court stated that the language of the rule
protects statements made "in the course of plea discussions with an attorney
for the government.' ' 54 The rule is designed to stimulate free and open nego-
tiations between the defendant and the opposing counsel without fear of reper-
cussions."' Noting that other circuits have applied the rule in similar factual
situations, the court held that Watkins's subsequent statements were not pro-
tected since Watkins made the statements after the finalization of the plea
agreement.56 Watkins also argued for the protection of the statements due to
the fact that they were similar to the information given during the protected
negotiations.'57 The court rejected this argument with the reasoning that sub-
sequent statements, regardless of whether they are identical, are beyond the
scope of the rule.'
4. United States v. Erekson
59
a. Facts
IRS Special Agent Howard contacted defendant Gene M. Erekson to dis-
cuss a business client of Erekson's who was under criminal investigation."
Erekson agreed to meet with Howard at the IRS office at which time Erekson
gave a tape recorded interview, voluntarily answering certain questions, and
choosing not to answer others.' 6' Approximately eighteen months after the
interview, a grand jury indicted Erekson for conspiracy to defraud the IRS."6
Erekson argued for the exclusion of the statements he made during the inter-
view with Special Agent Howard because the IRS had not given Erekson
Miranda warnings prior to the interview."' The district court relied on the
conclusions of a magistrate's evidentiary hearing to find that the circumstances
152. l
153. Id. at 500-01. See generally Anjili Soni & Michael E. McCann, Guilty Pleas, 84 GEO.
.J. 1039 (1996) (providing an in depth review of the case law involving Rule 11).
154. Id. at 500 (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 1 l(e)(6)(D)).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id In addition, Watkins argued that the contractual language of the agreement protected
the use of his subsequent statements. Id. The court quickly rejected this claim because of the con-
ditional sentence that voids the agreement on any violations of its terms. Id.
158. Id.
159. 70 F.3d 1153 (10th Cir. 1995).
160. Erekson, 70 F.3d at 1154.
161. Id. at 1155.
162. Id. at 1154. Erekson was also indicted for presenting a false social security number, but
that count is not at issue in this appeal. Id.
163. Id. at 1156.
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did not necessitate a Miranda warning.' Erekson was subsequently convict-
ed of the charges, and he appealed the denial of his motion to suppress state-
ments.
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit adopted the findings from the evidentiary hearing to
hold that Erekson's interview with Special Agent Howard did not meet the
requirements for a Miranda warning." Erekson argued that the circumstanc-
es required a Miranda warning because the IRS agents knew that the nature of
the questions would illicit incriminating responses.'67 The court concluded
that Erekson voluntarily made the statements, based on the fact that he was
not forced to answer questions,'" the environment was not coercive,'6 the
interview was not excessively long, 7 and Erekson's personal characteristics
did not make him susceptible to coercion. 7' Additionally, Erekson argued
that his statements were involuntary and inadmissible because the IRS agents
induced his statements by deceit.'" The court stated that statements are ob-
tained through deceit when the "agents affirmatively mislead [a suspect] as to
the true nature of their investigation."'73 Erekson himself was not under in-
vestigation at the time of his interview, and the investigation did not focus on
him until after he made those incriminating statements.' The court conclud-
ed that Erekson voluntarily made the statements, warranting them admissible,
and that the facts did not require a Miranda warning."
,C. Analysis
Courts have struggled with the issue of protecting self-incriminating state-
ments, with varied results. The Tenth Circuit adhered to the approach that as-
sumes the defendant knowingly and voluntarily chooses to waive his Fifth
164. Id. at 1155-56.
165. Id. Additionally, Erekson argued that the statements obtained during the interview vio-
lated his Fourth Amendment protection of unreasonable search and seizure but the court deter-
mined that a Fifth Amendment analysis was more appropriate. Id. at 1157-58.
166. Id at 1156-58.
167. Id. at 1156.
168. Id. at 1157. The court noted that Erekson chose not to answer six questions for fear they
might incriminate him. Id.
169. Id. The court explained that the coercive environment would exist if the agents made
threats, intimidating gestures, or displayed their revolvers. Id.
170. Id. The interview lasted twenty minutes. Id.
171. Id. Susceptibility to coercion might result from youth, old age, lack of education, or lack
of intelligence. Id.
172. Id. at 1157.





Amendment privilege. However, the court took a pro-defendant stance, fol-
lowing the Supreme Court, in its solution to the problem of requiring a defen-
dant to choose between his constitutional protections. In such a case, the court
will not require the defendant to waive one right for the purpose of invoking
another.
D. Other Circuits
Other circuits frequently determine when incriminating statements receive
protection. These circuits have addressed the basic issue of defining "custodial
interrogation," which triggers the defendant's proper invocation of his Fifth
Amendment right to silence.'76 The Eighth Circuit decided a case factually
similar to Erekson, in which the court determined that the defendant was not
in custody when questioned by FBI agents due to the surrounding circum-
stances.'" Additionally, the circuits vary on decisions regarding whether de-
fendants have properly invoked their Fifth Amendment rights and the use of
subsequent statements.
78
Beyond the scope of custodial interrogation, the circuits have determined
which statements are protected under the rules governing immunity and plea
bargains. The Ninth Circuit decided three cases that dealt with the relationship
of protected statements and the grant of immunity.' In one of these cases,
United States v. Camp," the court held that although the defendant's state-
ments were not admissible in the trial for which the defendant received
176. See United States v. Moya, 74 F.3d 1117, 1119 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that aliens
subjected to custodial interrogation at the United States border are entitled to Miranda warnings,
but that a Miranda warning was not required when the questioning of an alien defendant did not
constitute custodial interrogation); Sprosty v. Buchler, 79 F.3d 635, 641 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
117 S. Ct. 150 (1996) (identifying the factors to be considered for determining whether the defen-
dant was in custody for the purposes of requiring Miranda warnings); United States v. Ventura, 85
F.3d 708, 710-12 (1st Cir. 1996) (defining the conclusive meanings of "custody" and "interroga-
tion" for the purposes of requiring Miranda warnings).
177. United States v. McKinney, 88 F.3d 551, 554-55 (8th Cir. 1996); see supra notes 156-
172 and accompanying text.
178. See United States v. Ramirez, 79 F.3d 298, 305 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 140
(1996) (holding that when the defendant chooses not to answer certain questions but agrees to
answer others, the defendant does not invoke his Fifth Amendment right and interrogation may
continue); Pope v. Zenon, 69 F.3d 1018, 1024-25 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that the prosecution's
use at trial of defendant's confession obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment privilege was
harmless error when the confession did not contradict the defense's theory of the case).
179. See United States v. Anderson, 79 F.3d 1522, 1529-30 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that
defendant's compelled statements in related civil trial did not grant him immunity from criminal
liability); United States v. Dudden, 65 F.3d 1461, 1467-69 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that compelled
testimony received under an informal immunity agreement may require a hearing to determine
whether the compelled testimony may be used by the government in the present prosecution); in-
fra notes 177-78 and accompanying text.
180. 72 F.3d 759 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1557 (1996).
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immunity, those statements were not protected at the sentencing of the defen-
dant for an unrelated criminal conviction.'8 The First and Fifth Circuits also
decided issues regarding Fifth Amendment privileges at pretrial hearings chal-
lenging plea agreements."
An additional issue surrounding a defendant's choice to invoke his privi-
lege against self-incrimination concerns the prosecutor's comments at trial.
Circuits' decisions vary depending on the facts and circumstances surrounding
the comments made during the trial about the defendant's silence."'
Circuits agree that a court cannot compel a defendant to submit to a men-
tal examination without violating his Fifth Amendment privileges, but the
results after the defendant consents to an examination are admissible.'" The
circuits were also uniform in determining that although the Fifth Amendment
applies to documents, there is no privilege for the compelled production of
previously voluntarily produced statements and documents."
CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit appears reluctant to expand the rights of criminal de-
fendants, which is consistent with the lead of the conservative United States
181. Camp, 72 F.3d at 762.
182. See United States v. Conway, 81 F3d 15, 16-17 (1st Cir. 1996) (finding that when the
defendant did not fully understand the terms of the agreement in the plea hearing and believed he
was being granted full immunity, the government violated this right against self incrimination by
using his statements against him in sentencing); United States v. Bond, 87 F.3d 695, 700 (5th Cir.
1996) (finding that defendant did not preserve the issue for appeal when he invoked his right to
remain silent in the pretrial motion hearing regarding the terms of the plea bargain because testify-
ing would effectively waive his privilege against self-incrimination); United States v. Catano, 65
F.3d 219. 224 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding the defendant is not entitled to Fifth Amendment immunity
for testifying at pretrial hearing to determine if the defendant met the terms of his plea agreement
because he was not being required to make any statements that might have been incriminating).
183. See United States v. Francis, 82 F.3d 77, 79 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2513
(1996) (holding that the government did not violate the defendant's right against self-incrimination
when the prosecutor commented that the evidence was uncontradicted); United States v. Zanabria,
74 F.3d 590, 593 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that the prosecutor may use the defendant's silence
during his arrest questioning to rebut the defense's theory without violating the defendant's right
to remain silent); United States v. Comam, 88 F.3d 487, 499-501 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S.
CL 326 (1996) (holding that the defendant's right against self-incrimination was violated when the
prosecutor made indirect comments during closing arguments about the codefendant's failure to
take the stand); United States v. Tenorio, 69 F.3d 1103, 1107 (1lth Cir. 1995) (holding that the
prosecution may not use the defendant's silence after he was given Miranda warnings to imply
guilt); cf. United States v. Two Parcels of Real Property, 92 F.3d 1123, 1129 (1lth Cir. 1996)
(holding that in a civil case, the trier of fact may make an adverse inference from the invocation
of the privilege against self-incrimination).
184. See Savino v. Murray, 82 F.3d 593, 603-04 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1 (1996);
United States v. Davis, 93 F.3d 1286, 1295 (6th Cir. 1996).
185. See United States v. Feldman, 83 F.3d 9, 14-15 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding that there is no
Fifth Amendment protection to destroy documents that contain incriminating evidence); In re
Grand Jury Witnesses, 92 F.3d 710, 712 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that the Fifth Amendment does
not protect the contents of a document that a person voluntarily prepared); In re Grand Jury Sub-
poena, 75 F.3d 446, 448 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that the Fifth Amendment does not protect the
production of previously compelled statements, but only protects against improper use); In re
Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 70 F.3d 521, 522 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that there was no
violation of an attorney's privilege against self-incrimination by requiring him to produce his
business records).
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Supreme Court. Decisions from this Survey period reflect the Tenth Circuit's
position that defendants make knowing and voluntary choices for which they
are accountable, regardless of the undesirable consequences. The only excep-
tions the court has made are those where the defendant's circumstances are
beyond his control, or when the defendant must choose between two constitu-
tional privileges, thus interpreting defendant's rights rather narrowly.
Elizabeth R. Imhoff

CRIMINAL LAW: DOUBLE JEOPARDY
INTRODUCrION
The Tenth Circuit reviewed a large number of double jeopardy cases dur-
ing the 1995-96 Survey period.' The most remarkable of these occurred in the
arena of civil forfeiture.2 Prior to 1996, various circuits around the country
interpreted Supreme Court case holdings3 to mean that a civil in rem forfei-
ture following a criminal conviction constituted double jeopardy." In United
States v. Ursery,5 however, the court stated unambiguously that several cir-
cuits had misinterpreted those decisions. 6 Two Tenth Circuit cases demon-
strate the pre-Ursery posture7 and post-Ursery turnaround."
This Survey begins with a general discussion of the Double Jeopardy
Clause and Supreme Court precedent. Section II offers a discussion of the dual
issues arising in cases when a criminal conviction precedes or follows civil
sanctions, including in rem civil forfeitures of property used to further criminal
activity and civil monetary penalties in the form of fines. Section IMI addresses
multiple charges stemming from the same set of facts or occurrences. In Sec-
tion IV, the Survey tracks Tenth Circuit decisions regarding successive prose-
cutions in the form of retrials.
I. BACKGROUND
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment states in part: "nor
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of
life or limb." The Double Jeopardy Clause generally "protects against a sec-
ond prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, a second prosecution for
the same offense after conviction, and multiple punishments for the same of-
fense."'" While the Constitution only mentions "life or limb," double jeopar-
1. The Tenth Circuit reviewed approximately 51 cases involving the Double Jeopardy
Clause from September 1995 to September 1996. See, e.g., Yparrea v. Dorsey, 64 F.3d 577 (10th
Cir. 1995); United States v. Meyer, 95 F.3d 1161 (10th Cir. 1996).
2. See, e.g., United States v. 9844 South Titan Court, 75 F.3d 1470 (10th Cir. 1996); Unit-
ed States v. Lopez, 93 F.3d 694 (10th Cir. 1996).
3. See Montana Dep't of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994) (holding that a
tax imposed on illegal drugs after criminal conviction and confiscation of the drugs constituted a
second punishment for the same offense); Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993) (ruling
Eighth Amendment restrictions on excessive fines apply to in rem civil forfeiture); United States
v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989) (stating a civil penalty not rationally related to the government's
actual damages may constitute punishment).
4. See infra notes 71-82, 142-53 and accompanying text.
5. United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996).
6. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2144 (correcting the Sixth and Ninth Circuits' interpretation of
Kurth Ranch, Austin, and Halper).
7. South Titan Court, 75 F.3d at 1483.
8. Lopez, 93 F.3d at 696-97 (1996).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
10. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969).
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dy protection also covers imprisonment and monetary penalties." The double
jeopardy doctrine originally prohibited a second trial for an offense after a
judgment for that same offense. 2 This made its application straightforward
and unambiguous. Modern legislative expansion of substantive crimes generat-
ed more complexity with respect to the overall issues and the elements that
comprise those crimes, providing fertile soil for inconsistent judicial applica-
tion, misunderstanding, and confusion. 3
Perhaps in part because of these complexities, courts have carved out
exceptions to these general principles. Double jeopardy does not bar civil
forfeitures, some remedial civil sanctions, two convictions arising out of the
same act if each offense requires proof of separate facts, or retrial of cases
infected by trial error. 4
I. MULTIPLE PUNISHMENTS? CRIMINAL CONVICTION AND CIVIL SANCTIONS
A. Background
Following the Supreme Court's decisions in United States v. Halper,5
Austin v. United States,'6 and Montana Department of Revenue v. Kurth
Ranch," the Tenth Circuit, in United States v. South Titan Court," assumed
that the Court had shifted its position regarding double jeopardy and civil
forfeiture. 9 The Supreme Court then clarified its position in United States v.
Urser9'° and announced to misguided circuits throughout the country that its
posture regarding civil forfeiture in the double jeopardy context remained
consistent with two hundred years of jurisprudence.' The Tenth Circuit's
holding in United States v. Lopez? demonstrated a complete turnaround from
South Titan Court and reflected the Tenth Circuit's new understanding in light
of Ursery.' To understand this development and the source of the Tenth
Circuit's earlier confusion, this background section briefly reviews the history
of civil forfeiture jurisprudence, the Supreme Court cases that led the Tenth
Circuit astray, and the content of the Court's clarification in Ursery.
11. Kurth Ranch, 114S. CL at 1941 n.l.
12. Adam R. Fox, The Ninth Circuit Renegade-United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Curren-
cy: Finding Double Jeopardy in a Single Coordinated Prosecution, 5 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
67, 68-69 (1995).
13. James A. Shellenberger & James A. Strazzella, The Lesser Included Offense Doctrine
and the Constitution: The Development of Due Process and Double Jeopardy Remedies, 79
MARQ. L. REV. 1, 117-18 (1995).
14. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2142; Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932);
Fox, supra note 12, at 69-71.
15. 490 U.S. 435, 447-48 (1989).
16. 509 U.S. 602, 618 (1993).
17. 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1948 (1994).
18. 75 F.3d 1470 (10th Cit. 1996).
19. South Titan Court, 75 F.3d at 1483-84.
20. 116 S. CL 2135 (1996).
21. Ursery, 116 S. CL at 2142-44; see infra notes 72-82, 129-53 and accompanying text
(analyzing the Tenth, Second, Ninth, and Eighth Circuits' misunderstanding of the Court's posi-
tion on civil forfeitures).
22. 93 F.3d 694 (10th Cir. 1996).
23. Lopez, 93 F.3d at 696-97.
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1. Civil Forfeiture: Historical Context
Civil forfeiture originated in the law of admiralty and dates back two
centuries.24 In early admiralty cases, the forfeiture of property used in crimi-
nal activity did not constitute double jeopardy because courts treated the prop-
erty itself, not its owner, as the cause of the offense.' The fiction of the
"guilty vessel" stemmed from the desire to quickly and efficiently seize ships
used for illegal activities without the burdens and delays associated with due
process and conviction of the owners.' This type of seizure was especially
appealing in an era when the owners often lived half the world away and no
efficient modes of communication or travel existed. One of the earliest exam-
ples of the guilty property concept appears in an 1827 case in which a United
States vessel captured a Spanish privateer, the Palmyra.7 The Court permit-
ted the Palmyra's forfeiture prior to the owner's conviction since the forfeiture
statute created in rem jurisdiction (against the property), independent of a
criminal proceeding in personam (against the person).' This rendered con-
cepts such as guilt or innocence of the owner and commensurate validity of
the punishment irrelevant."
2. Civil Forfeiture: Austin v. United States3
Some commentators and courts viewed Austin v. United States as signal-
ing a shift toward treating civil forfeitures as punishment for double jeopardy
purposes.3' On June 13, 1990, Richard Lyle Austin met Keith Engebretson at
Austin's body shop and agreed to sell Engebretson cocaine. Austin left the
shop, went to his mobile home, and then returned to the shop with two grams
of cocaine.32 The trial court convicted Austin and sentenced him to seven
years in prison for the drug offense.33 The government obtained forfeiture of
Austin's mobile home and auto body shop under the Drug Abuse Prevention
24. See, e.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974); Van Oster
v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465 (1926); Goldsmith v. United States, 254 U.S. 505 (1921); Dobbins Dis-
tillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395 (1877); The William Bagaley, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 377 (1866);
Harmony v. United States, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210 (1844); The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat) 1
(1827); Phile qui tam v. The Ship Anna, 1 U.S. (1 Dal].) 197 (1787).
25. See Donald J. Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, Civil Forfeiture and the War on Drugs: Les-
sons from Economics and History, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 79, 93 (1996) ("The legal fiction was
that the property itself, without human intervention, caused the harm or violated the law."); see,
e.g., United States v. The Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 233 (1844) ("The vessel
which commits the aggression is treated as the offender, as the guilty instrument or thing to which
forfeiture attaches, without any reference whatsoever to the character or conduct of the owner.").
26. See Boudreaux & Pritchard, supra note 25, at 119-20;, see also, e.g., United States v.
James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 57 (1993) (noting the historical necessity of seiz-
ing personal property, which can abscond, to establish jurisdiction over the property).
27. The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 8.
28. Id. at 14-15.
29. Harmony, 43 U.S. (2 How.) at 234.
30. 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
31. See J. Kelly Strader, Taking the Wind Out of Government Sails?: Forfeitures and Just
Compensation, 23 PEPP. L. REV. 449, 474-75 (1996); Robert M. Sondak, The Tide is Turning:
Civil Forfeiture Law is Becoming More Accommodating to Innocent Mortgagees, 48 CONSUMER
FIN. L.Q. REP. 178, 179-80 (1994).
32. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 605-06 (1993).
33. 1l at 604.
1997]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
and Control Act (DAPCA),' on the theory that Austin used these items, like
the Spanish vessel Palmyra, in the commission of the crime.' Thus, the gov-
ernment forced Austin to forfeit several thousand dollars worth of property as
a result of his selling several hundred dollars worth of illicit narcotics.'
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to determine whether the
forfeiture violated the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause.37 Finding
that the forfeiture violated the Excessive Fines Clause, the Court did not ad-
dress the issue of double jeopardy.' Since the Eighth Amendment limits the
government's power to impose monetary punishments, the Court's decision
turned on whether a civil forfeiture, like monetary fines, constitutes punish-
ment under DAPCA § 881(A)(4) and (a)(7).39
The Austin Court outlined the historical foundation for civil forfeiture as
consisting of: 1) the fiction that the property itself was guilty and/or 2) the
notion that the owner assumed responsibility for the acts of those to whom the
owner entrusted property.' In reality, the Court stated, owner negligence
formed the basis of both rationales. According to the Court, the fiction of
culpable property under the first rationale could not justify forfeiture when the
owner took all reasonable measures to prevent the unlawful use of the
property.4' Under the second rationale, the Court noted, the law holds owners
accountable for acts committed by those to whom owners negligently assign
their property.42 Citing extensive historical precedent, the Court affirmed that
forfeiture always serves, at least in part, to punish the owner.43 Thus, the
Court determined that Eighth Amendment restrictions on excessive fines apply
to in rem civil forfeiture without reaching the issue of double jeopardy."
34. DAPCA authorizes the forfeiture of:
(4) [alll conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels, which are used, or are
intended for use, to transport, or in any manner facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt,
possession, or concealment of [controlled substances].
(6) [a]ll moneys, negotiable instruments, securities, or other things of value furnished or
intended to be furnished by any person in exchange for a controlled substance ....
(7) [all real property, including any right, title, and interest (including any leasehold
interest) in the whole of any lot or tract of land and any appurtenances or improvements,
which is used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate
the commission of, a violation of this subchapter punishable by more than one year's
imprisonment ....
21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (1994).
35. Austin, 509 U.S. at 615-16.
36. Joseph B. Harrington, Austin v. United States: Forfeiture as Punishment and the Impli-
cations for Warrantless Seizures, 4 B.U. PuB. INT. LJ. 415, 419 (1995).
37. Austin, 509 U.S. at 604. The Excessive Fines Clause prohibits excessive bail, fines, and
cruel and unusual punishment. U.S. CONST. amend. Vm.
38. Id. at 617-23.
39. Id. at 610.
40. Id. at 615.
41. Id. at 615-16 (citing Goldsmith, 254 U.S. at 511).
42. d. at 616-18.
43. Id. at 618.
44. Id. at 621-22.
[Vol. 74:2
CRIMINAL LAW: DOUBLE JEOPARDY
3. Civil Monetary Penalty: United States v. Halper' and Department of
Revenue v. Kurth Ranch.'
Courts historically have held that government officials do not violate the
Double Jeopardy Clause when they impose a remedial civil sanction and a
criminal punishment for the same offense.' These holdings stem from the
position that the Double Jeopardy Clause protects against multiple punishments
for the same offense and that civil penalties are not traditionally designed to
punish.' However, the Supreme Court appeared to retreat from this position
in Halper.
In Halper, the government sought $130,000 in fines for $585 in damages
on top of a $5,000 fine and two years in prison for violating the False Claims
Act.' Noting the outcome depended on the facts of each case, the Court nev-
ertheless ruled that a civil action may constitute punishment and trigger the
Double Jeopardy Clause.' While the Court failed to establish a specific
threshold for when a civil action passes into the realm of punishment, it suc-
ceeded in setting forth a generalized rule of proportionality which balances the
damages to the government against the penalty imposed on the defendant."
The Court stated that a reasonableness rule applies, with a civil penalty consti-
tuting a second punishment only if it "bears no rational relation to the goal of
compensating the Government for its loss."52 In Halper, the Court concluded
that a penalty 220 times the government's damages constituted a judgment not
rationally related to the purpose of compensating the government. 3
The Supreme Court, in Kurth Ranch, expanded the range of civil sanc-
tions that may constitute punishment and give rise to a double jeopardy
claim.5' The Court held that a tax imposed on illegal drugs, after a criminal
conviction and confiscation of the drugs, subjected the defendants to multiple
punishments for the same offense." Conceding that the government generally
levies taxes to generate revenue, as opposed to furthering punitive goals, the
Court held that a tax could nonetheless constitute punishment for double jeop-
ardy purposes in certain instances.' In Kurth Ranch, the State of Montana
imposed a tax on the possession and storage of dangerous drugs where the tax:
(1) resulted from the perpetration of a crime; (2) served punitive rather than
45. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
46. 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994).
47. See, e.g., Eric Michael Anielak, Note, Double Jeopardy: Protection Against Multiple
Punishments, 61 Mo. L. REv. 169, 171 (1996) (discussing the dual imposition of civil sanctions
and criminal penalties in the context of Kurth Ranch).
48. Id
49. Halper, 490 U.S. at 441 (citing 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3731 (1982) (amended 1994)).
50. Halper, 490 U.S. at 443, 448.
51. Id at 448-49.
52. Id at 449.
53. Id at 451.
54. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1945-48.
55. Id. (noting that the government imposed the tax under Montana's Dangerous Drug Tax
Act, MoNT. CODE ANN. §§ 15-25-101 to -123 (repealed 1995)). See Charles K. Todd, Jr., The
Supreme Court Assaults State Drug Taxes with a Double Jeopardy Dagger: Death Blow, Serious
Injury, or Flesh Wound?, 29 IND. L. REV. 695, 695-96 (1996).
56. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. CL at 1946.
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revenue generating purposes; and, (3) attached to goods which the taxpayer
did not own at the time of taxation and never lawfully possessed in the first
place.57 The Court termed this drug tax a "concoction of anomalies" distinct
from a standard property tax, and characterized the tax as punishment."'
4. Ursery v. United States,9
In United States v. Ursery," the Sixth Circuit construed Austin and
Halper to mean that civil forfeiture constitutes punishment for double jeopardy
purposes.6 The suit commenced when Michigan police found marijuana
growing in Ursery's house.' In addition to a criminal indictment for the drug
offense, the government initiated civil forfeiture proceedings against the house
under DAPCA. 3 Contending that, consistent with Halper and Austin, the civ-
il forfeiture proceeding constituted punishment, the Sixth Circuit reversed on
double jeopardy grounds.'
Citing double jeopardy precedent concerning civil forfeiture proceed-
ings,' the Supreme Court reaffirmed its position that, as a remedial civil
sanction, in rem civil forfeiture does not constitute punishment under the Dou-
ble Jeopardy Clause.' Halper, the Court reasoned, involved a civil penalty,
not a civil forfeiture.67 While a civil monetary penalty may operate punitively
when the fine sufficiently outweighs the government's damages, well estab-
lished case law demonstrates that in rem civil forfeiture, as an action against
the property itself, does not constitute punishment under the Double Jeopardy
Clause.' The Court distinguished Ursery from Austin by holding that the lat-
ter addressed the Excessive Fines Clause.' While the Court conceded in Aus-
tin that judicial decisionmakers could characterize a forfeiture as punishment
and subject it to the Excessive Fines Clause, Austin only mentioned the Dou-
ble Jeopardy Clause in a footnote asserting its inapplicability to in rem civil
57. Id. at 1947-48.
58. Id. at 1948.
59. 116 S. CL 2135. The Court also reviewed United States v. $405,089.23 United States
Currency, 33 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 1994), in which defendants convicted of conspiracy and money
laundering were subsequently forced to undergo an in rem civil forfeiture proceeding. The Ninth
Circuit contended that the forfeiture violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
$405,089.23 United States Currency, 33 F.3d at 1214; see also supra text accompanying notes 9-
12. The Supreme Court reversed for reasons set forth in its concurrent review of United States v.
Ursery, 59 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 1995).
60. 59 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 1995).
61. Ursery, 59 F.3d at 571-73.
62. Ursery, 116 S. CL 2135, 2138-39 (1996).
63. Id. at 570; see also 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7).
64. Ursery, 59 F.3d at 568.
65. United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354 (1984); Various Items of
Personal Property v. United States, 282 U.S. 577 (1931).
66. Ursery, 116 S. CL at 2141-42.
67. Id. at 2144-45.
68. Id. at 2145. The Court applied a two-part test. First, the Court inquired whether Congress
intended the forfeiture to be criminal or civil. Second, the Court asked if the forfeiture proceedings
were "so punitive in fact as to 'persuade us that the forfeiture proceeding[s] may not legitimately
be viewed as civil in nature,' despite Congress' intent" Id. at 2147 (citing 89 Firearms, 465 U.S.
at 366).
69. Id. at 2146.
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forfeiture proceedings. 0 The Court dismissed Kurth Ranch as irrelevant to
Ursery since the former involved a tax anomalous to standard taxes in that it
served a punitive, rather than a revenue generating, purpose.7'
B. In rem Civil Forfeiture: Pre-Ursery
1. United States v. 9844 South Titan Court'
a. Facts
On June 18, 1992, the United States District Court for the District of
Colorado convicted Philip May of possession of cocaine with intent to distrib-
ute and other related crimes." The Court sentenced May to ten years in pris-
on, ordered him to pay a $12,500 fine, and assessed against him the cost of
incarceration estimated at $100,000. 74 On July 8, 1992, the government filed
a forfeiture action under DAPCA" against the residential and business prop-
erties which housed the cocaine.76 May contended that the Supreme Court
overruled the traditional notion that civil forfeiture does not constitute punish-
ment with its decisions in Halper, Austin, and Kurth Ranch, and that his crimi-
nal punishment subsequent to the civil forfeiture amounted to double jeopar-
dy."
b. Decision
Citing the Ninth Circuit decision in United States v. $405,089.23 United
States Currency,7 the Tenth Circuit stated: "Austin makes it clear that for-
feitures under [DAPCA] are punishment, and we agree with the Ninth Circuit
that there is no difference between the excessive fines and the double jeopardy
definition of punishment." 9 Relying on Halper and Kurth Ranch, the court
found that two trials constitute two jeopardies.s Thus, even though the
criminal and civil proceedings derived from the same overall prosecution, they
constituted two distinct efforts to punish, which placed the defendant in double
70. Id. at 2144-46 (citing Austin, 509 U.S. at 608 n.4).
71. Id. at 2147. The Ursery Court explained:
Halper dealt with in personam civil penalties under the Double Jeopardy Clause; Kurth
Ranch with a tax proceeding under the Double Jeopardy Clause; and Austin with civil
forfeitures under the Excessive Fines Clause. None of those cases dealt with the subject
of this case: in rem civil forfeitures for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
I&a
72. 75 F.3d 1470 (10th Cir. 1996).
73. South Titan Court, 75 F.3d at 1475.
74. Id.
75. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7).
76. South Titan Court, 75 F.3d at 1475.
77. Id. at 1483-84.
78. 33 F.3d 1210, 1222 (9th Cir. 1994). Guided by Halper and. Austin, the Ninth Circuit
barred the forfeiture of property under DAPCA. The court asserted that the forfeiture constituted
punishment for the same drug related conduct for which the defendants had already been convict-
ed in the criminal proceedings. Thus, the forfeiture was a violation of double jeopardy. Id.
79. South Titan Court, 75 F.3d at 1484.
80. Id. at 1487.
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jeopardy." The court found that the forfeiture of May's house and business
property amounted to a second punishment after May's criminal conviction on
drug related charges, and barred the forfeitures on double jeopardy grounds.'
C. In rem Civil Forfeiture: Post-Ursery
1. United States v. Lopez 3
a. Facts
On January 13, 1993, a search of Johnny Lopez's apartment revealed
eight kilograms of cocaine, twenty kilograms of marijuana, $100,000, and a
warranty deed conveying title to a residence." The government asserted that
the money and residence were used in, or were proceeds of, the drug activi-
ties.' Pursuant to DAPCA,? the court entered a judgment of civil in rem
forfeiture against the cash and the residence." Subsequent to the forfeiture,
the government filed an indictment based on unlawful possession of the drugs
with intent to distribute."8 Lopez filed a motion to dismiss on double jeopardy
grounds. 9 The district court found against Lopez since the prior civil forfei-
ture action involved elements not present in the criminal charges."
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit ruled against the defendant since Ursery rendered the
double jeopardy issue irrelevant 9 The Tenth Circuit recognized that under
Ursery, in rem civil forfeiture is not considered punishment for purposes of
the Double Jeopardy Clause.' Thus, even if the government based its in rem
civil forfeiture and criminal indictment on the same offense, the defendant
could not invoke double jeopardy protection since the forfeiture failed to con-
stitute punishment and therefore never placed the defendant in jeopardy in the
first place.9
D. In Rem Civil Forfeiture: Pre-Ursery but Double Jeopardy Claim
Rejected On Other Grounds
81. Id. at 1487-88.
82. Id. at 1484.
83. 93 F.3d 694 (10th Cir. 1996).
84. Lopez, 93 F.3d at 695.
85. Id.
86. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7); see full text supra note 34.
87. Lopez, 93 F.3d at 695.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 696.
90. Id. One of the additional elements involved aiding a racketeering enterprise. id.
91. Id. at 697.
92. Id. at 698 (citing Ursery, 116 S. CL at 2149).
93. Id. at 696-97.
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1. United States v. Cordoba94
a. Facts
A search of Romualdo Cordoba's van unearthed 10 kilograms of co-
caine.95 The government instituted a civil forfeiture action against the van
under DAPCA.9 On the same day, the government charged Cordoba with
possession and intent to distribute cocaine. 9 Subsequently, the government
seized a $10,000 check and a Corvette contending that both were drug pro-
ceeds.9" Cordoba agreed to the forfeiture of all property as part of a plea
agreement." Prior to sentencing, however, Cordoba filed a motion to dismiss
alleging that the forfeiture and the criminal conviction violated the Double
Jeopardy Clause." ° The district court denied the motion to dismiss and the
defendant raised the same argument on appeal."0
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit held that since Cordoba had consented to the forfeiture
in his plea agreement, he waived any right to object on double jeopardy
grounds." Although the plea agreement made no reference to double jeopar-
dy and Cordoba potentially failed to understand his possible defenses, he nev-
ertheless waived his right to the claim." Thus, "Mhe Double Jeopardy
Clause... does not relieve a defendant from the consequence(s) of his volun-
tary choice.' °
2. United States v. German"'
a. Facts
The government indicted Daniel German for possession with intent to
distribute more than 100 kilograms of marijuana after seizing German's truck,
which he used to transport the drug, under DAPCA." At the time of
German's arrest, the government gave him a "Notice of Seizure of a Convey-
ance for a Drug-Related Offense" which advised him of the forthcoming sei-
zure."'7 The government subsequently sent a notice providing German with
further details of the seizure and German signed a receipt acknowledging that
94. 71 F.3d 1543 (10th Cir. 1995).
95. Cordoba, 71 F.3d at 1544.
96. Id; see also 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a)(4).
97. Cordoba, 71 F.3d at 1544.
98. Id.; see also 21 U.S.C. §§ 881 (a)(4) and (a)(6).
99. Cordoba, 71 F.3d at 1545.
100. Id. at 1545-46.
101. Id. at 1545.
102. Id. at 1546.
103. Id.
104. Id. (citing United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1979)).
105. 76 F.3d 315 (10th Cir. 1996). For cases pertaining to the rule of law discussed in
German, see United States v. Clark, 84 F.3d 378 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v. Hardwell, 80
F.3d 1471 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v. Denogean, 79 F.3d 1010 (loth Cir. 1996).
106. German, 76 F.3d at 316; see also 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a)(4).
107. German, 76 F.3d at 316.
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he received it."e However, German failed to submit a claim of ownership
along with a cost bond or an in forma pauperis declaration by the dead-
line."° Thus, German resorted to an administrative ruling which resulted in
the forfeiture of the truck."0 German then filed a motion to dismiss the crim-
inal indictment on double jeopardy grounds."' The court held that because
German did not judicially contest the forfeiture by filing a claim of ownership
and bond in district court, the government never adjudicated his alleged culpa-
bility nor placed German in jeopardy."2
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit rejected the defendant's assertion that his double jeop-
ardy claim survived despite his failure to contest the forfeiture in district
court.1 3 The Tenth Circuit instead affirmed the district court and stated that
since German failed to contest the civil forfeiture by filing a claim of owner-
ship and bond, he did not become a party to the forfeiture proceeding."
4
Thus, the court never made a determination of guilt, and, for double jeopardy
purposes, the government never punished German in the first place.'
E. Monetary Penalty
1. United States v. Hudson' 
6
a. Facts
John Hudson, Larry Beresel, and Jack Rackley consented to pay the Of-
fice of the Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC") $16,600, $15,000, and
$15,000, respectively for alleged banking violations."' After the government
indicted the defendants for the same mis-allocations of bank funds that gave
rise to the OCC sanctions, the defendants moved to dismiss based on double
jeopardy."" The district court rejected the claim, asserting that the fines
served remedial, not punitive, purposes."9 The Tenth Circuit vacated and re-
manded so that the district court could ascertain the actual loss to the govern-
ment and substantiate its assertion that the fines were solely remedial based on
evidence that a rational relation existed between the fines and the
108. ld. at 316-17.
109. Id. at 317.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 318-19.
113. Id. at 319.
114. Id. at 319-20.
115. Id. at 318-19 (citing United States v. Torres, 28 F.3d 1463, 1465 (7th Cir. 1994)). Both
the Third and the Fifth Circuits used similar reasoning to conclude defendants who failed to con-
test civil forfeiture actions never became parties and thus were never "punished" for double jeop-
ardy purposes. See United States v. Baird, 63 F.3d 1213, 1214 (3d Cir. 1995); United States v.
Arreola-Ramos, 60 F.3d 188, 189 (5th Cir. 1995).
116. 92 F.3d 1026 (10th Cir. 1996) [hereinafter Hudson I1].
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government's damages.' On remand, an evidentiary hearing revealed that
the OCC incurred $72,000 in expenses to pursue the defendants. 2 ' However,
the court concluded that the sanction served punitive purposes since the OCC
desired to use the fines to deter future violations." Thus, the district court
concluded that the indictment violated the Double Jeopardy Clause." The
government then appealed the district court's ruling. 24
b. Decision
Relying on Halper, the court asserted that the only issue on appeal con-
cerned whether the fine was grossly disproportionate to the sanction such that
the latter advanced more than remedial purposes."n Under the test in Halper,
the defendant suffers no punishment if a rational relationship exists between
the fine and the aim of compensating the government for its loss." 6 Since
the government proved damages of $72,000 and the fines amounted to
$46,600, the court found the fines rationally related to the government's dam-
ages.'27 Thus, the district court abused its discretion in determining that the
sanctions were not solely remedial."n
F. Analysis
The Supreme Court's holding in Ursery left many circuits scrambling to
find a graceful way to assume a completely different posture with respect to in
rem civil forfeitures and double jeopardy.' The Tenth Circuit underwent
this adjustment as evidenced by its pre-Ursery decision in Titan Court and
post-Ursery realignment in Lopez.
In Titan Court, the Tenth Circuit relied on Halper, Kurth Ranch, and
Austin to determine that civil forfeiture may constitute punishment and that no
distinction between civil and criminal punishments exists.' ° Thus, imposing
multiple punishments for the same activity constitutes a violation of the Dou-
ble Jeopardy Clause.' 3' The precedent offered through Austin particularly
compelled the Tenth Circuit because the court based the punishment in Titan
Court on the same statute (DAPCA) and subsections' as the forfeiture in
Austin.'33 Thus, the Tenth Circuit readily concurred with the Ninth
Circuit " that no difference exists between "the excessive fines and the dou-
120. United States v. Hudson, 14 F.3d 536 (10th Cir. 1994) [hereinafter Hudson I].
121. Id.
122. Hudson I1, 92 F.3d at 1028.
123. Id. at 1027.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1028.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1028-29.
128. Id. at 1030.
129. See infra notes 142-53 and accompanying text.
130. South Titan Court, 75 F.3d at 1484.
131. Id. at 1484.
132. 21 U.S.C. §§ 881 (a)(4) and (a)(7).
133. South Titan Court, 75 F.3d at 1484.
134. $405,089.23 United States Currency, 33 F.3d at 1219; see supra note 59 (describing the
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ble jeopardy definition of punishment."'3
However, in Ursery the Court stated that excessiveness under the Eighth
Amendment does not constitute punishment for double jeopardy purposes
under the Fifth AmendmentY" Six months after the Tenth Circuit decided
Titan Court, and two months after the Supreme Court's holding in Ursery, the
Tenth Circuit heard the Lopez case. Like Titan Court, Lopez involved a crimi-
nal indictment for unlawful possession of drugs with intent to distribute and a
civil in rem forfeiture action against property related to the drug offense under
DAPCA. Heeding the Ursery avouchment, the Tenth Circuit rejected as
non-pertinent the double jeopardy issues surrounding the civil forfeiture."
As with Titan Court, Cordoba and German involved double jeopardy
claims resulting from criminal indictments and civil forfeitures relating to drug
offenses. Although the Tenth Circuit decided Cordoba and German in a pre-
Ursery arena under the misapprehension civil forfeitures constituted punish-
ment, the Tenth Circuit avoided the issue by disposing of them on other
grounds. By consenting to the forfeiture in Cordoba, the defendant waived his
right to a double jeopardy claim.'" Because the defendant failed to contest
the forfeiture in German, the court never recognized him as a party and conse-
quently never technically punished him.'
Hudson did not involve a civil forfeiture. Rather, like Halper, it entailed a
monetary penalty. The Tenth Circuit in Hudson appropriately initiated a
straightforward application of Halper since monetary penalties remained unaf-
fected by Ursery. Since the fine was not grossly disproportionate and was
rationally related to the costs incurred by the government, it was not punish-
ment for the purposes of double jeopardy."'
G. Other Circuits
Like the Tenth Circuit, other Circuits reconciled their decisions with the
Court's holding in Ursery and found that civil forfeiture does not constitute
punishment for purposes of the Fifth Amendment."2 However, while still in
the pre-Ursery information vacuum, the Second Circuit postulated that the
Halper disproportionality test applied to civil forfeiture.'" The Second Cir-
Ninth Circuit's position in $405,089.23 United States Currency).
135. South Titan Court, 75 F.3d at 1484 (citing $405,089.23 United States Currency, 33 F.3d
at 1219).
136. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2147.
137. 21 U.S.C. §§ 881 (a)(6) - (a)(7).
138. Lopez, 93 F.3d at 698.
139. Cordoba, 71 F.3d at 1546.
140. German, 76 F.3d at 318-19.
141. Hudson il, 92 F.3d at 1029. Other circuits agree that the post-Ursery litigation arena
leaves Halper-type civil sanction cases unaffected. See, e.g., S.A. Healy Co. v. Occupational Safe-
ty and Health Review Comm'n, 96 F.3d 906, 911 (7th Cir. 1996) (applying Halper to determine
that a fine was so grossly disproportionate that double jeopardy attached).
142. See infra notes 145-53 and accompanying text.
143. United States v. G.P.S. Automotive Corp., 66 F.3d 483, 490 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Unit-
ed States v. 38 Whalers Cove Drive, 954 F.2d 29, 35 (2d Cir. 1992)). The court offered a long
perusal of the meaning of Halper, Kurth Ranch, and Austin, but left a definitive determination to a
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cuit also suggested that Austin opened the door to punishment considerations
in the realm of civil forfeiture.'" After Ursery, the Second Circuit conceded.
"Austin conveyed the impression to many federal courts that civil forfeiture
should also be considered 'punishment' for purposes of the Double Jeopardy
Clause of the Fifth Amendment... Ursery has effectively repudiated
[that] ... impression. . .. "
The Ninth Circuit entertained the same pre-Ursery understanding when it
ruled in United States v. $405,089.23 United States Currency, one of the lower
court cases overturned in Ursery.'" Two months after the Ursery decision,
the Ninth Circuit had occasion to decide another case involving a civil in rem
forfeiture under DAPCA."' In addition to conceding that Ursery required re-
versal of $405,089.23 United States Currency, the Ninth Circuit briefly ex-
plained Ursery's two-pronged test,'4 and asserted that the application of this
test resulted in the conclusion that "civil in rem forfeitures pursuant to 21
U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) do not constitute punishment for purposes of the Double
Jeopardy Clause. Because [the defendant's] property was forfeited pursuant to
this section, his double jeopardy claim necessarily fails."' 4 Thus, this hold-
ing marked a complete turn around by the Ninth Circuit in response to the
Supreme Court's decision in Ursery.
Like the Second and Ninth Circuits, the Eighth Circuit allowed the for-
feiture of a vessel which the owners used to transport drugs in addition to the
criminal indictment for the drug offenses'5 The court explained, "[-until
recently, it was unclear whether a criminal defendant was subject to double
jeopardy when the government attempted civil forfeiture of property... The
Supreme Court greatly clarified this area of the law with its decision in United
States v. Ursery."'' Nevertheless, the court addressed the issue of excessive
fines and acknowledged that a defendant might still find relief under the
Eighth Amendment's umbrella.' Further, the Ninth Circuit recognized that
civil sanctions such as fines may still constitute punishment for double jeopar-
dy purposes if they are "divorced from the government's damages and expens-
es."'53
later date because the "broader jurisprudential developments" relating to double jeopardy occurred
after the appeal was briefed and argued. Id at 492.
144. G.P.S. Automotive, 66 F.3d at 491-92.
145. United States v. Certain Funds, 96 F.3d 20, 25 (2d Cir. 1996); see also United States v.
Brophil, 96 F.3d 31 (2d Cir. 1996).
146. 33 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 1996).
147. United States v. Sardone, 94 F.3d 1233 (9th Cir. 1996); see aLso 21 U.S.C. § 881.
148. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
149. Sardone, 94 F.3d at 1236.
150. United States v. One 1970 36.9' Columbia Sailing Boat, 91 F.3d 1053, 1056 (8th Cir.
1996); see aLso United States v. Quinn, 95 F.3d 8 (8th Cir. 1996).
151. Columbia Sailing Boat, 91 F.3d at 1055-56.
152. Id. at 1057-58. However, the court concluded that in this instance the fine was not ex-
cessive. Id. at 1058.
153. United States v. Gartner, 93 F.3d 633, 634 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Halper, 490 U.S. at
442).
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Within the double jeopardy context, "multiplicity" occurs when the same
behavior constitutes more than one criminal offense.' " To establish a viola-
tion of the Double Jeopardy Clause, the defendant must show that the multiple
offenses charged derive from the same facts. ' In 1932, the Supreme Court
established two tests to determine what comprises a single "offense."'" First,
in the event of a continuing series of homogeneous acts, for example, tearing
several mail bags open at one time, the test asks whether the law prohibits the
individual act or the overall course of conduct.'" If the law forbids the indi-
vidual act, then each act amounts to a separate offense.ss If the law enjoins
the overall course of conduct, then each act combines to form a single of-
fense. 5 Thus, if the law prohibits tearing open a mail bag, then each mail
bag violation results in a separate offense."W Second, if one act violates two
distinct statutory provisions, the test asks whether each provision requires
proof of at least one element not required in the other provision. 6 '
For example, in Blockburger v. United States,s" the Supreme Court up-
held the defendant's conviction for violating two separate offenses after he
sold morphine hydrochloride in violation of the Harrison Anti-Narcotic
Act."6 The first offense stemmed from selling the drug in some form other
than in the original stamped package.'" The second offense resulted from
selling the drug without a written order.'" The courts frequently employ this
second test and often refer to it as the "Blockburger analysis" or "Blockburger
test."'" However, the Blockburger test will not control if the legislature in-
tends to create two separate offenses. 6
154. United States v. Richardson, 86 F.3d 1537, 1551 (10th Cir. 1996).
155. Id. at 1551-52.
156. Blockburger 284 U.S. at 302-03.
157. id.; see, e.g., United States v. Callwood, 66 F.3d 1110, 1114-15 (10th Cir. 1995) (up-
holding a sentence of three consecutive prison terms for use of a firearm, even though the same
firearm was used in the course of the three underlying offenses).
158. Id.
159. BLockburger, 284 U.S. at 302.
160. Id. at 303.
161. Id. at 304.
162. Id. at 301.
163. Id. at 300-01; see also Harrison Anti-Narcotic Act, ch. 136, §§ 1005-1007, 42 Star. 298-
301 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
164. Id. at 301 n.1
165. Id. at 303-04.
166. See, e.g., United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 (1993).
167. Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 779 (1985) (citing Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S.
359 (1983)).
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2. Lesser or Greater Included Offenses
Lesser or greater included offenses do not survive the Blockburger test
since courts treat the two offenses as one and the Double Jeopardy Clause bars
multiple or successive prosecutions." Although the greater offense includes
at least one element not required in the lesser offense, the lesser offense re-
quires no different elements than those required in the greater offense." For
example, assault with a dangerous weapon includes the lesser included offense
of assault. While assault with a dangerous weapon includes elements not con-
tained in assault per se, assault requires no other elements than those contained
in assault with a dangerous weapon. In such situations the government can not
invoke the Blockburger test, which requires unique elements in each offense,
and a defendant's Double Jeopardy Clause challenge should succeed. 7°
This rule clearly applies in the event of a conviction for a greater offense
followed by prosecutions for lesser included offenses since convictions for the
latter require no proof beyond that which satisfied the conviction criteria for
the former. "' However, prosecution for a greater offense followed by con-
viction for a lesser included offense resulting from new developments in the
case or charges from different subdivisions of a jurisdiction presents a more
complex and ambiguous scenario.
In Brown v. Ohio," the Supreme Court clarified this scenario when it
ruled irrelevant the sequence of trial for greater and lesser included offens-
es."' In Brown, the defendant stole a car from Cleveland, Ohio, and the po-
lice apprehended him while he was driving in Wickliffe, Ohio.'74 The
Wickliffe police charged the defendant of joyriding, which involves taking or
operating a car without the owner's consent." After the defendant served
jail time in Wickliffe, the police returned him to Cleveland, where authorities
indicted him for auto theft, which consists of joyriding with intent to perma-
nently deprive the owner of possession. Thus, joyriding represents a lesser
included offense in the greater offense of auto theft.'" Applying the
Blockburger test, the Court held that joyriding and auto theft serve as the same
offense for double jeopardy purposes, and barred conviction for the greater
offense of auto theft.'"
However, the Court in Brown conceded that exceptions might apply
"where the State is unable to proceed on the more serious charge at the outset
because the additional facts necessary to sustain that charge have not occurred
or have not been discovered despite the exercise of due diligence."' Thus,




172. 432 U.S. 161 (1977).
173. Brown, 432 U.S. at 168.
174. Id. at 162.
175. ld.
176. Id. at 162-64.
177. Id. at 162-63.
178. Id. at 168-69.
179. Id. at 169 n.7.
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if the greater offense depends on facts that develop after the first trial, the
courts may allow successive prosecutions."0 The Court applied this excep-
tion in Garrett where the greater offense depended on facts occurring after the
trial for the lesser offense such that the latter did not bar a subsequent prose-
cution for the greater offense.'
B. Tenth Circuit Cases
1. Yparrea v. Dorsey"n
a. Facts
Christopher Yparrea broke into a house and stole some of its contents."l
The court convicted Yparrea separately of larceny and burglary and enhanced
his sentence by eight years based on New Mexico's habitual criminal offender
statute.' After losing in state court, Yparrea filed a writ of habeas corpus,
arguing that the enhancement of his sentence constituted a violation of the
Double Jeopardy Clause since the sentences were based on the same underly-
ing conduct."' A magistrate dismissed the claim and the district court dis-
missed the petition."
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit noted that, while burglary requires entry into the dwell-
ing, larceny does not."v Further, larceny requires an actual confiscation,
which burglary does not." Applying the Blockburger test, the court deter-
mined that since each offense requires proof of a fact which the other does
not, the defendant could not take refuge under the cover of the Fifth
Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause."
2. United States v. Richardson90
a. Facts
The district court convicted Bobby Richardson on separate offenses of
possession with intent to distribute cocaine and possession with intent to dis-
tribute methamphetamine.' 9' On appeal, Richardson asserted that, because the
authorities found the two substances together in his toolshed, possession of the
substances constituted a single offense, and therefore the separate convictions
180. Shellenberger & Strazzella, supra note 13, at 149-50.
181. Garrett, 471 U.S. at 791-93.
182. 64 F.3d 577 (10th Cir. 1995).
183. Yparrea, 64 F.3d at 578.
184. Id.; see also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-18-17 (Michie 1996).
185. Yparrea, 64 F.3d at 578-79.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 580.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 579-80.
190. 86 F.3d 1537 (10th Cr. 1996).
191. Richardson, 86 F.3d at 1542.
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resulted in a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause."9
b. Decision
The plain language of DAPCA, 93 upon which the district court based
the convictions, reveals congressional intent to treat possession of different
controlled substances as separate offenses. 94 Further, the legislative history
offers no contrary evidence.' Thus, the court concluded that Richardson's
convictions did not merit double jeopardy protection.'96
3. United States v. Rodriguez-Aguirre'"
a. Facts
Gabriel Rodriquez-Aquirre served a sentence for conspiracy to distribute
marijuana in Kansas."9 Authorities in New Mexico subsequently indicted
Aquirre, along with his co-conspirators, for activities arising out of a drug
distribution ring.' 99 After a mistrial in district court, a grand jury indicted
Aguirre on all twenty-two counts." One count charged Aguirre with engag-
ing in a Continuing Criminal Enterprise ("CCE").' Aguirre moved to dis-
miss this count arguing that the conspiracy conviction in Kansas was a lesser
included offense of the CCE count such that the conspiracy conviction pre-
vented the government under Brown from retrying him on the greater CCE of-
fense.' The district court denied the motion.2'
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit held that because the Kansas indictment alleged that the
conspiracy continued until March of 1989 and the New Mexico indictment
pertained to charges continuing through December of 1993, it did not
constitute the same offense.' The court concluded that when a defendant
continues unlawful conduct after prosecution, the state may still use that
unlawful conduct in another case to prove a continuing violation.'
192. Id. at 1552.
193. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).
194. Richardson, 86 F.3d at 1553 (citing United States v. Sturmoski, 971 F.2d 452, 461-62




197. 73 F.3d 1023 (10th Cir. 1996).
198. Rodriguez-Aguirre, 73 F.3d at 1024.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. The CCE was in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848. Id.
202. Id. at 1025.
203. Id. at 1024.
204. Id. at 1026.
205. Id. at 1026-27 (citing Garrett, 471 U.S. at 798).
1997]
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C. Analysis
The facts of Yparrea suggest treating the larceny as a "lesser included
offense" of the burglary.2' However, although both convictions arose out of
the same conduct, the harsh reality under the Blockburger test is that they
represent two separate offenses if each conviction requires the proof of dif-
ferent facts.' The drug convictions in Richardson embraced no separate ele-
ments nor required a different set of facts.2 However, congressional intent
trumped Blockburger and required that the convictions receive treatment as
separate offenses.' Thus, the hierarchical order of authority places the plain
wording of the statute first, the legislative history second, and the Blockburger
test last.21
While the State of Kansas convicted the defendant in Rodriguez-Aguirre
of the lesser included offense of conspiracy to distribute marijuana, such that
courts would typically bar the greater offense of CCE under the Blockburger
test, " Rodriguez-Aguirre offered the exception set forth in Brown and ap-
plied in Garrett. Namely, since the greater offense depended on facts that
occurred after the first trial, double jeopardy was not applicable."'
D. Other Circuits
While the Supreme Court's holdings in Blockburger, Brown, and Garrett
tended to homogenize circuit court decisions with respect to the issues raised
in Yparrea and Rodriguez-Aguirre, the Court's analysis in Richardson failed to
provide a similar clarifying rationale. Although the First, Second, Fourth,
Fifth, and Sixth Circuits concur with the Tenth Circuit regarding its decision
to treat the simultaneous possession of varying controlled substances as sepa-
rate offenses, they offer differing reasons for their results."3' DAPCA pro-
hibits the knowing manufacture, distribution, or dispensing of "a" controlled
substance.214 The Sixth Circuit held that simultaneous possession of heroin
and methadone constituted separate offenses since the statute deems heroin a
schedule I controlled substance while it regards methadone as a schedule II
substance for purposes of punishment."5 The Fifth Circuit asserted that when
Congress passed DAPCA it intended to give judges maximum flexibility in
fashioning sentences." 6 An interpretation treating all controlled substances
206. See supra notes 198-204 and accompanying text.
207. Yparrea, 64 F.3d at 579-80.
208. Richardson, 86 F.3d at 1549.
209. Id. at 1553.
210. See Garrett, 471 U.S. at 779; see also Shellenberger & Strazzella, supra note 13, at 122-
25 (discussing the relationship between the Blockburger test and legislative intent).
211. Shellenberger & Strazzella, supra note 13, at 146-47.
212. Rodriguez-Aguirre, 73 F.3d at 1026-27.
213. See infra text accompanying notes 215-225.
214. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (emphasis added).
215. United States v. Pope, 561 F.2d 663, 669 (6th Cir. 1977).
216. United States v. Davis, 656 F.2d 153, 158-59 (5th Cir. 1981) (citing MR. REP. No. 91-
1444 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4566, 4570).
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possessed simultaneously as one offense restricts that flexibility."' The
Fourth Circuit cited to the Sixth Circuit and held that, since drugs listed in
different schedules mandate different penalties, Congress intended the posses-
sion of each scheduled drug to constitute a separate violation."' The Second
Circuit brushed the surface of several arguments by contending that Congress
left one of the Second Circuit's prior decisions allowing the imposition of
cumulative sentences for possession of different drugs undisturbed when it
passed DAPCA.219 The Second Circuit embraced the separate schedule prop-
osition first offered by the Sixth Circuit as well as the congressional intent
assertion introduced by the Fifth Circuit.2 The First Circuit also adopted the
congressional intent validation for treating different drugs as separate offenses
and argued that the plain meaning of §841(a)(1) creates a violation for a con-
trolled substance and not a group of controlled substances."2 The Supreme
Court declined to clarify the rationale for treating different, simultaneously
possessed substances as separate offenses when it denied certiorari in the cases
arising out of the First,m Second,m Fourth, w and Fifthm Circuits.
IV. SuCcusivE PROSCUTrIONS: R RiAL
A. Background
In Lockhart v. Nelsonm , the Supreme Court affirmed a century of juris-
prudence by holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar retrial
when a conviction is set aside due to an error in the trial proceedings.' 2 The
Court set forth the following policy rationale: "[I]t would be a high price
indeed for society to pay were every accused granted immunity from punish-
ment because of any defect sufficient to constitute reversible error .... 228
In Lockhart, the appellate court reversed the initial conviction based on errone-
ous admission of evidence.' 9 The Court found that as long as sufficient evi-
dence exists to sustain a guilty verdict, even if it would have been insufficient
without the erroneous admission, double jeopardy does not bar retrial.' 3
Nevertheless, the Court recognized an exception to this general rule when
a reversal occurs due to insufficient evidence."3 In Burks v. United
217. Davis, 656 F.2d at 159.
218. United States v. Grandison, 783 F.2d 1152, 1156 (4th Cir. 1986).
219. Id. at 1156.
220. United States v. Deiesus, 806 F.2d 31, 36-7 (2d Cir. 1986).
221. United States v. Bonilla Romero, 836 F.2d 39, 47 (1st Cir. 1987).
222. Bonilla Romero v. United States, 488 U.S. 817 (1988).
223. DeJesus v. United States, 479 U.S. 1090 (1987).
224. Grandison v. United States, 479 U.S. 845 (1986).
225. Davis v. United States, 456 U.S. 930 (1982).
226. 488 U.S. 33 (1988).
227. Lockhart, 488 U.S. at 38 (citing United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896)).
228. Id. (citing Bail, 163 U.S. at 466).
229. Id. at 34.
230. Id. (conceding that if the evidence had been barred, the government would have at-
tempted to offer additional evidence to satisfy its burden).
231. Id. at 39.
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States, 2 the Court held that while reversal based on erroneous admission of
evidence allows the defendant a trial free from error, reversal due to insuffi-
ciency of evidence amounts to an acquittal."' A distinct policy rationale ex-
ists for an acquittal in the second circumstance since society holds no "interest
in retrying a defendant when, on review, it is decided as a matter of law that
the jury could not properly have returned a verdict of guilty."
B. Tenth Circuit Cases
1. United States v. WackerX
a. Facts
The court convicted Edith Wacker and six other defendants of various
drug related offenses associated with a large marijuana harvesting and distribu-
tion operation located on her parent's farm.' The defendants appealed one
of the convictions pertaining to the use of a firearm and argued for reversal of
the conviction due to insufficiency of evidence.' While the evidence suf-
ficed at the time of conviction, the Supreme Court changed the standard for
determining what constitutes "use of a firearm" before the Tenth Circuit decid-
ed the case on appeal.' To obtain a conviction for "use" of a firearm at the
time of the trial, the prosecution needed to establish that the defendants en-
joyed "ready access" to the firearm and that the firearm served as an "integral
part" of the criminal activity.2 9 However, the Supreme Court subsequently
changed the standard to require that the defendants actively employ the fire-
241arm during the crime.
b. Decision
Relying on Lockhart, the Tenth Circuit reversed the trial court based on
error rather than on "pure insufficiency of evidence," meaning double jeopardy
could not bar a second trial on remand."4 In the district court, the govern-
ment produced evidence commensurate with the jury instruction based on the
legal standard used at the time.'c Thus, the Tenth Circuit asserted its unwill-
ingness to reverse a conviction solely because the prosecution failed to present
evidence which they did not know was relevant at the time.'
232. 437 U.S. 1, 14-16 (1978).
233. Burks, 437 U.S. at 14-16.
234. Id. at 16.
235. 72 F.3d 1453 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 117 S. CL 136 (1996).
236. Wacker, 72 F.3d at 1460-62.
237. Id. at 1459-60.
238. Id. at 1464-65 (citing United States v. Bailey, 116 S. CL 501, 509 (1995) (changing the
standard for "use" of a firearm to "actively employed the firearm during and in relation to the
predicate crime")).
239. Id. at 1463.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 1465.
242. Id. at 1464-65.
243. Id. at 1465.
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2. United States v. Miller'"
a. Facts
The district court convicted Brian Miller and Michael Hicks of various
drug related offenses.2' The judge incorrectly instructed the jury regarding
one of the grounds for conviction relating to the "use" of a firearm.2" Hicks
appealed asserting that with a proper instruction the jury might not have con-
victed him on the use of a firearm in relation to the drug trafficking crime.'
While the government contended that Hicks carried the firearm, the jury en-
joyed the liberty to reject that assertion and to convict him solely on the basis
that he concealed the firearm in his van." If so, similar to Wacker, the jury
would have passed a conviction that was inconsistent with the new standard
for "use" and "carrying" of a firearm. Since the jury returned a general ver-
dict, uncertainty existed as to whether it relied on the incorrect instruction.2'
b. Decision
Relying on its holding in Wacker, the Tenth Circuit found that it could
remand for a new trial only if the jury could have returned a guilty verdict if
it received proper instruction in the first instance.' The court found suffi-
cient evidence to support a guilty verdict under the "carry" prong of the stat-
ute (not alleged in Wacker) since "carry" under the statute only requires that
the defendant possessed, through dominion and control, and transported the
firearmn." Since Hicks carried the firearm in his van during the crime's
commission, the jury could have returned a guilty verdict even with a proper
instruction. Thus, the Tenth Circuit remanded for a new trial. 2
C. Analysis
Lockhart and Burks, together with their progeny, Wacker and Miller, set
forth the rule and exceptions to the rule regarding retrials due to trial error and
insufficiency of evidence. Trial error does not bar retrials as long as sufficient
evidence exists for a jury to convict. 3 However, if the court reverses due to
the lack of sufficient evidence to convict, then retrial violates double jeopardy
244. 84 F.3d 1244 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. CL 443 (1996).
245. Miller, 84 F.3d at 1247-48.
246. Id. at 1257.
247. Id. at 1257. The jury was told that it could find one of the defendants guilty of one of
the counts if he "used" the firearms and he "used" them if he merely concealed them in his van.
ld This instruction was contrary to the requirements for "used" set forth in Bailey. See supra note
238 and accompanying text.
248. Miller, 84 F.3d at 1257.
249. Id at 1257.
250. Id. at 1258.
251. Id. at 1258-60.
252. Id. at 1260-61. But see United States v. Smith, 82 F.3d 1564, 1567-68 (10th Cir. 1996)
(addressing the same issue on appeal but finding that the evidence was not sufficient to support a
conviction under a proper instruction).
253. Lockhart, 488 U.S. at 38.
19971
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
since the reversal amounts to an acquittal.' However, if the insufficiency
prompting the reversal stems from a changed legal standard" or an erro-
neous jury instruction,' as opposed to "true insufficiency of evidence" 7
then Lockhart applies and retrial may proceed.2 s
D. Other Circuits
In United States v. Lanzoti,' the Seventh Circuit allowed a retrial
where the jury found the defendants guilty on several counts for participating
in an illegal gambling business in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1955.' After a
jury conviction on all counts, the defendants argued, and the government con-
ceded, that the government lacked sufficient evidence to support conviction on
one of the counts."' The government changed its theory of conviction to one
the evidence supported, and the Seventh Circuit determined that, since the new
theory was not argued to the jury, the interests of justice required a new tri-
al.' The defendants moved to dismiss contending that, because the evidence
failed to support a conviction on the theory actually communicated to the jury,
double jeopardy barred a new trial.23 The district court denied the
defendant's motion and the Seventh Circuit affirmed on the basis that the
government's failure to support its legal theory by the facts proved at trial fell
outside of the functional equivalent of an acquittal as defined by Lockhart and
Burks.' True insufficiency of evidence requires the factual innocence of the
defendant and does not derive from a court's determination of incongruity
between the legal theory of conviction and the government's facts.'
The Eighth Circuit permitted retrial where the government convicted the
defendant under the wrong capital murder provision.' Although the Eighth
Circuit conceded the defendant's double jeopardy assertion contained "consid-
erable logic" since there was insufficient evidence in the first trial to support
the felony charge, it distinguished between reversal for true insufficiency of
evidence and reversal for a legally defective indictment. 7 The Eighth Cir-
cuit recognized the difficulty of prevailing against a retrial based on a showing
of insufficiency of evidence to the extent that it amounted to an acquittal.m
However, the court defended the high standard, as a matter of policy, since
without it appellate courts would not vehemently reverse due to trial error "if
254. Burks, 437 U.S. at 15-16.
255. Wacker, 72 F.3d at 1465.
256. Miller, 84 F.3d at 1257-58.
257. Wacker, 72 F.3d at 1465.
258. Lockhart, 488 U.S. at 38.
259. 90 F.3d 1217 (7th Cir. 1996).
260. Lanzoti, 90 F.3d at 1219; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1994).
261. 1d& at 1219-20.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 1220.
264. Id. at 1221-22.
265. Id. at 1222-23.
266. Parker v. Norris, 64 F.3d 1178, 1180-82 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 820
(1996).
267. Parker, 64 F.3d at 1181 (citing Ball, 163 U.S. at 671-72).
268. Id.
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they knew that reversal of a conviction would put the accused irrevocably
beyond the reach of further prosecution."2
CONCLUSION
The law affords little refuge for defendants under the umbrella of the
Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause. Although conviction for posses-
sion of different drugs does not require the proof of unique facts as set forth
in Blockburger, the government treats the possession of each substance as a
separate offense. Further, retrial for the same offense is not barred if the insuf-
ficiency of evidence in the first trial results from a changed legal standard or
an erroneous jury instruction. Even these seemingly harsh laws appear rela-
tively benign compared to the battering that a defendant must endure in the
realm of in rem civil forfeitures. Relying on antiquated law dating back some
two hundred years in the admiralty arena, the Court emphatically held that the
government may confiscate a defendant's property and institute criminal pun-
ishment for the same drug related offense.
It is unusual for circuit courts to misunderstand the Supreme Court's posi-
tion as profoundly as did the Second, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits
in the civil forfeiture arena. Ursery changed the course of double jeopardy
jurisprudence. Like the Tenth Circuit, many courts are struggling to understand
this latest development and to realign themselves with the nation's highest
Court.
Virginia Grace Brannon





Most of the recent controversy regarding drug sentencing arises from
inconsistencies between statutory minimums' and the relatively new Sentenc-
ing Guidelines2 (Guidelines) promulgated by the Federal Sentencing Commis-
sion.3 Where the two conflict, courts have exercised judicial discretion to de-
termine the appropriate standard." This has created overwhelming disparity
between sentences for the same offense, leading to massive appeals and per-
ceptions of discrimination.' In cases where there is no conflict, the Guidelines
themselves may still contradict policy goals.6 The Tenth Circuit has reacted to
this dilemma by attempting to establish sentencing standards that remain con-
sistent with congressional intent,7 while adhering to recent Supreme Court
precedent.' This paper examines drug sentencing cases handed down during
1. Sentences for most federal narcotic offenses are governed by 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1994).
2. U.S. SENTENCiNo GUDELtNES MANUAL § 2D1.1 (1995).
3. The Commission is an independent agency in the judicial branch, consisting of three
federal judges, four other voting members, and one non-voting member, as outlined in 28 U.S.C. §
991(a) (1994).
4. See William W. Schwarzer, Sentencing Guidelines and Mandatory Minimums: Mixing
Apples and Oranges, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 405 (1992); William W. Wilkins, Jr. et al., Competing
Sentencing Policies in a "War on Drugs" Era, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 305, 319-24 (1993). But
see Barbara S. Meierhoefer, The Role of Offense and Offender Characteristics in Federal Sentenc-
ing, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 367, 367-68 (1992) (arguing that mandatory minimums and sentencing
guidelines constrain judicial discretion). See generally Gary S. Gildin, Appellate Determinacy: The
Sentencing Philosophy of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, 40 VILL. L.
REV. 577 (1995) (discussing the evolution of appellate court sentencing philosophy); Mark Miller,
Appellate Review of Sentences, 84 GEo. LJ. 1389 (1996) (outlining powers and limitations of
appellate courts reviewing alleged sentencing errors); Marcy Rasmussen Podkopacz & Barry C.
Feld, Judicial Waiver Policy and Practice: Persistence, Seriousness and Race, 14 LAW & INEQ. J.
73 (1995) (analyzing judicial discretion in juvenile court).
5. See James E. Coleman, Jr. et al., Report of the Special Committee on Race and Ethnicity
to the D.C. Circuit Task Force on Gender, Race, and Ethnic Bias, 64 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 189,
307-28 (1996) (discussing the basis for claims of discrimination regarding the crack and cocaine
sentencing disparity); Matthew F. Leitman, A Proposed Standard of Equal Protection Review for
Classifications Within the Criminal Justice System That Have a Racially Disparate Impact: A
Case Study of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines' Classification Between Crack and Powder Co-
caine, 25 U. TOL. L. REv. 215 (1994) (outlining the disparate impact between crack and cocaine
sentences and the relevant constitutional challenges); Podkopacz & Feld, supra note 4, at 109-11;
David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1283 (1995) (dis-
cussing discrimination and equal protection issues in the context of cocaine sentencing); Karen
Lutjen, Article, Culpability and Sentencing Under Mandatory Minimums and the Federal Sentenc-
ing Guidelines: The Punishment No Longer Fits the Criminal, 10 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL'Y 389 (1996) (arguing that criminal sentences rarely correspond to actual culpability);
Laura A. Wytsma, Comment, Punishment for "Just Us"-A Constitutional Analysis of the Crack
Cocaine Sentencing Statutes, 3 GEo. MASON INDEP. L. REv. 473 (1995) (discussing the sentenc-
ing disparity between whites and blacks for drug offenses).
6. See infra Part VI. C.
7. See generally Peter N. Witty, Note, Plain Language, Congressional Intent, and Common
Sense, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 799, 800 (1996) (analyzing Congressional intent to "ensure fair
and equitable punishment for identical criminal conduct").
8. Melendez v. United States, 116 S. CL 2057 (1996); Neal v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 763
435
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the period September 1995 through August 1996. Part I provides a brief over-
view of the sentencing guidelines; Part H examines their interpretation; Parts
1I and IV focus on the resolution of conflicting sentences when the Guide-
lines differ from statutory minimums; Part V describes the recent controversy
surrounding crack to cocaine sentencing ratios; and finally, Part VI discusses
the ennhancement of adult sentences as a result of a prior juvenile record.
II. BACKGROUND
In making sentencing decisions, federal courts refer both to statutory rang-
es 9 and Sentencing Guidelines created by the United States Sentencing Com-
mission (Commission) pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.'0 The
Guidelines, which became effective November 1, 1987," consist of a table of
offense levels and criminal history categories," and were intended to promote
consistency and proportionality in sentencing. 3 Because the Commission re-
ceived express delegation from Congress for their creation, the Guidelines also
carry the authority of legislative rules.
4
As a result, courts must adhere to the Guidelines, as well as to any related
policy statements. 5 A judge may depart from the Guidelines only in the pres-
ence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances, 6 yet statutory minimums
also control." Therefore, conflicts arise when courts interpret the Guidelines
differently or find them to be inconsistent with statutory minimums."
In the area of drug sentencing, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 9 se-
verely restricted the Commission's authority over drug sentencing'm by tailor-
ing statutory minimums to the drug quantities attributed to each defendant 2 '
(1996).
9. Maximum and minimum sentencing ranges have historically been established via statute,
allowing judicial discretion within statutory limits. See David Leibsohn et al., Twenty-Fifth Annual
Review of Criminal Procedure: Sentencing Guidelines, 84 GEO. L.J. 1261 n.2134 (1996); Philip
Oliss, Comment, Mandatory Minimum Sentencing: Discretion, the Safety Valve, and the Sentenc-
ing Guidelines, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1851 (1995).
10. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3673 (1994), 28 U.S.C. § 991-998 (1994); see also Mistretta v. Unit-
ed States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (upholding the constitutionality of the Commission and its Guide-
lines).
11. 18 U.S.C. § 3551 n.1 (1994).
12. U.S. SENTENCING GuDELNEs MANUAL § 2D1.1(c) (1995).
13. See Orrin G. Hatch, The Role of Congress in Sentencing: The United States Sentencing
Commission, Mandatory Minimum Sentences, and the Search for a Certain and Effective Sentenc-
ing System, 28 WAKE FoRESr L. REv. 185 (1993); Leibsohn et al., supra note 9, at 1262.
14. See John P. Jurden, Comment, United States v. Muschik. An Administrative Law Cri-
tique of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines' Ability to Override Judicial Statutory Interpretations,
80 MIN. L. REv. 469, 479 (1995).
15. See Id at 480.-
16. See Leibsohn et al., supra note 9, at 1279.
17. See Jurden, supra note 14, at 481 ("Congressional action imposing harsh and inflexible
drug-related sentences arguably contradicts the Guidelines' purposes of sentencing proportionality
and uniformity.").
18. See id. at 480 ("Congress intends the Commission's authority to amend the Guidelines to
be the primary means of resolving intercircuit conflicts over the interpretation of the Guidelines.").
19. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971 (1994).
20. See Jurden, supra note 14, at 481; Margaret P. Spencer, Sentencing Drug Offenders: The
Incarceration Addiction, 40 VILL. L. REv. 335, 351 (1995).
21. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)-(D) (1994).
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As such, the Act imposed mandatory minimum sentences corresponding to the
weight of a "mixture or substance containing a detectable amount" of a
controlled substance.' Critics argue that this conflicts with the goals of con-
sistency and proportionality because the quantity distributed, rather than the
pure drug, determines the appropriate sentence.24 This "market-oriented" ap-
proach' targets drug dealers, who often distribute drugs within a "carrier
medium" such as blotter paper or gelatin, therefore creating a larger quantity
and a longer sentence for the same actual drug weight.' Moreover, both the
1988 Amendments to the Act" and the Violent Crime Control and Law En-
forcement Act of 1994? increased the penalties for drug offenses even fur-
ther," in addition to expanding the limits and usage of mandatory mini-
mums.
30
In the past year, the Tenth Circuit made significant strides in attempting
to resolve the conflict between the Guidelines and statutory minimums within
the context of drug sentencing. While the courts continue to reflect a national
trend toward stiffer penalties for drug offenders, political agendas and claims
of disparate impact remain. This Survey reviews the Tenth Circuit reaction to
these forces in recent decisions regarding drug sentencing, as well as current
trends in other circuits.
III. NEAL V. UNITED STATE?: DEFtNING "MIXTURE OR SUBSTANCE"
A. Background
Recently, the Tenth Circuit addressed the issue of standardized procedures
in weighing drugs for sentencing purposes.' In the past, courts interpreted
the Anti-Drug Abuse Act's 33 mandatory minimum sentences based on the
"mixture[s] or substance[s] containing a detectable amount of a controlled
22. ld. § 841(b)(IXA)-(B).
23. See Jurden, supra note 14, at 482 ("Concern about major drug traffickers who create and
market large quantities of diluted drugs led Congress to fashion the Act's mandatory minimum
sentence provisions. Congress therefore targeted the quantity of a distributed substance. .... ");
Eric J. Stockel, "Mixture or Substance:" Continuing Disparity Under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines § 2D1.1, 12 TouRO L REv. 205 (1995).
24. See Jurden, supra note 14, at 481; see also U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SPECIAL REPORT
TO THE CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIEs IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUsTICE SYS-
TEM, app. A at 8 (1991) (discussing the 1986 Drug Abuse Act as representing a move toward
mandatory minimum sentences, which is inconsistent with the establishment of sentencing guide-
lines).
25. United States v. Richards, 67 F.3d 1531 (10th Cir. 1995) (adopting Congress' market-
oriented approach as articluted in Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453 (1991)).
26. See Jurden, supra note 14, at 482-84.
27. Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1994)).
28. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 13701-14223
(1994) and scattered U.S.C. sections).
29. See Spencer, supra note 20, at 343-56.
30. See id. at 351.
31. 116 S. CL 763 (1996).
32. See Stephanie Stone, En Banc 10th Circuit Holds Methamphetamine Sentences Should
Be Based on Total Weight of Drug Mixture, WEST'S LEGAL NEws, July 12, 1996, at 6859, avail-
able in 1996 WL 387613.
33. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971 (1994).
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substance" to include different factors, leading to inconsistent sentences."
Yet the controversy regarding standards began with the landmark case of
Chapman v. United States,1 in which the Supreme Court held that blotter
paper used as a carrier medium for the drug lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD)
must be included in determining the appropriate sentence for drug traffick-
ing." The Court noted that neither the Guidelines nor the relevant statute
defined the phrase "mixture or substance" for sentencing purposes.' The
Court determined that applying the plain meaning of the terms corresponded to
Congress's market-oriented approach,39 measuring the weight of the drug by
the quantity that is actually distributed, rather than the pure drug itself.' This
often increases penalties for those possessing large quantities of drugs, no
matter the form."'
The Supreme Court resolved this controversy by affirming the plain
meaning approach in Neal v. United States.' Here, the Court reviewed a Sev-
enth Circuit decision applying Chapman,43 in which the defendant sought
reduction of his 1989 sentence" after the Commission retroactively revised
the method for determining the weight of LSD under the Guidelines in No-
vember, 1993.' Neal was convicted of possession of LSD with intent to dis-
tribute and sentenced according to the entire drug quantity, including its carrier
medium.' At the time, the statutory minimum sentence for the offense was
ten years for a total weight exceeding ten grams,' but the 1993 Guideline
34. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)-(B).
35. See Jurden, supra note 14, at 472-83.
36. 500 U.S. 453 (1991).
37. Chapman, 500 U.S. at 453.
38. Id. at 461-62.
39. Id. at 461, 465; see also United States v. Silvers, 84 F.3d 1317, 1320-25 (10th Cir.
1996) (applying the "one plant/one kilogram" sentencing standard for marijuana possession under
§ 841(b)(1)(A), noting that many courts have inferred an intent to punish growers more severely
under this guideline); United States v. Naranjo, 52 F.3d 245, 249-51 (9th Cir. 1995) (acknowl-
edging that a district court may subtract the amount of drugs tainted by sentencing entrapment
from the total quantity of drugs attributable to the defendant for purposes of establishing a manda-
tory minimum sentence); cf. United States v. Lacey, 86 F.3d 956, 962-66 (10th Cir. 1996) (hold-
ing that the government did not engage in outrageous behavior when it arranged purchase of five
kilograms of cocaine by informant, and downward departure of informant's sentence was not justi-
fied); United States v. Hardwell, 80 F.3d 1471, 1496-98 (10th Cir. 1996) (rejecting defendant's
argument that he was a victim of "sentence entrapment" when the government induced him to
purchase a higher quantity of cocaine at a below-market price). See generally Marcia G. Shein,
Sentencing Manipulation and Entrapment: Courts are Wary, but Admit the Possibility, CRIM.
JUST., Fall 1995, at 24 (proposing that the Sentencing Guidelines and their quantity-based sentenc-
ing scheme are being misused by the government to entrap offenders and manipulate sentences).
40. Chapman, 500 U.S. at 461.
41. Id
42. Neal, 116 S. Ct. at 763.
43. United States v. Neal, 46 F.3d 1405 (7th Cir. 1995).
44. Neal, 116 S. Ct. at 765.
45. See U.S. SENTENciNG GuIDE.INEs MANUAL, app C., amend 488 (1995). The amended
guideline instructed courts to apply a constructive weight of 0.4 milligrams to each dose of LSD
within (or on) a carrier medium. § 2D1.1(c); see also Shein, supra note 39, at 33 (noting that
"Neal based his motion on the U.S.S.G. change in 2D1. earlier in 1993 that instituted a uniform
and more lenient formula for calculating LSD weight").
46. Neal, 116 S. Ct. at 763.
47. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(l)(A)(v) (1994).
[Vol. 74:2
DRUG SENTENCING
revision instructed courts to give each dose of LSD on a carrier medium a
weight of 0.4 milligrams for sentencing purposes.'
Neal contended therefore that the revision reduced the drug weight attrib-
utable to him to 4.58 grams, reducing his sentence to 70 to 87 months.4 The
Seventh Circuit followed Chapman, reasoning that the Guidelines co-existed
with the statutory minimum, but did not override it.' The Supreme Court af-
firmed, stating that the "Commission's choice of an alternative methodology
for weighing [SD does not alter our interpretation of the statute in
Chapman,"51 and adhered to its earlier decision under principles of stare de-
cisis.52
Neal provided a much-needed resolution to the growing intercircuit con-
flict over the meaning of "mixture or substance" for sentencing purposes,
53
overturning many lower court decisions to comply with the affirmed stan-
dard.s' In the Tenth Circuit, the Court of Appeals reversed United States v.
Richards,55 using the plain meaning approach of the Neal Court and in-
cluding the carrier medium in "mixture or substance" for sentencing purpos-
es.
57
B. United States v. Richards'
Prior to Neal, the Tenth Circuit held that "mixture or substance" did not
include waste by-products for purposes of drug sentencing under the statutory
minimum. 59 Richards was convicted of possession with intent to manufacture
methamphetamine, possessing 28 grams of the pure drug, or 32 kilograms in a
mixture with waste water.' His original sentence of 188 months was reduced
to 60 months on a motion to modify,' and the Tenth Circuit affirmed on ap-
peal.' The court stated that it had "never specifically interpreted the statute
48. Neal, 116 S. CL at 765.
49. Neal, 46 F.3d at 1407.
50. See id at 1409;, see also United States v. Dorrough, 84 F.3d 1309 (10th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 117 S. CL 446 (1996) (denying defendant's motion to reduce his sentence pursuant to the
November, 1993 amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines, excluding waste materials from "mix-
ture or substance").
51. Neal, 116S. CLat766.
52. Id
53. See generally Edward J. Tafe, Comment, Sentencing Drug Offenders in Federal Courts:
Disparity and Disharmony, 28 U.S.F. L. REv. 369, 385-98 (1994) (discussing conflicting sentenc-
ing decisions among the circuits).
54. See United States v. Marshall, 83 F.3d 866 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. Cohn, No.
94-1561, 1996 WL 266436, at *1 (7th Cir. May 17, 1996); Basco v. United States, No. 94-2186,
1996 WL 243318, at *1 (8th Cir. May 13, 1996) (per curiam); United States v. Pirnat, No. 94-
5675, 1996 WL 148555, at *1 (4th Cir. April 2, 1996).
55. 87 F.3d 1152 (10th Cir. 1996) [hereinafter Richards I11].
56. Richards III, 87 F.3d at 1155-57.
57. ld at 1157.
58. 87 F.3d 1152 (10th Cir. 1996).
59. United States v. Richards, 67 F.3d 1531 (10th Cir. 1995) [hereinafter Richards 1].
60. ld The applicable statute, § 841(b)(1XA)(viii), provides a 10 year mandatory minimum
for possessors of 100 grams of methamphetamine or 1 kilogram of a mixture or substance con-
mining methamphetamine, or 5 years for 10 grams/100 grams. Id. at 1532 n.l.
61. Richards v. United States, 796 F. Supp. 1456 (D. Utah 1992) [hereinafter Richards 11.
62. Richards 11, 67 F.3d at 1531.
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apart from the [G]uideline to require the inclusion of waste water in its defini-
tion of 'mixture or substance."'' It therefore interpreted Chapman to articu-
late a market-oriented approach distinguishing between "usable substances"
and "unusable substances"' and excluding waste by-products from "mixture
or substance."
The Tenth Circuit granted en banc review, however, and subsequently re-
versed its earlier decision." The court held that a combination of metham-
phetamine and liquid by-products constituted a "mixture or substance" for sen-
tencing purposes.67 The court also used the plain meaning approach of
Neal' and Chapman and rejected the "marketable" or "usable" approach,'
stating:
Congress recognized the reality of the illicit drug market when it
stated that a defendant is eligible for a mandatory minimum sentence
if the defendant commits a drug offense involving a "mixture or sub-
stance containing a detectable amount of' a controlled substance. In
no way did Congress limit § 841 to usable or marketable mixtures
containing controlled substances.'
The Tenth Circuit therefore held that Congress requires the mandatory mini-
mum sentence under § 841 with or without a carrier medium, as long as "the
defendant possesses the specified quantity of a 'mixture or substance.""'7
C. United States v. Noveyn
In the recent decision of United States v. Novey," the Tenth Circuit re-
lied on Neal to assert that "the Sentencing Commission does not have the
authority to override or amend a statute."7' Here, Novey filed a motion to
reduce his sentence for possession with intent to distribute marijuana, origi-
nally enhanced due to his status as a career offender." Yet the relevant stat-
ute76 required the sentence for career offenders to be "at or near the maxi-
mum term authorized," which conflicted with a recent amendment to the
Guidelines commentary reducing the penalty for career offenders." The court
63. Id. at 1534.
64. Id. at 1536. "Chapman's recognition of Congress' 'market-oriented' approach dictates
that we not treat unusable drug mixtures as if they were usable." Id. at 1537.
65. Id. at 1537.
66. Richards 11, 87 F.3d at.
67. Id. at 1157.
68. Id. at 1155-57.
69. Id. at 1157-58; see supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
70. Richards III, 87 F.3d at 1158.
71. Id.
72. 78 F.3d 1483 (10th Cir. 1996).
73. Novey, 78 F.3d at 1483.
74. Id. at 1486 (citation omitted).
75. Id. at 1484.
76. 28 U.S.C. § 994(h) (1994).
77. Novey, 78 F.3d at 1487 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 994(h)).
78. The U.S. SEmCING GuiDEams MANUAL § 4111.1, amend. 506, cm. 2 (1995),
changed the definition of the term "Offense Statutory Maximum" from "the maximum term of im-
prisonment authorized for the offense" to the statutory maximum without any enhancement for
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therefore deemed the amendment inconsistent with the statute and "invalid as




These decisions undoubtedly reflect a political agenda, representing a solid
shift of power from the Commission to the legislature in the criminal sentenc-
ing arena.' While Congress formed the Commission to develop guidelines
promoting consistency and proportionality in sentencing,8 Neal emphasized
that the legislature retains the final word. Therefore, statutes may override the
Guidelines in order to promote other political goals, such as recent efforts to
crack down on drug dealers' in an election year where drug abuse was a
prevalent issue."
While it seems reasonable to punish drug offenders harshly to deter mas-
sive trafficking and promote public safety, decisions such as Neal may con-
tribute to the legitimization of discriminatory practices.8" For example, the
prior criminal record. Novey, 78 F.3d at 1485-86.
79. Id. at 1487.
80. See David Boerner, Sentencing Guidelines and Prosecutorial Discretion, 78 JUDICATuRE
196 (1995); Dean J. Spader, Megatrends in Criminal Justice Theory, 13 AM. J. CRIM. L. 157,
192-95 (1986).
81. See Jurden, supra note 14.
82. Drug dealers are much more likely than users to possess drugs within a carier medium.
Therefore, sentencing based on the weight of the entire "mixture or substance" generally imposes
harsher sentences on drug dealers. See Michelle Rome Kallam, Let the Punishment Fit the Crime:
State v. Newton, Chapman v. United States, and the Problem of Purity and Prosecutions, 52 LA.
L. REV. 1267 (1992); Thomas J. Meier, A Proposal to Resolve the Interpretation of "Mixture or
Substance" Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRMaNOLOGY 377
(1993); Eric P. Berlin, Comment, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines' Failure to Eliminate Sen-
tencing Disparity: Governmental Manipulations Before Arrest, 1993 Wis. L. REv. 187 (1993);
Joseph Rizzo, Comment, Federal Sentencing Guidelines: What is the Fair Interpretation of "Mix-
ture or Substance?", 14 PACE L. REV. 301 (1994); Edward J. Tafe, Comment, Sentencing Drug
Offenders in Federal Courts: Disparity and Disharmony, 28 U.S.F. L. REV. 369 (1994).
83. See Advocates Seek to Define Recovery as Election Issue, ALCOHOLISM & DRUG ABUSE
WKLY., Feb. 19, 1996, at 1 (reporting a New Hampshire forum organized to discuss alcohol and
drug issues); Dole Plans Key Role for Military in Drug War Politics: Republican Presidential
Nominee Renews His Pledge to Put National Guard in the Forefront of the Battle Against Illegal
Narcotics, L.A. TIMEs, Sept 2, 1996, at A17 (reporting presidential candidate Dole's pledge to
utilize the national guard to fight illegal narcotics); Dole Scoffs at Clinton's Stance on Drugs;
President Has Sent Youth a "No Big Deal" Message, Republican Says, WASH. POST, Sept. 1,
1996, at A18 (reiterating Dole's criticism of Clinton on drug issues); Join Together Publishes
Political Action Guide, ALCOHOLISM & DRUG ABUSE WKLY., Sept. 23, 1996, at 7 (chiding that
the 1996 presidential candidates were vying for the title of "Most Concerned About Drug
Abuse"); Maria L. La Ganga, News Media are Missing Drug Story, Dole Tells Editors, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 20, 1996, at A20 (outlining some of presidential candidate Dole's plans to promote
his anti-drug message via the media); David G. Savage, Clinton Not to Blame for Rise in Teen
Drug Use, Experts Say, L.A. TUIES, Sept. 18, 1996, at A5 (noting that although crime increased
sharply in the last three years of Clinton's presidency, he was not to blame).
84. See Drew S. Days HIL, Race and the Federal Criminal Justice System: A Look at the
Issue of Selective Prosecution, 48 ME. L. REV. 179 (1996) (outlining issues of selective prosecu-
tion due to race and the distinction between crack and cocaine offenses). But see James E.
Coleman, Jr. et al., Report of the Special Committee on Race and Ethnicity to the D.C. Circuit
Task Force on Gender, Race, and Ethnic Bias, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 189, 326-27 (1996) (not-
ing that despite the disparity, most jurisdictions have held that the sentencing distinction between
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growing awareness that static policies often disproportionately affect minori-
ties' contributes to fears of "sentence entrapment"' and the disparate im-
pact of the 100:1 cocaine to crack sentencing ratioY Previously, the co-exis-
tence of the Commission and the legislature at least provided a system of
checks and balances within the scheme of criminal sentencing, but Neal re-
quires a mandatory standard. When in doubt, the statute rules." This not only
limits the previous discretionary role of the judiciary in making sentencing
determinations,89 but also minimizes the authority of the Guidelines them-
selves. Ironically, by establishing prevalent statutory authority, Neal provided
the consistency sought by the Commission at the same time that it reduced its
authority.
E. Other Circuits
Prior to Neal, the circuits disagreed regarding the balance of authority
between the Guidelines and statutory sentencing ranges. 9 Yet post-Neal, most
circuits consistently comply with the Guidelines unless they conflict with the
applicable statute." Only the Ninth Circuit has produced conflicting decisions
regarding the interpretation of "mixture or substance," 9 and the remaining
circuits have not interpreted Neal at this time.
cocaine and crack do not violate the Equal Protection Clause).
85. See infra notes 119-22 and accompanying text.
86. See supra note 39.
87. See infra Part V.
88. Neal v. United States, 116 S. CL 763, 764; see also Philip Oliss, Mandatory Minimum
Sentencing: Discretion, the Safety Valve, and the Sentencing Guidelines, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1851,
1854 (1995).
89. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
90. See United States v. Demkier, 65 F.3d 94 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that the weight of the
carrier medium was properly included in determining the weight of LSD for sentencing purposes);
United States v. Jacobs, 65 F.3d 96 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1021 (1996) (deter-
mining that the weight of the carrier medium was properly included in the total weight of LSD for
sentencing purposes).
91. See United States v. Jones, No. 96-3027, 1996 WL 393114, at *1 (D.C. Cir. June 20,
1996) (per curiam) (using the entire weight of the mixture containing cocaine base in determining
the appropriate sentence); United States v. Flanagan, 80 F.3d 143 (5th Cir. 1996) (remanding for
resentencing consistent with Chapman, due to the incorrect calculation of the amount of LSD for
sentencing determinations); United States v. Hernandez, 79 F.3d 584 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that
the Guidelines are authoritative unless they are inconsistent with the Constitution or a federal
statute); United States v. Marshall, 83 F.3d 866 (7th Cir. 1996) (denying relief from mandatory
minimum sentencing to a movant seeking resentencing in light of amendment to the Guidelines);
United States v. Fountain, 83 F.3d 946, 951 (8th Cir. 1996) (determining that Guidelines com-
mentary is authoritative unless it is inconsistent with the relevant statute or the Constitution).
92. United States v. Innie, 77 F.3d 1207, 1208 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that "mixture or sub-
stance" does not include any materials that will be separated from the controlled substance before
use). But see United States v. Muschik, 89 F.3d 641 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that the trial court
was correct in including entire weight of drug medium in sentencing).
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IV. THE MELENDEZ CONTROVERSY: FURTHER CONFLICT BETWEEN THE
GUmELINES AND STATUTORY MINIMUMS
A. Background
In United States v. Bush,93 the Tenth Circuit held that the district court
did not abuse its discretion in departing from the statutory minimum sentence
for distribution of crack cocaine, pursuant to the Guidelines. 9 Where the
court was uncertain regarding the base offense," it directed the district court
to resentence the defendant "on the basis of the objective yielding the lowest
offense level." Hence, the court determined that a downward departure was
appropriate where the Guidelines supported a sentence below the statutory
minimum.'
Seven months later, the Supreme Court overruled this decision in
Melendez v. United States."' The government moved for a downward depar-
ture from the Guidelines for Melendez's possession with intent to distribute
cocaine, due to his "substantial assistance" with its investigation."9 The trial
court refused to depart below the statutory minimum. Melendez appealed,
arguing that the government's Section 5Kl.1 motionm also extended to de-
parture below the statutory minimum."°
The Supreme Court disagreed, determining that without a specific motion
to depart from the statutory minimum, the district court lacked authority to do
so."° It clarified that such a motion is required by statute, °3 but Congress
did not charge the Commission with implementing this requirement. The
Guidelines must only "constrain[] the district court's discretion in choosing a
specific sentence after the Government moves for a departure below the
statutory minimum.'
0 4
93. 70 F.3d 557 (loth Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. CL 795 (1996).
94. Bush, 70 F.3d at 561 n.3 (10th Cir. 1995) ("Nor is it significant whether any of the
mandatory minimum sentences prescribed in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) apply, because the district court
may depart below such mandatory minimum sentences where, as here, the government has moved
for a downward departure pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K 1.1.").
95. The court was uncertain "whether the object of the conspiracy was to distribute cocaine
base, cocaine powder, or both." Id. at 560.
96. Id. at 561.
97. Id. at 561-62.
98. 116 S. Ct. 2057 (1996).
99. Melendez, 116 S. Ct. at 2063. The term "substantial assistance" refers to defendant's
agreement to assist the government in their investigation and to sign a plea agreement. Id. at 2059.
Section 5Kl.I of the Guidelines states that "[u]pon motion of the government stating that the
defendant has provided substantial assistance ... , the court may depart from the [Gluidelines."
Id. at 2063 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 5KI.1).
100. See supra note 99.
101. 116 S. CL at 2060.
102. Ild. at 2063 (explaining that U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1(a) may guide the court in selecting a sen-
tence below either the Guidelines range or statutory minimum, but a specific government motion
is still required for departure below the. statutory minimum).
103. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (1994).
104. Melendez, 116 S. Ct. at 2062-63 (footnote omitted).
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B. United States v. Belt"5
In United States v. Belt, the Tenth Circuit reiterated the Supreme Court's
holding in Melendez"'° and noted that the decision overruled the circuit's
earlier decision in Bush."° Belt, the defendant, was convicted of conspiracy
to distribute a controlled substance" and appealed his statutory minimum
sentence on grounds that the government's 5K1.1 motion to depart from the
Guidelines "allowed the court to ignore statutory minimums.""'° In addition,
Belt argued that U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2 should apply, requiring sentencing "without
regard to any statutory minimum sentence."" Since Belt "chose" to be sen-
tenced under 5K1.1 and it was too late in the proceedings to refer to an alter-
nate standard, the court determined that he had forfeited his right to be sen-
tenced under 5C1.2.1" Therefore, it upheld the district court decision to ap-
ply 5K1.1. and impose the statutory minimum sentence." 2 This was the low-
est possible sentence under Melendez,"3 since the government's 5Kl.1 mo-
tion requested departure below the Guidelines only."
4
C. Analysis
Melendez and Belt once again established a hierarchy of authority among
statutes, the Guidelines, and the discretion of the lower courts. The govern-
ment must make a specific motion to depart from statutory minimums, but it
may also depart from the Guidelines as long as the statutory minimum is
maintained. This limits judicial discretion and case-specific sentencing, as well
as attempts to challenge statutory authority. These decisions therefore contrib-
ute to increasing federal control in this arena,"' upholding statutory mini-
mums as the prevailing standard.
105. 89 F.3d 710 (10th Cir. 1996).
106. Belt, 89 F.3d at 713.
107. Id. at 712 n.1.
108. At no time did the court identify the actual "controlled substance" as distributed.
109. Belt, 89 F.3d at 711 (referring to government's U.S.S.G. § 5KI.1 motion). The court
noted that circuits were spit on this issue prior to Melendez, and prior Tenth Circuit decisions
supported the contention that a 5KI.1 motion allows the court to ignore statutory minimums. The
Supreme Court settled the controversy in Melendez. See iL at 712 n.l.
110. Id. at 714. The defendant argued that U.S.S.G. § 5C.2 should apply, rather than §
5KI.1. However, the court noted that although 5C1.2 requires sentencing in accord with the
Guidelines without deference to statutory minimums, the sentence available under 5C1.2 would
have been greater than the sentence under 5K.1. ld. at 714 & nn.5-6; cf United States v. Acosta-
Olivas, 71 F.3d 375, 379 (10th Cir. 1995) (explaining the difference in the operation of these two
provisions).




115. See Jay M. Cohen & David J. Fried, United States v. Lopez and the Federalization of
Criminal Law, DEC PROSEcrrOR, Nov.-Dec. 1995, at 23. See generally Gerald G. Ashdown,
Federalism, Federalization, and the Politics of Crime, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 789, 804 (1996) (dis-
cussing the historical development of federal control in the area of criminal law and procedure);
Charles B. Schweitzer, Street Crime, Interstate Commerce, and the Federal Docket: The Impact of
United States v. Lopez, 34 DUQ. L. REV. 71 (1995) (providing an analysis of a recent Supreme




Only the Ninth Circuit has addressed the Melendez decision thus far. In
United States v. Castaneda,"6 the court determined that under Melendez,
district courts lack the authority to depart below the statutory minimum sen-
tence without a motion by the government based on substantial assistance." 7
Other circuits should soon follow, since the Supreme Court supplied a national
standard in Melendez to eliminate prior inter-circuit conflict.""
V. THE RECENT CONmovERSY: CRACK TO COCAINE SENTENCING RATIO
A. Background
Under the current Guidelines, offenses involving one gram of crack co-
caine ("crack") results in the same sentence as those involving 100 grams of
powder cocaine." 9 This disparity has sparked criticism and controversy, due
to the potentially unfair impact on minorities.'" Statistics show that although
the majority of drug users in the United States are white, the majority of those
serving time for drug offenses are African-American. 2' Therefore, critics ar-
gue that the current 100:1 ratio has a discriminatory impact and causes
disproportionality in sentencing." 2 They also assert that minorities are more
likely to use crack, while whites are more likely to use powder cocaine 3
This difference arguably leads to more severe punishments for minorities.
In response, each circuit has reviewed the issue and determined that this
sentencing disparity did not violate the Fifth Amendment of the Constitu-
tion.'24 Yet, the Commission proposed amendments to the Guidelines in
116. 94 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 1996).
117. Castaneda, 94 F.3d at 594.
118. The circuits were split prior to Melendez. See supra note 109.
119. U.S. SENTENciNG GUIDELIFS MANuAL § 2DI.I(c)(I 1) (1995).
120. See Days, supra note 84, at 189; see also William W. Schwarzer, Sentencing Guidelines
and Mandatory Minimums: Mixing Apples and Oranges, 66 S. CAL L. REV. 405, 407-09 (1992);
David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1283 (1995).
121. See Keith W. Watters, Law Without Justice, NAT'L B. Ass'N MAG., Mar.-Apr. 1996, at
1. Statistics offered include:
(i) African Americans make up 12% of the population and comprise 13% of drug users,
55% of all drug convictions, and 74% of all drug prison sentencing. (ii) 52% of crack
users are white. (iii) 75% of cocaine powder users are white (iv) Powder cocaine related
convictions in 1993 were comprised of 32% white, 27% black, 39.3% Hispanic ... (vi)
Whites are more likely to be placed on probation than African Americans. (vii) Since
1988, the U.S. Attorney General has approved death penalty prosecutions against 12
whites, 7 Hispanics, 2 Asians, and 40 African Americans.
Id. at 23. But see William Carlsen, Study on Sentences Finds No Racial Bias in Western Judges;
Blacks' Longer Terms Tied to Other Factors, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 21, 1996, at A3.
122. See Watters, supra note 121, at 23 (noting that "five (5) grams of crack will equal ap-
proximately ten (10) doses on the street; however, five hundred (500) grams of powder cocaine
will equal a staggering twenty-five hundred (2,500) doses on the street"). Watters also asserts that
"African-American communities have been 'red-lined' for mass arrest and incarceration while
white communities have been largely ignored." Id. at 1.
123. See Days, supra note 84, at 189-90.
124. See id. at 190; United States v. Then, 56 F.3d 464 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Cher-
ry, 50 F.3d 338 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Williamson, 53 F.3d 1500 (10th Cir. 1995);
United States v. Johnson, 40 F.3d 436 (D.C. Cir. 1994); United States v. Lewis, 40 F.3d 1325 (lst
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April, 1995, advocating equal treatment of crack and powder cocaine
offenses" by lowering the penalties for crack offenses to match those for
powder cocaine."2 Congress voted to disapprove the amendments in Septem-
ber, 1995,'" and the President signed the Act in October, 1995," issuing a
public statement that "[tirafficking in crack, and the violence it fosters, has a
devastating impact on communities across America, especially inner-city com-
munities. Tough penalties are required because of the effect on individuals and
families, related gang activity, turf battles, and other violence."'" Within this
statement, the President acknowledged the sentencing disparity as problematic
and charged the Commission to make new recommendations."'
Even so, many minority defendants have recently relied on the
Commission's proposed amendments to argue for lower crack-related sentenc-
es. '3 Others argue that judges should consider "the nature and circumstances
of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant" as sentenc-
ing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553,"3 warranting a downward departure
where there is disparate treatment.'33
None of these disparate treatment arguments have been successful,"3
however, until United States v. Arnstrong.'33 In Armstrong, the Supreme
Court held that to be entitled to discovery on a claim of prosecution based
solely on race, a defendant must show that the government declined to prose-
Cir. 1994); United States v. D'Anjou, 16 F.3d 604 (4th Cir. 1994); United States v. Clary, 34 F.3d
709 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Coleman, 24 F.3d 37 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Hard-
en, 37 F.3d 595 (11th Cir. 1994); United States v. Lloyd, 10 F.3d 1197 (6th Cir. 1993); United
States v. Frazier, 981 F.2d 92 (3rd Cir. 1992); United States v. Lawrence, 951 F.2d 751 (7th Cir.
1991).
125. See Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 60 Fed. Reg.
25,074, 25,075-76 (1995) (proposed May 1, 1995).
126. See Days, supra note 84, at 191; see also Paula C. Johnson, At the Intersection of Jus-
tice: Experiences of African American Women in Crime and Sentencing, 4 AM. U. J. GENDER &
L. 1, 60-62 (1995) (noting that the Commission saw no justification for the sentencing disparity
between crack and powder cocaine offenses.)
127. 141 CONG. REC. S14779-02 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1995); see also Johnson, supra note 126,
at 61.
128. Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Amendment, Disapproval Act. Pub. L No. 104-38, 109
Stat. 334 (1995); see Legislation: Clinton Retains Stiff Crack Penalties, FACTS ON FILE WORLD
NEwS DIG., Nov. 2, 1995, available in 1995 WL 11601728.
129. President's Statement on Signing § 1254 (Oct. 30, 1995), available in 1995 WL
634347.21.
130. Id. at *2.
131. See Stephanie Stone, U.S. Appeals Courts Still Turning Down Challenges to Crack Co-
caine Sentencing Laws, WEST'S LEGAL NEws, May 20, 1996, at 4477, available in 1996 WL
265206.
132. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (1994).
133. Cf. Stone, supra note 131.
134. See United States v. Anderson, 82 F.3d 436 (D.C. Cir. 1996); United States v. Sanchez,
81 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 1996); United States v. Fike, 82 F.3d 1315 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v.
Smith, 73 F.3d 1414 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that increased sentence for possession of crack rath-
er than powder cocaine is not unconstitutionally vague); United States v. Jimenez, 68 F.3d 49
(2nd Cir. 1995); United States v. Fisher, 58 F.3d 96 (4th Cir.), cert. denied 116 S. Ct 329 (1995);
United States v. Cherry, 50 F.3d 338 (5th Cir. 1995) (all noting that sentencing disparity between
crack and powder cocaine did not warrant downward departure); United States v. Booker, 70 F.3d
488 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Higgs, 72 F.3d 69 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v. Dumas,
64 F.3d 1427 (9th Cir. 1995).
135. 116 S. Ct. 1480 (1996).
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cute suspects of other races for the same offense."3 By at least providing a
limited opportunity to make such a claim, the Court created a small opening in
the barricade against disparate treatment claims. But despite the significance of
this decision, the controversy regarding sentencing continues,3 and the
Tenth Circuit has been the last to address the issue after the rejection of the
Commission's recommendations.
B. United States v. Maples"~
One of three defendants, Kristen Maples, was sentenced to 70 months
incarceration for conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute cocaine
base and possession with the intent to distribute cocaine base.39 Defendant
Michael Maples received an 84-month sentence for two counts of possession
with intent to distribute cocaine base,"4 and defendant James Marlin
Simpson received a 63-month sentence for distributing cocaine base. 4' The
district court considered cocaine base to be equivalent to crack under the
Guidelines' and sentenced the defendants accordingly. All three appealed
their sentences in a joint motion, 3 arguing that the district court erred in
denying downward departures due to the Commission's recommendation to
abolish the 100:1 cocaine to crack sentencing ratio.'" The district court de-
termined that it lacked jurisdiction to do so, since it was bound to apply the
Guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing."4
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit noted that the issue was moot, since the
Commission's recommendations were rejected by Congress and determined
that Maples had no grounds for appeal."4 Simpson appealed his sentence on
other grounds, arguing that "the Commission's recommendation indicates a
failure to adequately consider the differences between crack and powder co-
caine when initially drafting the Guidelines under which [he] was sen-
136. Armstrong, 116 S. CL at 1489.
137. Congress is again considering legislation again that would increase sentences for powder
cocaine in order to eliminate disparity. See H.R. 3196, 104th Cong. (1996); H.R. 3154, 104th
Cong. (1996) (proposing to increase the sentence for trafficking in powder cocaine to that of
crack).
138. 95 F.3d 35 (10th Cir. 1996).
139. Maples, 95 F.3d at 36. The scientific definition of "cocaine base" is the paste made from
coca leaves at the beginning of the cocaine marketing system. THOMAS W. HUTCHINSON Er AL,
FEDERAL SENTENCING LAW AND PRACTICE 212 (2d ed. 1994). However, § 2DI.(c) was amended
in 1993 to include: "'Cocaine base,' for the purposes of this guideline, means 'crack.' 'Crack' is
the street name for a form of cocaine base, usually prepared by processing cocaine hydrochloride
and sodium bicarbonate, and usually appearing in a lumpy, rocklike form." Andrea Wilson, Fed-
eral Sentencing Guidelines: Annual Eleventh Circuit Survey January 1, 1994 - December 31,
1994, 46 MERCER L. REV. 1395, 1404-05 (1995).
140. Maples, 95 F.3d at 37.
141. Id.
142. Id; see Widson, supra note 139, at 1404-05.
143. Maples, 95 F.3d at 37.
144. Id.
145. Id; see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(aX4)(A), (b) (1994); United States v. Canales, 91 F.3d 363,
370 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. Kissick, 69 F.3d 1048, 1052 (10th Cir. 1995).
146. Maples, 95 F.3d at 37.
147. Id.
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tenced."' 8 The Tenth Circuit again disagreed," stating that the Commis-
sion considered the distinction, and determined the issue was "not the sort of
discrete, individual and case-specific mitigating circumstances justifying
downward departure under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)."'"' The court therefore af-
firmed all three sentences.' 5'
C. Analysis
Once again, the recent focus on political goals masks the relevant issues
of discrimination and social impact in the area of drug sentencing. Although
statistics illustrate the disparate impact of federal crack and cocaine sentencing
policies on the American population, 2 reality is overshadowed by political
agenda. Emerging from an election year in which crime was a predominant is-
sue, 53 tough penalties at any cost seem to be a quiet "battle cry" of the in-
cumbent, and statutory minimums still prevail.
It is ironic that while Congress created the Commission to strive for con-
sistency and proportionality,' its efforts to do so are repeatedly quashed.
Instead, standards such as the 100:1 cocaine-crack sentencing ratio create a
noticeable disparity in application, leading to a new form of discrimination.
While the circuits must adhere to this statutory authority, their deference to
statutory limits leads to disproportionate sentencing, and the Tenth Circuit is
no exception. Yet under the President's charge, the Commission may now
create new alternatives to avoid disparate treatment of minority populations.
D. Other Circuits
The Tenth Circuit was the last to address this issue after Congress reject-
ed the Commission's recommendations."' All other circuits have consistently
held that a downward departure is not warranted due to discriminatory
impact. 15
VI. ENHANCING ADULT SENTENCING WITH PRIOR JUVENILE OFFENSES
A. Background
With the increase in both numbers of juvenile offenders and the violence
of their crimes,'57 the juvenile justice system has slowly readjusted its focus
148. ld (citing Appellant's Brief at 8, Maples (No. 95-3247)).
149. Id. (stating that "the Commission recommended the elimination of the sentencing differ-
ential for crack in no way indicates that it failed to adequately consider the differences between
crack and powder cocaine when it originally adopted the guidelines").
150. Id. at 37-38.
151. Id. at 38.
152. See supra note 121.
153. See supra note 83.
154. See Leibsohn et al., supra note 9, at 1262.
155. See supra Part V.A.
156. See supra note 134.
157. See infra note 196; see also David Yellen, What Juvenile Court Abolitionists Can Learn
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from rehabilitation to punishment. 5 As early as 1967, the Supreme Court
granted juveniles many of the procedural protections given to adults in the
landmark decision of In re Gault. And in 1984, the newly established Sen-
tencing Guidelines devised enhancements for adult offenders based on both
prior adult and juvenile sentences."6 For example, courts treat both *prior
juvenile and adult sentences of more than sixty days confinement alike in
terms of enhancing an adult sentence.' 6' While courts have historically used
juvenile convictions to enhance adult sentences,"6 the practice is now explic-
itly supported by the Guidelines,"6 as well as the Federal Youth Corrections
Act of 1994.'6
In United States v. Johnson," s the D.C. Circuit upheld the use of
defendant's juvenile convictions to enhance his sentence for possession of
cocaine base with intent to deliver."M Johnson challenged the Commission's
authority to factor his juvenile convictions into his criminal history catego-
ry 167 and alleged discriminatory intent."at But the court affirmed the
Commission's authority to establish sentencing criteria under the Sentencing
Reform Act'6 and maintained the enhancement. 70 In an effort to discour-
age recidivism,17' the court stated that juvenile offenders must refrain from
additional criminal activity in order to escape further punishment in adult-
hood," 2 since adult repeat offenders are sentenced according to their entire
criminal history.
73
From the Failures of Sentencing Reform, 1996 WiS. L. REV. 577 (1996); Howard N. Snyder &
Melissa Sickmund, JuvEl4uE OFFENDERS AND Victims: A FOCUS ON VIOLENCE, OFF. OF Juv.
JUST. & DELiNQ. PREVENoON, May 1995, at 4-10 (indicating that the juvenile violent crime rate
increased significantly between 1988 and 1992).
158. See Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense: Punishment,
Treatment, and the Difference it Makes, 68 B.U. L. REV. 821, 821-22 (1988); Deborah L. Mills,
United States v. Johnson: Acknowledging the Shift in the Juvenile Court System from Rehabilita-
tion to Punishment, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 903, 903 (1996); Laura Sessions Stepp, The Crackdown
on Juvenile Crime: Do Stricter Laws Deter Youths?, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 1994, at Al (noting
apparent societal support for punishment of juvenile crimes). See generally Gordon A. Martin. Jr.,
The Delinquent and the Juvenile Court: Is There Still a Place for Rehabilitation?, 25 CONN. L.
REV. 57 (1992) (arguing that the American criminal justice system has abandoned rehabilitative
measures in favor of punitive ones).
159. 387 U.S. 1 (1967); see Mills, supra note 158, at 915.
160. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §4AI.2(d) (1995).
161. 1& §§ 4Al.l(b), 4A2.1(d)(2)(A).
162. See Mills, supra note 158, at 932-33; see also Note, Selective Incapacitation: Reducing
Crime Through Predictions of Recidivism, 96 HARv. L REV. 511 (1982).
163. See Mills, supra note 158, at 904, 933.
164. 18 U.S.C. §§ 5001-5042 (1994).
165. 28 F.3d 151 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
166. Johnson, 28 F.3d at 156-57.
167. Jl at 153.
168. lld
169. Id at 153-54 (citing 28 U.S.C §§ 991, 994(a) (1994)); cf. Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (stating that the Commission has broad
authority to establish the Guidelines, barring contradiction of the express intent of language of
Congress).
170. Johnson, 28 F.3d at 156-57.
171. A recidivist is a "habitual criminal" or "criminal repeater." BLACK'S LAw DiCnoNARY
1269 (6th ed. 1990). See generally Podkopacz & Feld, supra note 4, at 165-70.
172. Johnson, 28 F.3d at 154-55.
173. ld.
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B. United States v. Wacker
174
Seven co-defendants were convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent
to distribute approximately 2000 pounds of marijuana, four counts of posses-
sion with intent to distribute marijuana, and two counts of the use of a firearm
in connection with a drug trafficking offense.'" Six of the co-defendants ap-
pealed, 16 arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support these charg-
es.17
Among other issues, the court reviewed the enhancement of the sentence
of one defendant (Lipp) on the basis of a 1972 juvenile drug conviction."
T
7
The court had set aside the conviction in 1973, pursuant to a Federal Youth
Corrections Act (FYCA) provision, which allowed district court judges to "au-
tomatically set aside" juvenile convictions by unconditionally discharging a
juvenile from probation prior to expiration of the court-mandated period."
Lipp argued that in doing so, the court "expunged" his sentence, precluding it
from consideration in determining his criminal history category under the
Guidelines."u
The Sentencing Guidelines, however, distinguish between convictions that
are set aside and those that are expunged. 8' The Tenth Circuit determined
that a conviction set aside under the FYCA was set aside under the Guide-
lines, rather than expunged." It reasoned that the purpose of allowing juve-
nile convictions to be set aside is to offer youthful offenders a new start' 83
But "if a juvenile offender turns into a recidivist, the case for conferring the
benefit dissipates," and the conviction should be considered for adult sentenc-
ing purposes." 4
While the Tenth Circuit has referred to expunging as the "process of seal-
ing or destroying the record of a criminal conviction after expiration of a
certain time,"'' the court did not address the meaning of "set aside" under
the FYCA prior to Wacker. The majority of other circuits have held that the
174. 72 F.3d 1453 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. CL 136 (1996).
175. Wacker, 72 F.3d at 1460.
176. As part of a plea agreement, Edith Wacker pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to
possess with the intent to distribute 2,000 pounds of marijuana, and all other charges against her
were dropped. Id.
177. Id. at 1462.
178. Id. at 1478-79.
179. Id. at 1479 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 5021(b) (repealed 1984)).
180. lI; see U.S. SENTENCING GUIDEUNES MANUAL § 4A1.2(j) (1995) ("Sentences for ex-
punged convictions are not counted [in the criminal history calculation].").
181. The comment to section 4A1.2(j) of the Guidelines states:
A number of jurisdictions have various procedures pursuant to which previous convic-
tions may be set aside or the, defendant may be pardoned for reasons unrelated to inno-
cence or errors of law, e.g.,in order to restore civil rights or to remove the stigma asso-
ciated with a criminal conviction. Sentences resulting from such convictions are to be
counted. However, expunged convictions are not counted.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDEuNES MANUAL § 4A1.2, cmL 10.
182. Wacker, 72 F.3d at 1479.
183. Id. (citing United States v. Ashburn, 20 F.3d 1336, 1343 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting 107
CONG. REG. 8709 (1961) (statement of Sen. Dodd))).
184. Id (quoting United States v. McDonald, 991 F.2d 866, 872 (D.C. Cir. .1993)).
185. Id. (citing United States v. Johnson, 941 F.2d 1102, 1111 (10th Cir. 1991)).
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FYCA "does not allow a court to authorize the actual physical obliteration of
the record of conviction."'" Of the four circuits to consider the issue, only
the Ninth Circuit concluded that a sentence that was set aside under the FYCA
is an expungement under the Guidelines.'" The Ninth Circuit, however, re-
lied upon the Supreme Court decision in Tuten v. United States" for its po-
sition, and the Tenth Circuit did not find this decision controlling." As a
result, the court held that Lipp's conviction had not been expunged for pur-
poses of the Sentencing Guidelines."9
C. Analysis
While Wacker did not address a conflict between the Guidelines and the
relevant statute, the Tenth Circuit's application of the Guidelines created an
effect inconsistent with underlying policy. If, as the court reasoned, the pur-
poses of setting aside a juvenile conviction is to allow for a new start,'
9'
allowing the conviction to remain on his record clearly does not support this
goal." For example, if a juvenile relies on receiving a new start and with-
holds his criminal record when hired, a conviction revealed later may be cause
for termination.'" If this obstacle is somehow avoided, any further punish-
ment fourteen years later in conjunction with another offense is a repetitive
punishment for a distant mistake, not a new beginning. ' "
Furthermore, an individual who has not been convicted of a criminal of-
fense in fourteen years is hardly a recidivist. This individual has not consis-
tently committed crimes since incarceration. It would better serve the court to
reward the fourteen years without a conviction than to punish for a distant
past.' It would serve a juvenile offender better to truly believe that (s)he
has a new beginning when (s)he is given a theoretical fresh start, knowing that
186. Id. (quoting Ashburn, 20 F.3d at 1341 (citing United States v. Gardner, 860 F.2d 1391,
1399 (7th Cir. 1988))).
187. Id. (citing Gardner, 860 F.2d at 1391; Ashburn, 20 F.3d at 1336; McDonald, 991 F.2d at
866; United States v. Kammerdiener, 945 F.2d 300 (9th Cir. 1991)).
188. 460 U.S. 660 (1983).
189. Wacker, 72 F.3d at 1479.
190. Id. at 1480. The court stated.
We believe that the Sentencing Guidelines have since clarified that, at least for Guide-
line purposes, the two terms are not interchangeable. Because we find that the juvenile
conviction was not expunged for purposes of the Sentencing Guidelines, we hold that it
was properly considered by the district court in determining Lipp's criminal history.
Id.
191. Id.; see supra note 183.
192. See generally David M. Altschuler, Tough and Smart Juvenile Incarceration: Reintegrat-
ing Punishment, Deterrence and Rehabilitation, 14 ST. LOUIS U. PuB. L. REv. 217 (1994) (dis-
cussing the intent and effect of juvenile sentencing policies). But see T. Markus Funk, A Mere
Youthful Indiscretion? Re-examining the Policy of Expunging Juvenile Delinquency Records, 29 U.
MicH. J.L. REAroRM 885 (1996) (emphasizing the necessity of determining rehabilitative potential
prior to expunging juvenile records).
193. See Funk, supra note 192, at 885.
194. See generally Julianne P. Sheffer, Serious and Habitual Juvenile Offender Statutes: Rec-
onciling Punishment and Rehabilitation Within the Juvenile Justice System, 48 VAND. L REv. 479
(1995) (outlining the goals of the juvenile justice system and analyzing the effectiveness of puni-
tive and rehabilitative approaches).
195. See i.
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his or her self-image and future does not include being labeled a criminal.
In a time when juvenile offenses are increasing at an alarming rate, both
in seriousness and frequency,' the Tenth Circuit should be compelled to
consider the real issues and impact of its decisions. Adults with a juvenile
history that continues into adulthood may deserve a career-offender status,
complete with sentence enhancement for juvenile offenses. But those who
make an isolated mistake must sustain the punishment for a lifetime if distant
juvenile offenses fail to disappear from adult records.
D. Other Circuits
Only one other circuit addressed this issue directly during the survey peri-
od. In United States v. McNeil,'" the Eighth Circuit agreed with the district
court in considering the defendant's prior juvenile conviction as a predicate
offense for the career offender guideline."9 It affirmed that any offense com-
mitted prior to age 18 can be used for criminal history purposes as long as the
youth was convicted as an adult and the sentence exceeded one year and one
month.'"
The First Circuit addressed this issue indirectly in United States v.
Lindia,5' stating that "a sentencing court may invoke § 4A1.3 to depart
downward from the career-offender category if it concludes that the category
inaccurately reflects the defendant's actual criminal history."'20 Therefore,
when a court interprets the defendant's "actual" criminal history to exclude
juvenile offenses, it may depart downward from the career-offender guide-
line.'
CONCLUSION
In a period of turmoil and increasing criminal activity, consistency is at a
premium, and conflicts between standards and policies are frequent In the
area of drug sentencing, the Tenth Circuit has struggled with conflicts between
196. Fox Butterfield, Experts on Crime Warn of a 'Ticking Time Bomb', N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 6,
1996, at A6 (predicting that violent juvenile crime will "explode" in the next few years); Fox
Butterfield, Major Crimes Fell in '95, Early Data by FBI Indicate, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 1996, at
Al (acknowledging a trend of increasing violent crime among juveniles); Caitlin Francke, Girls'
Crimes Worry Some Officials; Rate is Increasing; "More Serious Side" of Delinquency Seen;
Equality of "Thug Life"; Number Referred to Juvenile System Doubles in 6 Years, BALTIMORE
SUN, July 28, 1996, at 1B (reporting statistics of rising female juvenile offenders and increasing
rate of referrals in Baltimore, Maryland); Bob Herbert, Trouble After School, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4,
1996, at A17 (noting a steady increase in violent crime among juveniles); Fiona M. Ortiz, More
People, More Kidr, More Delinquents, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Jan. 11, 1996, at C02 (outlining
plans to deal with increasing juvenile crime in Portland, Oregon); Youth Crime, BANGOR DAILY
NEws, Apr. 9, 1996 (reporting incidents of juvenile crime in Bangor, Maine); cf. 142 CONo. REC.
S9016-02 (daily ed. July 29, 1996) (discussing the drug epidemic in the United States and its
effect on youth).
197. 90 F.3d 298 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 596 (1996).
198. McNeil, 90 F.3d at 299.
199. Id. at 299-300.
200. 82 F.3d 1154 (1st Cir. 1996).
201. Lindia, 82 F.3d at 1165.
202. Id.
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statutory minimums and the relatively new Sentencing Guidelines, and has
managed to establish some consistent standards. For the most part, the Guide-
lines are authoritative, but only to the extent that they do not conflict with
statutes or congressional intent. As a result, the consistency intended by Con-
gress is often hampered by political agendas of the legislature and Supreme
Court.
While it cannot be said that the Tenth Circuit participates directly in this
process, its steady adherence to national trends calls for consideration of the
growing issues and perception beyond the desire for standards. Among the
circuits, recent outcries of disparate impact among minorities, juveniles, and
other specialized groups demand a renewed focus on the practical effects of
sentencing decisions. And with the political spotlight on racial discrimination
and sentencing entrapment via adherence to the Guidelines, the Tenth Circuit
will need to continue to make tough decisions regarding the impact of drug





Employment law attempts to provide broad protection for employees by
eliminating discrimination from the workplace and compensating victims.'
Congress enacted remedial statutes that protect employees from discrimination
on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin,2 age,' and disabili-
ty." This Survey examines how the Tenth Circuit dealt with several important
issues in the field of employment law during the survey period.'
Part I of this Survey addresses the controversial issue of individual liabili-
ty under Title VII. In Haynes v. Williams,6 the Tenth Circuit examined the
issue of individual liability under Title VII in the context of sexual harass-
ment. The Haynes court concluded that supervisors could not be held personal-
ly liable under Title VII. Part II of the Survey analyzes disparate impact
claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). In Ellis v.
United Airlines, Inc., the Tenth Circuit concluded that claims of disparate
impact are not viable under the ADEA.9
Part l examines the award of attorney's fees under Title VII. In
Corneveaux v. CUNA Mutual Insurance Group,'0 the court held that award-
ing attorney's fees against counsel under Title VII is inappropriate." Part IV
discusses when the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) considers unpaid
leave a "reasonable accommodation." In Hudson v. MCI Telecommunications
Corp., the court held that indefinite, unpaid leave is not a "reasonable ac-
commodation" under the ADA.'3 Finally, this Survey examines how these
Tenth Circuit decisions affect both Plaintiffs and Defendants.
1. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975) (detailing the purposes
underlying Title VII).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 20ooe-20ooe-17 (1994).
3. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1994).
4. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213.
5. The survey period covers cases decided between September 1995 and August 1996.
6. 88 F.3d 898 (10th Cir. 1996).
7. Haynes, 88 F.3d at 898-99.
8. 73 F.3d 999 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2500 (1996).
9. Ellis, 73 F.3d at 1007.
10. 76 F.3d 1498 (10th Cir. 1996).
11. Corneveaux, 76 F.3d at 1508.
12. 87 F.3d 1167 (10th Cir. 1996).
13. Hudson, 87 F.3d at 1169.
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I. THE QUESTION OF PERSONAL LiAn.rrY UNDER TTLE VII
A. Background
Title VII prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin,' and prevents retaliatory acts directed toward
employees who file complaints against an employer. 5 The Civil Rights Act
of 199116 expanded Title VII equitable relief to include compensatory and
punitive damages.' Prior to the 1991 expansion, only equitable remedies
such as reinstatement and backpay were generally assessed against employ-
ers."1
In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 9 the Supreme Court agreed with
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) guidelines concluding
that Congress intended to utilize agency principles in determining employer
liability.' Under agency principles, an employee's wrongful conduct imputes
liability to the employer.2' Conduct that falls outside the legitimate scope of
the employee's authority, however, releases the employer from liability.2
Agents may be held personally liable for conduct undertaken without the ap-
parent, actual, or implied authority of the employer.' Additionally, agency
doctrine allows joint liability between the employer and agent.' The Court's
application of agency law has caused confusion among the circuits.' Thus,
the reliance on agency principles has failed to provide a clear standard on the
issue of personal supervisor liability.
Arguably, the Tenth Circuit added to the overall confusion concerning
14. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
15. Id. § 2000e-3(a).
16. 1&.
17. Id. § 1981a(a)(l) states, in pertinent part
In an action brought by a complaining party under [Title Vi]... against a respondent
who engaged in unlawful intentional discrimination.. prohibited under [this act], and
provided that the complaining party ... may recover compensatory and punitive damag-
es as allowed in subsection (b) of this section ....
Id.
18. See Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1314 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing pre-1991 remedies
as supporting employer liability).
19. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
20. Vinson, 477 U.S at 72.
21. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) Op AGENCY § 219(1) (1958) (stating the master is liable for
torts of servants committed in the scope of their employment).
22. Id. §§ 228, 235 (stating that the act must be committed in contemplation of some benefit
to the master for employer to incur respondeat superior liability).
23. Id. § 359C(l).
24. Id. § 217B, 359C(l) (stating the principal and agent are jointly and severally liable "for
a wrong resulting from the tortious conduct of an agent and principle, and a judgment can be ren-
dered against each. .. ."); see also Janice R. Franke, Does Title VII Contemplate Personal Liabil-
ity for EmployeelAgent Defendants?, 12 HOFSTRA LAB. LJ. 39, 48-50 (1994) (making an argu-
ment for imposing joint and several liability). The Second Circuit has adopted the argument that
joint and several liability applies. See Comwell v. Robinson, 23 F.3d 694, 697 (2d Cir. 1994)
(finding individual supervisors jointly and severally liable under Title VI1); Tomka, 66 F.3d at
1318-19 (Parker, J., dissenting).
25. See Rachel E. Lutner, Note, Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment: The Morass of
Agency Principles and Respondeat Superior, 1993 U. ILL. L. REv. 589 (1993) (stating the use of
agency principles has not managed to establish a clear standard among the courts).
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supervisor liability by failing to resolve the issue of individual liability under
Title VII.2' In Sauers v. Salt Lake County," the Tenth Circuit held that Title
VII prohibits suits against individuals in their individual capacity.' However,
six months later, the court in Brownlee v. Lear Siegler Management Service
Corp.," held that an agent's status as an employer can render the agent per-
sonally liable." Recently, the Tenth Circuit characterized the issue of person-
al liability as open and unresolved.3' Furthermore, the other circuit courts are
equally divided on the issue of personal liability.Y
B. Haynes v. Williams33
1. Facts
Marcia Haynes and Melanie Dean (collectively the Plaintiffs) worked with
Gail Williams (Defendant) in a mental health unit at a prison facility operated
by the Oklahoma Department of Corrections.' The Plaintiffs instituted an
action under Title VII accusing the Defendant of improper physical contact
and verbal abuse.35 The Western District Court of Oklahoma held that the
Defendant was personally liable and awarded compensatory and punitive dam-
ages to the Plaintiffs.'
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that a supervisor could not be held
personally liable. 37 The court reasoned that the Plaintiffs must sue the em-
ployer directly for recovery under Title VII.' The Tenth Circuit relied on the
holding in Sauers to support its finding.3" Specifically, the court addressed
the apparent contradiction' between Sauers and Brownlee by finding that the
26. See Ball v. Renner, 54 F.3d 664, 667 (10th Cir. 1995) (avoiding the question of personal
supervisor liability).
27. 1 F.3d 1122 (10th Cir. 1993).
28. Sauers, 1 F.3d at 1125; see also Lankford v. City of Hobart, 27 F.3d 477, 480 (10th Cir.
1994) (applying the Sauers rule).
29. 15 F.3d 976 (10th Cir. 1994).
30. Brownlee, 15 F.3d at 978. Brownlee is an age-discrimination case, but the Bal court
cited to it to demonstrate that confusion exists within the Tenth Circuit regarding personal liabili-
ty. Ball, 54 F.3d at 667.
31. Ball, 54 F.3d at 668.
32. Compare Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 104 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that su-
pervisor may qualify as an "employer" under Title VII), rev'd on other grounds, 900 F.2d 27 (4th
Cir. 1990) and Jones v. Continental Corp., 789 F.2d 1225, 1231 (6th Cir. 1986) (stating that a
plaintiff may properly seek recovery against individuals under Title VII), with Tomka, 66 F.3d at
1313 (precluding individual liability under Title VII), and Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391, 1399
(D.C. Cir. 1995) (finding no individual liability for supervisors under Title VIU), and Miller v.
Maxwell's Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1993) (deciding that individuals may not be
sued personally under Title VI).
33. 88 F.3d at 898.
34. Haynes, 88 F.3d at 899.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 898.
37. Id. 898-99.
38. Id. at 899.
39. Id.
40. Ball, 54 F.3d at 667.
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language in Brownlee used a different agency principal that does not affect
Sauers.4' Further, the court stated that the language in Brownlee is "obiter
dictum," while the rule in Sauers was the proper holding for the case.' Final-
ly, the court concluded that even if the two cases were directly in conflict,
they would still follow the rule in Sauers.'
The court next analyzed the issue of individual liability in fight of the
remedial changes to Title VII made by the Civil Rights Act of 1991.' The
court interpreted the amended language of Title VII as continuing to affix
liability on the employer and not the individual supervisor.'5 Additionally, the
court reasoned that because Title VII placed caps on the possible award in
terms of the number of employees, Congress must have intended to place a
cap on employer liability.4' Congress enacted caps only for employers, which
implied that Congress did not consider individuals to be liable.' The Tenth
Circuit further reasoned that if Congress intended to hold individuals liable
under Title VII, Congress would have included individuals in the amended
statute.'
3. Analysis
The Supreme Court has yet to address the issue of personal liability under
Title VII. Advocates of personal liability ' suggest that the deterrence value is
strong enough to justify imposing individual liability under Title VII. ° An-
other policy argument asserts that a literal reading of Title VII appears to
support the finding of individual liability.5
Critics of individual liability argue that the language in Title VII does not
support an imposition of individual liability.52 In Haynes, the Tenth Circuit
followed the majority argument that "taken as a whole," the language used in
the amended Title VII "continue[s] to reflect the legislative judgment that
41. Haynes, 88 F.3d at 900.
42. Id. at 900.
43. Id. The court noted a published opinion of one panel constitutes binding precedent ab-
sent en banc reconsideration or a contrary Supreme Court decision. Id. at 900 n.4.
44. Id. (stating the amendments add compensatory and punitive damages to the remedies
available).
45. Id. at 901.
46. Id. Under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the lowest cap of $50,000 applies to employers
with more than 14 but fewer than 101 employees. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3XA) (1994).
47. Haynes, 88 F.3d at 901.
48. Id. (stating that Congress would have discontinued the exemption for small employers if
Congress intended individual liability).
49. See Ming K. Ayvas, Note, The Circuit Split on Title Vll Personal Supervisor Liability,
23 FORDHAm URB. LJ. 797, 813-14 (1996) (discussing the competing rational of statutory inter-
pretation under Title VII); see also Rebecca Hanner White, Vicarious and Personal Liability for
Employment Discrimination, 30 GA. L REv. 509, 551-56 (1996) (assessing the arguments for and
against imposing individual liability).
50. See Ayvas, supra note 49, at 814-15.
51. See Scott B. Goldberg, Comment, Discrimination by Managers and Supervisors: Recog-
nizing Agent Liability Under Title VII, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 571, 575 (1994) (noting liability turns
on who is considered the employer and defining "employe" as a person engaged in business with
15 or more employees and agents of the employer).
52. See White, supra note 49, at 551-56; see also Ayvas, supra note 49, at 805-08 (outlining
arguments for limiting Title VII to employers).
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statutory liability is appropriately borne by employers, not individual supervi-
sors."53 Furthermore, it seems inconsistent to exempt small employers who
employ fourteen or fewer persons from complying with Title VU, while hold-
ing individuals who employ no one personally liable for discrimination."
Title VII was enacted as a remedial statute and because there is no mention
whatsoever in the language of Title VII about individual liability, the Tenth
Circuit's argument is convincing.
The Haynes court cited two propositions to support the notion that Con-
gress never intended individual liability under Title VII. First, the court con-
cluded that it would be a "long stretch" to infer "Congress silently intended to
abruptly change" the meaning of the statute through an amendment that only
addresses the remedial portions of the statute.55 Second, the court concluded
that since Congress enacted liability caps for the employer and failed to ad-
dress a cap for individual liability, no individual liability was contemplated or
intended.
56
The initial impression of the court's holding in Haynes is to question any
reasoning that exonerates the person responsible for the harm. Nevertheless,
careful study will show that the Tenth Circuit's decision is appropriate under
the current federal employment discrimination scheme. 7 The language of
Title VII does not support the imposition of personal liability.
C. Other Circuits
The Tenth Circuit is one of the last circuits to address the issue of indi-
vidual liability under Title VII. The Fourth and the Sixth Circuits impose
individual liability under Title VI. The Fourth Circuit held that "[an individ-
ual qualifies as an 'employer' under Title VII if he or she serves in a supervi-
sory position and exercises significant control over the plaintiff's hiring, firing
or conditions of employment."'58 The Sixth Circuit stated that "the law is
clear," individuals may be held liable as "'agents' of an employer under Title
VII."5 9
The Second, Fifth, Ninth, Eleventh, and the District of Columbia Circuits
have all refused to impose individual liability. The Second Circuit reasoned
that Title VII's failure to explicitly allow agent liability illustrates Congress's
intent not to hold individuals liable.' The Fifth Circuit reasoned that allow-
ing individual liability would be "illogical" as it would result in some employ-
ees being treated as "both an employer and an employee."' The Ninth Cir-
cuit stated that Title VII's use of the term "agent" in the definition of "em-
53. Haynes, 88 F.3d at 901.
54. See White, supra note 49, at 553.
55. Haynes, 88 F.3d at 901.
56. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
57. See generally White, supra note 49, at 544-56 (arguing that Title VII should be limited
to employers).
58. Parohne, 879 F.2d at 104.
59. Continental Corp., 789 F.2d at 1231.
60. Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1314.
61. Grant v. Lone Star, 21 F.3d 649, 653 (5th Cir. 1994).
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ployer" indicated incorporation of respondeat superior liability, and not to
impose individual liability.2
1I. DISPARATE IMPACT UNDER THE ADEA
A. Background
Congress enacted the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)6
3
"to promote employment of older persons based on their ability rather than
age." The ADEA prohibits employers from discriminating against older
employees over the age of forty.'t Because of the many similarities between
the ADEA and Title VII, courts have applied some of the same theories of
liability.66
Claims under the ADEA are brought by individuals who assert that their
employers discriminated against them because of their age.67 Disparate treat-
ment claims arise when an employer treats an employee unsatisfactorily be-
cause of a protected characteristic such as age.6m Unlike disparate treatment,
disparate impact theory is based on the protected characteristic which has an
unjustified effect on members of a protected class.'9 After Hazen Paper Co.
v. Biggins,70 it is not clear whether disparate impact extends to the ADEA.7"
The argument behind disparate impact liability was espoused by Chief Justice
Burger in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.' The basic premise is that a facially
neutral employment practice can have an unconstitutional disparate impact
upon a protected class.' The Court declined to address the issue of whether a
disparate impact theory of liability is viable under the ADEA.4
In Geller v. Markham," the Second Circuit premised liability under the
ADEA on a disparate impact theory. 6 The Supreme Court denied certiorari
on appeal, but Justice Rehnquist strenuously dissented, arguing application of
disparate impact liability to the facts in Geller undermined the underlying
62. Maxwell's In'l Inc., 991 F.2d at 587; see also Haynes, 88 F.3d at 898; Gary, 59 F.3d at
1399 (agreeing with the reasoning in Miller that the agent provision in Title VII incorporated
respondeat superior liability); Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764 (11th Cir. 1991) (denying
individual liability in cases involving public employers).
63. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1994).
64. Id. § 621(b).
65. Id. § 621(a)(1).
66. See Michael C. Sloan, Comment, Disparate Impact in the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act: Will the Supreme Court Permit It?, 1995 Wis. L REv. 507, 513-17 (1995) (discussing
the theories of liability under the ADEA).
67. CHARLEs D. EDELMAN & ILENE C. SimLn, FEDERAL AGE DISCIMINATION IN EM-
PLOYMENT LAW: SLOWING DOwN THE GOLD WATcH 76 (1978).
68. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
69. Id.
70. 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
71. Hazen, 507 U.S. at 610.
72. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
73. Albemarle Paper Co., 422 U.S. at 426.
74. Hazen Paper Co., 507 U.S. at 610.
75. 635 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nom. Markham v. Geller, 451 U.S. 945
(1981).
76. Geller, 635 F.2d at 1031-34.
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policies and statutory provisions of the ADEA.' Justice Rehnquist found that
the "reasonable factor other than age" exception explicitly protects age-neutral
factors and would, therefore, preclude disparate impact liability in cases where
the employer's actions are based on cost factors.' He further stated that so
long as the cost rationale is not pretext, such employment practices do not
implicate the ADEA regardless of the effect on older workers.'
Justice O'Connor similarly indicated in her Hazen Paper analysis that she
would not support extending disparate impact liability to the ADEA. Other
Justices have also expressed concerns about disparate impact liability in other
opinions." Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has not resolved the issue of
whether to extend disparate impact liability to the ADEA.
B. Ellis v. United Airlines, Inc. "
1. Facts
Two flight attendants sued United Airlines, Inc. (United) for refusing to
hire them claiming violation of the ADEA.Y United claimed the flight atten-
dants failed to meet the company's weight restrictions.' The flight attendants
contended that the restrictions were pretextual for age discrimination and alter-
natively, that the weight restriction as applied to applicants disparately impacts
older individuals by not accounting for the natural weight gain associated with
age. "' The district court granted summary judgment for United and the flight
attendants appealed."
2. Decision
The issue on appeal was whether the disparate impact theory was cogniza-
ble under the ADEA. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision
to grant summary judgment," taking the opportunity to answer the question
left open by Hazen Paper." The Tenth Circuit held that the ADEA does not
77. Markham, 451 U.S. at 948 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting).
78. Id. at 948-49.
79. Id.
80. See Sloan, supra note 66, at 539-42 (analyzing Justice O'Connor's opinion in Hazen
Paper).
81. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 656 (1989) (expressing concern
about disparate impact liability leading to quotas); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265 (1988) (expressing concern that disparate impact liability may result in racial quotas);
see also Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (expressing concerns about the effects of
disparate impact); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 448 U.S. 469 (1989); Wygant v. Jackson
Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (expressing concern about disparate impact potentially impos-
ing liability without a finding of fault).
82. 73 F.3d 999 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. CL 2500 (1996).
83. Ellis, 73 F.3d 997, 1000.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1001.
87. Id. at 1012.
88. Hazen, 507 U.S. at 610 (declining to address the issue of whether the ADEA encom-
passes disparate impact theory of liability).
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recognize the theory of disparate impact liability."
Beginning with a textual analysis of the ADEA, 90 the Tenth Circuit inter-
preted the phrase "because of such individual's age" as prohibiting an employ-
er from intentionally treating individuals differently based on age,9' but not
prohibiting unintentional discrimination resulting from employment decisions
made for reasons other than age.'2 While the court generally has interpreted
the ADEA in tandem with Title VII, 3 it reasoned that the ADEA is different
from Title VII in "salient ways that counsel against interpreting the ADEA to
recognize disparate impact claims and that reinforce our reading of the text of
the ADEA."
94
First, the court reasoned that § 623(0 of the ADEA states an employer
may take action otherwise prohibited "where the differentiation is based on
reasonable factors other than age." The court noted that there is similar lan-
guage in the Equal Pay Acte which the Supreme Court interpreted to pre-
clude disparate impact claims.'7
Second, the court reasoned that the legislative history of the ADEA does
not support disparate impact claims." A pre-enactment report issued by the
Secretary of Labor" recommended that "arbitrary discrimination based on
age" should be prohibited, while problems resulting from factors that "affect
older workers more strongly" should be addressed through other means."®
Further, the court noted that Congress explicitly added disparate impact claims
to Title VII in the 1991 Civil Rights Act,"' while providing no parallel pro-
vision to the ADEA 1" Citing dicta in Hazen Paper'" and a trend among
courts addressing the issue of disparate impact claims under the ADEA,"
89. Ellis, 73 F.3d at 1007.
90. Id. The ADEA's prohibition on discrimination provides that:
[lit shall be unlawful for an employer (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensa-
tion, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive or
tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
his status as an employee, because of such individual's age ....
Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1994)).
91. Ellis, 73 F.3d at 1007.
92. Id.
93. Id. (explaining that in Griggs the Supreme Court construed Title VI to create a disparate
impact theory).
94. Id. at 1007.
95. Id. at 1008.
96. The Equal Pay Act provides, in pertinent part, that employers can pay unequal wages to
men and women where the pay differential is "based on any other factor other than sex .... " 29
U.S.C. § 206(dXl) (1994).
97. Ellis, 73 F.3d at 1008 (citing County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 170-71
(1981)).
98. Id. at 1008.
99. Id. (quoting U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER, AGE DISCRIMINA-
TION IN EMPLOYMENT, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR TO THE CONGRESS UNDER § 715
OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (1965)) [hereinafter SECRETARY'S REPORT].
100. Id.
101. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(IXA).
102. Ellis, 73 F.3d at 1008.
103. Hazen, 507 U.S. at 610.
104. See Lyon v. Ohio Educ. Ass'n & Prof'l Staff Union, 53 F.3d 135, 138 (6th Cir. 1995);
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the Tenth Circuit held that disparate impact claims are not cognizable under
the ADEA.'"
C. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit considered the legislative history of the ADEA in its
Ellis decision."e An argument that Congress intended to extend disparate im-
pact liability to the ADEA correlates the Secretary's Report"° with the
Court's reasoning in Griggs, in which both expressed a similar concern about
arbitrary discrimination." The Tenth Circuit, however, interpreted the
Secretary's Report as recommending the prohibition of disparate impact theory
under the ADEA.Im
The Tenth Circuit's interpretation of the Secretary's Report appears appro-
priate considering that Congress amended Title VII, but not the ADEA, to
provide specifically for disparate impact."' The Tenth Circuit argues that by
specifically amending Title VII, and not the ADEA, Congress intended to
disallow disparate impact under the ADEA.'" However, as one commentator
remarked, "[i]t seems unpersuasive... to read so much into congressional
inaction."" 2 The legislative intent argument, standing alone, is not very com-
pelling.
The ADEA permits employment decisions based on "reasonable factors
other than age (RFOA).""' 3 The Tenth Circuit's decision in Ellis follows the
reasoning of Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Geller in which he argued the
RFOA exception precludes disparate impact liability in cases where the em-
ployer bases action on cost factors even though the facially neutral action may
disparately impact older workers." 4 Justice Rehnquist further reasoned that
the RFOA exception explicitly protects age-neutral factors so long as the cost
rationale is not a pretext for discrimination based on age."
5
DiBiase v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 48 F.3d 719, 732-34 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that there is
no disparate impact claim under the ADEA); EEOC v. Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d 1073,
1076-78 (7th Cir. 1994).
105. Ellis, 73 F.3d at 1008-09.
106. See supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text.
107. SECRETARY'S REPORT, supra note 99.
108. For a general discussion favoring the allowance of disparate impact claims under the
ADEA, see Steven J. Kaminshine, The Cost of Older Workers, Disparate Impact, and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 42 FLA. L. REv. 229 (1990); Peter H. Harris, Note, Age Dis-
crimination. Wages, and Economics: What Judicial Standard?, 13 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 715
(1990); Maria Ziegler, Note, Disparate Impact Analysis and the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act, 68 MINN. L. REv. 1038 (1984).
109. Ellis, 73 F.3d at 1008.
110. For a general discussion of commentators opposed to extending disparate impact to the
ADEA, see Donald R. Stacy, A Case Against Extending the Disparate Impact Doctrine to the
ADEA, 10 EMPLOYEE RELA71ONS LJ. 437 (1984-85); Pamela S. Krop, Note, Age Discrimination
and the Disparate Impact Doctrine, 34 STAN. L. REv. 837 (1982).
111. Ellis, 73 F.3d at 1008.
112. Sloan, supra note 66, at 518.
113. The ADEA provides in relevant part that "[ilt shall not be unlawful for an employer...
to take any action otherwise prohibited... where the differentiation is based on reasonable factors
other than age...." 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(1) (1994).
114. Markham, 451 U.S. at 948 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 949. The cost rational argument is based on the premise that the combined effect
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The Tenth Circuit's most persuasive argument for disallowing disparate
impact liability under the ADEA is the RFOA exception. Commentators have
argued the existence of the RFOA defense implies the ADEA should be ap-
plied only to cases of disparate treatment." 6 Justice Rehnquist's dissent in
Geller is a good indication of how today's Court might decide the issue."'
D. Other Circuits
Other circuits have already addressed the issue of disparate impact liabili-
ty under the ADEA. The Second Circuit assumed disparate impact liability ap-
plies under the ADEA in Geller v. Markham."' The Geller case was decided
before Hazen Paper, and did not conduct an analysis of the issue. Geller is
not persuasive, however, because Hazen Paper eliminated the assumption that
disparate impact applies under the ADEA." 9
The Eighth Circuit held disparate impact liability cognizable under the
ADEA.'O The Eighth Circuit case decided post-Hazen Paper, assumed with-
out analysis that disparate impact theory under the ADEA was viable.' 2' The
Ninth Circuit, also post-Hazen Paper, did not decide the issue, but referred to
earlier Ninth Circuit precedent in finding no conflict between Hazen Paper
and the Ninth Circuit's jurisprudence recognizing a disparate impact claim
under the ADEA. In an unpublished opinion, the First Circuit assumed
that the district court correctly found that the ADEA supports a claim for age
discrimination on a theory of disparate impact liability'V
The Third,' 2' Sixth,'" and Seventh'2 Circuits have all concluded that
the ADEA does not support a disparate impact claim. The Seventh Circuit
disallowed the disparate impact challenge, holding the theory unavailable after
the Supreme Court's decision in Hazen Paper." The Third Circuit went into
great detail about the doubt Hazen Paper cast on the availability of disparate
impact liability under the ADEA,' and then ultimately refused to apply the
disparate impact theory for other reasons.'"
of higher pay, generally caused by older workers' seniority, coupled with the declining perfor-
mance, because of age-related physical deterioration, makes older workers more expensive. See,
e.g., Terrence P. Collingsworth, Note, The Cost Defense Under the Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act, 1982 DUKE LJ. 580, 593-602 (1982).
116. See, e.g., Mack A. Player, Title VII Impact Analysis Applied to the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act: Is a Transplant Appropriate?, 14 U. TOL. L. REv. 1261, 1278-83 (1983). See
supra note 11 and accompanying text.
117. Markham, 451 U.S. at 948.
118. Markham, 635 F.2d at 1032.
119. See, e.g., DiBiase, 48 F.3d at 733 n.20.
120. Houghton v. Sipco, Inc., 38 F.3d 953, 958-59 (8th Cir. 1994).
121. Houghton 38 F.3d at 958-59.
122. See Mangold v. Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 67 F.3d 1470, 1473-74 (9th Cir. 1995).
123. Graffam v. Scott Paper Co., No. 95-1046, 1995 WL 414831, at *3 (1st Cir. July 14,
1995).
124. DiBiase, 48 F.3d at 732-34.
125. Lyon, 53 F.3d at 138-39.
126. Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d at 1076-77.
127. Id. at 1076-77.
128. DiBiase, 48 F.3d at 725-29.
129. Id. at 727-28.
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M. AWARDING ATrORNEY'S FEES AGAINST COUNSEL
A. Background
Litigants usually pay their own attorneys' fees under the "American"
rule.'" In some situations, including litigation under Title VII,'3' the losing
party can be ordered to pay the prevailing party's attorney's fees. 32 In
Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 33 the Supreme Court held that a pre-
vailing defendant may recover reasonable attorney's fees under Title VII if the
plaintiff's action was frivolous.'" However, the Supreme Court noted in
Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper,3- that Title VII does not authorize the im-
position of attorney's fees against opposing coun-el. 3
If a plaintiff's attorney is responsible for bringing a frivolous suit, the
court must impose sanctions from sources other than Title VII.'3 Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 11 (Rule 11)1 3" allows an award of attorney's fees
against counsel in these situations.'39 Some courts hesitate to assess sanctions
against opposing counsel under Title VII, but they assess sanctions under Rule
11." o The imposition of attorney's fees against counsel under Title VII re-
mained an unresolved issue in the Tenth Circuit. In Roadway, the Supreme
Court noted that Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1988 fee provisions are identi-
cal. 4 The Tenth Circuit addressed the issue in the context of § 1988 in
Crabtree v. Muchmore." In Crabtree, the Tenth Circuit remanded to have
attorney's fees awarded under § 1988 or Rule 11 depending upon who was at
fault between the client and the attorney. 43 Other circuits have held that §
1988 does not support the imposition of attorney's fees against opposing coun-
sel.
1"
130. See, e.g., Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975)
(stating that under the Traditional American Rule," each party is responsible for its own
attorney's fees).
131. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (providing: "[i]n any action or proceeding under this subchapter
the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney's fee ...
132. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 421 U.S. at 260-61.
133. 434 U.S. 412 (1978).
134. Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 421.
135. 447 U.S. 752 (1980).
136. Roadway, 447 U.S. at 761 n.9.
137. See, e.g., Susan R. Bogart, Civil Procedure--Third Circuit Suggests that Attorney Who
"Should Have Known Better" Share in Paying Attorney Fee Sanctions for Frivolous Employment
Discrimination Suit--Quiroga Hasbro, Inc., 934 F.2d 497 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 376
(1981), 65 TEMP. L. REv. 959 (1992) (discussing the sanctions applicable to attorneys).
138. FED. R. CIV. P. 11 [hereinafter Rule 11].
139. See generally Phyllis Tropper Baumann et al., Substance in the Shadow of Procedure:
The Integration of Substantive and Procedural Law in Title VII Cases, 33 B.C. L. Rnv. 211, 289-
96 (1992) (discussing how Rule 11 intersects with Title VII).
140. See, e.g., Johnson v. New York Transit Auth., 823 F.2d 31, 32 (2d Cir. 1987) (awarding
fees against attorney pursuant to Rule 11).
141. Roadway, 447 U.S. at 761.
142. 904 F.2d 1475 (10th Ci. 1990).
143. Crabtree, 904 F.2d at 1479.
144. See infra notes 164-67 and accompanying text.
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B. Comeveaux v. CUNA Mutual Insurance Group"
1. Facts
Mary Corneveaux worked for CUNA Mutual Insurance Society (CUNA)
for thirteen years." CUNA, in 1989, phased out Corneveaux's position due
to company wide downsizing." Corneveaux applied for another position and
the company hired a male employee instead.'
Comeveaux brought suit against CUNA alleging age discrimination and
retaliation, sexual and religious discrimination, and breach of an implied con-
tract under Utah law."9 The trial court ordered Corneveaux's counsel to pay
$5,000 for attorney's fees incurred by CUNA in defense of the gender and
religious discrimination claims." ° CUNA's counsel questioned the appropri-
ateness of ordering Corneveaux's counsel to pay the fees under Title VII and
suggested a finding under Rule 11 instead.'5' The trial court found
Corneveaux's Title VII claims "unreasonable and groundless," yet the court
found no Rule 11 violation."52 The trial court further stated it was basing the
award for attorney's fees solely on Title VI. 5 3 The award of attorney's fees
against plaintiff's counsel under Title VII appeared as an issue of first impres-
sion in the Tenth Circuit during the survey period.
2. Decision
The issue on appeal was whether the trial court abused its discretion in
awarding attorney's fees against the Plaintiffs counsel based solely on Title
VII. The Tenth Circuit reversed, vacating the award of attorney's fees.'"
The court found that the trial court erred and the language of Title VII did not
support the award of attorney's fees against opposing counsel. 55 The Tenth
Circuit noted that in Roadway, the Supreme Court stated "[n]either § 1988 nor
§ 2000e-5(k) makes any mention of attorney liability for costs and fees."''
The Tenth Circuit then turned to the Crabtree case which was the next
authority cited by the trial court in awarding attorney's fees. The court dis-
tinguished this case from Crabtree because the trial court here had already
ruled Rule 11 sanctions were inappropriate." Thus, attorney's fees could not
be awarded against the Plaintiff s attorney.
145. 76 F.3d 1498 (10th Cir. 1996).
146. Corneveaux, 76 F.3d at 1502.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1501.




154. Id. at 1509.
155. Id.
156. Id. (citing Roadway, 447 U.S. at 761).
157. Id. at 1509. See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text.




The Supreme Court's notation in Roadway, that § 2000e-5(k) fails to
mention attorney liability for fees, is conclusive that Tide VII does not autho-
rize the imposition of attorney's fees against opposing counsel.'" Further, in
reliance on the Tenth Circuit's decision in Crabtree, the trial court erroneously
applied Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Hand,'" which addressed the proper alloca-
tion of Rule 11 sanctions between an attorney and the client."' Rule 11
sanctions were not at issue in Corneveaux. Neither Title VII nor the Tenth
Circuit's decision in Crabtree support a finding by the trial court of an award
of attorney's fees against opposing counsel.
One purpose for awarding attorney's fees is to discourage frivolous law-
suits. " Even though Title VII does not allow the awarding of attorney's fees
against counsel, other means are available to lower courts in sanctioning an
attorney. The Third Circuit referred to Rule I 1 and the court's inherent power
to control the judicial process as means for sanctioning attorneys. There-
fore, if a lower court believes counsel is responsible for bringing a frivolous
suit, the court should sanction the attorney by a means other than Title VII's
fee shifting provision.
C. Other Circuits
Several circuit courts have already concluded that it is inappropriate to
award attorney's fees against counsel in a Tide VII action. The Third Circuit
recognized that Title VII "does not authorize assessment of fees against the
loser's attorney."'" The Sixth Circuit held that "an award under section 1988
may only be charged against the losing party, not the party's attorney."'"
The Seventh Circuit held that "[s]ection 1988 only authorizes the imposition
of fees against parties to the litigation, not their attorneys."'" The Eleventh
Circuit held § 2000e-5(k) "contemplates assessments of attorney's fees against
losing parties, not against counsel." 67 Clearly, many circuits support the
Tenth Circuit's decision not to allow an award of attorney's fees against coun-
sel under Title VII.
IV. DEFNMG THE AMERICANS WITH DIsABILrrEs ACT
A. Background
The purpose underlying the enactment of the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA) is the prevention of employment discrimination against those who
159. Roadway, 447 U.S. at 761. See supra notes 135-41 and accompanying text.
160. 763 F.2d 1184 (10th Cir. 1985).
161. Chevron, 763 F.3d at 1187.
162. Bogart, supra note 137, at 959.
163. Quiroga v. Hasbro, Inc., 934 F.2d 497, 504 (3d Cir. 1991).
164. Quiroga, 934 F.2d at 504.
165. Smith v. Detroit Fed'n of Teachers, Local 231, 829 F.2d 1370, 1374 n.l (6th Cir. 1987).
166. Hamer v. County of Lake, 819 F.2d 1362, 1370 (7th Cir. 1987).
167. Durrett v. Jenkins Brickyard, Inc., 678 F.2d 911, 915 (1lth Cir. 1982).
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are disabled."s An employer violates the ADA if a qualified individual with
a disability requests a reasonable accommodation which would enable the
employee to perform the job and the employer refuses despite the fact that the
accommodation would not impose an undue hardship on the employer."6
The ADA is "an antidiscrimination statute that requires that individuals with
disabilities be given the same consideration for employment that individuals
without disabilities are given."'"
The Tenth Circuit adopted a two-part test for determining whether a dis-
abled person qualifies under the ADA.'7 ' First, the court determines "wheth-
er the individual could perform the essential functions of the job."'"2 Second,
if the court concludes the individual cannot perform the essential functions of
the job, the court must determine whether any reasonable accommodation by
the employer would enable the employee to perform the job.'"
Considerable uncertainty exists regarding what constitutes "reasonable
accommodation."' 74 Reasonable accommodation is generally interpreted as a
standard requiring the employer to accommodate a disabled employee until
such accommodation becomes an undue hardship on the employer." A rea-
sonable accommodation may include altering the physical layout of the
workplace, 76 making changes to the position itself,'" and providing addi-
tional unpaid leave.'"
Unpaid leave may be a reasonable accommodation under the ADA, how-
ever, the Fourth Circuit held that the ADA does not require an employer to
grant an employee indefinite leave as an accommodation."' Other circuit
168. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994) (providing in pertinent part: "[nlo [employer) ... shall
discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such indi-
vidual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees,
employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employ-
ment."). For a historical overview of the ADA, see generally Chai R. Feldblum, The Revolution of
Physical Disability Anti-Discrimination Law: 1976-1996, 20 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DIsABnLxTY L
REP. 613 (1996) (providing a historical overview of the ADA).
169. See Stephanie Jae Stevenson, Tenth Circuit Survey: Disability Law, 73 DENy. U. L REV.
707, 723 (1996). The article discusses additional qualifications for disabled status under the ADA.
Id. at 720-23.
170. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. at 1630.1(a) (1995).
171. White v. York Int'l Corp., 45 F.3d 357, 361 (10th Cir. 1995) (quoting Chandler v. City
of Dallas, 2 F.3d 1385, 1393-94 (5th Cir. 1993)).
172. White, 45 F.3d at 361.
173. Id. at 361-62.
174. See generally Morley Gunderson & Douglas Hyatt, Do Injured Workers Pay for Reason-
able Accommodation?, 50 INDuS. & LAB. REL. REV. 92 (1996) (discussing the uncertainty that ex-
ists with respect to reasonable accommodation); Barbara A. Lee, Reasonable Accommodation
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act: The Limitations of Rehabilitation Act Precedent, 14
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L 201 (1993) (detailing what constitutes a reasonable accommodation
under the ADA).
175. See Gunderson & Hyatt, supra note 174, at 93.
176. Development in the Law"The Americans with Disabilities Act: Great Progress, Greater
Potential, 109 HARv. L. REv. 1602, 1611 (1996).
177. Id.
178. Laura Pincus, The Americans with Disabilities Act; Employers' New Responsibilities to
HIV-Positive Employees, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 561, 578 (1993); see also McDonald v. Dep't of
Public Welfare, 62 F.3d 92, 97 (3d Cir. 1995).
179. Myers v. Hose, 50 F.3d 278, 283 (4th Cir. 1995).
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courts have reached similar conclusions."W The issue of indefinite leave as a
reasonable accommodation remained unresolved in the Tenth Circuit until the
current survey period.
B. Hudson v. MCI Telecommunications Corp.'""
1. Facts
April Hudson worked for MCI Telecommunications (MCI) as a customer
service representative. 2 Hudson's duties required her to spend approximate-
ly six hours a day on the phone and at a computer keyboard."8 3 Hudson was
diagnosed with carpal tunnel syndrome and her treating physician issued re-
strictions that she was to take fifteen minutes off for each hour of repetitive,
digital activity.'
She worked the next month and a half doing tasks that did not involve
typing or keyboard activity.' MCI suspended Hudson for being tardy and
later terminated her.'s6 After her termination she underwent surgery to cor-
rect the problem and her physician lifted her work restrictions." Hudson
brought the action alleging MCI failed to provide reasonable accommodations
thereby violating the ADA.'" The district court granted MCI's motion for
summary judgment and Hudson appealed.'
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding that
Hudson failed to establish that an indefinite leave of absence would be a "rea-
sonable accommodation" under the ADA.'" The court noted that the plaintiff
conceded she could not perform the essential functions of her job. 9 ' How-
ever, she alleged MCI failed to "reasonably accommodate" her by refusing her
unpaid leave while she sought treatment."
The court noted that in Myers,"" the Fourth Circuit "concluded that the
term 'reasonable accommodation' refers to those accommodations which pres-
ently, or in the near future, enable the employee to perform the essential func-
tions of his job."' 4 The court agreed with the plaintiff that an unpaid leave
may be a reasonable accommodation, but the court concluded in this case that
the plaintiff failed to present any evidence as to the duration of the impair-
180. See infra notes 203-05 and accompanying texL
181. 87 F.3d 1167 (10th Cir. 1996).






188. Id. at 1167.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 1169.
191. Id. at 1168-69.
192. Id. at 1169.
193. Myers, 50 F.3d at 278.
194. Hudson, 87 F.3d at 1169 (quoting Myers, 50 F.3d at 283).
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ment.' 9 Thus, the court concluded that MCI was not required to wait indefi-




The ADA guidelines provide that reasonable accommodations may include
additional unpaid leave for necessary medical treatment. 9' A per se rule that
unpaid leave of an indefinite period could never constitute a reasonable ac-
commodation, such as the one opined in Hudson, is irrational. The court in
Hudson did not clarify why unpaid leave should be analyzed differently from
other proposed accommodations under the ADA. Whether any accommodation
is reasonable should be analyzed by the specific circumstance in a given
case.'9" The courts should apply the same criteria to unpaid leave as other
proposed accommodations. 99
A per se rule is irrational because it is possible that an indefinite leave
could be a reasonable accommodation. For example, a large employer with a
very high turnover and unskilled labor force could provide indefinite leave as
a reasonable accommodation if the leave allows an employee to eventually
perform the essential job functions and the leave did not inflict undue hardship
upon the employer. In Hudson, MCI refused to provide unpaid leave while
Hudson sought necessary medical treatment and the court concluded that in-
definite leave was not a reasonable accommodation without an analysis of
whether it would impose an undue hardship upon MCI.2'
The plaintiff in Hudson failed to produce evidence as to the expected
duration of her impairment by the date of termination."' A notation made by
the plaintiff's physician on the day after termination indicated surgery would
end the plaintiff's impairment.2 Applying the court's reasoning, if the plain-
tiff had been terminated a day later, the unpaid leave would constitute a rea-
sonable accommodation. Furthermore, for a company to avoid liability in
unpaid leave cases, it need only terminate an employee before the employee
provides them with any evidence as to the expected duration of the unpaid
leave.
C. Other Circuits
Other circuits have addressed the issue of unpaid leave as a reasonable
accommodation, reaching the same result that the Tenth Circuit reached in
Hudson. The Fourth Circuit held that a reasonable accommodation under the
195. Id. at 1169.
196. Id.
197. See 29 C.F.R. pt.1630 app at 1630.2(o) (1996) (providing interpretive guidance of Title I
of the ADA).
198. See Lee, supra note 174, at 235-43.
199. See supra notes 175-178 and accompanying text
200. Hudson, 87 F.3d at 1169. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.




ADA does not include indefinite leave.' The Fifth Circuit similarly held
that an employer is "not required to make reasonable accommodation[s] in the
form of an indefinite leave of absence." Likewise, the Sixth Circuit held
that an employer is not under a duty to keep employees on unpaid leave until
a position opens up that will reasonably accommodate them.' The Third
Circuit, however, stated that "some case law might support the plaintiff's posi-
tion that an unpaid leave of absence is an appropriate accommodation in some
circumstances."
CONCLUSION
During the survey period the Tenth Circuit made it easier to defend
against employment discrimination claims. The court's decision in Haynes is
appropriate under the current federal employment law scheme. The language
of Title VII does not support a finding of personal liability. The application of
this holding does not preclude individuals from being liable, it only precludes
them from being liable under Tide VII. Individuals may still be sued under
state tort law.
The Tenth Circuit makes a persuasive argument for precluding disparate
impact liability under the ADEA in Ellis. The RFOA exception in the ADEA
along with Justice Rehnquist's dissent for denial of certiorari in Gellar, estab-
lish a compelling argument that a disparate impact theory is not cognizable
under the ADEA. Plaintiffs must now show intentional or disparate treatment
to prevail under the ADEA.
The only Tenth Circuit decision rendered during the survey period that
benefits plaintiffs is Corneveaux. If the Corneveaux court had reached the
opposite conclusion, holding that counsel may be liable for attorney's fees
under Title VII, this would discourage attorneys from bringing actions under
Title VII. The majority is clear that Tide VII does not support the finding that
counsel can be held liable for attorney's fees.
Finally, the Tenth Circuit's decision concerning reasonable accommoda-
tion under the ADA further burdens plaintiffs. The court hindered plaintiffs by
requiring them not only to establish that unpaid leave is a reasonable accom-
modation, but plaintiffs must also provide evidence as to the expected duration
of the impairment by the date of termination. This ruling is unsound because
the court failed to consider whether the indefinite leave imposed an undue
hardship on the defendant.
John Michael Anderson
203. Myers, 50 F.3d at 283.
204. Rogers v. Int'l Marine Terminals, Inc., 87 F.3d 755, 757 (5th Cir. 1996).
205. Monette v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1187 (6th Cir. 1996).




"[A ny court forced to enter the ERISA preemption thicket sets out on a
treacherous path."'
INTRODUCTION
Private employers currently spend more than twenty-five percent of their
total compensation costs on employee benefits.' The steady growth in such
benefits, which began as a post-World War II phenomenon, led to the require-
ment of a comprehensive scheme to govern benefit programs.3 Historical mis-
use and mismanagement of pension and employee welfare plans, as well as
lack of regulation, prompted the enactment of the Employment Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).4
This Survey examines two ERISA preemption cases: Fuller v. Norton6
and Cannon v. Group Health Service, Inc.7 Part I of this Survey provides a
background on ERISA preemption, including the statutory language and a
brief chronology of key Supreme Court cases analyzing the scope of preemp-
tion. Part II examines Fuller, in which the Tenth Circuit held that a multiple
employer welfare arrangement (MEWA) was subject to Colorado's workers'
compensation regulations.' The court further held that a MEWA's partially-
insured status allowed regulation by the state's insurance division, thereby
1. Gonzales v. Prudential Ins. Co., 901 F.2d 446, 451-52 (5th Cir. 1990).
2. Charles S. Mishkind et al., Employee Benefits Litigation, in LrnGATING EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINAnON CAsES 1996, at 223, 231 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series
No. 542, 1996).
3. 1l
4. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994); see RONALD J. COOKE, ERISA PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE 1-2 (2d ed. 1989); STEPHEN J. KRAss, THE PENsiON ANSWER BOOK 1-5 (6th ed. 1991)
(stating that ERISA was implemented in response to inadequately funded pension plans, plans
without retirement vesting provisions, and plans terminated prior to accumulation of sufficient
payout amounts).
5. The survey period covers the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals' decisions between Septem-
ber 1, 1995, and August 31, 1996.
6. 86 F.3d 1016 (10th Cir. 1996).
7. 77 F.3d 1270 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct 66 (1996). Other ERISA cases
decided by the Tenth Circuit during the Survey period include: Hawkins v. Commissioner, 86
F.3d 982 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that a marital settlement agreement incorporated into a divorce
decree was a qualified domestic relations order for purposes of determining tax liability); Thorpe
v. Retirement Plan of Pillsbury Co., 80 F.3d 439 (10th Cir. 1996) (involving withholding of early
retirement benefits); Herr v. Heiman, 75 F.3d 1509 (10th Cir. 1996) (identifying factors which
determine "employee" (as opposed to versus contractor) status under ERISA); Reich v. Stangl, 73
F.3d 1027 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 48 (1996) (holding ERISA grants authority to
the Secretary of Labor to seek equitable relief in an employee welfare benefit plan action);
Zimmerman v. Sloss Equip., Inc., 72 F.3d 822 (10th Cir. 1995) (upholding district court's finding
that an employer did not violate ERISA § 1140, governing protected rights, when terminating an
employee); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Financial Inst. Retirement Fund, 71 F.3d 1553 (10th Cir.
1995) (holding ERISA does not allow a "receiver's cash withdrawal of actuarially determined sur-
plus").
8. See Fuller, 86 F.3d at 1021-22.
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taking it outside the boundaries of ERISA preemption.9 Part Ill discusses
Cannon, which reflects the broad scope of ERISA preemption over state com-
mon law claims, even when preemption eclipses any remedy to the plaintiff.'"
I. GENERAL BACKGROUND
ERISA encompasses any employee pension" or welfare benefit plan.
ERISA health plans protect approximately 114 million Americans, or forty-
four percent of the population. 3 A benefit program delivering non-wage ben-
efits presumptively qualifies as an ERISA plan unless a specific exemption ap-
plies.' 4 ERISA seeks to protect plan beneficiaries by requiring that "minimum
standards be provided assuring the equitable character of such plans and their
financial soundness."" ERISA impacts states and employers in different
ways. For instance, states generally view ERISA as an impediment to their
ability to provide consistent protection for their citizens.'6 Conversely, em-
ployers view ERISA as critical to cost containment of benefit plans because
ERISA limits both administrative and litigation costs, while simultaneously
alleviating state imposed insurance premium taxes.'7
Within ERISA's administration and enforcement scheme," civil enforce-
9. See id. at 1026-27.
10. See Cannon, 77 F.3d at 1275.
11. "Employee pension benefit plan" is defined as:
any plan, fund or program which was heretofore or is hereafter established or maintained
by an employer or by an employee organization, or by both, to the extent that by its
express terms or as a result of surrounding circumstances such plan, fund, or program (i)
provides retirement income to employees; or (ii) results in a deferral of income by em-
ployees for periods extending to the termination of covered employment or beyond,
regardless of the method of calculating the contributions made to the plan, the method of
calculating the benefits under the plan or the method of distributing benefits from the
plan.
29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A).
12. "Employee welfare benefit plan" is defined as:
any plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is hereafter established or main-
tained by an employer or by an employee organization, or by both, to the extent that
such plan, fund, or program was established or is maintained for the purpose of provid-
ing for its participants or their beneficiaries, through the purchase of insurance or other-
wise, (A) medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of sick-
ness, accident, disability, death or unemployment, or vacation benefits, apprenticeship or
other training programs, or day care centers, scholarship funds, or prepaid legal services,
or (B) any benefit described in section 186(c) of this title (other than pensions on retire-
ment or death, and insurance to provide such pensions).
29 U.S.C. § 1002(1).
13. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTINO OFFIcE, EMPLOYER-BAsED HEALTH PLANS: IssuEs,
TRENDS, AND CHALLENGES POSED BY ERISA 2 (1995) [hereinafter EMPLOYER-BASED HEALTH
PLANS).
14. Frank Cummings, ERISA Litigation: An Overview of Major Claims and Defenses, SB31
ALI-ABA 511, 515 (1996).
15. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a).
16. See EMPLOYER-BASED HEALTH PLANS, supra note 13. As more and more private em-
ployers opt to self-fund health plans, states find themselves with even less control, as ERISA does
not treat self-funded plans as insurance, therefore exempting the employer from compliance with
state regulation. See id. at 2.
17. See id. Self-funded plans are exempt from state insurance premium tax. Id.
18. ERISA is comprised of three subchapters. Subchapter I provides protection of employee
benefits. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1169. This subchapter is divided into a general provisions subtitle (§§
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ment provides that a plan participant or beneficiary may sue "to recover bene-
fits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the
terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of
the plan."'9 The Supreme Court has held that claims brought in state court
against a plan sponsor or provider under this clause, pleading only state com-
mon law claims, can be removed to federal court.' The legislative intent of
ERISA is to recharacterize such actions as federal in nature.2 This is known
as the "complete preemption doctrine."
By comparison, conflict preemption occurs when both state law and
ERISA provide a cause of action, in which case "due regard for the federal
enactment requires that state jurisdiction must yield."'23 Conflict preemption in
ERISA actions results from interpretation of ERISA's preemption clause.2"
The clause states that the federal law will "supersede any and all state laws
insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan."
This preemption clause, in conjunction with the Act's savings clause,26 ex-
empts state insurance, banking, and securities regulations," and state criminal
laws' from preemption. Finally, ERISA's deemer clause2 excludes benefit
plans and their trusts from state regulation identified by the savings clause. 3
Roughly half of the Supreme Court ERISA cases involve preemption issues,
evidencing the confusion surrounding interpretation of the express preemption
1001-1003) and a subtitle for regulatory provisions (§§ 1021-1169). The regulatory provisions are
further broken down into six areas: reporting and disclosure (§§ 1021-1031), participation and
vesting (§§ 1051-1061), funding (§§ 1081-1086), fiduciary responsibility (§§ 1101-1114), admin-
istration and enforcement (§§ 1131-1145), and group health plans (§§ 1161-1169).
19. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).
20. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 67 (1987).
21. See id. at 65-66. ERISA preemption is an exception to the "well-pleaded complaint rule."
Id. at 65. The Court indicated that the clear legislative intent of the civil enforcement provisions
requires ERISA actions to be construed "as arising under the laws of the United States in similar
fashion to those brought under... [the] Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947." Id. at 65-66
(quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 93-1280, at 327 (1974)); see also Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No.
735, 390 U.S. 557, 561-62 (1968) (holding that federal removal of an action brought in state court
was proper under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, whose preemptive force
recharacterized the claim into one of federal question and, thus, completely displacing state ac-
tion).
22. This terminology is widely used by circuit courts. See, e.g.. Schmeling v. Nordam, 97
F.3d 1336, 1338 (10th Cir. 1996); Custer v. Sweeney, 89 F.3d 1156, 1164 (4th Cir. 1996). For the
substance of the doctrine, see Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 63-64 ("Congress may so
completely pre-empt a particular area that any civil complaint raising this select group of claims is
necessarily federal in character.").
23. Ingersoll-Rand v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 145 (1990) (quoting San Diego Bldg.
Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244 (1959)) (holding that ERISA preempted a state
claim for wrongful termination where employer allegedly attempted to avoid paying pension bene-
fit through employment termination).
24. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
25. Id
26. Id § 1144(b)(2)A) (stating that state laws regulating insurance, banking, and securities
shall apply to people of that.state).
27. ld. § 1144(b)(2)(A).
28. Id § 1144(b)(4).
29. Id § 1144(b)(2)(B). Under this clause, employee benefit plans governed by ERISA shall
not be "deemed" to include insurance companies, other insureds, or an entity engaging in the
business of insurance for the purposes of such state laws. Id.
30. Id
1997]
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clause, specifically the "relate to" language."
The Supreme Court addressed ERISA's preemption clause and the mean-
ing of its "relate to" language in Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc.32 In Shaw, the
Court found that New York's Human Rights and Disability Benefits Laws
"relate to" an ERISA plan.33 The Court, however, recognized a limit on
ERISA preemption if the state law is "too tenuous, remote, or peripheral"' to
the employee benefit plan." Subsequently, the Supreme Court in Metropoli-
tan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts Travelers Insurance Co.' held that a
state statute mandating minimum benefits for mental health regulated insur-
ance and was not preempted by ERISA.Y In this case, the Court urged that
the savings and deemer clauses be read together with a "common-sense
view."3 For example, ERISA exempts state insurance laws from its scope
but applies to state laws which regulate benefit plans or trusts.39 Justice
Blackmun's opinion recognized the confusing nature of ERISA preemption,
which generally preempts state laws, yet simultaneously reserves to states the
ability to regulate in certain narrow areas.'
In yet another preemption case, the Supreme Court examined these claus-
es and established that ERISA preempts state common law claims of bad faith
and tortious breach of contract against a health plan. insurer.4' Because the
Court concluded that a law regulating insurance must be "specifically directed
toward that industry," ERISA preempts these common law claims because
they may be brought against non-insurance defendants. 3 The Court empha-
sized that the underlying policy of ERISA's enforcement scheme supports
comprehensive and exclusive enforcement.'
In 1990, the Supreme Court interpreted ERISA's deemer clause as ex-
31. Catherine L Fisk, The Last Article About the Language of ERISA Preemption? A Case
Study of the Failure of Textualism, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 35, 59 (1996). The preemption clause
is fundamentally ambiguous because the "relate to" language "requires a modifier in order to have
a concrete meaning, and the wide spectrum of possible modifiers-directly, slightly, remote-
ly-suggests a wide spectrum of possible meanings." Id at 47.
32. 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
33. See Shaw, 463 U.S. at 100.
34. ld. at 100 n.21.
35. Id.
36. 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
37. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 471 U.S. at 758.
38. Id. at 740.
39. Id. at 741.
40. Id. at 739-40 (stating that the preemption and savings clauses are "not a model of legis-
lative drafting").
41. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 57 (1987).
42. lId at 50.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 54. The Court looked to the legislative history of ERISA:
Mhe substantive and enforcement provisions ... are intended to preempt the field...
thus, eliminating the threat of conflicting or inconsistent State and local regulation of
employee benefit plans. This principle is intended to apply in its broadest sense to all
actions of State or local governments, or any instrumentality thereof, which have the
force or effect of law.
Id. at 46 (quoting 120 CONG. REC. S29933 (daily ed. Aug. 22, 1974) (statement of Sen. Wil-
liams)).
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empting any self-funded employer plan from state insurance regulation.4
Subsequently, however, the Court ruled that ERISA preempts state law involv-
ing worker's compensation regulation, an area usually statutorily excluded
from ERISA when the state law "relates to" an employee welfare benefit
plan.4
Two recent decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court may signal a subtle
change in the trend of affording ERISA preemption the broadest possible in-
terpretation. In New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans
v. Travelers,4 the Court held that ERISA does not preempt a state law where
the law only indirectly influences an ERISA plan economically by affecting
the cost of insurance policies.' However, in Varity Corp. v. Howe,' the
Court allowed individuals to sue for benefit reinstatement when their employ-
er, acting in a fiduciary capacity as plan administrator, made misrepresenta-
tions to its employees about plan benefits." The Court stated that the purpose
of ERISA is to protect plan participants and beneficiaries, and that it is "hard
to imagine why Congress would want to immunize breaches of fiduciary obli-
gation that harm individuals by denying injured beneficiaries a remedy."'
Plaintiffs with denial of benefits claims may attempt to characterize them as
breach of fiduciary duty claims in an attempt to obtain redress. 2
The interplay between ERISA preemption and its exceptions is central to
this line of Supreme Court cases. ERISA's preemption clause, specifically its
"relate to" language, is decidedly ambiguous. Time and again the Court must
analyze the extent to which a state law "relates to" an ERISA plan. In these
cases the Court often affords preemption broad treatment. The narrow excep-
tions to ERISA's preemptive sweep include state insurance regulations as well
as plans maintained solely to comply with workers' compensation, unemploy-
ment, or disability laws.
45. FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 64-65 (1990).
46. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Greater Washington Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 126-
27 (1992). The Washington D.C. law at issue required employers providing employee health in-
surance to also provide equivalent health insurance to injured, worker's compensation eligible
employees. Id. ERISA language is clear that its provisions "shall not apply to any employee bene-
fit plan ... maintained solely for the purpose of complying with applicable workmen's compensa-
tion laws or unemployment compensation or disability insurance laws." 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(3)
(1994). Although this would seem to remove the law from the scope of ERISA preemption, the
Court held that regardless of such statutory language, the sweep of the preemption clause is opera-
tive where the worker's compensation plan was set by reference to the ERISA employee health
insurance plan. Greater Washington Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. at 130-31.
47. 115 S. CL 1671 (1995).
48. See Travelers, 115 S. Ct. at 1679. New York state law imposes hefty 24% hospital sur-
charges on commercially-insured patients while exempting those insured with Blue Cross/Blue
Shield from such surcharges because Blue Cross provides coverage to the commercially uninsur-
able. Id. at 1674, 1678.
49. 116 S. CL 1065 (1996).
50. Varify Corp., 116 S. CL at 1074, 1079.
51. Id. at 1078.
52. See Jeffrey Lewis & Dan Feinberg, Varity Corp. v. Howe: The Plaintiffs Perspective, 5
ERISA LrrG. REP., June 1996, at 3, 8.
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II. No ERISA PREEMPTION FOR MEWAS OVER STATE LAWS REGULATING
WORKERS' COMPENSATION & INSURANCE
A. Background
In Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 3 employers attempted to avoid a state
law requiring payment of disability benefits by claiming that the state law
"relates to" employee welfare benefits and was, therefore, preempted by
ERISA.' Although the Supreme Court held that a state may not regulate an
employer ERISA multibenefit plan, the state may enforce regulatory laws. 5
An employer, therefore, can be required by a state to maintain a separate ben-
efit plan for disability benefits providing the plan fails to comply with state
disability law. 6 The Shaw holding prevents employers from circumventing
state regulation by including disability benefits within a larger multibenefit
plan.
57
Subsequently, in Contract Services Employee Trust v. Davis,58 the Tenth
Circuit held that ERISA did not preempt Oklahoma's worker compensation
regulations.5 9 This holding was consistent with recent decisions of both the
First and Ninth Circuits.6a The Ninth Circuit held that an employer offering a
multibenefit plan could not use preemption to circumvent state regulation.6
When complying with a state regulation, an ERISA plan provider may experi-
ence burdensome economic implications. These implications, however, do not
"relate to" the plan so as to trigger ERISA preemption.61 Similarly, the court
concluded that an employer may not "don the mantle of ERISA preemption
simply by including workers' compensation benefits in its welfare benefit plan
and thereby escape the requirements of Maine's law."
ERISA defines a multiple employer welfare arrangement (MEWA) as "an
employee welfare benefit plan, or any other arrangement... which is estab-
lished or maintained for the purpose of offering or providing any benefit...
to the employees of two or more employers.., or to their beneficiaries."
The deemer clause excludes single-employer benefit plans from state regula-
tion,' but MEWAs may not claim such exclusion.' Therefore, while a
53. 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
54. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96.
55. Id. at 108.
56. Id. The Court examined the language of ERISA's § 1003(b)(3), which exempts plans
maintained "solely" to comply with state disability law. Id. at 107. The multibenefit plans at issue
did not exist "solely" to comply with state disability law, hence, appellee airlines' argument that
exemption from ERISA was inapplicable. Id.
57. Id. at 108.
58. 55 F.3d 533 (10th Cir. 1995). This case involved an attempt by a multiemployer trade
association to use ERISA preemption to alleviate their responsibility under Oklahoma worker's
compensation regulation. Id at 535.
59. See Contract Serv. Employee Trust, 55 F.3d at 534.
60. See Combined Management, Inc. v. Superintendent of Ins., 22 F.3d 1 (lst Cir. 1994);
Employee Staffing Serv., Inc. v. Aubry, 20 F.3d 1038 (9th Cir. 1994).
61. Employee Staffing Serv., 20 F.3d at 1040.
62. Id. at 1042.
63. Combined Management, 22 F.3d at 5.
64. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(40)(A) (1994).
65. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(6)(A) (1994).
66. Employee plans operating as fully-insured MEWAs are subject to "any law of any State
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MEWA delivers ERISA benefits to more than one employer, it is subject to
state law. State law holds MEWAs accountable to prevent entrepreneurs from
operating as profitable insurance ventures under the guise of an ERISA plan,
without being subject to state insurance laws.67 The legislative history of the
MEWA amendment indicates a desire to end multiple employer organization
abuse that uses ERISA preemption to avoid state insurance regulation.' A
Second Circuit decision, Atlantic Healthcare Benefits Trust v. Googins, 9 de-
termined that the MEWA clause operates as an exception to the deemer
clause-MEWAs may be construed as insurance entities, thereby allowing
state regulation.0
B. Fuller v. Norton71
1. Facts
The International Association of Entrepreneurs of America (IAEA), a non-
profit organization, sought to establish to offer its member employers partici-
pation in an employee welfare benefit plan.' This multiple employer welfare
arrangement established a trust, funded by employer contributions, to provide
employee benefits such as health, accident or disability insurance." In re-
sponse to an attempt by the IAEA's plan trustee to certify the trust, the Colo-
rado Division of Insurance ordered the temporary cessation of business activi-
ty."" Once the trust complied with workers' compensation and other Division
requirements, it could resume operation." The trustee sought a declaratory
judgment on two grounds. First, he claimed that because ERISA regulates
MEWAs, the IAEA was exempt from state workers' compensation or insur-
which regulates insurance." Id. § 1144(b)(6)(A)(i). Non-fully insured MEWAs are subject to "any
law of any State which regulates insurance... to the extent not inconsistent with the preceding
sections of this subchapter." Id § 1144(b)(6)(A)(ii).
67. Roger C. Siske et al., What's New in Employee Benefits: A Summary of Current Case
and Other Developments. CA62 ALI-ABA 1, 118 (1996). ERISA defines an "employer" as "any
person acting directly as an employer, or indirectly in the interest of an employer, in relation to an
employee benefit plan; and includes a group or association of employers acting for an employer in
such capacity." 29 U.S.C. § 1002(5). The issue, therefore, is to distinguish between an ERISA
plan established by such an association or group from for-profit insurance ventures attempting to
circumvent state regulation. International Ass'n of Entrepreneurs of Am. Benefit Trust v. Foster,
883 F. Supp. 1050. 1057 (E.D. Va. 1995). The Ninth Circuit held that ERISA's definition of "em-
ployer" requires a "bona fide 'organizational relationship' among the members other than a mere
association for the purpose of qualifying for benefits." Moideen v. Gillespie, 55 F.3d 1478, 1481
(9th Cir. 1995).
68. 128 CoNG. REc. H30356 (daily ed. Dec. 13, 1982) (statement of Rep. Erlenborn)
(proposing this amendment to close off any opportunity for MEWA operators to skirt state regula-
tion).
69. 2 F.3d I (2d Cir. 1993).
70. See Atlantic Healthcare Benefits Trust, 2 F.3d at 5. This case sought declaratory judg-
ment that ERISA preempts a MEWA from state insurance regulation. Id. at 2-3. The court con-
strued the 1983 MEWA amendment to allow states to regulate MEWAs as insurance companies.
See id. at 5.
71. 86 F.3d 1016 (10th Cir. 1996).
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ance regulatory schemes.76 Second, the trustee argued that Colorado MEWA
regulation violated the Commerce" and Equal Protection Clauses." The
district court dismissed the action and held that Colorado regulation of
MEWAs under insurance and workers' compensation regulations were excep-
tions to ERISA preemption.'m
2. Decision
In affirming the lower court decision, the Tenth Circuit held that non-fully
insured MEWAs are subject to state insurance regulatory laws and exempt
from ERISA preemption." State workers' compensation regulations apply to
benefits offered within a multibenefit planY The court concluded that al-
though workers' compensation regulations may economically impact an em-
ployee benefit plan, the regulations do not therefore "relate to" an ERISA
plan.s3 The court further held that a Colorado state statute extending Insur-
ance Division jurisdiction over MEWAs for compliance purposes was consis-
tent with the statutory interpretation of ERISA's MEWA amendment.U
C. Analysis
ERISA's statutory language excludes worker's compensation programs
from its preemptive sweep. In some circumstances, however, the preemption
clause will encompass such programs if they "relate to" an ERISA benefit
plan.' When employers offer worker's compensation benefits as part of a
multibenefit ERISA plan, ERISA will not preempt the state regulatory
scheme.s"
Further, the court construed the MEWA amendment to reserve regulation
of non-fully insured MEWAs to the state. Here, Colorado's MEWA regulation
requires certain reporting, disclosure and funding requirements. This state law
does not foreclose the trust from operating in Colorado, which would be in-
consistent with ERISA requirements. Instead, the law merely applies its insur-
ance requirements to MEWAs as authorized by ERISA. Consequently, the
IAEA trust failed in its attempt to escape Colorado insurance regulation on
two grounds: the regulation involved worker's compensation and the trust
76. Id.
77. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, c1. 3.
78. U.S. CoNSr. amend. XlV, § 1.
79. Fu/Uer, 86 F.3d at 1019.
80. See Fuller v. Norton, 881 F. Supp. 468, 471 (1995).
81. Fu/er, 86 F.3d at 1019.
82. I& at 1021-22.
83. Id. at 1021.
84. Treatment of Multiple Employer welfare Arrangements Under Employee Retirement In-
come Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 97-473, 96 Stat. 2612 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1002, 1144(b) (1994)); Fu//er, 86 F.3d at 1024-25. The relevant part of the Colorado statute at
issue in this case provides that "[nlothing ... shall ... limit the ability of the division of insur-
ance to regulate... multiple employer welfare arrangements." CoLo. REv. STAT. § 10-3-
903.5(2)(1994).
85. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
86. See discussion supra Part H. A.
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qualified as a MEWA.
D. Other Circuits
The Tenth Circuit is consistent with other circuits in its approach to
worker's compensation regulation. Several circuits have entertained the same
plaintiff seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from compliance with state
insurance regulation.' None of these circuits found the IAEA trust exempt
from state regulations."
In the Eighth Circuit, the court did not even address ERISA preemption,
stating that the threshold question is whether the trust was an ERISA plan."
Other circuits disposed of IAEA's ERISA claim using similar reasoning as the
Tenth Circuit. The Seventh Circuit held that ERISA did not preempt workers'
compensation regulations even when an employer offered the benefits within a
multiple benefit plan.'e Consequently, the state possessed the right to ensure
the provision of workers' compensation benefits in accordance with the state
workers' compensation regulations.9 Similarly, the Fifth Circuit found that
ERISA would not preempt provisions of the Louisiana workers' compensation
regulations." In this case, state workers' compensation regulations indirectly
increased the cost of an ERISA plan but did not "relate to" that plan.93
III. STATE COMMON LAW CLAims PREEMPTED DESPrrE LACK OF
ALTERNATE REMEDY
A. Background
Case law supporting preemption of state law claims began with Pilot Life
Ins. Co.94 ERISA preempts claims for state tort or breach of contract ac-
tions-specifically bad faith for improper handling of a claim under the
plan." This preemption analysis examines whether the law "relates to" an
ERISA plan. If so, ERISA will preempt the state claims.9 The savings
87. See Fuller v. Skornicka, 79 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 1996); Fuller v. Ulland, 76 F.3d 957 (8th
Cir. 1996); International Ass'n of Entrepreneurs of Am. v. Angoff, 58 F.3d 1266 (8th Cir. 1995);
Combined Management, Inc. v. Superintendent of Ins., 22 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1994); International
Ass'n of Entrepreneurs of Am. Benefit Trust v. Foster, 883 F. Supp. 1050 (E.D. Va. 1995).
88. See infra notes 89-98 and accompanying text.
89. See Fuler, 76 F.3d at 960, 960 n.4 (remanding case to state court to determine if IAEA
Trust is an ERISA-covered plan and noting that IAEA trust has been found by one district court
not to be an ERISA plan); International Ass'n of Entrepreneurs of Am., 58 F.3d at 1269 (conclud-
ing that concurrent jurisdiction exists to determine ERISA status of JAEA's trust).
90. Fuller v. Skornicka, 79 F.3d at 687.
91. I.
92. Martco Partnership v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 86 F.3d 459, 463 (5th Cir. 1996).
93. Id. at 463. The offset provisions of Louisiana worker's compensation law only deter-
mines the employer's obligation to the beneficiary. Id. The fact that the insurance provider chose
to reference the state law in its policy is not sufficient to trigger preemption. Id.
94. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux. 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
95. See generally id (holding ERISA preempted a state claim for improper processing of
benefit claims under an ERISA-regulated plan because state common law did not regulate insur-
ance as defined by ERISA's savings clause).
96. Id. at 47.
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clause9 prevents ERISA preemption only when the law is "specifically di-
rected toward [the insurance] industry."
In Pilot Life Insurance, the Supreme Court focused on the language of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act" in reaching its decision." The Court articulated
three criteria which identify the "business of insurance," triggering ERISA's
savings clause: (1) the law effects a spreading of risk; (2) the law is an inte-
gral part of the relationship between the insurer and insured; and (3) the law is
limited to insurance industry entities.'" The narrow exception carved out in
ERISA's language, to allow state regulation in certain areas, does not apply in
lawsuits brought against insurers operating as claims processors for a benefit
plan. °2 There is no state tort liability against an insurance company for pro-
cessing claims because ERISA's exclusive enforcement scheme provides a
remedy for denial of benefits."e3
B. Cannon v. Group Health Service, Inc."°w
1. Facts
The plaintiff was a group plan beneficiary who filed a claim against
Group Health Service, Inc. and GHS Health Maintenance Organization, Inc.
for- (1) negligence and bad faith refusal to authorize an autologous bone mar-
row transplant (ABMT) treatment in a timely fashion; (2) breach of contract;
and (3) breach of fiduciary duty." Blue Lincs HMO insured the plaintiff's
wife, Mrs. Cannon. She was diagnosed and treated for leukemia.'0 While in
remission, her physician sought approval for ABMT as a course of
treatment," but the insurer promptly refused the treatment as experimen-
tal."U The physician requested a reconsideration and provided literature to
support his contention that ABMT treatment was not experimental.'09 The
insurer again denied approval of the ABMT but authorized the treatment after
a third request."0 The plaintiff's wife, however, received notice of this ap-
proval after suffering a recurrence of cancer, rendering any ABMT treatment
ineffective."' Mrs. Cannon died approximately six weeks after she received
97. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
98. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 50.
99. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1994). That Act states, "The business of insurance, and every
person engaged therein, shall be subject to the laws of the several States which relate to the regu-
lation or taxation of such business." Id. § 1012(a).
100. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 50.
101. Id at 48-49 (quoting Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119 (1982)).
102. Fisk, supra note 31, 101, at 51.
103. See supra text accompanying note 19. ERISA, however, does not provide for punitive or
compensatory damages. Fisk, supra note 31, 101, at 51.
104. 77 F.3d 1270 (10th Cir. 1996).
105. Cannon, 77 F.3d at 1272.
106. Id at 1271.
107. Id The physician emphasized to the insurer that the transplant, to be effective, must be







Defendant removed the claim to federal court under ERISA preemp-
tion. 13 After denying plaintiff's motion for remand, the district court granted
summary judgment to the insurer, finding that the plaintiff's claims "related
to" an ERISA health plan."'
2. Decision
The plaintiff appealed the lower court decision on three grounds: (1)
ERISA does not preempt a claim for which ERISA provides no remedy; (2)
preemption of the claim without a remedy violated plaintiff's fundamental
right of access to justice; and (3) that the federal common law equitable estop-
pel allowed his claim."'
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court decision." 6 The
court held that ERISA preemption applies to common law state tort and con-
tract actions and, further, that the absence of an ERISA remedy fails to impact
preemption." '7 Interpreting ERISA's savings and deemer clauses," 8 the
court found that an insurance provider of ERISA plan benefits cannot be
deemed an insurance company subject to state insurance regulation."9
Plaintiff argued that ERISA preemption violates a constitutional "right to
access justice."'' " The Tenth Circuit concluded that the Supreme Court has
not defined such a broad fundamental right to access justice, and dismissed
this claim.''
Finally, the court dismissed plaintiff's claim for equitable estoppel under
federal common law." In so doing, the court identified the elements for a
claim of common law equitable estoppel: (1) misrepresentation of material
facts; (2) which is intentional; (3) when the party to be estopped was aware of
the true facts; and (4) an ignorant party relied on the misrepresented facts; (5)
to his or her detriment."2 The court stated that the delay in the ABMT pro-
cedure resulted from plan interpretation rather than misrepresentation.'24
Consequently, the Tenth Circuit dismissed this claim without adopting or re-




113. Id. at 1272.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1274.
117. See id.
118. See supra text accompanying notes 26-29, 30.
119. Cannon, 77 F.3d at 1275. The court found that the deemer clause contradicted plaintiff's
argument because it specifically excludes ERISA benefit plans from state regulation. Id.
120. Id. Plaintiff claimed this right was conferred by the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause and the Ninth Amendment. The latter amendment, e argued, and the Magna Carta, guar-
antee a right to redress through access to the courts. id.
121. Id at 1276.
122. See id. at 1277.
123. Id. at 1276-77.
.124. Id. at 1277.
125. Id
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C. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit recognized that a plaintiff may be left without recourse
if ERISA preempts state law claims but ERISA provides no remedy."M Al-
though sound reasons exist for creating an exception to ERISA to address this,
the court indicated that Congress, and not the judiciary, is the appropriate
forum for such policy choices.'"
Mr. Cannon claimed a state tort action of negligence or bad faith against
the insurer for its failure to timely authorize the ABMT." This case falls
within a growing body of ERISA benefit claims called "betrayal without reme-
dy" cases.'M" In these cases, the insurer promised the plan participant a bene-
fit, or the insurer made a representation regarding a benefit, which is not in
accordance with the plan.' Where, as in this case, the insurance coverage
"relates to" an ERISA benefit plan, ERISA preempts the claim.'' Once
ERISA preempts, no remedy exists under the Act's statutory scheme because
enforcement is limited to benefits defined under the plan or expenses actually
incurred. 32
The Tenth Circuit addressed the equitable estoppel argument advanced by
plaintiff. "' Some circuits have allowed a claim for federal common law eq-
uitable estoppel in cases where a plan beneficiary detrimentally relies on an
ambiguous plan provision." In these cases, a provider is estopped from de-
nying liability because of an intentional misrepresentation of a material
fact.3 Because ERISA requires maintenance of a written plan, informal plan
modifications are not subject to equitable estoppel." s When an ambiguous
plan provision exists and a plan representative interprets such a provision,
common law equitable estoppel may be invoked.' The fight in Cannon re-
garded interpretation of the ABMT provision of Mrs. Cannon's plan. Here, the
court found that the requisite equitable estoppel elements of misrepresentation
and detrimental reliance were absent.M Consequently, the court dismissed
126. Id. at 1274.
127. ld.
128. ld. at 1272.
129. Preemption--The Inconsistent Oral Promise to Pay Benefits, ERISA LniiO. REP., Feb.
1993, at 9. The Fifth Circuit first coined the phrase "betrayal without remedy" in Degan v. Ford
Motor Co., 869 F.2d 889, 895 (5th Cir. 1989).
130. Cannon, 77 F.3d at 1271-72. The insurer approved the procedure notwithstanding the
language of the rider to the plaintiff's health plan excluding ABMT benefits to treat acute leuke-
mia in first remission. Id. at 1272.
131. See supra text accompanying note 25.
132. See supra text accompanying note 19.
133. See id. at 1276-77.
134. See, e.g., National Cos. Health Benefit Plan v. St. Joseph's Hosp., Inc., 929 F.2d 1558,
1572 (11th Cir. 1991) (identifying the elements of federal common law equitable estoppel). Com-
pare Kane v. Aetna Life Ins., 893 F.2d 1283, 1285 (11th Cir. 1990) (applying equitable estoppel
where ERISA plan provision interpretation is ambiguous and insured detrimentally relies on such
interpretation), with Nachwalter v. Christie, 805 F.2d 956, 960 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding equitable
estoppel not applicable to enforce oral modification of ERISA plan).
135. National Cos. Health Benefit Plan, 929 F.2d at 1572.
136. Nachwalter, 805 F.2d at 960.
137. Kane, 893 F.2d at 1286.
138. Cannon, 77 F.3d at 1277.
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this claim for relief without adopting the equitable estoppel cause of ac-
tion.139
D. Other Circuits
During this survey period, the federal circuit courts continued the trend of
broad application of ERISA preemption involving state law claims. The Sixth
Circuit supported ERISA preemption for state common law tort actions
brought against an insurer." The Eleventh Circuit has expressed its concern
that ERISA's broad reach leaves plaintiffs without a remedy. " In that case,
ERISA preempted a fraudulent misrepresentation claim against an insurer be-
cause plaintiff tied the claim to a denial of benefits claim.'"
Two vicarious liability claims brought in the Seventh Circuit against
ERISA plan administrators for the alleged negligence of their provider physi-
cians proved unavailing. In Rice v. Panchal,'" the court analyzed federal
question jurisdiction in ERISA cases conferred via complete preemption, as
distinguished from the defensive posture of conflict preemption arising in
ERISA cases.'" Because the claim did not enforce any rights under the plan
and did not require interpretation of an ERISA plan, removal to federal court
was inappropriate under complete preemption. I" The court left open the pos-
sibility that "conflict preemption" may provide the vehicle for removal." In
Jass v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc.," the claim involved vicarious
liability against an ERISA plan administrator for the negligence of a provider
physician and nurse.'" The court held that ERISA preemption applied be-
cause the claim involved interpretation of the plan." This claim was distin-
guished from the Tenth Circuit's holding in Pacificare of Oklahoma, Inc. v.
Burrage,"0 because this physician's negligence was tied to the benefits de-
termination and because he was not an HMO employed physician but, rather
an independent contractor."'
Other circuits addressed equitable estoppel claims against ERISA plan
providers but provided no relief to plaintiffs. 2 The Ninth Circuit heard two
139. See id.
140. See Schachner v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 77 F.3d 889, 898 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding
that ERISA preempts Ohio law of bad faith, breach of contract and negligence against insurer).
141. See Morstein v. National Ins. Servs., Inc., 74 F.3d 1135, 1138 n.3 (11th Cir. 1996) (ex-
pressing regret that "the reach of ERISA preemption too often undermines the stated purpose of
the Act: to protect employees and beneficiaries of employee benefit plans").
142. See id at 1137-38.
143. 65 F.3d 637, 646 (7th Cir. 1995).
144. Rice, 65 F.3d at 639-40.
145. Maat 646.
146. See id.
147. 88 F.3d 1482, 1495 (7th Cir. 1996).
148. Jass, 88 F.3d at 1484.
149. 1& at 1489. The vicarious liability claim for the nurse's negligence was a denial of bene-
fits invoking ERISA preemption. I& The vicarious liability claim of negligence against the plan
for the physician required examination of the plan. d. at 1493.
150. 59 F.3d 151 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that ERISA does not preempt a vicarious liability
claim against an HMO for the negligence of its physician).
151. See Jass, 88 F.3d at 1494.
152. See F'mk v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 94 F.3d 489 (8th Cir. 1996); Pisciotta v. Teledyne
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cases seeking equitable estoppel relief for alleged violation of ERISA plan
provisions,' 3 and articulated its requirements for a bona fide claim: (1) ma-
terial misrepresentation; (2) reasonable detrimental reliance; (3) extraordinary
circumstances; (4) ambiguous plan term; and (5) misrepresentation based on
an oral plan interpretation." In both cases before the Ninth Circuit, the eq-
uitable estoppel claims were unsuccessful because the ERISA plan provisions
were unambiguous.'55
The Eighth Circuit held equitable estoppel inapplicable against an insurer
where the beneficiary was ineligible for the plan benefiL" The Second Cir-
cuit adheres to "principles of estoppel" in ERISA cases only under "extraordi-
nary circumstances."'' 1 The court articulated this requirement as well as
promissory estoppel elements in a severance benefits dispute.'58
CONCLUSION
In Fuller, the Tenth Circuit supported state regulation of workers' com-
pensation benefits notwithstanding that an ERISA plan structure encompasses
these benefits.' 9 Although states may not regulate an ERISA plan, compli-
ance with regulatory laws to ensure worker protection enables the state to
require a separate plan for purposes of compliance with state law."s Non-
Indus., 91 F.3d 1326 (9th Cir. 1996); Schonholz v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 87 F.3d 72 (2d
Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. CL 511 (1996); Marx v. Loral Corp., 87 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir.
1996); In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 85 F.3d 992 (2d Cir. 1996); Jenkins v. Montgomery Indus.,
77 F.3d 740 (4th Cir. 1996).
153. See Piscionta, 91 F.3d at 1326; Marx, 87 F.3d at 1049.
154. Pisciotta, 91 F.3d at 1331.
155. In Pisciotta, a retiree class alleged an ERISA violation when a former employer modi-
fied its health plan after promising to pay the full amount of retiree medical premiums for life. Id.
at 1329. Retirees relied on an insurance booklet, but the plan controlled and was held not ambigu-
ous. Id. at 1330-31. The second equitable estoppel case, Marx, involved a retiree class action that
alleged misrepresentations made to beneficiaries that plan provisions would not change when the
company was sold. Marx, 87 F.3d at 1051-52. The Marx court held that if a plan sufficiently
outlines a procedure to amend benefits, then no ambiguity exists in the plan provisions. Id at
1056.
156. See Fink, 94 F.3d at 492 (restricting equitable estoppel where a dispute over payout of
death benefit involved decedent's eligibility for group life policy and decedent was not an active,
full-time employee at the time of death).
157. Lee v. Burkhart, 991 F.2d 1004, 1009 (2d Cir. 1993); see also Gridley v. Cleveland
Pneumatic Co., 924 F.2d 1310, 1319 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding equitable estoppel only available
with showing of "extraordinary circumstances" in ERISA disputes going beyond ordinary elements
of equitable estoppel); Hozier v. Midwest Fasteners, Inc., 908 F.2d 1155, 1165 n.10 (3d Cir. 1990)
(finding practice of paying severance benefit to employees, beyond plan terms, may be implied
representation of continuation of the benefit to other employees, but does not qualify as an ex-
traordinary circumstance). But see Rosen v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees & Bartenders Union,
637 F.2d 592, 598 (3d Cir. 1981) (holding that extraordinary circumstances exist and pension plan
trustee was estopped from denying pension payout where trustee advised employee that employer
contributions to the fund were in arrears and employee subsequently deposited money to fund to
cover arrearage).
158. See Schonholz, 87 F.3d at 72 (holding that genuine issues of material fact existed on
estoppel claim). The court relied on the language of ERISA and the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CoNTRAS § 90(1) (1979), to determine that employer's letter constituted a sufficiently definite
promise to the terminating employee such that employer reasonably should have expected "to
induce action or forbearance on the [plaintiff's] part." Id. at 79.
159. See Fuller v. Norton, 86 F.3d 1016, 1021-22 (10th Cir. 1996).
160. Id. at 1021.
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ERISA
fully insured multiple employer welfare arrangements are subject to Colorado
regulatory law irrespective of ERISA's broad preemptive sweep.'6'
In Cannon, the court found preemption operative over state common law
claims.'" Plan beneficiaries may, as the Cannon case demonstrates, find
themselves victims of the "betrayal without a remedy" dilemma. 63 The
Tenth Circuit rejected plaintiff's equitable estoppel claim, but stopped short of
adopting or rejecting equitable estoppel in ERISA cases.'" Should the Tenth
Circuit decide to adopt equitable estoppel in future ERISA actions it may, in
certain instances, provide a sorely needed vehicle for relief to "betrayal with-
out remedy" plaintiffs.
Historically, ERISA preemption has been broadly applied, while the reme-
dies available to beneficiaries are few."e Indeed, as Justice Birch stated in
his dissent in Sanson v. General Motors Corp.,'" the purpose of ERISA is to
protect plan beneficiaries, but an overbroad reading of ERISA preemption case
law may allow an employer to "hoodwink a long time employee and leave
him stranded without any recourse whatsoever" and "[that] result stands the
entire statutory scheme on its proverbial head.'
67
ERISA preemption continues to be a highly litigated area because of the
complex nature of this federal law. Meanwhile, interpretation of ERISA's
preemption, savings, and deemer clauses frustrates the courts." Congress
wanted ERISA to provide a broad and exclusive framework for the adminis-
tration of employee benefits."6 Consequently, it is likely that ERISA pre-
emption will continue unabated.
Jane D. Bailey
161. Id. at 1024.
162. See Cannon v. Group Health Serv., Inc., 77 F.3d 1270, 1274 (10th Cir. 1996).
163. See id.
164. Id. at 1277.
165. Lewis & Feinberg, supra note 52, at 3.
166. 966 F.2d 618 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding that a retiree's claim that the former employer
had fraudulently misrepresented availability of benefits was preempted by ERISA).
167. Sanson, 966 F.2d at 623 (Birch, J., dissenting).
168. See, e.g., New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 115 S. C. 1671, 1676 (1995) (discussing ERISA's "relate to" and "connection with"
language as "unhelpful text" and "frustrating" while "look[ing] instead to the objectives of the
ERISA statute as a guide").
169. See supra note 44.
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OIL & GAS LAW
INTRODUCTION
Two oil and gas issues generate continuous debate: the calculation of
royalties paid on oil and gas produced on federal land,' and the scope of fed-
eral preemption of state oil and gas regulations.2 The Tenth Circuit addressed
both issues during the survey period.3 Santa Fe Energy Products Co. v.
McCutcheon4 considered calculation of federal royalties when oil or gas is
sold by a producer in a non-arm's length transaction. Panhandle Eastern
Pipeline Co. v. Oklahoma6 discussed the relative authority of federal and state
regulations governing oil and gas activities.7
I. GENERAL BACKGROUND
Domestic natural gas production continues to rise and reached 19 trillion
cubic feet in 1996.' Crude oil production, although at a forty-two year low,
forged ahead at 6.4 million barrels a day in 1996.9 Revenues to the federal
treasury generated by rent and royalties from oil and gas activities on federal
land are measured in the billions of dollars annually; only federal income tax
revenue exceeds the revenue generated by the nation's natural resources.'"
Federal regulation of this vast enterprise has expanded over the past sixty
years. State and local governments regulated natural gas sales prior to 1938."
However, Supreme Court decisions in 1918 and 1924 restricted the state regu-
1. See, e.g., Owen L. Anderson, Calculating Royalty: "Costs" Subsequent to Produc-
tion-"Figures Don't Lie, But .. ", 33 WASHBURN LJ. 591, 591 (1994). "Royalty payment
disputes, particularly those involving gas, will continue to be a chief source of litigation in the fu-
ture." Id.
2. See, e.g., David E. Pierce, Reconciling State Oil and Gas Conservation Regulation with
the Natural Gas Act: New Statutory Revelations, 1989 BYU L. REV. 9, 10 (1989). "After fifty
years of experience under the Natural Gas Act (NGA), allocation of federal and state authority to
regulate oil and gas production remains unclear." Id.
3. In addition, the Tenth Circuit decided two other oil and gas cases between September,
1995 and August 1996. First, the court considered a private contract dispute with respect to drill-
ing company leases in Slawson Exploration Co. v. Vintage Petroleum, Inc., 78 F.3d 1479 (10th
Cir. 1996). Second, the court examined the jurisdiction of the Federal Energy Regulatory Com-
mission in the context of interstate transportation of gas in Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. FERC,
83 F.3d 1298 (10th Cir. 1996).
4. 90 F.3d 409 (10th Cir. 1996).
5. Santa Fe Energy Prods., 90 F.3d at 411-15.
6. 83 F.3d 1219 (10th Cir. 1996).
7. Panhandle, 83 F.3d at 1225-29.
8. American Gas Association, Preliminary Findings Concerning 1996 Natural Gas Re-
serves (visited June 11, 1997) <http://www.aga.com/gio/96gas.htrnl>.
9. Telephone Interview with Joe Lastelic, Spokesman, American Petroleum Institute (June
11, 1997).
10. Michael E. Shapiro, Sagebrush and Seaweed Robbery: State Revenue Losses from
Onshore and Offshore Federal Lands, 12 ECOLOGY L.Q. 481, 481 (1985).
11. WILIAM A. MOGEL, TRANSPORTATION AND MARKETING OF NATURAL GAs 19 (1985).
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lation of oil and gas within interstate commerce." Congress reacted to the
interstate regulatory gap by enacting the Natural Gas Act (NGA) in 1938."
The stated purpose of the NGA is to protect the public interest by regulating
the transportation and sale of natural gas in interstate commerce.' 4 Congress
vested NGA oversight in the Federal Power Commission (FPC) (subsequently
renamed the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)). Oil shortag-
es and rising oil prices led Congress to amend the NGA regulatory scheme by
enacting the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 (NGPA).'6 The NGPA altered
the method for computing natural gas pricing by abandoning a cost-based
formula requiring complex calculations of producer costs.' The act instituted
a new method that categorized gas based on the circumstances of its produc-
tion and sale.' The categories are defined by various circumstances of the
'T"ist sale" of the gas.19
Problems computing oil and gas royalties" led Congress to enact the
Federal Oil and Gas Royalty Management Act of 1982 (FOGRMA). 2 Con-
gress hoped to mitigate a number of ills affecting federal oil and gas manage-
ment, including royalty procedures overwhelmed by the growing volume and
complexity of accounting systems, drilling field thefts of equipment and oil,
12. Id. at 19-20 (citing Missouri v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 265 U.S. 298 (1924) and Public
Util. Comm'n v. Landon, 249 U.S. 236 (1918)).
13. MoGEL, supra note 11; Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 717, 717a-717w (1994).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 717(a)-(b) (1994).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 7172(a)(1)(C) (1994).
16. MOGEL, supra note 11, at 59. See also Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
621, 92 Stat. 3350 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
17. MOGHEL,supra note 11, at 63.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 64 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 3301(21) (1994)). The statute defines "first sale":
(A) General rule.-The term "first sale" means any sale of any volume of natural gas-
(i) to any interstate pipeline or intrastate pipeline;
(ii) to any local distribution company;
(iii) to any person for use by such person;
(iv) which precedes any sale described in clauses (i), (ii), or (iii); and
(v) which precedes or follows any sale described in clauses (i), (ii), (iii), or
(iv) and is defined by [FERC] as a first sale in order to prevent circumvention
of any maximum lawful price not established under this chapter.
(B) Certain sales not included.-Clauses (i), (i), (iii), or (iv) of subparagraph (A) shall
not include the sale of any volume of natural gas by any interstate pipeline, intrastate
pipeline, or local distribution company, or any affiliate thereof, unless such sale is attrib-
utable to volumes of natural gas produced by such interstate pipeline, intrastate pipeline,
or local distribution company, or any affiliate thereof.
15 U.S.C. § 3301(21).
20. Criticisms of federal oil and gas royalty management led Secretary of the Interior James
Watt to appoint a panel to study the Department of Interior's royalty accounting systems. The
panel issued its report in January of 1982. U.S. COMM'N ON FIscAL ACcOuNTABILIry, U.S. DEP'T
OF INTERIOR, FISCAL ACCOUNTABILrrY OF THE NATION'S ENERGY RESOURCES: REPORT OF THE
CoMISSiON 13-39 (1982). The Commission was popularly named for its chair, David E.
Linowes, and this publication is thus known as the "Linowes Report." The report contained sixty
recommendations for royalty reform, after listing many problems with the current regulatory
framework. Its recommendations drove Congress to swift action; the President signed FOGRMA
on January 12, 1983. Laura Lindley, Of Teapot Dome, Wind River and Fort Chaffee: Federal Oil
and Gas Resources, NAT. RESOURCES & ENv'T, Summer 1995, at 25.
21. Federal Oil and Gas Royalty Management Act of 1982, 30 U.S.C. §§ 188, 191, 1701-57
(1994).
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and federal government reluctance to take advantage of state and Indian tribe
offers to assist in royalty management.' Furthermore, Congress determined
that companies underpaid royalty obligations by as much as 10 percent, result-
ing in an estimated loss of $500 million annually." These problems led Con-
gress to the reforms embodied in FOGRMA. 4 The Tenth Circuit considered
regulations promulgated under FOGRMA targeting royalty management in
Santa Fe Energy Products Co. v. McCutcheon.'
II. AFFniATE SALES AND ROYALTY CALCULATIONS
A. Background
To address serious defects in royalty management and the methodologies
used to compute the lessor's royalties under federal oil and gas leases, Con-
gress enacted FOGRMA in 1982.' Among the reforms instituted by
FOGRMA is a framework for federal royalty management and enforcement.
This scheme directs the Mineral Management Service (MMS) to solicit the
assistance of states and Indian tribes to enforce its provisions.27 The statute
defines the rights and responsibilities of lessees, operators, and other persons
involved in oil and gas transportation and the sale of oil and gas produced
from federal leases.' It also specifies record-keeping duties for operators,
audit authority for federal, state and Indian agencies, royalty payment method-
ologies, inspection rights, and civil and criminal penalties.'
Heightened audit requirements are among FOGRMA's reforms. Section
103(a) of FOGRMA requires federal oil and gas producers, transporters, les-
sees, and others to maintain royalty records." The act requires these parties
to produce royalty records upon request by the Secretary of the Interior, a
state, or any Indian tribe.3 The Secretary delegated authority to the MMS to
audit royalty payments." As a result of these reforms, Congress hoped to
remedy serious defects in the royalty management system by conducting more
22. H.R. REP. No. 97-859, at 15 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4268-69.
23. Id. at 16 (citing General Accounting Office reports).
24. Id. at 15-16.
25. 90 F.3d 409, 413 (10th Cir. 1996).
26. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
27. 30 U.S.C. § 1701(b)(5) (1994).
28. 30 U.S.C. § 1701(b)(l) (1994).
29. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1713-1715, 1718-1720 (1994).
30. Federal Oil and Gas Royalty Management Act § 103(a), 30 U.S.C. § 1713 (1994). The
statute states:
A lessee, operator, or other person directly involved in developing, producing, transport-
ing, purchasing, or selling oil or gas subject to this chapter through the point of first sale
or the point of royalty computation, whichever is later, shall establish and maintain any
records ... and provide any information that the Secretary may, by rule, reasonably
require .... Upon the request of any officer or employee duly designated by the Secre-
tary or any State or Indian tribe conducting an audit or investigation pursuant to this
chapter, the appropriate records, reports or information... shall be made available for
inspection and duplication by such officer or employee ....
Id.
31. Id
32. 30 C.F.R. § 201.100 (1996).
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audits, thus collecting more royalty underpayments.3
Regulations promulgated under FOGRMA have been revised frequent-
ly.3' In 1988, the MMS established new oil valuation standards and proce-
dures,35 and revised the regulations that govern the value of oil and gas for
royalty purposes.' Prior to 1988, they had used the "gross proceeds rule: 3
the value of oil and gas production for royalty purposes included the total
value of money and other consideration derived by a lessee when making an
oil or gas disposition." The rule included a caveat oil values could be deter-
mined by reference to "other relevant matters." 9
The 1988 revision of the gross proceeds rule provided greater detail to
make royalty calculations.' The agency confirmed its commitment to the rule
by stating that they would generally "assess royalty on the value to which the
lessee is legally entitled under its arm's length contract. The MMS main-
tain[ed] that gross proceeds to which a lessee is legally entitled under arm's
length contracts are determined by market forces and thus represent the best
measure of market value."' 1
While reaffirming the 1988 revision of the gross proceeds, the MMS add-
ed a process to value oil production not sold in an arm's length transaction.'
Non-arm's length transactions, according to the MMS, include such situations
as intracompany use of oil, or a transaction lacking a sales contract. '3
The 1988 regulations provide the method for assessing the value of oil
for royalty purposes within non-arm's length transactions." Specified criteria
in a prescribed order are applied.' 5 If the first criterion reasonably applies to
33. H.R. REP. No. 97-859, at 15 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4268.
34. Mary Gilliam Zuchegno, How New Rules Affect Existing Oil and Gas Leases, 19 CoLo.
LAw. 2073, 2073 (1990).
35. Revision of Oil Product Valuation Regulations and Related Topics, 53 Fed. Reg. 1184
(1988) (codified at 30 C.F.R. pts. 202, 203, 206, 207, 210, 241, and 43 C.F.R. pts. 3100, 3160).
Through the revision, the MMS sought to clarify existing regulations promulgated under the NGA,
including "that royalty is to be paid on all consideration received by lessees, less applicable allow-
ances, for lease production." Id.
36. Id. at 1186.
37. 30 C.F.R. § 206.103 (1987), amended by 53 Fed. Reg. 1184 (1988). The regulation con-
tains the gross proceeds rule:
The value of production, for the purpose of computing royalty, shall be the estimated
reasonable value of the product as determined by the Associate Director due consider-
ation being given to the highest price paid for a part or for a majority of production of
like quality in the same field, to the price received by the lessee, to posted prices, and to
other relevant matters.
Id. (emphasis added).
38. Independent Petroleum Ass'n of Am. v. Babbitt, 92 F.3d 1248, 1252 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(citing 30 C.F.R. § 206.151 (1995)).
39. 30 C.F.R. § 206.103.
40. Revision of Oil Product Valuation Regulations and Related Topics, 53 Fed. Reg. at
1186.
41. Id.
42. Revision of Oil Product Valuation Regulations and Related Topics, 52 Fed. Reg. 1858,




45. 30 C.F.R. § 206.102(c) (1988).
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the circumstance of the sale, it is used; otherwise the next applicable criterion
is used.' The criteria are: (1) The lessee can use its own current posted
prices used in arm's length transactions for similar oil sold in significant
quantities in the same field; (2) if the lessee has no posted prices, then an
arithmetic average of the posted prices, given the same circumstances of the
first method, is used; (3) if no posted price exists in the same field, then
prices used in a similar field; (4) if no contemporaneous arm's length transac-
tions, then spot sales postings and other relevant information; and (5) a net-
back procedure that works backward from the sales price to determine the
value to the lessee.' In addition, the fifth criterion allows for any other rea-
sonable means to calculate value where all of the previous means are inappli-
cable. 4
Thus, the 1988 revision served to substantially clarify the "other relevant
matters"' 9 language of the pre-1988 regulation, especially in the area of non-
arm's length transactions. It was under these regulations that the Tenth Cir-
cuit decided the following case.
B. Santa Fe Energy Products Co. v. McCutcheon5°
1. Facts
Santa Fe Energy Resources Company (Producer) and one of its affiliates
were the targets of a California State Controller's Office's audit covering
royalty payments from 1984 through 1987." The California agency wanted
to determine if Producer had mistakenly valued oil for royalty purposes.52 In
the transaction at issue, Producer produced oil under federal leases in Cali-
fornia and sold most of its oil to its affiliate, Santa Fe Energy Products Com-
pany (Marketing Affiliate).53 Producer had calculated royalties based on the
value of the sale by Producer to its Marketing Affiliate. 4 Although Producer
was the lessee of record, the California agency requested documents from
Marketing Affiliate to determine if Producer chose the proper values when
computing the royalties paid on the oil sold to Marketing Affiliate.55
Following Marketing Affiliate's refusal to produce documents, the MMS
issued a compliance order to Producer.56 Marketing Affiliate appealed the
MMS' order to its director, who affirmed the agency's order.57 Thereafter,
46. Id.
47. 30 C.F.R. § 206.102(c)(1)-(6) (1988).
48. 30 C.F.R. § 206.102(c)(5) (1988).
49. 30 C.F.R. § 206.103 (1987).
50. 90 F.3d 409 (10th Cir. 1996).
51. Santa Fe Energy Prods., 90 F.3d at 411.
52. ld. at 411-12.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 412.
55. Id. at 411-12.
56. Id. at 412.
57. l. The Tenth Circuit quoted the MMS' director's finding that
[tihe issue in this case is whether the transfer [between Producer and Marketing Affili-
ate], admittedly not at arm's length, represents fair market value. The request for infor-
mation from [Marketing Affiliate] was meant to ascertain that fact .... Without the
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Marketing Affiliate appealed to the Interior Board of Land Appeals
(IBLA)5 The IBLA affirmed the director's order, stating that the MMS
could examine the records of an "affected person" '9 and was not limited to
examining the records of the federal lessee. 60 Marketing Affiliate's petition
for reconsideration was denied by the IBLA."'
Marketing Affiliate subsequently filed a complaint in federal district
court asking for a review of the IBLA decision.' The MMS countered by
filing a motion for summary judgment.' The district court granted the mo-
tion, stating that the MMS has the "broad discretion to require disclosure of
information."
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judg-
ment in favor of the MMS.' The court rejected Marketing Affiliate's two
arguments.' First, Marketing Affiliate contended that the district court erred
by not applying the 1988 revisions to the regulations governing royalty man-
agement.67 In dismissing this argument, the court noted that the revised reg-
ulations were prospective and did not affect the oil produced during the audit
period.' An earlier IBLA decision, Exxon Co., U.SA.,' had established
that the MMS specifically intended the 1988 regulations to apply to gas pro-
duction on or after March 1, 1988. The court noted that agency interpreta-
tions of their own rules must be given great deference.7' Thus, the court de-
clined to apply the 1988 revisions to the regulations governing royalty
management.'
Second, Marketing Affiliate asserted that the MMS erred when choosing
information requested from [Marketing Affiliate], the State and MMS cannot make a
reasonable determination as to the value of the crude oil for royalty purposes, since the
lessee's gross proceeds always is the minimum value.
Id. (citing 30 C.F.R. § 206.103 (1987)).
58. Id.
59. Under section 103(a) of FOGRMA, a "person directly involved in ... purchasing or
selling oil or gas [is] subject to [the Act]." Federal Oil and Gas Royalty Management Act of
1982 § 103(a), 30 U.S.C. § 1713 (1994). The Act defines "person" as "any individual, firm,
corporation, association, partnership, consortium, or joint venture." Federal Oil and Gas Royalty
Management Act § 3(12), 30 U.S.C. § 1702(12) (1994).




64. Id. at 413.
65. Id. at 415.
66. Id. at 413-15,
67. Id. at 413.-
68. Id. Marketing Affiliates' royalty audit covered the period from January 1, 1984, to June
30, 1987, and the revised royalty management regulations were expressly applied to oil produc-
tion on or after March 1, 1988. Id. at 413 (citing 53 Fed. Reg. 1184, 1230 (1988)).
69. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 128 LB.L.A. 22 (1993).
70. Id. at 24 (referring to the intent of the MMS, as represented in the Revision of Oil
Product Valuation Regulations and Related Topics, 53 Fed. Reg. at 1230 (1988)).
71. Santa Fe Energy Prods. v. McCutcheon, 90 F.3d 409, 413 (10th Cir. 1996) (citing
Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994)).
72. Id.
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the point at which royalties were computed, the proper point being the sale
between Producer, the federal lessee, and Marketing Affiliate, rather than the
sale between Marketing Affiliate and a third party, as the MMS asserted."
Consequently, Marketing Affiliate argued that the records of its sales to third
parties were not available to the MMS under FOGRMA's record-keeping and
audit requirements.
The court looked to the text of FOGRMA to determine the extent of the
statute's record-keeping requirements." Section 103(a) of FOGRMA re-
quires a lessee, "or other person," involved in producing, transporting, and
marketing oil or gas through the first sale, or royalty calculation point, to
maintain those records required for compliance with royalty regulations." A
"person" is defined as "any individual, firm, corporation, association, partner-
ship, consortium, or joint venture."76 Since Marketing Affiliate is a "person"
as defined by FOGRMA, and Marketing Affiliate was the first purchaser of
oil produced by Producer under a federal lease, the court concluded that sec-
tion 103(a) applied. Thus, Marketing Affiliate must allow access to its re-
cords."
Next, the court applied the pre-1988 gross proceeds rule, discussed
above.78 The "other relevant matters" language, which concededly provided
very little guidance to the MMS, allowed the agency to inquire about Market-
ing Affiliates' sales in order to determine fair market value." Their sale of
oil would be a "relevant matter" under the pre-1988 regulation, as it could
help the MMS ascertain the fair market value of the oil at the time of its
transfer between Producer and Marketing Affiliate.'
Finally, the court concluded that the MMS' determination that Marketing
Affiliate must produce documents relating to the arm's length sale of oil
received from Producer "was not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law."'
The court affirmed the district court's order of summary judgment in favor of
the government.'
73. Id.
74. Id. at 413-14.
75. See supra note 30.
76. 30 U.S.C. § 1702(12) (1994).
77. Santa Fe Energy Prods., 90 F.3d at 414-15.
78. Id. at 414. The court cited the following regulation:
The value of production, for the purpose of computing royalty, shall be the estimated
reasonable value of the product as determined by the Associate Director due consider-
ation being given to the highest price paid for a part or for a majority of production of
like quality in the same field, to the price received by the lessee, to posted prices, and
to other relevant matters.
Id. (citing 30 C.F.R. § 206.103 (1987)) (emphasis added).
79. Santa Fe Energy Prods., 90 F.3d at 414-15.
80. Id. at 414.
81. Id. at 414-15.
82. Id. at 415.
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C. Analysis
Santa Fe Energy Products turns on the scope of FOGRMA's royalty
calculation methodologies, and the requisite audit authority to determine oil
and gas values for royalty purposes. Section 103(a) of FOGRMA requires
records to be kept through the "point of first sale or the point of royalty com-
putation, whichever is later." 3 The Tenth Circuit determined that Marketing
Affiliate's sale to a third party was the point of first sale, thus records could
be examined by the MMS with regard to that sale, in order to determine the
value of royalties owed by Producer."
The point of contention between Producer, Marketing Affiliate, and the
MMS was the period at which the agency should make royalty calculations.
To reframe the issue: At what point, from the oil's first gush up the wellhead
to the first arm's length sale downstream, is the value of the oil fixed for
purposes of royalty computations? The court determined that the "first sale"
was the sale by Marketing Affiliate to a third party, not the intracorporate
transfer of oil from Producer to Marketing Affiliate.'
Assume that the MMS audit, completed in the wake of this Tenth Circuit
decision, resulted in Producer paying higher federal royalties since the royalty
was now based on the higher market prices obtained by Marketing Affiliate.
The higher royalty charged to the producer calls into question the fairness of
this outcome. Commentators have noted that traditionally the lessee-in this
case Producer-is viewed as holding a greater risk vis-a-vis the lessor be-
cause the lessor's royalty expectation has few upfront risks while the lessee
risks the working interest and capital investment needed to explore, develop
and produce the oil or gas.' While the lessor's risk is low, however, the
lessor still has an interest in obtaining a fair value for its oil and gas." The
lessor bears the risk that the lessee will not diligently develop the oil or gas
and obtain a fair price for it."
This risk from reliance on the lessee to obtain a fair price upon which
the royalty is based was heightened by the advent of the use of marketing
affiliates to conduct the lessee's marketing efforts." Following FERC's re-
structuring of producer/pipeline/consumer relationships in the mid-1980s, oil
and gas producers were allowed to market what they produced, but were
reluctant to do so because of the attendant responsibilities of measuring, bill-
ing, and controlling the flow of its oil and gas, responsibilities traditionally
held by pipeline purchasers.9° Thus, producers developed the concept of
marketing affiliate.9
83. 30 U.S.C. § 1713(a) (1994).
84. Santa Fe Energy Prods. v. McCutcheon, 90 F.3d 409, 414 (10th Cir. 1996).
85. Id.
86. Anderson, supra note 1, at 59f.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Arthur J. Wright & Carla J. Sharpe, Direct Gas Saks: Royalty Problems for the Pro-
ducer, 46 OKLA. L. REV. 235, 236 (1993).
90. Id. at 235-36.
91. Id. at 236.
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The marketing affiliate relationship, according to one commentator,
served to mitigate producers' increased responsibility by (1) the producer
holding a larger share of gross proceeds by not sharing a portion of the sale
proceeds with royalty owners, and (2) capturing the cost of marketing efforts
through the affiliate. 92 Santa Fe Energy Products militates against the first
of these reasons for using marketing affiliates by interpreting federal royalty
regulations in a way which captures the value of the sale by the marketing
affiliate to a third party. 93
Whether the outcome of Santa Fe Energy Products is fair thus seems
tied to whether, and to what extent, the marketing affiliate may be used to
fulfill the lessee's obligation to obtain a fair price for the oil and gas. To the
extent that the sale by the marketing affiliate is the fair price contemplated by
the lessor for the return on its royalty interest, and that fair price is not the
price upon which the royalty is based, the outcome of Santa Fe Energy Prod-
ucts is fair, viewed in this light the MMS' regulations are only attempting to
capture the fair value for the royalty holder.
However, to the extent that an oil or gas producer does seek to obtain a
fair price in the non-arm's length sale to its marketing affiliate, the capture of
the sale price to the marketing affiliate's customer unfairly burdens the pro-
ducer with excessive royalty obligations. The FOGRMA statute requiring
royalty computation at the first arm's length sale,94 interpreted as encom-
passing the sale from a marketing affiliate to a third party," clearly favors
the lessor/royalty interest, since it captures a portion of the sales price which
may exceed the fair price upon which the oil or gas was transferred between
affiliates.
Practitioners should note that a recently enacted statute may change the
royalty management scheme yet again. On August 13, 1996, President
Clinton signed legislation intended to improve royalty management.9" The
Federal Oil and Gas Royalty Simplification and Fairness Act of 19969
(FOGRSFA) revises procedures for collecting royalty payments, including the
statute of limitations for audit exposure, interest payments on returns of
overpayments, and the delegation of royalty collection activities to the
states. 98
The practical effect of the legislation is unknown---regulations have not
been promulgated 9 -- but the MMS believes it will simplify royalty manage-
92. Id.
93. Santa Fe Energy Prods., 90 F.3d at 414.
94. 30 U.S.C. § 1713(a) (1994).
95. Santa Fe Energy Prods., 90 F.3d at 414.
96. Federal Oil and Gas Royalty Simplification and Fairness Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
185, 110 StaL 1700 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 30 U.S.C.).
97. Id.
98. Id. §§ 3-5.
99. The MMS intends a phased approach to implementing the royalty management modifi-
cations mandated by FOGRSFA. Meeting on Federal Oil and Gas Royalty Simplification and
Fairness Act of 1996, 61 Fed. Reg. 55,941 (1996). The MMS expects that FOGRSFA will re-
quire numerous changes to royalty management programs, including increased delegation of roy-
alty collection and enforcement activities to the states. Statement of Regulatory Priorities, 61 Fed
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ment1 ° Typical commentary to date describes the oil and gas industry's
"delight" at the prospect of royalty management reform.'" While the act is
designed to streamline royalty computations, collections, and audits," it
does not modify FOGRMA's description of the point at which royalty com-
putations are made in arm's length transactions."° As a consequence, the
outcome of Santa Fe Energy Products in a post-FOGRSFA setting would
vary to the extent of the types of records audited, the identity of the enforce-
ment agency, and the statute of limitations for audits. On the other hand, the
timing of royalty computations, such as the point of first sale in an arm's
length transaction, would not likely change.
III. PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW BY THE NATURAL GAS ACT
A. Background
As discussed above, the NGA and NGPA created a scheme of federal
regulation for the oil and gas industry.'" The preemption doctrine guides
analysis of the effect of these statutes." Under the Supremacy Clause,
Congress can enact federal statutes that preempt state law." The Supreme
Court recognizes three circumstances in which a federal statute preempts a
state statute." 7 First, Congress can provide for preemption expressly in the
statute."' Second, a state law is preempted if there is an actual conflict with
a federal law." Finally, a body of federal law may occupy a field, leaving
no room for state regulation."'
As early as 1947, and regularly since then, the Supreme Court has de-
scribed the NGA as a statute that occupies an entire area, within which the
states may not act."' Section l(b) of the NGA describes the scope of feder-
al authority as extending to the transportation and sale of natural gas, and to
Reg. 62,071, 62,073 (1996).
100. Industry Execs Applaud Clinton's Signing of Royalty Fairness Bill, INSIDE ENER-
GY/wrrH FED. LANDS, Aug. 19, 1996, at 14, available in 1996 WL 8697208 (quoting the MMS'
Director Cynthia Quarterman as saying that the new law would "provide additional certainty,
equity and simplicity in royalty management").
101. See, e.g., Kimberley Music, Clinton Signs Bill Writing New Book on Collection of Oil,
Gas Royalties, OIL DAILY, August 14, 1996, at 1.
102. S. REP. No. 104-260, at 13 (1996).
103. 30 U.S.C. § 1713(a) (1994). FOGRSFA does not modify FOGRMA's section
addressing the point of royalty computation.
104. See supra notes 11-20 and accompanying text.
105. See infra note 147 and accompanying text for examples of the preemption doctrine as
applied to NGA and NGPA cases.
106. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, ci. 2.
107. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992). For a discussion of pre-
emption and federal energy statutes, see Note, Preemption and Regulatory Efficiency in Federal
Energy Statutes, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1306 (1990).
108. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 331 U.S. 682, 690 (1947) ("As
was stated in the House Committee report, the 'basic purpose' of Congress in passing the Natural
Gas Act was 'to occupy this field in which the Supreme Court has held that the States may not
act.'") (citation omitted).
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companies engaging in such activity, but authority "shall not apply to... the
production or gathering of natural gas."" 2 The Supreme Court interpreted
"production or gathering" narrowly to ensure broad federal control over the
industry.113
Although the NGPA ostensibly served as a partial deregulation of the gas
market by removing certain price restrictions, the Supreme Court addressed
its true effect on the exclusive jurisdiction created by the NGA in Transconti-
nental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. Mississippi Oil & Gas Board."4 The Court
held that the NGPA did not in fact alter the comprehensive regulatory scheme
created by the NGA, thus the "deep federal concern" over gas pricing con-
tinued to provide a rationale for federal preemption of state regulation."'5
B. Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co. v. Oklahoma"6
1. Facts
Natural gas producers and purchasers (plaintiffs) challenged the constitu-
tionality of an Oklahoma statute affecting royalty payments." 7 The Oklaho-
ma legislature enacted Senate Bill 160 (SB 160) in 1984. " ' The law had
two principal effects. ' 9 First, the bill amended the procedure for determin-
ing the royalties paid to owners of drilling units."n Second, the bill forced
the first purchaser of the oil or gas to pay the required royalties.'2 ' In addi-
tion, the first purchaser could not contract out the responsibility to pay the
royalties.'"
The plaintiffs filed suit in district court against the Oklahoma Commis-
sioners of the Land Office.'" The owners of the mineral interests intervened
112. 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1994). Section l(b) of the Act states:
The provisions of this [Act] shall apply to the transportation of natural gas in interstate
commerce, to the sale in interstate commerce of natural gas for resale for ultimate pub-
lic consumption for domestic, commercial, industrial, or any other use, and to natural
gas companies engaged in such transportation or sale, but shall not apply to any other
transportation or sale of natural gas or to the facilities used for such distribution or to
the production or gathering of natural gas.
Id.
113. Interstate Natural Gas Co., 331 U.S. at 693.
114. 474 U.S. 409, 417-21 (1986).
115. Transcontinental, 474 U.S. at 421-22.
116. 83 F.3d 1219 (10th Cir. 1996).
117. Panhandle, 83 F.3d at 1221.
118. Id. at 1222. For purposes of convenience, the Tenth Circuit and this Survey refer to the
two revisions by the name of Oklahoma Senate Bill, SB 160.
119. Id. SB 160 amended two existing statutes: OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 87.1(e) (Supp. 1984)
and OKiLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 540 (Supp. 1984).
120. Panhandle, 83 F.3d at 1223.
121. 1 Prior to SB 160, where two or more royalty owners had separate tracts within a
drilling unit, the lessee of the tract that included a producing well must have paid to the royalty
owners of the nonproducing tracts a one-eighth royalty in all production generated within the
unit. Id. at 1222 (citing OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 87.1(e) (Supp. 1984)). SB 160 altered royalty
owner's rights by adding to the one-eighth share an amount commensurate with the royalty
owner's interest in the unit. Id. at 1222-23 (citing 20 Op. Okla. Att'y Gen. 181 (1989)).
122. Panhandle, 83 F.3d at 1223.
123. Id. at 1224.
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as defendants in the case." The plaintiffs agreed that the repeal of SB 160
in 1992 remedied the constitutional issues, but the repeal arguably did not
apply to royalty payments during the period between 1985 and 1993.'7 The
amended complaint included a claim that federal law preempted SB 160."2
The district court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, finding that
federal law preempted SB 160.'"
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision." s The court
considered two issues: the preemption of SB 160 by the NGA and
NGPA,' 9 and whether those portions of SB 160 that were constitutional
could be severed from the remainder of the statute.' 3
The court began by determining Congress' intent with respect to the
preemption of state law. 3' An inference of federal preemption occurs when
"Congress has legislated comprehensively to occupy an entire field of regula-
tion, leaving no room for the states to supplement federal law."'3 2 The rele-
vant federal law in this case was the NGA and NGPA 33 The court noted
that Congress enacted the NGA, in part, in response to a series of Supreme
Court decisions invalidating state regulation of interstate oil and gas activi-
ties." To fill this gap, the NGA created the Federal Power Commission
(now FERC) to regulate those activities from which the state was prohibit-
ed. 3 The NGPA did not alter this comprehensive regulatory scheme." 3
Next, the court turned to the question of the scope of FERC's authority,
in relation to that of the state, to regulate oil and gas. Pursuant to the NGA,
FERC regulates the transportation and sale of oil and gas in interstate com-
merce, as well as those companies engaged in such activity.37 The court
124. Id.
125. Id. The court stated
[Plaintiffs] have no dispute with SB 168 [which repealed SB 160], as it allows produc-
ers disadvantaged by its royalty payment provisions to offset any loss by producing a
correspondingly greater volume of gas than they would otherwise be entitled to pro-
duce. (Appellee-intervenors] agree that SB 168 remedied the constitutional defects of
SB 160, because SB 168 explicitly provides that a purchaser who pays its contracted
producer for gas taken is thereafter liable to no other parties. Thus, the determination
whether SB 160 was constitutional affects the rights and liabilities of these parties for
the period 1985 to 1993 only.
Id.
126. Id. at 1225.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1223.
129. Id. at 1225.
130. Id. at 1229.
131. Id. at 1225.
132. Id. (quoting Northwest Central Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm'n of Kansas, 489
U.S. 493, 509 (1989)).
133. Id. at 1225-29.
134. Id.; see supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
135. Panhandle, 83 F.3d at 1225 (quoting Corporation Comm'n v. FPC, 415 U.S. 961, 962
(1974)).
136. Id. at 1226-27 (quoting Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. Mississippi Oil & Gas
Board, 474 U.S. 409, 421 (1986)).
137. Id. at 1225-26 (quoting Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. FERC, 955 F.2d 1412, 1416
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found that the powers reserved to the states-those powers outside of FERC's
jurisdiction- include the regulation of the physical production and gathering
of oil and gas "in the interests of conservation or any other consideration of
legitimate local concern." 3 '
Thus, the issue of preemption turned on whether SB 160 fell within
physical production or gathering, the only allowable purview of state regula-
tion.'" The court concluded that SB 160 did not regulate physical produc-
tion or gathering.'" Instead, the court found that SB 160 directly regulated
interstate gas purchasers by making them liable to all royalty owners of a
particular drilling unit.14 By regulating interstate purchasers, and not just
producers, SB 160 imposed obligations on them that would "substantially and
materially influence their purchasing decisions."' 2 Because SB 160 over-
stepped the state's authority, the court found it preempted by the NGA and
NGPA to the extent of its effect on the purchase of natural gas from inter-
state pipelines.
Finally, the court had to decide whether the preempted portions of SB
160 could be severed from those provisions which were constitutional."
The court held that under Oklahoma law, the whole of SB 160 was preempt-
ed since the valid portions of the statute were "so essentially and inseparably
connected with and so dependent upon the void provisions" that the state
legislature would not have enacted the statute with only the valid provi-
sions."
C. Analysis
NGA and NGPA effectively reserve to the states a very specific and
limited area of regulation--states may regulate only the physical production
and gathering of oil and gas when they have legitimate local concerns.'"
Beyond this reservation, courts' holdings usually specify that the NGA and
NGPA preempt state law. In the past thirty years, the Supreme Court decided
six cases involving state law and its relation to the NGA, and found that state
law was preempted in all but one.'" Likewise, the Tenth Circuit has held
(10th Cir. 1992)).
138. Id. at 1225-26 (quoting Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 331 U.S. 682, 690 (1947)).
139. Id. at 1227-28.
140. Id. at 1228.
141. Id& at 1229.
142. Id. at 1228.
143. Id. at 1229.
144. Id. at 1229-31.
145. d. at 1229-30 (quoting OKLA. STAT. it. 75, § 1la (1995)). The issue of severability is
governed by state law. Id. at 1229.
146. Interstate Natural Gas, 331 U.S. at 690.
147. See Northwest Central Pipeline Corp., 489 U.S. at 518-19 (1989) (holding that the
NGA does not preempt a state regulation of production despite possible effect on interstate pur-
chasers; regulation was plausibly related to a legitimate state concern to protect correlative rights
of Kansas producers); Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 301-04 (1988) (holding
that the NGA preempted a state requirement that a public utility must obtain state approval to
transport natural gas and state statute impermissibly regulated rates of companies involved in the
interstate transportation of natual gas); Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. Mississippi Oil
& Gas Board, 474 U.S. 409, 424-25 (1986) (holding that the NGA preempted the order of a state
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that states may not encroach upon federal regulation of the transportation,
sales, and distribution of oil and gas.'4
While case law appears well settled, commentators' assessment of the
effect of the NGA and its preemptive consequences fuels debate over the
statute's reach into intrastate activities. One commentator believes that the
jurisdictional distinction between federal and state governments created by the
NGA adequately protects consumers, in addition to being relatively simple for
the courts and agencies to apply."4 Others believe that the once useful, nar-
row construction by the Supreme Court of state powers over production and
gathering have increasingly become an impediment to the types of regulations
states need to effectively manage the growing complexity of oil and gas oper-
ations."s
Recent FERC orders have obscured the once clear distinction between
state control of production and gathering and federal control of pricing and
transportation. 5' FERC Orders 436152 and 636' deregulated many as-
pects of transportation and sales functions.'54 FERC issued Order 436 in
1985 to create "equal access" in the gas pipeline market; pipeline owners
must transport gas owned by third parties under the same terms as it trans-
ports its own gas. 5
FERC Order 636, issued in 1992, continued the process of deregulation
by requiring interstate pipelines to separately sell their transportation, storage,
and gas marketing services." It has been argued that the post-Order 636
oil and gas board requiring a pipeline company to purchase ratably from a gas pool because the
order undermined congressional intent to regulate prices); Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S.
176, 184 (1983) (holding that the NGA preempted state regulation prohibiting producers from
passing an increase in severance taxes through to consumers and that the regulation was preempt-
ed to the extent that the statute applied to sales of gas in interstate, as opposed to intrastate, com-
merce); Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 748-51 (1981) (holding that the NGA preempted
state regulation providing for a state tax to be added to oil and gas owners' costs associated with
marketing the gas; this provision of the tax statute usurped FERC's authority to determine pipe-
line and producer costs); Northern Natural Gas Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 372 U.S. 84, 95-96
(1963) (holding that the NGA preempted state regulation requiring pipeline to take ratably from
all connected users and that the regulation violated FERC's authority over sale and transportation
of natural gas in interstate commerce).
148. See Backus v. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co., 558 F.2d 1373, 1375 (10th Cir. 1977);
Saturn Oil & Gas Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 250 F.2d 61, 67 (10th Cir. 1957). After citing
Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 331 U.S. 682, 690-91, the court remarked
that "[tihis would seem to dispose of the point. The jurisdiction of the Commission is not defeat-
ed by state regulatory action." Saturn Oil & Gas, 250 F.2d at 67.
149. Frank R. Lindh, Federal Preemption of State Regulation in the Field of Electricity and
Natural Gas: A Supreme Court Chronicle, 10 ENERGY LJ. 277, 314 (1989).
150. Paula A. Sinozich et al., Project, The Role of Preemption in Administrative Law, 45
ADMN. L. REV. 107, 128, 145-46 (1993); Cody L. Graves & Maria Mercedes Seidler, The Reg-
ulation of Gathering in a Federal System, 15 ENERGY LJ. 405 (1994).
151. Graves & Seidler, supra note 150, at 408.
152. Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines after Partial Wellhead Decontrol, 50 Fed. Reg.
42,408 (1985) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 2, 157, 250, 284, 375, 381).
153. Pipeline Service Obligations and Revisions to Regulations Governing Self-Implement-
ing Transportation and Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines After Partial Wellhead Decontrol, 57
Fed. Reg. 13,267 (1992) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 284).
154. Graves & Seidler, supra note 150, at 405.
155. Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines after Partial Wellhead Decontrol, 50 Fed. Reg. at
42,408.
156. Pipeline Service Obligations and Revisions to Regulations Governing Self-Implement-
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environment effectively allows market forces to regulate gas gathering and
distribution functions, and as a result there is no compelling need for federal
preemption of these activities.'57
D. Other Circuits
The District of Columbia Circuit delivered a cautionary note during the
survey period, in United Distribution Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Com-
mission.' There the court stated: "[Clonflict preemption analysis must be
applied with particular care in those instances in which the Commission seeks
to preempt state regulation merely because it has some effect on the interstate
transportation of natural gas."'59 While the court conceded that a state stat-
ute is not preempted merely because it might indirectly affect gas rates, a
statute will be preempted if it infringes upon one of the enumerated federal
responsibilities."
The state regulation at issue targeted "buy/sell" transactions involving
"agreements by which firm shippers allocate space on an interstate pipeline to
customers who negotiate their own wellhead transactions."'' The court
found that interstate transportation of the gas is a key element of the buy/sell
agreement.62 While the regulation indirectly affects rates, and thus may not
be preempted on that basis alone, the direct effect on interstate transportation
of gas does provide sufficient ground for preemption."
Thus, like the Tenth Circuit in Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co., the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit has affirmed the jurisdictional boundaries between
federal and state regulation of the oil and gas industry. The construction fol-
lowed by the District of Columbia and Tenth Circuits provides strict adher-
ence to the exclusive domains of state regulation of physical production and
gathering, and federal regulation of interstate transportation and sale of natu-
ral gas.
CONCLUSION
Tenth Circuit case law on oil and gas follows well-established rules of
law. Nearly sixty years have passed since the NGA's enactment; this aged
pedigree certainly contributes to the harmony of these decisions. Additionally,
the pervasive regulation of the industry, which has been conferred by the
ing Transportation and Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines After Partial Wellhead Decontrol, 57
Fed. Reg. at 13,267.
157. Graves & Seidler, supra note 150, at 422-23.
158. 88 F.3d 1105 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
159. United Distrib. Co., 88 F.3d at 1157.
160. 1d at 1156-57 (citing Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293. 308 (1988)).
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NGA, amended by NGPA, and refined by FOGRMA, make this area a crea-
ture of regulatory law, where remarkably specific language establishing stan-
dards and procedures leaves little room for judicial discretion. The Tenth





The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals selected divergent'approaches to the
two securities arbitration cases it heard during the Survey period. In the first
case, Armijo v. Prudential,' the Tenth Circuit mandated arbitration of an em-
ployment discrimination suit pursuant to an arbitration clause contained in the
brokers' employment agreements Adhering to the national presumption fa-
voring arbitration, the court declared that when it finds ambiguity in an arbi-
tration agreement it must assume the parties intended to arbitrate any dispute
that may arise unless there is clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.3
Alternatively, in Cogswell v. Merrill Lynch,' the Tenth Circuit held that
courts, and not arbitrators, are to decide jurisdictional issues of arbitrability in
the securities industry.' The court reasoned that where there is ambiguity in
an arbitration contract as to whom the parties intended to resolve timeliness
disputes, the courts shall have the responsibility of determining whether a
claim is time-barred. In Cogswell, the court followed Supreme Court prece-
dent' reversing the traditional presumption in favor of arbitration where the
question is one involving jurisdictional issues of arbitrability
I. GENERAL BACKGROUND OF ARBITRATION IN THE SECURITrIES INDUSTRY
In 1817, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) first introduced arbitra-
tion into the securities industry.' The NYSE adopted arbitration to offer its
members an inexpensive and efficient forum in which to resolve their dis-
putes.9 By 1872, the NYSE made arbitration available to nonmembers, includ-
ing securities industry employees and investors.'0 Nevertheless, American
courts infrequently employed and, indeed, discouraged arbitration." The
1. 72 F.3d 793 (10th Cir. 1995).
2. Armijo, 72 F.3d at 799.
3. ld.
4. 78 F.3d 474 (10th Cir. 1996).
5. Cogswell, 78 F.3d at 480.
6. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 115 S. Ct. 1920 (1995) (holding that courts,
and not arbitrators, should independently determine arbitrability of securities disputes where there
is a relevant arbitration provision).
7. Cogswell, 78 F.3d at 478.
8. Catherine McGuire et al., Current Issues in Securities Industry Arbitration, in ALI-ABA
COURSE OF STUDY, Jan. 11, 1996, at 45, 47.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Brian K. Van Engen, Post-Gilmer Developments in Mandatory Arbitration: The Eapan-
sion of Mandatory Arbitration for Statutory Claims and the Congressional Effort to Reverse the
Trend, 21 J. CORP. L. 391, 393 (1996). Much of the judicial hostility towards arbitration descend-
ed from the English judicial system's disapproval of arbitration. Id. For additional historical back-
ground, see generally C. EDWARD FLErcHER, ARBrrRATING SEcuRims DISPUrES 15 (1990) (dis-
cussing how English courts permitted revocation of arbitration agreements because the difficulties
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American legal system's reluctance to invoke this new type of dispute resolu-
tion stemmed from the belief that it was an unfair and arbitrary process. 2
In response to the judicial hostility toward alternative forms of dispute
resolution, Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) in 1925.3 In
so doing, Congress sought to "place arbitration agreements on equal ground
with other, more accepted contractual arrangements" and to displace judicial
preference for litigation.' 4 The FAA states that "[i]f any suit or proceeding
[is] brought... upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agree-
ment..., the court ... shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial
of the action until such arbitration has been had .... ", Sixty years later,
the Supreme Court declared that "any doubts concerning the scope of arbitra-
ble issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration....
With the adoption of the FAA, and as the number of investors in the
marketplace swelled, arbitration became both more essential and more preva-
lent. In 1958, the NYSE mandated that all employees arbitrate disputes with
investors. 7 Likewise, the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD),
a self-regulatory organization of the securities industry, adopted arbitration
proceedings in 1968."8 Initially, the NASD instituted arbitration as a volun-
tary measure for NASD members and customers. 9 However, by 1972, the
NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure (NASD Code or Code) required mem-
bers to submit disputes to arbitration upon a customer's insistence.2'
Today, the NASD arbitrates approximately 6,000 disputes per year, com-
pared with only 318 in 1980.2" These numbers reflect the sweeping effect
arbitration has had on the securities industry in the last decade alone. The
FAA, together with several recent Supreme Court decisions, can be credited
for the emergence of arbitration as an effective and widely employed alterna-
tive to litigation.'
of enforcement would destroy their jurisdiction); Darrell Hall, An Argument Against Permitting
Parties to Opt Out of U.S. Securities Laws in International Transactions, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 57,
61 (1997) (stating that the U.S. Supreme Court was "initially disinclined to honor" arbitration
agreements in the securities context).
12. Paul Lansing & John D. Bailey, The Future of Punitive Damage Awards in Securities
Arbitration Cases After Mastrobuono, 8 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 201, 202 (1996).
13. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14,(1994); Van Engen, supra note 11, at 393.
14. Id.
15. 9 U.S.C. § 3.
16. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983).
17. McGuire et al., supra note 8, at 47.
18. Deborah Masucci, Securities Arbitration-A Success Story: What Does the Future Hold?,
31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 183, 185 (1996).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Marilyn Blumberg Cane et al., Securities Arbitration Update 1995, in ALI-ABA COURSE
OF STUDY, Feb. 16, 1996, at 529, 531; Martin L. Budd, Securities Industry Arbitration-Recent
Issues, in ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY, Jan. 12, 1995, at 205, 207.
22. Stephen L. Hayford, Commercial Arbitration in the Supreme Court 1983-1995: A Sea
Change, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1, 1 (1996). See, e.g., First Options of Chicago, Inc. v.
Kaplan, 115 S. Ct. 1920 (1995); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991);
Shearson/American Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); AT&T Tech. v. Communication




II. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION IN THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY
A. Background
Regulatory organizations requires all securities industry employees to sign
a Uniform Application for Securities Industry Registration or Transfer
(Form U-4) upon employment." The Form U-4 is, inter alia, a private agree-
ment between the employee and employer to arbitrate any dispute that may
arise between them.14 The scope of arbitrable controversies is usually gov-
erned by reference to either NYSE or NASD rules.'
In a seminal securities employment arbitration case, Gilmer v. Inter-
state/Johnson Lane Corp.,6 the Supreme Court held that a claim under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) can be subject to compulsory
arbitration.' The Gilmer court noted that since the plaintiff had agreed to
arbitrate any disputes subject to NYSE rules by signing a Form U-4, arbitra-
tion must proceed.2" In short, Gilmer holds that statutory claims, such as
those under the ADEA and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, may be subject
to mandatory arbitration.'
While the majority of circuits follow Gilmer with regard to NYSE age
discrimination disputes, they remain split over whether types of employment
controversies mandate arbitration pursuant to NASD rules.30 For example, in
Farrand v. Lutheran Brotherhood,3 the Seventh Circuit held that an arbitra-
tion clause in a Form U-4 was not enforceable. 2 Although the Form U-4 ref-
erenced the NASD Code with regard to the scope of arbitrable issues, the
23. McGuire et al., supra note 8, at 65; IAN R. MACNEIL E" AL., FEDERAL ARBrIRATIoN
LAw § 13.3.3 (1994). Securities firms use Form U-4 agreements to register their securities indus-
try personnel with a particular regulatory organization, such as the NYSE or NASD. McGuire et
al., supra note 8, at 65.
24. McGuire et al., supra note 8, at 65.
25. Id. at 65-66 (providing examples of NYSE and NASD arbitration procedure clauses that
define the scope of arbitrable issues pursuant to the policies of such self-regulatory organizations).
26. 500 U.S. 20 (1991). See Lisa M. Horvath, Arbitration, 73 DENY. U. L. REV. 637, 639
(1996) ("In Gilmer, pursuant to an arbitration clause contained in a broker's representative appli-
cation, the U.S. Supreme Court decided that a claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (ADEA) was subject to mandatory arbitration" and "[al broad reading of Gilmer permits arbi-
tration of any statutory claim when an employment contract contains an arbitration agreement")
(citations omitted).
27. Giimer, 500 U.S. at 20.
28. Id. at 26 (stating that "having made the bargain to arbitrate, the party should be held to it
unless Congress itself has evidenced an intention to preclude waiver of judicial remedies for the
statutory rights at issue" (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473
U.S. 614, 628 (1985)). The Court concluded that Gilmer failed to show that Congress intended to
preclude arbitration with the adoption of the ADEA. Id. at 30-31.
29. Van Engen, supra note 11, at 402. See also Hayford, supra note 22, at 29-32 (stating
that Gilmer "stands as an unmistakable indicant of the breadth and depth of the current [Supreme]
Court's changed attitude about the suitability of arbitration as a means for adjudicating statutory
claims'). Id. at 32.
30. Van Engen, supra note 11, at 408.
31. 993 F.2d 1253 (7th Cir. 1993). In Farrand, the court did not interpret the NASD Code
to mandate arbitration, primarily because neither the NASD nor the SEC had issued an analysis of
the Code requiring arbitration. Id. at 1255.
32. Id.
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court did not read employment discrimination disputes into the NASD
Code." In Kidd v. Equitable Life Assurance Society,3' however, the Elev-
enth Circuit declared that the NASD Code mandates arbitration of all employ-
ee discrimination suits." As in Armijo, discussed below, the Kidd court relied
upon the concept that ambiguities in arbitration clauses must invariably be set-
tled in favor of arbitrability.
36
B. Armijo v. Prudential Insurance Company of America"
1. Facts
Plaintiffs Armijo, Fuentes and Hourigan were Prudential employees sell-
ing insurance policies and mutual funds.' The plaintiffs, all of whom are
Hispanic, filed employment discrimination complaints against defendant Pru-
dential with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission alleging termina-
tion as the result of race, sex or national origin." The plaintiffs subsequently
filed their employment discrimination suits in federal court.' Prudential re-
sponded by filing motions to compel arbitration pursuant to plaintiffs' signed
employment agreements."'
As a condition of their employment, the plaintiffs signed a Form U-4.'2
The Form U-4 compelled the plaintiffs to arbitrate certain disputes that might
arise between the plaintiffs and Prudential.43 According to the Form U-4, the
scope of arbitrable disputes is governed by the organizations with which Pru-
dential and its employees are registered." In this instance, Prudential required
all of its employees engaged in the selling of securities to register with the
NASD.45 Thus, the provisions of the NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure
were integrated into the Form U-4 and bound the plaintiffs and Prudential."
The NASD Code provides that "any dispute, claim, or controversy arising out
of or in connection with the business of any member of the [NASD] Associ-
ation" shall be arbitrated at the insistence of any member.'
33. Id.
34. 32 F.3d 516 (11th Cir. 1994). In Kidd, two securities employees alleged violations of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against their employer. After the district court refused to
compel arbitration, the plaintiffs appealed to the Seventh Circuit which summarily reversed the
district court's ruling, requiring arbitration. Id. at 518-19. The Kidd court concluded that its inter-
pretation of NASD rules harmonized several of the Code's facially ambiguous sections. ld. at 519-
20.
35. Id. at 519.
36. Id
37. 72 F.3d 793 (10th Cir. 1995).
38. Armijo, 72 F.3d at 795.
39. Id. at 796 (stating that plaintiffs filed prior to October 1, 1993, the date of the amended
NASD Code). See infra note 47 and accompanying text (discussing the between the amended and
unamended versions of the NASD Code).
40. Id. (stating that plaintiffs filed complaints in federal court after October 1, 1993).
41. Id.




46. Id. The Form U-4 signed by all three plaintiffs incorporated the February 1992 version
of the Code. Id. at 796.
47. NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure § 1 (1992). On October 1, 1993, the NASD
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The District Court of New Mexico granted Prudential's motions to compel
arbitration with Hourigan and Armijo.' A different judge of the same district
court, however, denied the motion with regard to Fuentes." Accordingly,
each of the losing parties appealed to the Tenth Circuit."'
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit granted Prudential's motions to compel arbitration,
holding that all plaintiffs must submit their claims against Prudential to arbi-
tration.52 The arbitration provisions of the Form U-4 and the NASD Code
were upheld and considered germane to these plaintiffs." Moreover, the court
held that although the NASD amended its Code on October 1, 1993, to clarify
that some employment disputes are subject to arbitration,5 4 "[tihe version of
the Code in effect during the alleged acts of discrimination was the February
1992 version of the Code.""
Thus, the court focused the majority of its opinion on the issue of whether
the unamended version of the Code encompassed employment discrimination
suits. The court stated that the February 1992 NASD Code is vague with re-
spect to the types of disputes it covers.' Accordingly, the court relied upon
both precedent and policy to justify its conclusion that the NASD Code covers
employment discrimination suits."
First, the court adhered to a judicial presumption in favor of arbitration to
support its opinion.' The court stated that the "general mandate that is driv-
ing our decision in this case [is] the requirement to construe arbitration clauses
broadly where possible." 9 Moreover, where there is ambiguity in arbitration
amended its Code of Arbitration Procedure. The amended version of the Code covers, inter alia,
"any dispute, claim, or controversy arising out of or in connection with the business of any mem-
ber of the Association, or arising out of the employment or termination of employment of associ-
ated person(s) with any member .... NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure § 1 (1993) (empha-
sis added to denote language added to the amended version of the Code).
48. Armijo, 72 F.3d at 795-96.
49. Id. at 796. Initially, the district court denied Prudential's motions to compel arbitration
with regard to all three plaintiffs. Id. However, upon Prudential's motion for rehearing and its
submission to the court of the October 1, 1993 Code amendments, the district court reversed its
order concerning Hourigan and Armijo. Id.
50. Id. at 795. This judge came to the opposite conclusion although presented with the
amended Code as well. Id. at 796.
51. Id. at 796. Because "[t]hese cases were assigned to the same panel, orally argued togeth-
er with one counsel representing all Plaintiffs and another representing all Defendants, and involve
the same legal issues," the Tenth Circuit consolidated the cases. Id. at 795, n. 1.
52. Id. at 798-801.
53. 1d. at 795 (considering the plaintiffs "associate members").
54. Id. at 798.
55. Id. at 796.
56. Id. at 798 (stating that "[u]nfortunately, the February 1992 Code is less than clear re-
garding its applicability to employment disputes").
57. Id. at 797-99. For instance, the court stated that "[t]he Supreme Court has held that an
employee can be required to arbitrate federal claims for employment discrimination if he or she
has contracted to do so." Id. at 797 (citing Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35).
58. d. at 798.
59. Id. at 799. For opinions holding that the NASD Code applies to employment disputes,
see Kidd v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 32 F.3d 516 (11th Cir. 1994) and Johnson v. Piper
Jaffray, Inc., 530 N.W.2d 790 (Minn. 1995).
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clauses, the court need not look further.' "mo acknowledge the ambiguity is
to resolve the issue, because all ambiguities must be resolved in favor of
arbitrability.9'6
Second, the court acknowledged that an employee may be required to
submit an employment discrimination suit to arbitration if a contract calling
for arbitration exists.' Indeed, an examination of the broad language of the
Form U-4 and NASD Code indicates that plaintiffs and Prudential intended to
arbitrate numerous potential disputes, most likely including employment con-
troversies.'
Last, the court gave deference to the fact that, according to NASD legis-
lative comment, the amended version of the NASD Code" was implemented
"simply to 'clear up any ambiguity' and 'to assure' that employment disputes
are arbitrable under Section 8 [of the Code]." Thus, the most appropriate
outcome incorporates employment discrimination suits within the meaning of
previous Codes, such as the February 1992 version of the NASD Code.'
Consequently, the court concluded that each plaintiff had agreed to arbitrate
any dispute with Prudential encompassed within the NASD Code, including al-
leged employment discrimination.'
B. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Armijo is consistent with that of the Su-
preme Court and the majority of other circuits in mandating arbitration of
employment disputes in the securities industry. Armijo once and for all sets
forth the Tenth Circuit's position concerning the treatment of employment
discrimination suits in the securities industry. Where the court discovers ambi-
guity in an arbitration agreement as to whether the parties intended to arbitrate
a particular dispute, the court shall mandate arbitration unless their is clear and
60. Armijo, 72 F.3d at 798.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 797 (citing Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35).
63. Id at 799. Speaking for the court, Judge Ebel construed the Form U-4 agreement be-
tween the plaintiffs and Prudential broadly, stating that the language of the Form U-4 and, by
specific reference, the NASD Code "clearly indicates that the parties believed, and intended, that
at least certain disputes between Prudential and these Plaintiffs would be arbitrated." I Further-
more, the court stated that the Form U-4 signed by Prudential and the plaintiffs requires submis-
sion to arbitration of any disputes between the parties in connection with their employment rela-
tionship. Id. (referring to NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure § 8(a) (1993)).
64. Referring to the October 1, 1993 version of the NASD Code signed by Armijo and
Hourigan. Id.
65. Ld. at 800-01 (quoting 58 Fed. Reg. 39,070, 39,071 (1993)).
66. Id at 798. The court stated that there is evidence from as early as 1987 indicating that
the NASD Code applies to employment disputes. Id. (citing 52 Fed. Reg. 9232 (1987)). Several
other courts have applied the new NASD Code to employment controversies that occurred prior to
October 1, 1993, but filed after that date. See, e.g., Kuehner v. Dickinson & Co., 84 F.3d 316 (9th
Cir. 1996) (discussed infra notes 72-76 and accompanying text); Pitter v. Prudential Life Ins. Co.,
906 F. Supp 130 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (ordering arbitration of a Title VII claim although the relevant
conduct occurred prior to October 1, 1993); Wojcik v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 901 F. Supp. 1282
(N.D. 11I. 1995) (ordering arbitration of state fraud and contract claims where the alleged wrong-
doing took place before October 1, 1993).
67. Id. at 799.
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convincing evidence to the contrary.
Moreover, with this decision, the Tenth Circuit aligned itself with three
emerging trends in case law dealing with mandatory arbitration clauses in
employment contracts.' The Tenth Circuit now advances the expansion of
the number of statutory claims subject to mandatory arbitration,' the creation
of a presumption of mandatory arbitrability of employment contracts:' and,
finally, the broad applicability of the FAA to "all but a small class of employ-
ment contracts."7'
C. Other Circuits
In Kuehner v. Dickinson & Co.,' the Ninth Circuit held that an employ-
ee who signed a Form U-4 agreement prior to October 1, 1993, and who al-
leges misconduct prior to that date, must arbitrate her wrongful discharge
suit.73 According to the court, because the amended version of the NASD
Code does not deprive the plaintiff of her substantive rights, and because the
plaintiff sued after the Code was amended, the arbitration rule controlled.74
More significantly, the court emphasized that the plaintiff signed a Form U-4
in which she agreed to be bound by NASD rules "as may be amended from
time to time."' Additionally, where a new procedural rule is adopted it shall
68. Van Engen, supra note 11, at 410 (referring to "the post-Gilmer trend toward expansive
enforcement of mandatory arbitration clauses").
69. 1l at 407-08. See Horvath, supra note 26, at 639 (concluding that Gilmer "opened the
door to mandated arbitration of statutory claims"); see generally Metz v. Merrill Lynch, 39 F.3d
1482, 1487 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that an employee must arbitrate her Title VII claim pursuant
to her broker registration with the NASD); Mago v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 956 F.2d 932,
935 (9th Cir. 1992) (mandating arbitration where the plaintiff failed to produce sufficient evidence
to prove that the language of Title VII precludes arbitration); Saari v. Smith Barney, Harris,
Upham & Co., 968 F.2d 877, 882 (9th Cir. 1992) (mandating arbitration of claims pursuant to the
Employee Polygraph Protection Act); Bender v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 971 F.2d 698, 700
(11th Cir. 1992) (ordering arbitration based upon Gilmer and holding that there is "no reason to
distinguish between ADEA claims and Title VII claims" for the purposes of arbitration applicabili-
ty). But see Utley v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 883 F.2d 184, 187 (1st Cir. 1989) (finding that nei-
ther the legislative history nor the explicit language of Title VII require arbitration without a prior
judicia hearing).
70. Van Engen, supra note 11, at 408-10. See generally Moses H. Cone Hosp. v. Mercury
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983) (stating that "[tihe Arbitration Act establishes that, as a
matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in
favor of arbitration"); Kidd, 32 F.3d at 519 (declining to adopt either the Farrand decision or its
reasoning and mandating arbitration of all employee discrimination suits subject to the NASD
Code). But see Farrand v. Lutheran Bhd., 993 F.2d 1253, 1255 (7th Cir. 1993) (stating that Gilmer
"did not establish a grand presumption in favor of arbitration" for employment contracts).
71. Van Engen, supra note 11, at 409-10 (declaring that "in keeping with the post-Gilmer
trend," several federal courts have endorsed the exclusion of only a limited number of employ-
ment contracts from FAA coverage). See also Crawford v. West Jersey Health Sys., 847 F. Supp.
1232, 1242 (D.NJ. 1994); Williams v. Katten, Muchin & Zavis, 837 F. Supp. 1430, 1438 (N.D.
111. 1993). But see Heidi M. Hellekson, Note, Taking the "Alternative" Out of the Dispute Resolu-
tion of Title VII Claims: The Implications of a Mandatory Enforcement Scheme of Arbitration
Agreements Arising Out of Employment Contracts, 70 N.D. L. REv. 435, 446 (1994) (suggesting
that Congress' intent in drafting the FAA was to exempt employment contracts from the scope of
the act's jurisdiction).
72. 84 F.3d 316 (9th Cir. 1996).
73. Kuehner, 84 F.3d at 320-21.
74. Id
75. Id. at 320. Fuentes signed a Form U-4 identical to the one signed by the plaintiff in
1997]
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"govern suits filed after its effective date regardless of when the relevant con-
duct occurred." 6 Thus, although otherwise consistent with the Tenth Circuit's
ultimate decision in Armijo, the Ninth Circuit's decision in Kuehner failed to
consider the presumption of arbitrability in upholding the mandatory arbitra-
tion clause.
III. THE TIMELINESS OF A CLAIM SUBJECT TO ARBITRATION
A. Background
Self-regulatory organizations, including the NASD and the NYSE, insti-
tuted a rule imposing a six-year time limitation upon disputes eligible for
resolution through arbitration." "The purpose of the rule was to eliminate
from arbitration stale claims and to direct parties either to other arbitration
fora that may be available to them by contract or to the courts.""8 Until 1990,
this eligibility rule was free from controversy.' Since then, however, the pro-
cedural application of the rule has spawned extensive litigation.' Specifically,
because the eligibility requirement precludes claims from arbitration that are
filed more than six years from the occurrence of the transaction, whether the
courts or the arbitrators should decide the eligibility of a claim is uncertain."'
Interestingly, the circuit courts are split as to who should determine
whether arbitrators have jurisdiction to hear disputes where the controversy
arose more than six years prior to the filing. The Third,' Sixth,83 Seventh8
and Eleventh' Circuits have held that courts are to decide issues of timeli-
ness while the Fifth' and Eighth' Circuits maintain that arbitrators should
determine such issues." All of the circuits except the Eighth have based their
Kuehner. Armijo, 72 F.3d at 796.
76. Kuehner, 84 F.3d at 320 (citing Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 114 S. CL 1483, 1502
(1994)).
77. McGuire et al., supra note 8, at 52.
78. Id at 52-53.
79. 1d. at 53.
80. 1d. See e.g., infra notes 82-89 and accompanying text.
81. McGuire et al., supra note 8, at 53.
82. PaineWebber, Inc. v. Hofmann, 984 F.2d 1372 (3d Cir. 1993).
83. Securities Serv. Network, Inc. v. Cromwell, 62 F.3d 1418 (6th Cir. 1995) (unpublished
decision) (holding that NASD Code § 35 does not satisfy the requirement that there be clear and
unmistakable evidence of the parties' intent to allow the arbitrator to decide issues of timeliness);
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. McCoy, 995 F.2d 649 (6th Cir. 1993); Roney & Co. v. Kassab, 981
F.2d 894 (6th Cir. 1992).
84. Edward D. Jones & Co. v. Sorrells, 957 F.2d 509, 514 (7th Cir. 1992); PaineWebber,
Inc. v. Famam, 870 F.2d 1286, 1292 (7th Cir. 1989).
85. Merrill Lynch v. Cohen, 62 F.3d 381, 383 (11th Cir. 1995).
86. Smith Barney Shearson, Inc. v. Boone, 47 F.3d 750, 753-54 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that
issues of "substantive arbitrability" are for the courts to decide and that issues of "procedural
arbitrability" are for the arbitrators to determine).
87. FSC Secs. Corp. v. Freel, 14 F.3d 1310, 1312-13 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that NASD
Code § 35 presented "clear and unmistakable" evidence of the parties' intent to arbitrate issues of
timeliness).
88. The Second and Ninth Circuits have not yet decided the narrow of issue of whether
courts or arbitrators are to decide issues of timeliness with regard to the NASD Code, but see
infra notes 124-37 and accompanying text. However, prior to the Survey period both the Second
and Ninth Circuits held that arbitrators are to decide statute of limitation issues. See Shearson
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decisions upon the principle that section 15 of the NASD Code "is either a
jurisdictional prerequisite or a procedural requirement" as opposed to evidence
of the parties contractual intent to arbitrate disputes."
Recently, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of who should decide
whether an arbitration claim is time barred. In First Options of Chicago,
Inc. v. Kaplan," the Court held that courts, and not arbitrators, should inde-
pendently determine if an arbitration panel has jurisdiction to hear a dispute.9'
The Court qualified this power by stating that courts will not have jurisdiction
where there is "clear and unmistakable" evidence that the parties intended
arbitrators to hear procedural issues such as timeliness.'
B. Cogswell v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.93
1. Facts
The plaintiff, Cogswell, a Colorado resident, lost a significant amount of
money after investing in limited partnerships through her broker, Trevor, of
Merrill Lynch.94 The final transaction involved in this dispute took place on
February 23, 1987." When the plaintiff opened her account with Merrill
Lynch, she signed a client contract in which she agreed to arbitrate any dis-
pute arising from her business relationship with Merrill Lynch.'
In August, 1993, more than six years after the final transaction, the plain-
tiff filed an arbitration proceeding with the NASD against both Merrill Lynch
and Trevor.' The plaintiff alleged that her broker made unsuitable invest-
ments considering her financial objectives." Merrill Lynch petitioned the Su-
preme Court of New York for an order staying arbitration." Merrill Lynch
contended that the plaintiff's claim was ineligible for arbitration because she
filed her claim more than six years after the alleged misconduct." Specifi-
cally, Merrill Lynch referred to section 15 of the NASD Code which provides
that "[n]o dispute, claim or controversy shall be eligible for submission to
Lehman Hutton, Inc. v. Wagoner, 944 F.2d 114, 121 (2d Cir. 1991); O'Neel v. National Ass'n of
Secs. Dealers, Inc., 667 F.2d 804, 807 (9th Cir. 1982); Application of Conticommodity Servs., Inc.
v. Philipp & Lion 1980, 613 F.2d 1222, 1226 (2d Cir. 1980).
89. Martin L. Budd, Securities Industry Arbitration-Recent Developments, in ALI-ABA
COURSE OF STUDY, Jan. 11, 1996, at 141, 146.
90. 115 S. Ct. 1920 (1995).
91. First Options, 115 S. Ct. at 1923-24.
92. d. at 1924.
93. 78 F.3d 474 (10th Cit. 1996).
94. Cogswell, 78 F.3d at 475.
95. Id.
96. Id. The plaintiff opened her Merrill Lynch brokerage account in December 1984. Id.
97. Id.
98. 1& Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the investments "were of high risk and would
not be liquid for many years into the future" and that "Trevor earned substantial commissions by
purchasing these investments for [her] account, substantially in excess of the amount he would
have earned if he had purchased suitable securities for her account." Id. (alterations in original).
99. Id. Merrill Lynch appealed to the New York court system because its agreement with the
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arbitration under this Code where six (6) years have elapsed from the occur-
rence or event giving rise to the act or dispute, claim or controversy."''
°
In the meantime, the plaintiff filed a motion for an order to compel arbi-
tration in the District Court of Colorado."° The district court stayed its pro-
ceeding pending the outcome of the New York petition. 3
Because the plaintiff failed to show cause why the petition should be
denied, the New York Supreme Court granted Merrill Lynch's petition, hold-
ing that the claim was time-barred according to section 15 of the NASD
Code."° Consequently, Merrill Lynch applied to the District Court of Colo-
rado for an order permanently staying arbitration based on the New York
Supreme Court's ruling." The District Court of Colorado denied Merrill
Lynch's motion and ordered arbitration to proceed."m The district court rea-
soned that "only arbitrators, and not the courts, have jurisdiction to determine
whether [section] 15 of the NASD Code bars an arbitration claim."'" Merrill
Lynch appealed to the Tenth Circuit.
2. Decision
The issue before the Tenth Circuit in Cogswell was one of first impres-
sion, °" and its decision affiliated the Tenth Circuit with the majority of other
circuits."' The Tenth Circuit held that courts, and not arbitrators, must inde-
pendently determine the timeliness of an arbitration claim under the NASD
unless there exists "clear and unmistakable" evidence to the contrary."'
The Cogswell court based much of its decision on First Options."2 The
First Options court declared that the intentions of the parties must be discov-
ered to determine whether they meant for an arbitrator or a court to decide the
timeliness of a claim."3 But, "[c]ourts should not assume that the parties
agreed to arbitrate arbitrability unless there is 'clea[r] and unmistakabl[e]'
evidence that they did so."" 4 Thus, First Options' analysis reversed the tra-
ditional presumption that ambiguity should be resolved in favor of
arbitrability. Rather, the Court declared that once the language of the contract
is determined to be unclear regarding who is to decide arbitrability, the courts






107. Id. at 475-76 (relying upon the Eighth Circuit's ruling in FSC Secs. Corp., 14 F.3d at
1310).
108. Id. at 476.
109. Id. (stating that "[w]e have never considered whether the district courts have jurisdiction
to determine whether an arbitration claim is barred under the time limit contained in § 15 of the
NASD Code").
110. Id. See supra notes 82-89 and accompanying text.
111. Cogswell, 78 F.3d at 480 (quoting First Options, 115 S. Ct. at 1924).
112. Id.




should automatically settle the issue.'
In Cogswell, the Tenth Circuit decided that in order to determine the
parties' intentions concerning who is to decide arbitrability, the court must
examine the language of the contract."6 Here, the court held that it need not
determine whether section 15 of the NASD Code is silent or ambiguous as to
whether the courts or the arbitrators should assess timeliness.' ' 7 Instead, it
was obliged only to conclude that section 15 cannot be considered "clear and
unmistakable" evidence that the parties intended to have arbitrators decide
issues of timeliness."8 As a result, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district
court's ruling and remanded the case for a determination as to whether there is
sufficient evidence that the plaintiff's claim is in fact time-barred." 9
C. Analysis
Cogswell represents a significant and controversial step for the Tenth
Circuit. The Tenth Circuit's decision in Cogswell effectively establishes a
statute of limitations for the commencement of arbitration proceedings. The
six-year time period to resolve disputes in arbitration is a jurisdictional pre-
requisite to reaching an arbitral tribunal."2 Thus, where six years have alleg-
edly elapsed since the occurrence of the event giving rise to the cause of ac-
tion, the courts are compelled to determine whether the claim is in fact time-
barred.'
12
Such a rule will have the effect of adding an additional stage to any arbi-
tration proceeding where a party claims arbitration is time-barred. Trial courts
will have to make in-depth, factual determinations if they are delegated the
responsibility of resolving issues of timeliness."n These elaborate proceed-
115. Id. at 1924-25.
116. Cogswell, 78 F.3d at 478 (stating that "[ilf we conclude the agreement is silent, ambigu-
ous, or devoid of 'clear and unmistakable' evidence the parties intended the arbitrators to deter-
mine the applicability of § 15 of the NASD Code, we must conclude the parties intended for the
court to decide whether it applies" (citing First Options, 115 S. CL at 1924)).
117. Id. at 480.
118. Id. at 480-81. The court also analyzed § 35 of the NASD Code which provides that "ar-
bitrators shall be empowered to interpret and determine the applicability of all provisions under
the Code." Id. (quoting NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure § 35 (1995)). However, as with §
15 of the NASD Code, the court held that § 35 does not offer "clear and unmistakable" evidence
that the parties sought to have the arbitrators decide whether a claim is time-barred. Id.
119. Id. at 481.
120. Cane et al., supra note 21, at 557-58. Moreover, the effect of this rule is considered by
at least one commentator to deprive the investor of a substantive right:
The rule has been interpreted by the securities industry and by the judiciary to bar an
investor from bringing, in either an arbitral or judicial forum, a claim, otherwise timely
pursuant to the statute of limitations when, pursuant to the eligibility rule, six years have
elapsed from the occurrence or event giving rise to the claim.
Margaret M. Harding, The Cause and Effect of the Eligibility Rule in Securities Arbitration: The
Further Aggravation of Unequal Bargaining Power, 46 DEPAuL L. REV. 109, 140 (1996).
121. Cane et al., supra note 21, at 558.
122. In fact, the plaintiff raised the point that a jurisdictional prerequisite to arbitration will
require courts to hold "mini-trials" in order to resolve such factual disputes. Although the court
conceded that "[t]his may indeed occur in some cases," it ultimately dismissed such a concern for
convenience in favor of upholding the parties' contractual agreement in the absence of clear and
unmistakable evidence to the contrary. Cogswell, 78 F.3d at 481; see also Merrill Lynch v. Cohen,
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ings will undermine the purposes of the NASD arbitration clauses, originally
installed to offer an efficient and inexpensive alternative to litigation.'"
D. Other Circuits
Two similar cases were decided by the other circuits during the Survey
period. In PaineWebber, Inc. v. Elahi,'24 the First Circuit held that arbitra-
tors, and not the courts, are to decide issues of timeliness.' 2 In Elahi, the
court stated that the rule governing their decision, as set forth in First Op-
tions, !26 presumptively requires resolution of arbitrability issues by the
courts.'" Thus, the Elahi court's decision turned on whether the court classi-
fied the dispute as an issue of arbitrability. Because the court considered the
language of the agreement ambiguous at best, and supported the longstanding
tradition that ambiguity in arbitration agreements shall presumptively be de-
cided in favor of arbitration, it held that the timeliness of the claim must be
submitted to the discretion of an arbitrator.'"
In PaineWebber, Inc. v. Bybyk,' 29 the Second Circuit followed its earlier
decisions in Application of Conticommodity Services, Inc.'" and Shearson
Lehman Hutton, Inc. v. Wagoner.'3 ' In both Conticommodity and Wagoner,
the court was faced with the broader issue of who is to decide whether a dis-
pute is barred when the statute of limitations has tolled.'"2 In Bybyk, howev-
er, the court addressed for the first time the narrower issue of the arbitrability
of a claim that may be time-barred under specific eligibility requirements of
the arbitration contract itself.'33 After examining the intent of the parties
62 F.3d 381 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that "§ 15 is a substantive eligibility requirement" and the
courts should decide issues of timeliness of arbitration claims because "concerns for judicial econ-
omy alone are not sufficient to justify interference with the binding agreement of the parties")
(quoting Goldberg v. Bear Stearns & Co., Inc., 912 F.2d 1418, 1422 (11th Cir. 1990)).
123. Masucci, supra note 18, at 185 (stating that "[t]he objective of [SRO arbitration clauses]
was to provide the small investor with a fast, fair, and inexpensive mechanism to resolve disputes
with the securities industry"); LEONARD L. RISKIN & JAMES E. WESTERBROOK, DisPurE RESO-
LUIMON AND LAWYERS 297 (1987) (declaring that in addition to providing speed and cost efficien-
cy, arbitration has the advantages of informality, privacy, and the opportunity to utilize a more
neutral decisionmaker).
124. 87 F.3d 589 (1st Cir. 1996).
125. E/ahi, 87 F.3d at 601-02.
126. The E/ahi court also relied upon AT&T Tech. v. Communications Workers of Am., 475
U.S. 643, 649 (1986), the Court stated that "[uinless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide
otherwise, the question of whether the parties agreed to arbitrate is to be decided by the court, not
the arbitrator." Elahi, 87 F.3d at 595.
127. E/ahi, 87 F.3d at 595.
128. 1l at 601 (presuming that the parties intended for an arbitrator to determine issues of
timeliness because there existed no clear and convincing evidence to the contrary).
129. 81 F.3d 1193 (2nd Cir. 1996).
130. 613 F.2d at 1222 (holding that the validity of the statute of limitation defenses are for
the arbitrator to address).
131. 944 F.2d at 114 (holding that arbitrators, and not the courts, shall assess statute of lim-
itations issues). The court adhered to the presumption that ambiguity or doubts regarding the
scope of the parties' intent to arbitrate should necessarily be resolved in favor of arbitrability. Il
at 121.
132. McGuire et al., supra note 8, at 55 (referring to Conticommodity and Wagoner as "early
decisions involv[ing) state statutes of limitations, rather than the six-year eligibility period").
133. Bybyk, 81 F.3d at 1199-1201 (discussing the fact that the NASD Code was not incorpo-
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through an analysis of the contract language,"3 the Bybyk court applied the
First Options standard, holding that section 15 of the NASD Code presented
clear and unmistakable evidence of the parties' intent to have an arbitrator
determine arbitrability.' 3' Moreover, the court stated that section 35 of the
NASD Code provided further proof that the parties intended to commit all
issues of arbitrability to an arbitrator."3
CONCLUSION
Although the Tenth Circuit aligned itself with the majority of other cir-
cuits in the two securities arbitration cases it heard during the Survey period,
the court's decisions represent a profound and contentious posture. In Armijo,
the court adopted and enhanced emerging trends in the securities industry by
expanding the scope of claims subject to mandatory arbitration. In Cogswell,
the court reversed the traditional presumption of arbitrability by establishing a
statute of limitations for arbitration, and thus narrowing the breadth of author-
ity vested in arbitrators.
In short, the Tenth Circuit's decisions in Armijo and Cogswell set forth a
double standard of mandatory arbitration enforcement in the securities indus-
try. Where there exists any doubt as to whether the parties intended to arbi-
trate their substantive contractual disputes, the Tenth Circuit will presump-
tively hold that arbitration must proceed. Alternatively, where there exists any
doubt as to whether the parties intended to arbitrate procedural disputes that
may preclude arbitrability, the Tenth Circuit will consider such controversies
jurisdictional prerequisites to arbitration. As a result, courts, and not arbitra-
tors, will resolve controversies concerning the timeliness of an arbitration
claim unless there is clear and unmistakable evidence to the contrary of the
parties' intent that the arbitrator would determine issues of timeliness.
Adam J. Agron
rated into the client agreement to arbitrate and, therefore, the court must look only to the client
agreement to determine whether the parties intended to arbitrate such a dispute).
134. Id. at 1199-1200. The Bybyk court concluded that the NASD Code had not been effec-
tively incorporated into the parties' client agreement. Id. at 1201. Nonetheless, the court held that
even if the rules had been included there would have been sufficient evidence that the parties
intended to have an arbitrator decide issues of timeliness. Id. at 1202.
135. Id. at 1199-1200. The court referred primarily to the following language of the agree-
ment: "[A]ny and all controversies... concerning any account, transaction, dispute or the con-
struction, performance, or breach of this or any other agreement ... shall be determined by arbi-
tration ... ." Id. at 1199 (quoting the arbitration agreement between Bybyk and PaineWebber)
(emphasis added).





Disability benefits play an important role in the broader social safety net'
Individuals suffering from physical or mental disabilities may receive benefit
payments under two major federal programs authorized by the Social Security
Act.2 The Old Age Survivors and Disability Insurance (OASDI) program pro-
vides workers with an insurance program designed to protect against unexpect-
ed loss of earnings due to injury, retirement, or death.' The Supplemental
Security Income (SSI) program offers disability payments for individuals qual-
ifying for the means based welfare program.4 Both OASDI and SSI define
disability as the inability "to engage in any substantial gainful activity by
reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which
can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to
last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." Determining wheth-
er an individual qualifies as disabled is the most difficult and commonly liti-
gated requirement of both OASDI and SSI.6
The Social Security Administration (SSA) administers the massive OASDI
and SSI programs. One commentator appropriately labeled the SSA disability
program as "the Mount Everest of bureaucratic structures." The entire
OASDI program provides benefits to 45 million individuals, including 5.9
million beneficiaries under disability status.' Almost 800,000 blind or disabled
OASDI beneficiaries also receive SSI payments.' Another 2.4 million blind or
disabled individuals receive only SSI benefits.'0
Individuals denied benefits by the SSA may seek administrative review
and subsequent judicial review in the federal courts." In 1987, administrative
law judges (ALJs) decided 320,000 appeals from SSA decisions. 2 Disability
1. See JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY Dis-
ABILTrY CLA.MS 18-20 (1983); Jon C. Dubin, Poverty Pain, and Precedent: The Fifth Circuit's
Social Security Jurisprudence, 25 ST. MARY's LJ. 81, 88 (1993).
2. Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.).
3. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-422 (1994).
4. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383.
5. 42 U.S.C §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A) (1994).
6. Jon C. Dubin, Social Security Law, 26 TEX. TECH L REv. 763, 763-64 (1995); Larry M.
Gropman, Social Security, 1995 DET. C.L. REV. 773, 774 (1995).
7. Paul R. Verkuil, The Self-Legitimating Bureaucracy, 93 YALE LJ. 780, 781 (1984)
(book review).
8. Social Sec. Admin., U.S. Dept of Health & Human Servs., 59 Soc. SEC. BULL. 96
(1996) (listing current SSA operating statistics).
9. Id.
10. Id. at 97.
11. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see generally ARTHUR ABRAHAM & DAvID L KOPELMAN, FEDERAL
SOCIAL SECURITrrY 115-26 (1979) (explaining the steps and issues of the appeal procedure).
12. KENNETH CUL DAvIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINIsTRATIvE LAw TREATISE 6
(3d ed. 1994).
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cases amount to a significant component of the total federal court caseload.
The average circuit court must decide 382 disability cases each year.' 3 Over-
all, appeals from denials of Social Security disability benefits were 5.3% of all
new district court filings and 3.2% of the caseload in the courts of appeals'
The role of judicial oversight is particularly important for the administra-
tion of Social Security disability benefits. 5 Historically, the SSA has been
vulnerable to external pressures and exercised its own bureaucratic power to
influence the overall case load and the level of rejections.' 6 For this reason,
judicial review provides an important check to ensure that the administrative
agency makes informed and rational decisions, acts within its statutory author-
ity, and adheres to fundamental constitutional protection. 7
The Tenth Circuit addressed the role of this important judicial check on
the SSA during the survey period from September 1995 through August 1996.
Section I examines three cases involving enhanced judicial review of SSA
decisions. Section II considers pain and drug addiction, their relation to dis-
ability benefits, and the Tenth Circuit's interpretation of recent congressional
pronouncements against drug addiction. Finally, Section IlI addresses the issue
of reopening a disability case due to fraud, as well as constitutional require-
ments for notice before the SSA terminates benefits.
I. DuTY OF THE ALJ
The Commissioner of Social Security has statutory authority to establish
rules and regulations to carry out the provisions of the Social Security Act'"
and to make determinations about the eligibility of individual disability claim-
ants. 9 The first level of review for an individual pursuing a disability claim
occurs at the state agency level.' If dissatisfied by the initial decision, the
claimant may appeal by seeking administrative review at the federal level."
A federal administrative law judge (ALJ) reviews the application, holds hear-
ings, consults medical and vocational experts, and makes detailed findings to
13. Id. at 7.
14. Richard E. Levy, Social Security Disability Determinations: Recommendations for Re-
form, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REv. 461, 477 n.88 (referencing statistics from the 1987 ANNUAL REPORT
OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS).
15. See JERRY L. MASHAW ET AL., SOCIAL SECURITY HEARINGS AND APPEALS 136-46
(1978).
16. Levy, supra note 14, at 484-507. During the 1980's, the Reagan administration sought to
reduce the number of disability beneficiaries by 891,000 through aggressive enforcement and
heightened substantive standards for disability. Id. at 484. The SSA also instituted practices that
pressured ALJs to process claims faster and increase the rate of denials. Id. at 494. Furthermore,
the SSA pursued an explicit policy of nonacquiescence to federal court decisions when it dis-
agreed with lower court decisions. Id. at 503-07. See also DONNA PRICE COFER, JUDGES BUREAU-
CRATS, AND THE QUESTION OF INDEPENDENCE 66-152 (1985) (presenting a detailed review of the
Trachtenberg era, 1975-79, when new management controls were instituted by the Bureau of
Hearings and Appeals, a 1979 suit filed by ALJs, and congressional amendments in 1980).
17. See DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 12, at 173-210.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 405(a).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 405(b).
20. Levy, supra note 14, at 465-66; SOCIAL SECURITY ADMIISTRATION, SOCIAL SECURITY
HANDBOOK 15-16 (12th ed. 1995) [hereinafter SSA HANDBOOK].
21. Id. at 471.
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either accept or reject disability claims.'
The AI's determination of disability status must follow a standardized
five step evaluation process.' Step one asks whether the claimant currently
performs work defined in terms of substantial gainful activity."' If the answer
is yes, the ALJ denies disability benefits.' If the answer is no, the AL
moves to step two.26
Step two requires the claimant to show that he suffers from a medically
severe impairment, or combination of impairments, that limits his ability to
perform work.' If the claimant cannot demonstrate a medical impairment, the
ALT denies disability benefits." If the claimant shows the impairments have a
threshold impact on his ability to do work activity, the analysis proceeds to
step three.29
Step three inquires whether the claimant's impairment is equivalent to a
recognized impairment that precludes substantial gainful activity. ° If the
claimant's impairment is one of the recognized impairments, the AJ awards
disability benefits to the claimant.3 If the claimant does not have a recog-
nized impairment, the analysis moves to step four."
Step four examines whether the impairment prevents the claimant from
performing his previous work.33 If the claimant can perform past work, the
AJ denies disability status.' If past work is no longer possible, the analysis
moves to step five.3
22. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.929 (OASDI), 416.1429 (SSI) (1996).
23. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520; Williams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 750-52 (10th Cir. 1988);
Anthony V. Aifieri, Disabled Clients, Disabling Lawyers, 43 HASTINGS LJ. 769, 806-11 (1992);
SSA HANDBOOK, supra note 20, at 137-49.
24. Williams, 844 F.2d at 750. Regulations define "substantial gainful activity" as "work that
(a) [ilnvolves doing significant and productive physical or mental duties; and (b) [i]s done (or
intended) for pay or profit." 20 C.F.R. § 416.910. The Tenth Circuit elaborated on the meaning of
this term in a 1979 case. Markham v. Califano, 601 F.2d 533, 534 (10th Cir. 1979). The court
stated that substantial gainful activity was work performed on a regular basis. Id. Intermittent
work does not necessarily constitute substantial gainful activity, and the SSA should review med-
ical testimony to determine if such an intermittent worker qualifies for disability benefits. Id.
25. Williams, 844 F.2d at 750.
26. Id.
27. Id. (citing Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140 (1987) (stating that a claimant must
have a severe impairment or combination of impairments, otherwise a claim is denied)). Regula-
tions contain detailed guidelines for listing medically severe impairments that significantly limit
the ability for a person to perform "basic work activities." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, .1525. Basic
work activities include: "[p]hysical functions such as walking, standing, sitting, lifting, pushing,
pulling, reaching, carrying, or handling; ... [clapacities for seeing, hearing, and speaking; ...
[u]nderstanding, carrying out, and remembering simple instructions; ... (u]se of judgment; ...
[r]esponding appropriately to supervision, co-workers and usual work situations; and... [d]ealing
with changes in a routine work setting." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521.
28. Williams, 844 F.2d at 751.
29. Id. at 750-51.
30. Id. If a claimant has an impairment either listed by the SSA or equivalent to a listed
impairment, the SSA must find that the claimant is disabled without regard to the claimant's age,
education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d).
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Step five explores whether the claimant has the residual functional capaci-
ty to perform other work in the economy given the claimant's age, education,
and work experience.' If'the Secretary can show that alternative employment
opportunities exist in the economy, the AUJ denies disability benefits." If
not, the claimant can be awarded disability benefits."
After AJ review, a denied claim may be appealed to the Appeals Coun-
cil.39 The Appeals Council may deny the request to review, affirm, or reverse
the ALJ. The determination by the Appeals Council represents a final deci-
sion by the Commissioner.4 The claimant may seek judicial review in the
federal courts.' The federal and appellate courts review the record to see if
an AUJ decision was supported by substantial evidence and if the AI fol-
lowed the required regulations.' The following cases illustrate the standards
that the Tenth Circuit applies to ALJ decisions on Social Security disability
decisions.
A. Developing the Record: Carter v. Chater"
1. Facts
Nelda Carter filed for disability insurance benefits claiming disability for
paroxysmal atrial tachycardia, a chronic peptic ulcer, gastrointestinal pain, and
weakness of her upper arm.' The AUL conducted the five-step evaluation
process and denied the claim at step five.* The ALJ determined that Carter
retained residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform sedentary and light
work in the economy.' He then considered Carter's RFC in relation to her
age, education, and work experience by applying the Medical-Vocational
Guidelines.' After analyzing these factors and hearing testimony from a vo-
cational expert, the AL ruled that Carter did not meet the disabled re-
quirements.' The Appeals Council denied her request for review and the dis-
trict court affirmed the AlJ's ruling.' Carter appealed on grounds that the




39. Levy, supra note 14, at 472. The Appeals Council is within the SSA. Id.
40. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.967-.981 (OASDI), 416.1467-.1481 (SSI).
41. 20 C.F.R. § 404.981. The claimant may file an action in federal district court 60 days
after receipt of notice of the council's decision. Id.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
43. Id.
44. 73 F.3d 1019 (10th Cir. 1996).
45. Id. at 1021.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 2. The Medical-Vocational Guidelines, commonly
known as "grids," provide a framework to evaluate the residual functional capacity based upon the
claimant's characteristics (age, education, and work experience) and vocational factors describing
the type of work (sedentary, light, medium, heavy, and very heavy). Williams, 844 F.2d at 751-52.





physician's report diagnosed Carter as suffering from depression and associat-
ed neuropsychiatric symptoms, the AL rejected the report because he deemed
it unsupported by any testing or clinical interview.52
2. Holding
The Tenth Circuit agreed with Carter's claim that the ALJ failed to devel-
op the record.53 As a general rule, the AJ has a "duty of inquiry to fully and
fairly develop the record as to material issues." 4 Courts impose a heightened
duty to develop the record when the claimant is not represented by counsel.55
The Tenth Circuit determined that the AUJ in Carter's case should have devel-
oped the record concerning the physician's diagnosis of depression.' The
court noted that the AJ failed to sufficiently inquire about Carter's mental
state in the hearings, and he discounted the medical diagnosis of mental de-
pression without seeking further tests or medical consultations."
3. Analysis
The Social Security Act does not envision an adversarial review process
between the claimant and the SSA.-8 Rather, the ALJ has the responsibility to
elicit all information relevant to the claimant's case, decide whether the indi-
vidual has a valid claim, and document the evidence and reasoning of the
decision.59 Based on Carter, the Tenth Circuit will hold ALJs responsible for
a serious examination of the medical evidence for mental illness claims, even
if the claimant has not raised that claim herself.
4. Other Circuits
Other courts have also required ALJ's to take an active role in developing
the record. The Second Circuit reversed an ALJ who failed to record the testi-
mony of a medical expert and ignored other medical records in denying bene-
fits to an HIV positive claimant.' The Fifth Circuit remanded an ALJ's deni-
al of benefits for failing to include a report from the treating physician about
the claimant's ability to work.6 The Ninth Circuit reversed an AI who re-
jected a disability claim based on fatigue and pain because the medical records
were sparse and inadequately documented.' The same court noted the height-
52. Id. at 1021-22.
53. Id. at 1021.
54. Id. (citing Baca v. Department of Health & Human Servs., 5 F.3d 476, 479-80 (10th Cir.
1993)).




58. Levy, supra note 14, at 472; see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.944, .950, .1450, 416.144.
59. 20 C.F.R. § 404.944; Baker v. Bowen 886 F.2d 289, 291-92 (10th Cir. 1989).
60. Pratts v. Chater, 94 F.3d 34, 34 (2d Cir. 1996).
61. Ripley v. Chater, 67 F.3d 552, 552 (5th Cir. 1995). But see Brock v. Chater, 84 F.3d 726
(5th Cir. 1991) (upholding an ALJ's refusal to order a consultive examination of a claimant who
wrote a letter after the hearing that raised claims of depression and past drug abuse).
62. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273 (9th Cir. 1996).
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ened duty of the ALI to develop the record of a claimant who is not repre-
sented by counsel.'
B. Explaining the Finding: Clifton v. Chater"
1. Facts
Danny Clifton filed for disability benefits on grounds of a back injury.'
The ALJ applied the five-step analysis and denied his disability claim because
he could still perform sedentary work.' The Appeals Council denied review
and the district court affirmed.' Clifton appealed on grounds that his impair-
ment met the listed requirements and that he did not retain the ability to per-
form sedentary work in the economy.'
2. Holding
The Tenth Circuit rejected the AL's findings because he merely stated
summary conclusions without discussing the evidence at step three, the recog-
nized impairment step.' The Social Security Act specifically requires that the
ALI shall write a "statement of the case, in understandable language, setting
forth a discussion of the evidence, and stating the Commissioner's determina-
tion and the reason or reasons upon which it is based."70 In Clifton, the court
determined that the ALJ did not discuss the evidence nor explain why he re-
jected Clifton's claim at step three."
3. Analysis
Under the Social Security Act, courts do not make factual findings in
social security cases.' The court may not reweigh the evidence nor substitute
its discretion for that of the ALJ." The court's role is to review the record to
ensure that substantial evidence supports the ALI's conclusion and that the
ALJ applied correct legal standards.74 Federal courts require ALJs to present
a detailed explanation of their findings to ensure that reviewing courts can
perform their oversight role.' As the Tenth Circuit noted, without a detailed
account of the AU's findings linked to the evidence, the reviewing court can-
not carry out its proper role of judicial review. 6
63. Id. at 1288.
64. 79 F.3d 1007 (10th Cir. 1996).
65. Id. at 1008.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1009.
69. Id.
70. 42 U.S.C. § 405(b)(1).
71. Clifton, 79 F.3d at 1009.
72. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)).
73. Musgrave, 966 F.2d at 1374.
74. Clifton, 79 F.3d at 1009.
75. Id ; Cook v. Heckler, 783 F.2d 1168, 1172-73 (4th Cir. 1986); Brown v. Bowen, 794
F.2d 703, 708 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
76. Clifton, 79 F.3d at 1009.
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The Tenth Circuit reached a similar result in the recent case of Kepler v.
Chater The court remanded the AL's decision because the finding ad-
dressed the complaints about pain in a conclusory fashion.'8 The court found
that the ALT should have considered the claimant's assertions of pain and
explain the specific evidence relevant for rejecting the complaints. Without
knowing the specific evidence or logic that led the ALT to reject the disability
claim, the appellate court cannot determine whether the conclusion is support-
ed by the evidence.' The Tenth Circuit ordered a limited remand with in-
structions for express findings linked to the relevant evidence.8
4. Other Circuits
Two other circuits have reversed ALJ findings for failure to explain their
decisions. The Eighth Circuit overturned an AU's denial of disability benefits
to an individual who claimed he had been suffering from post-traumatic stress
disorder since 1975.82 The Eighth Circuit found that the ALJ failed to include
retrospective medical opinions or evidence of personality change observed by
family members.83 In a similar fashion, the Ninth Circuit rejected an ALT's
limited reasons for turning down an individual's claim for back pain.
C. Substantial Evidence and Bias: Winfrey v. Chater,
1. Facts
William Winfrey filed a disability claim alleging pain in his neck, shoul-
der, back, right leg, and additional problems arising from headaches, asthma,
liver disfunction, hypoglycemia, hiatal hernia, depression, general anxiety
disorder, and somatoform disorder.' Winfrey worked as a truck driver for 21
years in a position that required him to load and unload cargo.U In 1988,
Winfrey injured his neck and shoulder while working and subsequently ob-
tained worker's compensation." He quit his position in 1991 because he
could no longer perform his job in face of growing medical complications."
The AU initially applied the five-step analysis and denied disability based on
the Medical-Vocational Guidelines." The Appeals Council reversed and re-
77. 68 F.3d 387 (10th Cir. 1995).
78. Id. at 390.
79. Id. at 391.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Jones v. Chater, 65 F.3d 102 (8th Cir. 1995).
83. Id. at 104.
84. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 829 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that the AU must provide
specific, cogent reasons for disbelief, and the reasons for rejecting the claimant's testimony must
be clear and convincing).
85. 92 F.3d 1017 (10th Cir. 1996).
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manded with orders to obtain further evidence about Winfrey's physical and
mental factors and to reevaluate under proper legal principles.9' In the second
round, the ALT concluded that Winfrey could perform medium work and re-
turn to his past work as a truck driver, but excluded the task of loading or
unloading materials from his truck driving duties.' Winfrey appealed on
grounds that the AL erred in the evaluation of (1) subjective complaints; (2)
mental impairments; (3) RFC; (4) ability to return to work; and (5) vocational
expert testimony.93
2. Holding
The Tenth Circuit reversed because (1) the ALJ's evaluation of subjective
complaints relied on factors not supported by substantial evidence;" (2) the
ALJ improperly substituted his own medical judgment contrary to the advice
of a medical expert; 9 and (3) the AJ committed numerous errors at step
four of the five part sequential analysis."
3. Analysis
The standard of review in Social Security disability claims is whether the
Secretary's decision "is supported by substantial evidence and whether the
Secretary applied the correct legal standards." In Winfrey, the AJ deter-
mined that the claimant had an incentive not to work, based solely on the
AJ's speculation that the claimant's pension might prohibit him from work-
ing.9 Additionally, the ALJ disregarded the medical diagnosis that Winfrey
suffered from a psychological problem combined with a physical disorder."
The AJ discounted these claims based on his assessment that the "claimant is
bored and whiny and has [an] incentive not to work and to complain about
problems."'" The Tenth Circuit expressed concern about the overall tone and
manner with which the AJ evaluated the evidence. 0' The court inferred
from the record that the ALJ may have exhibited some bias in evaluating
Winfrey's case."m In an unusual step, the Tenth Circuit recommended that





93. Id. at 1020.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1022-23.
96. Id. at 1023-25.
97. Washington v. Shalala, 37 F.3d 1437, 1439 (10th Cir. 1994) (stating that the court must
"meticulously examine the record" to determine whether the evidence is substantial and must
"take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight").
98. Winfrey, 92 F.3d at 1020-21.
99. 1d at 1020.
100. IM.






The Eleventh Circuit confronted a similar matter concerning AUJ bias in
1996.'" The court reversed an AUl who dismissed the credibility of the
claimant's medical experts because they always side in favor of the claim-
ant."' The district court deduced that the ALJ's past experience or mere gos-
sip formed the basis for the ALJ's dismissal of the medical experts." Under
regulations governing the review process, the "administrative law judge shall
not conduct a hearing if he or she is prejudiced or partial with respect to any
party or has any interest in the matter pending for decision."" 7 The Eleventh
Circuit noted the unique role of the AJ in the disability review process and
that impartiality is essential to the integrity of the system."° The court re-




Although drug addiction does not necessarily affect a person's ability to
engage in physical activity, courts recognize drug addiction as an impairment
that qualifies for disability benefits."0 Claimants can establish drug addiction
as a disability in a two part test (1) the individual must prove that he has lost
the ability to control his use of the drug; and (2) the addiction, alone or in
combination with other impairments, prevents the individual from performing
substantial gainful activity."' The Tenth Circuit addressed this issue most
recently in the following case.
A. Drug Addiction and Pain Evaluation: Saleem v. Chater" 2
1. Facts
Suhiyr Saleem filed for SSI benefits alleging a disability due to arthritis,
headaches, back problems, and nerves." 3 The ALJ initially rejected Saleem's
disability claim but the Appeals Council reversed and remanded with instruc-
104. Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397 (11th Cir. 1996) (noting that the district court confronted
conflicting physician opinions about whether the claimant retained the residual functional capacity
to perform sedentary tasks).
105. Id at 1400.
106. Id
107. Id (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.940).
108. Id. at 1401.
109. Id
110. Channel v. Heckler, 747 F.2d 577, 580 (10th Cir. 1984) (citing Odle v. Heckler, 707
F.2d 439, 440 (9th Cir. 1983) and McCoy v. Schweiker, 683 F.2d 1138, 1148 (8th Cir. 1982)).
The SSA's Medical-Vocational Guideline used to evaluate physical and mental impairments is
based on physical abilities, such as the ability to lift or walk; but SSA regulations do recognize
that certain nonexertional impairments may also qualify for benefits. Id. These other impairments
include drug addiction, mental impairments, pain, alcoholism, dizziness and psychiatric disorders.
Id.
11. Coleman v. Chater, 58 F.3d 577, 579 (10th Cir. 1995) (stating the two part test when the
plaintiff suffered from alcoholism).
112. 86 F.3d 176 (10th Cir. 1996).
113. 1U at 178.
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tions to consider Saleem's substance abuse problem.' 4 In a second hearing,
the ALJ again denied disability status after conducting the five step evalua-
tion." The AIJ asserted that Saleem could control her pain by taking pre-
scription drugs and thereby retained the capacity to perform work."6 The
Appeals Council denied review and the district court affirmed.""
2. Holding
The Tenth Circuit determined that the ALJ did not properly consider
Saleem's pain disability in light of her addiction to prescription drugs. The
court declared that "the ALJ cannot discredit a claimant's assertions of dis-
abling pain by relying on her use of medicines to which the medical evidence
clearly indicates she is addicted, and which she should have long ago stopped
taking, but which presently provide adequate pain relief."".8
3. Analysis
The ALJ rejected Saleem's allegation of disabling pain based in part on a
statement by her physician that her pain can be controlled by medication." 9
The Tenth Circuit found that the ALJ did not give adequate consideration to
the negative side effects of the medication, despite statements by the physician
that Saleem's medication served her more harm than good."2 According to
the court, the ALJ's decision would force Saleem back to work, addicted, but
free from severe pain."' The Tenth Circuit reasoned that such a result would
violate congressional policy statements declaring that Social Security laws
should not be applied to perpetuate drug addiction.'" The court remanded
the case with instructions for an ALJ to reconsider Saleem's claims of dis-
abling pain and provide legitimate reasons for accepting or denying her credi-
bility.1
The significance of Saleem and the future role of substance abuse in So-
cial Security disability may be altered by recent congressional action. Amend-
ments to the Social Security Act signed into law on March 29, 1996, deny
disability benefits if drug addiction or alcoholism forms the basis for the dis-
ability determination. 4 Individuals who obtained disability status based sole-




116. Ild. at 178-79.
117. Id. at 178.
118. Id. at 179-80.
119. Id. at 180.
120. Id. at 179.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 180.
124. Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, § 105(c), 110
Stat. 847 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)).
125. Senator McCain, one of the amendment's sponsors, described the amendment as denying
SSI benefits to those whose sole disability is drug addiction or alcoholism. 142 CoNG. REC.
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Based upon the amendment and its intent, courts will likely distinguish
between claimants in the position of Saleem and others who purposely con-
sume addictive substances. The Saleem-type claimant seeks to obtain disability
status on a basis independent of the addiction and should remain eligible for
benefits if the SSA carefully administers the amendment.
4. Other Circuits
The Tenth Circuit took recognized that other circuits had addressed this
issue." The Seventh Circuit permitted a claimant to avoid pain relief medi-
cation that would otherwise allow him to work if he had a reasonable fear of
becoming addicted." The Eighth Circuit considered a case where the claim-
ant alleged disabling back pain and the treating physician discontinued pre-
scription medication, fearing that the claimant was becoming addicted. The
Eighth Circuit remanded with instructions to hear vocational expert testimony
and determine whether the Secretary can demonstrate that the claimant could
perform jobs available in the economy." This past year, the Eighth Circuit
upheld an ALJ who determined that a claimant's alcoholism problem was
sufficiently controlled to justify omitting that factor when conducting an anal-
ysis of functional limitations.'"
IIl. OVERPAYMENT AND NoTIcE
An individual receiving disability benefits may perform some work so
long as the work level and earnings do not exceed guidelines known as sub-
stantial gainful activity (SGA)."' SSA regulations establish standards for de-
termining the SGA threshold. 3' A second set of SGA regulations applies to
those who are statutorily blind.32 The SSA may examine a claimant's past
earnings to determine if the claimant performed SGA.'33 If the SSA discov-
ers that the claimant's application involved fraud or fault,'34 the SSA can re-
open the individual's case and recover for overpayment.135 This issue arose
in the following case.
S3114-02, 53117 (daily ed. March 28, 1996) (statement of Sen. McCain). Several senators voiced
their concern that drug addicts and alcoholics used their benefits to finance their addictions. Id.
Senator McCain noted that the amendment would save approximately $3.5 billion over two years.
Id.
126. Saleem v. Chater, 86 F.3d 176, 179 (10th Cir. 1996) (citing Seventh and Eighth Circuit
decisions).
127. Dray v. Railroad Retirement Bd., 10 F.3d 1306, 1313 (7th Cir. 1993).
128. Dover v. Bowen, 784 F.2d 335 (8th Cir. 1986).
129. Mapes v. Chater, 82 F.3d 259 (8th Cir. 1996).
130. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(4); Jozefowicz v. Heckler, 811 F.2d 1352, 1356 (10th Cir. 1987)
(applying § 423(d)(4)); see generally Daniel M. Taubman, Tenth Circuit Update of Social Security
Cases, 43 Soc. SEC. REP. SER. 817, 825-26 (1994).
131. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1571-.1576 (1996).
132. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1584.
133. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1574(1).
134. See generally SSA HANDBOOK, supra note 20, at 31-32.
135. Fowler v. Bowen, 876 F.2d 1451, 1453-54 (10th Cir. 1989); see generally Michael R.
Schuster et al., Social Security Advocacy After Your Client's Application for Benefits Has Been
Granted, 29 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 605, 613-15 (1995) (explaining what an attorney should do if
the SSA has made an overpayment).
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A. Fraud, Overpayment and Notice: Marshall v. Chater' 3
1. Facts
Ray Marshall initially received Social Security disability benefits for
blindness in 1974.1 7 Marshall started working at the University of New
Mexico in 1979 and earned a salary below the SGA limits.13 Over the next
ten years, Marshall received pay increases that put him over the SGA lim-
its.139 In 1987 and 1988, he submitted reports to the SSA understating his
actual earnings. 4 The SSA discovered evidence of these discrepancies and
started an investigation in 1990.14
In September 1991, the SSA contends that it sent Marshall a notice about
the alleged SGA violations. Marshall asserted that he never received the no-
tice. 42 While there is a dispute over the initial notice, the SSA notified Mar-
shall in October 1991 of its determination that he engaged in SGA back in
1984, and sent him a notice on December 20 regarding its impending recon-
sidered decision. 43 In a series of procedural moves, the SSA terminated
Marshall's benefits and Marshall sought to reverse the SSA action in federal
court. ' " In February 1992, the district court concluded the benefits were not
available and dismissed Marshall's complaint for failure to exhaust administra-
tive remedies. Marshall requested a new administrative hearing and the
ALJ remanded to the SSA for reconsideration.' The SSA reopened
Marshall's case based on new and material evidence and determined that he
had performed SGA in 1986. Upon review of the SSA decision, the ALJ con-
cluded: (1) Marshall received proper notice either by the September 1991
notice, oral contacts with SSA, or the December 20, 1991, letter, (2) the SSA
had authority to reopen the case based on new and material evidence; (3) Mar-
shall performed SGA since February 1986 and was not entitled to benefits
after April 1986; and (4) the SSA could recover an overpayment equal to
$82,349 from Marshall."" The Appeals Council denied review and the dis-
trict court affirmed.' 4
2. Holding
The Tenth Circuit upheld the AJ's findings that (1) the SSA had the
authority to reopen the case and terminate benefits;' 4 (2) the SSA satisfied
its constitutional due process requirements of notice by sending a letter and
136. 75 F.3d 1421 (10th Cir. 1996).












149. Id. at 1426.
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providing an opportunity to respond;"'° and (3) the claimant was not entitled
to benefits during the appeals process.'51
3. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit ruled that the SSA has authority to reopen a case and
terminate benefits of one who had previously participated in SGA. 52 Under
SSA regulations, a blind person's entitlement to benefits ends the very month
that person engages in SGA.'53 The Tenth Circuit rejected Marshall's argu-
ment that the SSA improperly reopened the case because there was no "new"
evidence since the reopening occurred four years after the prior determina-
tion. 54 The court interpreted "new evidence" to include information not be-
fore the decisionmaker who made the prior determination. 5 ' In Marshall's
case, his true earnings were not before the SSA decisionmaker in 1988. The
SSA effectively reopened the 1988 determination when it concluded in Oc-
tober 1991 that Marshall had previously performed SGA in 1984."
In terms of the constitutional issue, the Tenth Circuit ruled that the SSA
did not violate Marshall's due process rights. Under Mathews v. Eldridge,'57
a claimant must be given notice before the agency terminates disability bene-
fits." After Mathews, courts evaluating challenges to procedural due process
must consider the following three factors: (1) the private interest affected by
the agency action; (2) the risk of error in the procedure; and (3) balancing the
government's interest in maintaining the existing procedure with the burdens
of instituting new procedures." 9 In Marshall's case, the court said it was un-
clear whether the September 1991 predetermination letter was ever sent."
Even if it was not sent, the letter of December 20, 1991, cured the possible
error to provide adequate notice. 6 ' The Tenth Circuit effectively determined
there was no risk of error associated with the second factor since the claimant
received notice through the December 20, 1991, letter. 62
On the third issue, the Tenth Circuit ruled that Marshall was not entitled
to benefits while his appeal was pending before the ALJ.63 Under the stat-
ute, a claimant has the right to receive benefits during an administrative appeal
when "the physical or mental impairment on the basis of which such benefits
are payable is found to have ceased, not to have existed, or to no longer be
disabling."'" The SSA interpreted the statute narrowly to apply only to cases
150. Id. at 1427-28.
151. Id. at 1428.
152. Id. at 1426-28.
153. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1586(a)(3) (1996).
154. Marshall, 75 F.3d at 1426.
155. Id. (citing Dugan v. Sullivan, 957 F.2d 1384, 1390 (7th Cir. 1992)).
156. Id. (citing Taylor ex rel. Peck v. Heckler, 783 F.2d 1112, 1115 (10th Cir. 1984)).
157. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
158. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 332-33, 348-49.
159. WILLIAM J. Fox, UNDERSTANDING ADMMSTRATIVE LAW 112 (2d ed. 1992).
160. Marshall, 75 F.3d at 1427.
161. Id. at 1427-28.
162. Id. at 1427.
163. Id. at 1428.
164. 42 U.S.C. § 423(g)(1)(B) (1994).
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of cessation of medical disability benefits, and not to cases of excessive earn-
ings." The Tenth Circuit upheld the agency's interpretation under the Chev-
ron analysis regarding court deference paid to an agency's permissible con-
struction of a statute."6 In Marshall, the court determined the statute and leg-
islative history were ambiguous, and upheld the agency's interpretation under
a deferential standard. 67 On all three issues addressed in Marshall, the Tenth
Circuit showed deference to the SSA in its efforts to discover fraud and take
steps to terminate benefits to a claimant that is not eligible for disability ben-
efits.'a
IV. CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit's decisions involving Social Security disability benefits
reflect a continuing effort to ensure administrative justice to claimants and
promote efficient administration of the massive disability program. The Tenth
Circuit will not tolerate AI decisions that do not fully develop the record,"6
explain the rationale behind a conclusion, 70 or exhibit the appearance of bi-
as.'' The court interpreted congressional concern over drug addiction to
impose safeguards that restrict the disability program's encouragement of
addiction by individuals suffering from pain."' Finally, it allowed discretion
to the SSA when the agency seeks to curtail fraud and abuse by approving
reasonable procedural notice requirements and granting deferential interpreta-
tion of the Social Security Act. "
Thomas A. Carr
165. Marshall, 75 F.3d at 1428.
166. Id. (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 842-43 (1984) ("If... the statute is ambiguous or silent on the issue in question, we must
determine whether the agency's determination is based on a permissible construction of the statute.
If so, we will defer to the agency's interpretation.")).
167. Marshall, 75 F.3d at 1428.
168. See generally Marshall v. Chater, 75 F.3d 1421 (10th Cir. 1996).
169. Carter v. Chater, 73 F.3d 1019, 1021 (10th Cir. 1996).
170. Clifton v. Chater, 79 F.3d 1007, 1009 (10th Cir. 1996).
171. Winfrey v. Chater, 92 F.3d 1017, 1020, 1022-25 (10th Cir. 1996).
172. Saleem v. Chater, 86 F.3d 176, 179-80 (10th Cir. 1996).




Congress enacted the Internal Revenue Code (the "Code") to raise revenue
and implement social and economic policy.' Where the Code contains ambig-
uous or underinclusive language, the courts must interpret its meaning and, at
times, its policy objectives. As with most statutes enacted by Congress, many
sections of the Code are open to numerous interpretations.' The Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals heard and decided several cases in which the court had to
interpret the Code's language during the 1995-96 survey period.3 This Survey
begins by providing a general background of taxation and the Internal Revenue
Code in Part I. Part II discusses United States v. Reorganized CF&J Fabrica-
tors.4 In CF&J, the Supreme Court affirmed the Tenth Circuit's decision
which held that the Code's funding-deficiency tax5 is not an excise tax for
priority purposes under federal bankruptcy law,6 but reversed the Tenth
Circuit's categorical subordination of the Internal Revenue Service's (the "Ser-
vice") tax claim.7 The Supreme Court looked beyond the Code's language to
determine the nature of § 4971(a) assessments, but limited courts' ability to
expand equitable subordination beyond the confines of statutory language.'
The Survey concludes with Part HI, which examines the Tenth Circuit's
interpretation, in two cases, of the Code provision which places a 100% penal-
ty on responsible persons who fail to pay over to the government withheld
employment taxes.9
I. GENERAL BACKGROUND
Taxes are a vital component of organized society.' ° Ancient societies
imposed taxes and developed methods to ensure their collection." Taxes pro-
1. JOSEPH A. PEcHMAN, FEDERAL TAx PoLIcY 5 (1987).
2. JOHN C. CHOMMIE, THE LAW OF FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION 10 (2d ed. 1973).
3. The survey period includes decisions of the Tenth Circuit between September 1, 1995,
and August 31, 1996.
4. 53 F.3d 1155 (10th Cir. 1995).
5. 26 U.S.C. § 4971 (1994).
6. 26 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8) (1994 & Supp. 1997) (interpreting the original 26 U.S.C. §
507(a)(7) which has since been amended to § 507(a)(8)).
7. United States v. Reorganized CF&I Fabricators, 116 S. Ct. 2106, 2115 (1996).
8. Id.
9. 26 U.S.C. § 6672 (1994); Bradshaw v. United States, 83 F.3d 1175 (10th Cir. 1995);
Taylor v. IRS, 69 F.3d 411 (10th Cir. 1995).
10. DANIEL Q. PosmN, FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS 33 (2d ed. 1993). "Our
Founding Fathers believed that the power to tax was quintessential for the proper governance of
our country." David Laro, The Evolution of the Tax Court as an Independent Tribunal, 1995 U.
ILL. L. REv. 17. 19 (1995).
11. PosmN, supra note 10, at 33. In ancient Sumer, the first organized society of record, the
payment of taxes was ensured by religious sanction. Id. at 33-34. In ancient Greece, taxes were
imposed upon the Athenian upper classes to finance the coups d'etat of 411 and 404 B.C. Id.
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vide for government administration and military defense,' 2 and attempt to
achieve social and economic change.' 3
The Constitution gives Congress the "Power To lay and collect Taxes."' 4
Tax bills begin in the House and then transfer to the Senate. 5 The legislators
compromise between competing social and economic interests before promul-
gating tax legislation. 6 Today's tax system evolved from legislation present
at the country's inception." The Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is used to-
day.' Protest against taxation has an interesting history in the United States.
From the Boston Tea Party 9 to the Montana Freemen, " citizens have im-
plemented violent measures to avoid tax payment. Today, when a conflict
between the taxpayer and government arises, several legal avenues are open to
settle the dispute. The taxpayer can pay the deficiency, and in turn sue for a
refund in a District Court; or the taxpayer may petition the United States Tax
Court for a trial.2' The taxpayer or Service may appeal to the proper Court of
Appeals.'
The Code has grown from a document of sixteen pages to a mass of com-
plex regulations. 2' The complexity of tax law results from the sheer size of
12. Id. at 33. Taxation provided resources which allowed the United States to become a
world power. CHOMMIE, supra note 2, at 1.
13. PECHMAN, supra note 1, at 5. Taxes shift resources to the public sector, apportion gov-
ernmental costs among people based upon their economic situation, and facilitate "economic
growth, stability, and efficiency." Id. High taxes coupled with low government spending combats
inflation by constricting private demand. Low taxes coupled with high expenditures combat reces-
sion by increasing private demand. Id. at 8. Taxes allow the government to influence national
economic and social institutions. CHoMMIE, supra note 2, at 1.
14. U.S. CONST. art. I. § 8, cl. 1.
15. PECHMAN, supra note 1, at 44. "All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the
House of Representatives." U.S. CONST. art I, § 7. Tax proposals begin in the Treasury and other
federal agencies. The President makes recommendations to Congress, where they are reviewed by
two tax committees and sent to the House and Senate. PEcHMAN, supra note 1, at 44-53. Taxation
is assigned to a joint congressional committee. The Joint Committee on Taxation contains five
members of the House Ways and Means Committee and five members of the Senate Finance
Committee, three each from the majority party and two each from the minority party. Id. at 38-39.
For a more detailed description of the taxation legislation process, see CHOMMIE, supra note 2, at
8-10.
16. PECHMAN, supra note 1, at 38-39. Political, economic, and social groups attempi to
pressure the Treasury, the tax committees, and the President to gain an advantage in taxation leg-
islation. Id. at 38.
17. Id. at 39.
18. Id. The 1986 Code is comprised of the 1954 Code as amended by the Tax Reform Act
of 1986. Internal Revenue Code of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2095 (codified as
amended at 26 U.S.C. §§ 1-9722 (1994)).
19. In 1773, men boarded ships of the British East India Company and tossed tea overboard
to protest the tea tax imposed by British Parliament. PosIN, supra note 10, at 34-35.
20. FBI agents surrounded a Freemen compound in Montana for 81 days attempting to ap-
prehend the Freemen for committing various crimes, including tax evasion. Carey Goldberg, The
Freemen Sought Refuge in an Ideology That Kept the Law, and Reality, at Bay, N.Y. TIMES, June
16, 1996, at 14.
21. CHOimmE, supra note 2, at 14-15. The Tax Court does not provide for a jury trial. Id. at
15.
22. Id. The case may continue on to the United States Supreme Court. Id.
23. Id. at 10. The current Code consists of 800 pages which contain over 250,000 words. Id.
Difficult provisions treating corporations as separate entities, increasing rates on ordinary income,
giving privileges to certain economic classes, and closing loopholes have increased the complexity
of the Code. Id. at 10-11.
TAXATION
the regulations which govern it and the large number of people it directly
effects. 4 Taxation effects the lives of more Americans than perhaps any oth-
er area of the law.'
H. TAX CLAIMS IN BANKRUPTCY
A. Background
The Bankruptcy Code contains rules, called priorities, which determine the
order in which to pay creditors from the bankrupt's limited pool of resourc-
es.26 Unsecured compensatory excise tax claims of the government receive
eighth priority.' A penalty claim, however, receives priority only if it is a
pecuniary loss penalty.' A § 726(a)(4) noncompensatory penalty is subor-
dinated to all general, unsecured claims.' Taxpayers have heavily litigated
the Service's assessments to determine whether they are punitive or compen-
satory.3
24. POsiN, supra note 10, at 39-40. In the early 1990's, over 90 million tax returns were
filed annually in the United States. Id. The Service employed 120,000 in 1990. Laro, supra note
10, at 21.
25. Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489, 494-95 (1943). "No other branch of the law
touches human activities at so many points" as tax law. Id. at 494-95.
26. Lee A. Sheppard, Bankruptcy Tax Policy: How Far Should Equitable Subordination
Go?, 8 TAX PRAC. 356, 357 (1995). Secured claims come before unsecured claims. Id. Claims
arising out of the bankruptcy administration receive first priority. Id.
27. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8) (1993 & Supp. 1997). Section 507 of the Bankruptcy Code pro-
vides:
(a) [t]he following expenses and claims have priority in the following order.
(8) Eighth, allowed unsecured claims of the governmental units, only to the
extent that such claims are for...
(E) an Excise Tax on-
(i) a transaction occurring before the date of
the filing of the petition for which a return, if required, is last due, under applicable law
or under any extension, after three years before the date of the filing of the petition; or
(ii) if a return is not required, a transaction occurring during the three years im-
mediately preceding the date of the filing of the petition.
Id.
28. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(G) (1993 & Supp. 1997).
29. 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(4) (1994). Section 726(a) provides:
(a) Except as provided in section 510 of this title, property of the estate shall be distrib-
uted
(1) first, in payment of claims of the kind specified in, and in the order speci-
fied in section 507 of this title .....
(2) second, in payment of any allowed unsecured claim
(4) fourth, in payment of any allowed claim, whether secured or unsecured, for
any fine, penalty, or forfeiture, or for multiple, exemplary, or punitive damag-
es... to the extent that such fine, penalty, forfeiture, or damages are not
compensation for actual pecuniary loss suffered by the holder of such claim
(6) sixth, to the debtor.
Id.
30. Sheppard, supra note 26, at 357. Several courts have addressed whether a tax labeled as
an excise tax should be granted priority under § 50(a)(8)(E) of the Bankruptcy Code or subordi-
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An example of a contentious category of assessments are those levied
against pension plans. The Code requires that employers meet funding require-
ments for pension plans qualified under Code §§ 401(a) and 403(a).3 The
Code places an excise tax on employers who fail to fund pension plans as re-
quired.32 The assessment is located in a subsection entitled "Miscellaneous
Excise Taxes." If the language of this title defines the nature of the assessment
for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code, the government would receive eighth
priority. If, however, the assessment is a penalty, it would not receive priority
under the Bankruptcy Code because it does not compensate for pecuniary loss.
The legislative history of this section suggests Congress intended this excise
tax be punitive in nature.3 Commentators, however, have found the history
vague and inconclusive.'
nated as a penalty, if the true nature of the exaction is a penalty under § 726(a)(4). See generally
United States v. Mansfield Tire & Rubber Co., 942 F.2d 1055 (6th Cir. 1991); Unified Control
Systems Inc. v. IRS, 586 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1978); Kline v. Feinblatt, 403 F. Supp. 974 (D. Md.
1975).
31. 26 U.S.C. § 412 (1994). Section 412 provides:
(a) General rule. Except as provided in subsection (h), this section applies to a plan if,
for any plan year beginning on or after the effective date of this section for such plan-
(I) such plan included a trust which qualified (or was determined by the Sec-
retary to have qualified) under section 401(a), or
(2) such plan satisfied (or was determined by the Secretary to have satisfied)
the requirements of section 403(a).
A plan to which this section applies shall have satisfied the minimum funding
standard for such plan year if, as of the end of such plan year, the plan does not have an
accumulated funding deficiency. For purposes of this section and section 4971, the term
"accumulated funding deficiency" means for any plan, the excess of the total charges
over the funding standard account for all plan years (beginning with the first plan year
to which this section applies) over the total credits to such account for such years or, if
less, the excess of the total charges to the alternative minimum funding standard account
for such plan years over the total credits to such account for such years. In any plan
year in which a multiemployer plan is in reorganization, the accumulated funding defi-
ciency of the plan shall be determined under section 418B.
Id.
32. 26 U.S.C. § 4971 (1994). Section 4971 provides for taxes on those who fail to meet
minimum funding standards:
(a) Initial tax. For each taxable year of an employer who maintains a plan to which
section 412 applies, there is hereby imposed a tax of 10 percent (5 percent in the case of
a multiemployer plan) on the amount of the accumulated funding deficiency under the
plan, determined as of the end of the plan year ending with or within such taxable year.
(b) Additional tax. In any case in which an initial tax is imposed by subsection (a) on an
accumulated funding deficiency and such accumulated funding deficiency is not correct-
ed within the taxable period, there is hereby imposed a tax equal to 100 percent of such
accumulated funding deficiency to the extent not corrected.
Id.
33. The legislative history describes the statute's purpose:
The [committee] bill also provides new and more effective penalties where em-
ployers fail to meet the funding standards. In the past, an attempt has been made to
enforce the relatively weak funding standards existing under present law by providing
for immediate vesting of the employees' rights, to the extent funded, under plans which
do not meet these standards. This procedure, however, has proved to be defective since
it does not directly penalize those responsible for the underfunding. For this reason, the
bill places the obligation for funding and the penalty for underfunding on the person on
whom it belongs--namely the employer. This is achieved by imposing an excise tax
where the employer fails to meet the funding standards.
S. REP. No. 93-406, pt. I (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4890, 4909-10.
34. See Laurie F. Humphrey, Comment, In re Mansfield Tire & Rubber Company: A Penalty
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The Sixth Circuit, in United States v. Mansfield Tire & Rubber Co.,3"
became the first, and remains the only circuit to hold that a tax under §
507(a)(7)(E)-now § 507(a)(8)(E)--receives priority against unsecured claims.
Relying upon the statutory construction method used by the United States
Supreme Court in United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc.,' the Mansfield
court found that because Congress gave priority to excise taxes, courts should
conclude that Congress knowingly used the terms and should grant these taxes
priority.'
In Unified Control Systems v. 1RS,3 the Fifth Circuit stated that "the
label placed upon an imposition in a revenue measure is [not] decisive in de-
termining its character [as a tax or penalty]."39 The court found that § 4941
excise taxes were penalties and not allowed as claims.'
In Cassidy v. Dumler,'4 the Tenth Circuit held that a § 72(t) tax is puni-
tive in nature and may be equitably subordinated.42 Thus, the Cassidy court
rejected the Sixth Circuit's analysis on this issue, relying instead on the Fifth
Circuit's reasoning.43
Bankruptcy courts may deviate from congressionally established distribu-
tion rules.' The Bankruptcy Code provides for equitable subordination.45
Courts now apply equitable subordination in cases where a claim holder acts
in good faith.'
By Any Other Name Is Not a Penalty, 42 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 1069, 1081 (1992) (stating that
"the legislative history of section 507 is inconclusive at best"). But see David L. Kwass, Note,
Excise Taxes in Bankruptcy: United States v. Mansfield Tire & Rubber Co. Holds Congress to Its
Word, 12 VA. TAX REv. 513, 521 n.40 (1993) (suggesting two grounds with which to attack the
legislative history argument).
35. 942 F.2d 1055 (6th Cir. 1991).
36. 489 U.S. 235 (1989).
37. Mansfield Tire & Rubber Co., 942 F.2d at 1059. The Sixth Circuit said, "[wihere Con-
gress has exercised its constitutional power and deemed an exaction an 'excise tax', the question
has been answered." Id. at 1059.
38. 586 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1978).
39. Unified Control Sys., 586 F.2d at 1037.
40. Id. at 1039 (holding that granting priority to excise taxes "would thwart the congressio-
nal purpose to honor such assessments over the claims of entirely innocent creditors, except inso-
far as the government can show pecuniary loss").
41. 983 F.2d 161 (10th Cir. 1992).
42. Cassidy, 983 F.2d at 165. The Tenth Circuit relied upon Supreme Court decisions in
which the Court held that the name given to an exaction by the state legislature is not conclusive.
Id. at 163. The Court rejected appellant's contention that these cases did not apply to federal exac-
tions. Id.
43. 983 F.2d at 162.
44. Sheppard, supra note 26, at 357.
45. See Id. Section 5 10(c) provides:
(c) Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b) of this section, after notice and a hearing,
the court may-
(1) under principles of equitable subordination, subordinate for purposes of
distribution all or part of an allowed interest to all or part of another allowed
interest; or
(2) order that any lien securing such a subordinated claim be transferred to
the estate.
11 U.S.C. § 510(c) (1994).
46. Sheppard, supra note 26, at 357.
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In In re Virtual Network Services Corp,47 the Seventh Circuit expanded
equitable subordination. As courts were invoking equitable subordination at the
time of ratification, the court found that Congress ratified subordination when
it enacted the Bankruptcy Code of 1978.' Other circuits have also held that
they may equitably subordinate pre-petition tax penalties to other creditor's
claims.49
B. United States v. Reorganized CF&I Fabricators'
1. Facts
CF&I Fabricators sponsored two qualified pension plans which they did
not adequately fund as required by Code § 412.11 CF&I later filed for Bank-
ruptcy under Chapter I L" The Service filed proofs of claim, and assessed a
ten percent tax under § 4971 on the funding deficiency. 3 The Service sought
priority treatment in post-bankruptcy distributions under § 507(a)(7)(E)-now
§ 507(a)(8)(E).54 The Bankruptcy Court found that the tax liability was not an
excise tax under § 507," and accepted CF&I's reorganization plan which
placed the government in the lowest priority.56 Upon the government's ap-
peal, the District Court for the District of Utah affirmed. 7
2. Tenth Circuit Decision
Declaring the analysis set forth in Cassidy as binding precedent, the Tenth
Circuit found that the Bankruptcy Court correctly looked beyond the statutory
47. 902 F.2d 1246 (7th Cir. 1990).
48. In re Virtual Network Serv. Corp., 902 F.2d at 1249-50. The Seventh Circuit went on to
find "that § 510(c)(1) authorizes courts to equitably subordinate claims to other claims on a case-
by-case basis without requiring in every instance inequitable conduct on the part of the creditor
claiming parity among other unsecured general creditors." Id. at 1250.
49. See Burden v. United States, 917 F.2d 115, 119 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that § 510(c)
permits this subordination); Schultz Broadway Inn v. United States, 912 F.2d 230 (8th Cir. 1990)
(using legislative history of § 510(c) to support subordination of government tax claims).
50. 53 F.3d 1155 (10th Cir. 1995).
51. Reorganized CF&I Fabricators, 53 F.3d at 1156 [CF&I Fabricators]. In September of
1990, CF&I failed to contribute a required $12.4 million to the plans for the taxable year ending
December 31, 1989. Id.
52. United States v. Reorganized CF&I Fabricators, 116 S. Ct. 2106, 2109 (1996) [Reorga-
nized CF&I Fabricators]. CF&I filed in its attempt to reorganize, largely because of an inability
to meet the funding requirements of 29 U.S.C. § 1001. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. In the alternative, the Government sought to prioritize its claim as a tax penalty in
compensation for pecuniary loss under § 507(a). Id.
55. Id. The bankruptcy court read § 4971 as creating a noncompensatory penalty. Id.
56. Id. at 2109-10.
57. Id. at 2110. CF&I created a reorganization plan placing the § 4971 claim in a special
class for "nonpecuniary loss penalties" before the appeal was heard. Id. The District Court af-
firmed the court's decision to look beyond the words of the statute and the subordination. Id.
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label.5" The court then turned to equitable subordination. 9 The court said
that other courts apply equitable subordination only when a creditor has com-
mitted a wrongdoing,' but followed the Seventh Circuit's contrary reason-
ing.6' The Tenth Circuit held that "§ 510(c)(1) does not require a finding of
claimant misconduct to subordinate nonpecuniary loss tax penalty claims." 2
3. United States Supreme Court Decision
6 3
The Court relied upon the congressional purpose in creating § 4971.
Looking beyond the statutory language, the Court found that Congress intend-
ed § 4971 as a penalty and not an excise tax. 4 Because the language of §
4971 does not contain the term "excise" and because "characterizations in
the Internal Revenue' Code are not dispositive in the bankruptcy context,' "
the Court found the Service's unsecured claim should not receive priority.67
Relying upon the its recent decision in U.S. v. Noland,' the Court re-
versed the Tenth Circuit's equitable subordination of the Service's claim.'
Dissenting, Justice Thomas agreed that the Tenth Circuit improperly subordi-
nated the Service's claim, but thought every excise tax should be given §
507(a)(8)(E) status.7 °
C. Analysis
Because the language in § 4971 does not label its assessment as an excise
tax,71 the CF&I Court could have relied upon its decision in United States v.
58. CF&I Fabricators, 53 F.3d at 1158. In Cassidy, the Tenth Circuit held that "Congress'
labeling of [an] exaction as a tax is not determinative of its status for priority in bankruptcy .... "
Cassidy, 983 F.2d at 163. The CF&I court concluded that the bankruptcy court correctly refused
to treat the Internal Revenue Code's label as determinative for priority in 'bankruptcy purposes.
CF&I Fabricators, 53 F.3d at 1158.
59. See CF&I Fabricators, 53 F.3d at 1158.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1159. The Seventh Circuit relied upon legislative history to determine that Con-
gress intended courts to develop the equitable subordination doctrine. In re Virtual Network Servs.
Corp., 902 F.2d at 1249-50.
62. CF&I Fabricators, 53 F.3d at 1159.
63. The Supreme Court granted certiorari "to resolve a conflict among the circuits over
whether § 4971(a) claims are excise taxes within the meaning of § 507(a)(7)(E) [now §
507(a)(8)(E)], and whether such claims are categorically subject to equitable subordination under §
510(c)." Reorganized CF&I Fabricators, 116 S. Ct. at 2110.
64. Id. at 2114.
65. Id. at 2112. The only reference to the term "excise" is in the title of the chapter in which
§ 4971 is located. Id.
66. Id. at 2113.
67. Id. at 2114.
68. 116 S. Ct. 1524 (1996) (concluding that categorical reordering of priorities that take
place at the legislative level of consideration is beyond the scope of judicial authority to order
equitable subordination under § 510(c)).
69. Reorganized CF&I Fabricators, 116 S. Ct. at 2115.
70. Id. at 2116 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas thought it was "not appropriate...
for federal courts to perform a similar inquiry into valid taxes passed by Congress, and the ma-
jority cites no case in which this Court has denied bankruptcy priority to a congressionally enacted
tax." Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
71. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. "No inference, implication, or presumption of
legislative construction shall be drawn or made by reason of the location or grouping of any par-
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Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc.72 In Ron Pair, the Court held that where the lan-
guage of the Bankruptcy Code is plain, "'the sole function of the courts is to
enforce it according to its terms."" The CF&I Court incorrectly relied74 on
United States v. New York" and United States v. Sotelo.76 In these cases, the
Court refused to rely on the terminology used in relevant tax and bankruptcy
provisions and, instead, followed a functional analysis. The Court could have
used an analysis under Ron Pair, which mandates decisions based on statutory
language, to arrive at the same conclusion and maintain consistency with pre-
cedent.' Instead, the Court relied upon cases which are inconsistent with the
precedent established by Ron Pair and other Supreme Court cases."
The Court properly limited equitable subordination. The results may
harshly punish innocent creditors who take subject to prioritized government
claims.' Congress, however, decided claim priority in the Bankruptcy Code,
ticular section or provision or portion of this title ... ." 26 U.S.C. § 7806(b) (1994).
72. 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989) (holding that "as long as the statutory scheme is coherent and
consistent, there generally is no need for a court to inquire beyond the plain language of the stat-
ute").
73. Ron Pair, 489 U.S. at 241 (quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917)).
74. See Reorganized CF&I Fabricators, 116 S. CL at 2111.
75. 315 U.S. 510 (1942). The Court placed no weight on the tax label, looking instead to the
actual effects of the exaction. Id.
76. 436 U.S. 268, 275 (1978) (stating that "[w]e ... cannot agree with the Court of Appeals
that the penalty language of Internal Revenue Code § 6672 is dispositive of the status of
respondent's debt under Bankruptcy Act § 17(a)(1)(e)'); see Kwass, supra note 34, at 527
("Sotelo, however, no longer appears to be good law. Justice Rehnquist wrote the dissent in Sotelo
and endorsed the approach later adopted in Ron Pair.").
77. See Humphrey, supra note 34, at 1082 (approving of the Sixth Circuit's reliance on Ron
Pair in Mansfield Tire); Kwass, supra note 34, at 530 (stating that "the appropriate Supreme
Court standard is derived from the plain meaning rule in United States v. Ron Pair"). "After Ron
Pair... courts should rarely look beyond relevant statutory history to interpret what Congress
intended by enacting a statute." Jeffrey H. Paravano, Postpetition Interest on Oversecured Tax
Liens-Abandonment of the "Nonconsensual" Distinction in Bankruptcy Proceedings: United
States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 42 TAX LAw. 475, 487 (1989).
78. See Humphrey, supra note 34, 1077 n.60 (quoting Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410,
419-20 (1992) (construing amendments of the bankruptcy laws as not affecting prior law absent
legislative history to the contrary and declaring that "silence in the legislative history to the con-
wary cannot be controlling" where the statute is unambiguous)); Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129,
135-36 (1991) (starting with the language of a statute, presuming plain language expresses intent,
and allowing only conclusive legislative history to counter the presumption); Demarest v.
Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184, 190 (1991) (stating that "[w]hen... the terms of a statue [are] unam-
biguous, judicial inquiry is complete except in rare and exceptional circumstances"); Freytag v.
Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 873 (1991) (finding that when language is unambiguous, judicial
inquiry ends). The Supreme Court has been inconsistent interpreting the Code. See Kenneth N.
Klee & Frank A. Merola, Ignoring Congressional Intent: Eight Years of Judicial Legislation, 62
AM. BANKR. LJ. 1, 2 (1988) (criticizing courts for ignoring statutory language); Jeffrey W. Shaw,
Note, Discharging Tax Penalties in Bankruptcy Liquidation: No Relief for the Dishonest Debtor,
10 VA. TAX REv. 801, 803 n.10 (1991) (arguing that the Supreme Court has been inconsistent
when interpreting the Bankruptcy Code). But see Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the
Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a Fact-Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L.
REV. 1295 (1990) (arguing statutory interpretation is moving toward textualism).
79. United States v. Nolan, 48 F.3d 210 (6th Cir. 1995). The Nolan Court stated:
We do not see the fairness or the justice in permitting the Commissioner's claim for tax
penalties, which are not being assessed because of pecuniary losses to the Internal Reve-
nue Service, to enjoy an equal or higher priority with claims based on the extension of
value to the debtor, whether secured or not.
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and that decision should be respected by the courts.'o Bankruptcy judges will
no longer disrupt tax collection by imposing their own visions of fairness in
place of congressionally mandated priorities.
III. FALuRE TO PAY OVER TAx
A. Background
The Code places a 100% penalty tax on responsible persons who fail to
pay over to the government withheld employee taxes."' The employer's fail-
ure to follow the requirements of §§ 3102(a)82 and 3402(a)13 triggers the
80. See Humphrey, supra note 34, at 1082. Humphrey notes:
While the temptation exists to define congressional policy under the Bankruptcy Code as
a broad mandate to protect innocent creditors, the same Code also evidences a policy to
protect government revenues of almost every nature .... [Wihether Congress provides a
vehicle by which debtors in bankruptcy can be relieved of certain debt is entirely up to
them.
Id. (citation omitted). But see- Stephen W. Sather, Tax Issues in Bankruptcy, 25 ST. MARY'S LJ.
1363, 1375 (1994) ("Generally, courts should allow subordination of tax penalties in a Chapter I 1
plan when a failure to subordinate would dilute the distribution to unsecured creditors. Allowing
the government to receive a penalty before creditors with compensatory claims are paid in full is
not equitable.").
81. 26 U.S.C. § 6672 (1994). This penalty statute provides in part:
(a) Any person required to collect, truthfully account for, and pay over any tax imposed
by this title who willfully fails to collect such tax, or truthfully account for and pay over
such tax, or willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat such tax or the payment
thereof, shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be liable to a penalty equal
to the total amount of the tax evaded, or not collected, or not accounted for and paid
over. No penalty shall be imposed under section 6653 ... for any offense to which this
section is applicable.
Id.
82. 26 U.S.C. § 3102(a) (1994). Section 3102 sets forth the requirements for deductions of
taxes from wages, providing in part that "[tihe tax imposed by section 3101 shall be collected by
the employer of the taxpayer, by deducting the amount of the tax from the wages as and when
paid." Id.
83. 26 U.S.C. § 3402(a) (1994). Section 3402 provides requirements for withholdings,
stating in part:
(a) Requirement of withholding.
(1) In general. Except as otherwise provided in this section, every employer
making payments of wages shall deduct and withhold upon such wages a tax
determined in accordance with tables or computational procedures prescribed
by the Secretary. Any tables or procedures prescribed under this paragraph
shall-
(A) apply with respect to the amount of wages paid during such
periods as the Secretary may prescribe, and
(B) be in such form, and provide for such amounts to be deducted
and withheld, as the Secretary determines to be most appropriate to
carry out the purposes of this chapter and to reflect the provisions of
Chapter I applicable to such periods.
(2) Amount of wages. For purposes of applying tables or procedures pre-
scribed under paragraph (1), the term "the amount of wages" means the
amount by which the wages exceed the number of withholding exemptions
claimed multiplied by the amount of one such exemption. The amount of each
withholding exemption shall be equal to the amount of one personal exemption
provided in section 151(b), prorated to the payroll period. The maximum num-
ber of withholding exemptions permitted shall be calculated in accordance
with regulations prescribed by the Secretary under this section, taking into
account any reduction in withholding to which an employee is entitled under
19971
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penalty. The term "person" includes "an officer or employee of a corporation,
or a member or employee of a partnership, who as such officer, employee, or
member is under a duty to perform the act in respect of which the violation
occurs."8
4
Following the example set by other circuits, the Tenth Circuit very will-
ingly finds persons responsible under § 6672.5 "A person is responsible
within the meaning of the statute if that person is required to collect, truthfully
account for or pay over any taxes withheld from the wages of a company's
employees."' A managing officer or employee is generally a responsible per-
son." Holding office, controlling financial matters, having authority to spend
funds, owning stock, and hiring and firing employees all indicate responsibili-
ty." A corporate officer retains responsibility even if superiors threaten to
fire the officer if he pays the government."
If a responsible person intentionally prefers other creditors to the Service,
she meets the willfulness requirement under § 6 6 7 2 .' "Willfulness is present
whenever a responsible person 'acts or fails to act consciously and voluntarily
and with knowledge or intent that as a result of his action or inaction trust
funds belonging to the government will not be paid over but will be used for
other purposes.'"'"
Because of varied fact patterns and levels of control held by employees,
courts experience difficulty in developing a bright line test to determine re-
sponsibility." Responsible person status poses a question for the trier of
fact--determined on a case-by-case basis.93 Courts willingly uphold the pro-
visions of § 6672. In doing so, the courts protect government funds, even
when the result harshly imposes a penalty on those with little practical control
this section.
Id.
84. 26 U.S.C. § 6671(b) (1994).
85. Denbo v. United States, 988 F.2d 1029, 1032 (10th Cir. 1993).
86. Id.
87. Id. See also Muck v. United States, 3 F.3d 1378, 1380 (10th Cir. 1993) (stating that
"[the existence of [significant authority], irrespective of whether that authority is actually exer-
cised, is determinative").
88. Denbo, 988 F.2d at 1032. "Among other things, therefore, a corporate officer or employ-
ee is responsible if he or she has significant, though not necessarily exclusive, authority in the
.general management and fiscal decision making of the corporation.'" Id. (quoting Kissier v. Unit-
ed States, 598 F.2d 1128, 1132 (8th Cir. 1979)).
89. See Howard v. United States, 711 F.2d 729, 734 (5th Cir. 1983).
90. Denbo, 988 F.2d at 1033. In Denbo, the Tenth Circuit stated:
Although negligence does not give rise to § 6672 liability, the willfulness requirement
is... met if the responsible officer shows 'a reckless disregard of a known or obvious
risk that funds may not be remitted to the government.' A responsible person's failure to
investigate or to correct mismanagement after being notified that withholding taxes have
not been paid satisfies the § 6672 willfulness requirement.
Id. (quoting Smith v. United States, 894 F.2d 1549, 1554 n.5 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting Thibodeau
v. United States, 828 F.2d 1499, 1503 (11th Cir. 1987))).
91. Muck, 3 F.3d at 1381. (quoting Olsen v. United States, 952 F.2d 236, 240 (8th Cir.
1991) (quoting Hartman v. United States, 538 F.2d 1336, 1341 (8th Cir. 1976))).
92. Mary A. Bedikian, The Pernicious Reach of 26 U.S.C. Section 6672, 13 VA. TAX REV.
225, 240 (1993).
93. See Jay v. United States, 865 F.2d 1175 (10th Cir. 1989).
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over the payment of creditors." Responsible persons" include sureties,"
accountants, 97 and attorneys.98
The burden of proof falls on the responsible person.99 Assessments
against responsible persons are presumed correct, making it difficult for the
responsible person to meet the burden."m Section 6672 tax imposes joint and
several liability.' ° In addition, § 6672 does not grant a right to contribu-
tion.12
B. Tenth Circuit Decisions
1. Taylor v. Internal Revenue Service"3
a. Facts
Oscar and Donald Taylor incorporated Delta Cattle Corporation in 1981,
with business offices in Tulsa and ranches in eastern Oklahoma."° Donald
Taylor was the vice president, and served on the board of directors. 5 He
owned no stock, but he had authorization to write checks, borrow funds, and
hire and fire employees with Oscar's approval."° Taylor's primary responsi-
bility was that of a "cowboy": he did not prepare corporate payrolls, ensure
that taxes were withheld, file quarterly returns, or make quarterly deposits.
94. Bediklan, supra note 92, at 246. Bedikian observed:
[Section 6672] is harsh and far reaching, intended to protect the government when re-
sponsible persons dip into the "trust fund" and deliberately allocate money for uses other
than payment of the tax liability. Regardless of the amount of money involved, which
can be virtually inconsequential, the act itself constitutes a preference over the govern-
ment, thus triggering the assessment. Once the assessment is generated, the taxpayer
faces an extraordinary maze of presumptions and burdens ....
Id. Taxpayers have been successful in only 23 of 270 federal and claims court cases. Id. at 270
n.19.
95. The Service chooses, with complete discretion, against whom it will assert the penalty.
Neier v. United States, 127 B.R. 669, 680 (D. Kan. 1991) (finding that the Service need not seek
collection first from officer who had primary control over payment of trust fund taxes).
96. Pacific Nat'l Ins. Co. v. United Sates, 422 F.2d 26, 31 (9th Cir. 1970).
97. See Quattrone Accountants, Inc. v. IRS, 895 F.2d 921, 927 (3d Cir. 1990) (finding that
an accounting firm, which was responsible for the payment of a corporate client's bills, was a
"responsible person" although it was required to present client with copy of bills each month).
98. See IRS v. Blais, 612 F. Supp. 700, 707 (D. Mass. 1985) (finding that a lawyer, who
operated a car dealership under a power of attorney from the owner, was liable for 100% penalty
tax).
99. See Bedikian, supra note 92, at 246. McDermitt v. United States, 954 F.2d 1245, 1251
(6th Cir. 1992); Collins v. United States, 848 F.2d 740, 742 (6th Cir. 1988); Ruth v. United
States, 823 F.2d 1091, 1093 (7th Cir. 1987); Caldrone v. United States, 799 F.2d 254, 258 (6th
Cir. 1986); Sinder v. United States, 655 F.2d 729, 731 (6th Cir. 1981).
100. Bedikian, supra note 92, at 246.
101. See Conley v. United States, 773 F. Supp. 1176, 1176-77 (S.D. Ind. 1991); Cline v.
United States, No. 89-73312, 1993 U.S. App. WL 272516 (6th Cir. Jul. 21, 1993). But see Reid v.
United States, 558 F. Supp. 686, 688-89 (N.D. Miss. 1983) (finding federal common law right of
action for contribution or indemnification under section 6672).
102. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 645 (1980) (finding common
law fails to create the rule of contribution in antitrust).
103. 69 F.3d 411 (10th Cir. 1995).
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Taylor did, however, sign one 1984 tax return." In March of 1984, Delta
filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 In February of 1985, the IRS sent
Taylor a Notice of Proposed Assessment of 100 Percent Penalty which identi-
fied the quarters of unpaid taxes, the amount of unpaid taxes, and the penalty
amount."° In March of 1995, the IRS assessed the § 6672 penalty against
Taylor."t The bankruptcy court found that Taylor was not a responsible per-
son.' The district court reversed and found that Taylor was a responsible
person." 2 The district court held that Taylor had acted willfully,"3 and re-
jected Taylor's contention that the assessment was void because the IRS as-




The Tenth Circuit stated that "the bankruptcy court's ultimate determina-
tion whether an individual constitutes a 'responsible person'.., involves an
application of law to fact, which is subject to de novo review by the district
court."' ' The Tenth Circuit applied the test for responsible persons estab-
lished in Denbo, agreeing with the district court that Taylor had sufficient con-
trol over operations to qualify as a responsible person." 6 The court found
that the District Court should not have determined the willfulness issue as a
matter of law and remanded for findings of fact."7
The court found that the assessment against Taylor was valid and rejected
Taylor's contention that Stallard v. United States,"8 a Fifth Circuit decision,
prohibited such an assessment."9 The court stated, "[tihe Stallard court ac-
knowledged... that an aggregate, lump sum assessment of § 6672 penalties
is permissible as long as the IRS identifies the particular tax period for which
the taxpayer is liable .... ",o
107. Id. Oscar Taylor, Donald Taylor's brother, was the president; he managed the business
and owned all the stock, making all corporate decisions and determining which checks to write
and which creditors to pay. Id.
108. Id. at 414.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. "The Bankruptcy Court explained that a responsible person 'is the person who within
the corporate structure has the job to see that the withheld taxes are paid.' ... " Id. (quoting 26
U.S.C. § 6672). The Bankruptcy Court found that Oscar Taylor, Donald Taylor's brother, was the
responsible person. Id.




116. Id. at 416. The court pointed out that Taylor managed the daily operations in the busi-
ness office when his brother was not there, and had "the effective power to pay taxes." Id.
117. Id. at 417.
118. 12 F.3d 489 (5th Cir. 1994).




2. Bradshaw v. United States'21
a. Facts
In portions of 1985 and 1986, Larry Bradshaw acted as the president of
Heritage Building Products ("Heritage").'n On May 10, 1985, Bradshaw
entered into a credit agreement with Zion First National Bank granting the
bank a lien on Heritage's assets and the right to freeze Heritage's bank ac-
counts if Heritage went into default.'2 On March 15, 1986, Zion determined
that Heritage defaulted and so Zion froze the Heritage accounts. 24 Thus,
Heritage needed Zion's approval for the future use of funds."z Zion refused
approval for payment of withholding taxes with funds from the frozen ac-
counts, despite Bradshaw's request for the funds." Heritage failed to pay
federal withholding taxes to the IRS for the first three quarters of 1986, and
the penalty assessed for late payment in 1985.27 The Internal Revenue Ser-
vice assessed a 100% penalty against Bradshaw as a "responsible person"
under § 6672." The district court found that Bradshaw lacked the power to
distribute funds and therefore was not a responsible person.'"
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit relied primarily upon the Second Circuit's decision in
Kalb v. United States,"3 and declared Bradshaw a responsible person under
§ 6672."' The court said that a corporate officer "may not escape liability as
a 'responsible person' under § 6672 by voluntarily entering into agreements
which permit preferring other creditors to the government."' 2 Noting that
Bradshaw granted the bank power to prefer other creditors to the govern-
ment,' "33 the court found he could not avoid responsibility by ceding financial
control."' The Tenth Circuit agreed with the Ninth, 35 Fifth," and Sec-
ond 3" Circuits, which had arrived at similar conclusions.'38 The court said
the only way Bradshaw could have avoided liability was to resign or refuse to
121. 83 F.3d 1175 (10th Cir. 1995).








130. 505 F.2d 506 (2d Cir. 1974).
131. Bradshaw, 83 F.3d at 1182.
132. Id. at 1180.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Rykoff v. United States, 40 F.3d 305, 308 (9th Cir. 1994) ("The fact that a bank exer-
cises significant control over payments to creditors does not necessarily absolve the corporate
officer of liability under § 6672.").
136. Gustin v. United States, 876 F.2d 485, 491-92 (5th Cir. 1989) (stating that "[o]ne does
not cease to be a responsible person merely by delegating that responsibility to others").
137. Kalb, 505 F.2d at 510; see Botta v. Scanlon, 314 F.2d 392, 393 (2d Cir. 1963).
138. Bradshaw, 83 F.3d at 1181.
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sign the checks" thereby shutting down the company.39
C. Analysis
One commentator suggested that Congress intended to induce employers
to comply with their duty to pay taxes by imposing severe penalties on the
officials responsible for the employers' decisions."4 By extending the re-
sponsible person designation to an officer with no practical control over the
employer's payment to creditors, the Tenth Circuit imposes harsh consequenc-
es on those unable to avoid them-several commentators would say too
harsh.' 4' The Tenth Circuit may however, intend to protect innocent employ-
ees and the government from the abuse of corporate officers and
shareholders. 42
D. Other Circuits
Several other circuit courts of appeals ruled on the scope of the responsi-
ble person designation in the past year. In most of the cases, the circuit courts
found the taxpayer a responsible person under § 6672." A divided Ninth
139. Id.
140. James E. Hungerford, Howard v. United States: Who Should Be Responsible for the 100
Percent Penalty?, 1989 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 451, 453.
141. See Stephen J. Vasek, The Hidden Tax Trap of I.R.C. Section 6672, 67 Ky. LJ. 27, 73
(1978) (stating that the "[a]pplications of section 6672, as currently interpreted, often imposes a
harsh penalty on morally innocent and unsuspecting business managers"); Hungerford, supra note
140, at 470 (stating that "[i]t is certainly not fair to saddle an individual corporate employee who
is not responsible for the problem with a staggering corporate debt just to provide an alternate
means of collection"); Bedikian, supra note 92, at 238 (stating that "the consequences of extend-
ing the responsible person definition are unjustified and places persons ... in a virtual catch-22:
not following his superior's directive would have subjected him to termination while following the
directive would have subjected him to enormous penalties").
142. See Wright v. United States, 809 F.2d 425, 428 (7th Cir. 1987); Bedikian, supra note 92,
at 231. Bedikian notes:
[Slection 6672 is intended to be a powerful deterrent against the promiscuous or delib-
erate use of money which rightfully belongs to the government. It is only when courts
construe the statute mechanically, without regard to the actual control possessed by the
responsible person, that section 6672 begins to reveal its most pernicious side.
Id.
143. Gadoury v. IRS, No. 95-1872, 1996 WL 83894 (1st Cir. Feb. 26, 1996) (unpublished
disposition) (finding a company controller had sufficient control over disbursement of company
funds, admitted that he knew the taxes were not paid, and failed to take remedial steps); Donelan
Phelps & Co. v. United States, 876 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding the managers of company
in reorganization were responsible persons under § 6672); Keller v. United States, 46 F.3d 851
(8th Cir. 1995) (affirming a § 6672 penalty against an estate's personal representative who exer-
cised authority over the operation of an inn owned by the estate, and agreeing with the lower
court that the representative was a responsible person who had acted willfully); Szego v. Com-
missioner, No. CA-89-2186-JFM, 1995 WL 678257 (4th Cir. Nov. 15, 1995) (unpublished dis-
position) (finding a company's majority shareholder and chairman of the board liable for the
corporation's unpaid employment taxes under § 6672); Ashby v. United States, No. CV-92-00293-
HDM, 1995 WL 635178 (9th Cir. Oct. 27, 1995) (unpublished disposition) (affirming a district
court decision holding that a corporation's president was liable as a responsible person under §
6672); United States v. DiMeo, No. CV-89-0617-GLT, 1995 WL 501506 (9th Cir. Aug. 23, 1995)
(unpublished disposition) (affirming a district court decision holding a man liable for a company's
unpaid employment taxes as a responsible person under § 6672); Snyder v. Talon, No. CV-93-
2722, 1993 U.S. Dist. WL 597121 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 1993) (ruling that a bankruptcy court prop-
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Circuit ruled that gross negligence sufficed to establish the willfulness require-
ment of § 6672.'" The Sixth Circuit held that a company president's failure
to remit overdue withholding taxes was not willful, because a state statute en-
cumbered his use of the available funds.45
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in CF&I Fabricators arrives at the correct
conclusion, but by the wrong analysis. Instead of simply noting that the term
"excise" does not directly fall within § 4971 and by applying a functional
analysis, the Court relied upon its decisions in United States v. New York and
United States v. Sotelo. These cases-inconsistent with the Court's decision in
Ron Pair--open the door for courts to look beyond the direction imposed by
Congress to further their own agendas.
Because the Tenth and other Circuits have expanded the responsible per-
son definition, courts may assess huge penalties against unwitting employees
with little practical control over company actions. These employees can avoid
the penalty only by quitting their jobs when they discover that their employer
has failed to pay proper employment taxes. These harsh consequences, howev-
er, protect innocent employees and government revenue from abuse by corpo-
rate officers and shareholders.
Michael T. Lininger
erly denied a debtor's motion to reconsider a sumnmary judgment in favor of the IRS, because the
debtor's motion did not present any new issues).
144. Phillips v. IRS, 73 F.3d 939, 942 (9th Cir. 1996).





The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) defines government liability for the
tortious conduct of its employees.' Before enactment of the FTCA, parties
injured by the negligent acts of government employees sought a private relief
bill directly from Congress.2 To effectively address the growing number of
claims, and to provide a more accessible remedy, Congress enacted the FTCA
in 1946.? The FTCA waives sovereign immunity, allowing claims for injury
caused by the negligent or wrongful acts or omissions of government employ-
ees. Private parties may hold the United States liable if the law of the state
where the act or omission occurred would impose liability on a private indi-
vidual, subject to certain limitations.4
This Survey reviews Tenth Circuit holdings on three FTCA cases decided
during the Survey period.5 These cases focused on three issues: the discretion-
ary function exception, the government's liability as an employer of indepen-
dent contractors, and the government's reversionary interest in future damages
awarded to private citizens. In two cases, Tew v. United States6 and Bowman
v. United States (Bowman II),' the court utilized conventional analyses in de-
termining government liability. In the third case, Hill v. United States (Hill
II),8 the court struck new ground in finding that the government maintained a
reversionary interest in future damages awarded to a private citizen.
I. GOVERNMENT LIABILTY UNDER THE DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION
EXCEPTION
A. Background
1. The Discretionary Function Exception
The FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity is narrow in scope and subject
to several exceptions. The discretionary function exception provides that pri-
vate parties cannot hold the government liable for "[a]ny claim based up-
on ... the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a
1. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1402, 2401-2402, 2411-2412, 2671-2680 (1994).
2. Mark A. Dombroff, United States Government Liability, in AIRCRAFr CRASH LrGATION
1984, at 227, 236 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 267, 1984).
3. Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 812, 842-47 (1946). See gener-
ally 1 LESTER S. JAYSON, HANDLING FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS: ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL
REMEDIES, § 65.01, at 3-3 to 3-4 (1964) (discussing the two dominant objectives for enacting the
statute).
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).
5. The survey period extended from September 1995 through August 1996.
6. 86 F.3d 1003 (10th Cit. 1996).
7. 65 F.3d 856 (10th Cir. 1995) (Bowman 1/).
8. 81 F.3d 118 (10th Cir. 1996) (Hill 1ll), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 56 (1996).
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discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee
of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused."9 Appli-
cation of this exception evolved through a series of United States Supreme
Court cases, most recently in Berkovitz v. United States'° and United States v.
Gaubert."
In Berkovitz, the Court developed a two-part test for applying the discre-
tionary function exception. First, courts must consider whether a government
agent's judgment or choice produced the questionable conduct. 2 If no ele-
ment of choice or judgment existed, the court should neither find discretion
nor apply the exception. 3 If a court concludes that the conduct involved an
element of judgment, then it must make a second determination: whether the
exception shields that type of judgment from judicial review.'4 The Berkovitz
Court concluded that Congress intended to shield only conduct that involved
the permissible exercise of policy judgment."
Gaubert addressed government conduct subject to the discretionary func-
tion exception. ' The Court rejected a distinction based on the level of gov-
ernment at which the decision making occurred. 7 The Gaubert Court focused
on the nature of the conduct, rather than the status of the actor.' In applying
the Berkovitz two-part test, the Gaubert Court held that when a federal statute,
regulation, or agency guideline gave discretion to a government agent, a pre-
sumption arose that the agent's conduct was properly grounded in public poli-
cy. 9 Berkovitz and Gaubert developed a discreet discretionary function ex-
ception analysis, which allows for a flexible and broad application.'
9. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1994).
10. 486 U.S. 531 (1988). See generally Irl L Nathan, Torts-Governmental Immuni-
ty-Causes of Action Stemming from Federal Government's Negligence in Implementing Mandato-
ry Regulations or Statutes Are Not Barred by Discretionary Function Exception of Federal Tort
Claims Act: Berkovitz v. United States, 20 ST. MARY's LJ. 1018 (1989) (discussing the Supreme
Court's analysis); Thomas H. (Speedy) Rice, Berkovitz v. United States: Has a Phoenix Arisen
form the Ashes of Varig?, 54 J. Ant L. & CoM. 757 (1989) (discussing Supreme Court and federal
circuit decisions leading up to Berkovitz and Berkovitz's effect on discretionary function exception
analysis); Patricia M. Clarke, Note, Torts---The Discretionary Function Exception: Immunity for
the Negligent Execution of Agency Policy--Berkovitz v. United States, 61 TEMP. L. REv. 281
(1988) (concluding that the Court incorrectly decided Berkovitz and thereby inappropriately ex-
panded government immunity and contradicted Congressional intent).
11. 499 U.S. 315 (1991). See generally Carolyn K. Dick, United States v. Gaubert: Potential
Liability for Federal Regulations Under the "Discretionary Function" Exception of the Federal
Tort Claims Act, 36 S.D. L. REv. 180 (1991) (analyzing the applicability of the discretionary func-
tion exception to federal regulators who assume operational control of financial institutions).
12. Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 536-37.
16. Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 325-26.
17. Id. at 325 ("A discretionary act is one that involves choice or judgment; there is nothing
in that description that refers exclusively to policymaking or planning functions... [djiscretionary
conduct is not confined to the policy or planning level.").
18. Id.
19. Id. at 324.
20. See generally David S. Fishback & Gail Killefer, The Discretionary Function Exception
to the Federal Tort Claims Act: Dalehite to Varig to Berkovitz, 25 IDAHo L. REV. 291 (1989)
(reviewing discretionary function exception case law and concluding that there is a sensible frame-
work rooted in Congressional intent for applying the exception); William P. Kratzke, The Supreme
1997] TORTS
2. The Suits in Admiralty Act
The Suits in Admiralty Act (SAA), 2' like the FICA, waives sovereign
immunity. The SAA, however, applies specifically to maritime issues.' It
allows suit against the government if, under similar circumstances, the plaintiff
could maintain an admiralty proceeding against a private vessel and/or cargo
owner.' The FTCA and SAA provide mutually exclusive jurisdiction." The
SAA does not explicitly contain a discretionary function exception.
B. Tew v. United States'
1. Facts
Robert Tew died when his raft capsized on the Illinois River.' The acci-
dent occurred after Tew's raft passed over an underwater structure constructed
by a private citizen without the consent of the govemment.' The Army
Corps of Engineers (Corps) knew of the structure, but neither the Corps nor
the United States Coast Guard (Coast Guard) had removed it or placed warn-
ing markers near it.'
Representatives of Tew brought a wrongful death action under the FTCA
and SAA claiming that the Corps and the Coast Guard had negligently failed
to mark or remove the obstruction." The district court granted summary
judgment for the United States."
Court's Recent Overhaul of the Discretionary Function Exception to the Federal Torts Claims Act,
7 ADMIN. LJ. AM. U. 1 (1993) (concluding that recent Supreme Court cases offer flexible guide-
lines rather than precise tests in applying the discretionary function exception); Donald N.
Zillman, Protecting Discretion: Judicial Interpretation of the Discretionary Function Exception to
the Federal Tort Claims Act, 47 ME. L. REv. 365 (1995) (reviewing Supreme Court precedent and
all federal court decisions interpreting the discretionary function exception since Berkovitz).
21. 46 U.S.C. app. § 742 (1994).
22. See generally 1 PAUL S. EDELMAN, MARITME INJURY AND DEATH 459-79 (1960);
GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY § 11-11 (1957); James C.
Helfrich, Suits Against the United States Pursuant to the SIAA, PVA, EAA, FTCA, and FECA, 26
TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 121, 124-25 (1982); Kathryn C. Nielsen, Comment, The Discretionary Func-
tion Exception and the Suits in Admiralty Act: A Safe Harbor for Negligence?, 4 PUGET SOUND L.
REv. 385, 386-88 (1981).
23. 46 U.S.C. app. § 742 ("In cases where if such vessel were privately owned or operated,
or if such cargo were privately owned or possessed, or if a private person or property were in-
volved, a proceeding in admiralty could be maintained, any appropriate nonjury proceeding...
may be brought against the United States ... .
24. See Ashland v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., 711 F.2d 1431, 1435 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding
that SAA provided exclusive jurisdiction for maritime torts); Keene Corp. v. United States, 700
F.2d 836, 843 n.ll (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that the jurisdictional bases of the FTCA and SAA are
mutually exclusive); EDELMAN, supra note 22, at 479; DANIEL A. MORIS, FEDERAL TORT
CLAIMS § 12.1 (1993); Helfrich, supra note 22, at 126-27. But cf Jones & Laughlin Steel, Inc. v.
Mon River Towing, Inc., 772 F.2d 62, 64-65 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that FTCA includes jurisdic-
tion over maritime torts except for those torts for which a remedy was provided by the SAA or
Public Vessels Act).
25. 86 F.3d 1003 (10th Cir. 1996).
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2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit first reviewed the FTCA and SAA as waivers of the
United States' sovereign immunity." As a matter of first impression, the
court then considered whether the SAA contained an implied discretionary
function exception.32 The court stated that the FTCA's discretionary function
exception maintained the separation of powers by preventing independent
judicial review of legislative and administrative decisions.33 Since adherence
to the doctrine of separation of powers remains equally desirable in maritime
issues,34 the court found a discretionary function exception in the SAA. 3
The court then applied the two-part test for the discretionary function
exception set forth in Berkovitz. In order for the United States' conduct to
fall within the exception, it must: (1) involve an element of judgment or
choice, and (2) be grounded in public policy considerations."
Tew argued that the United States had a non-discretionary duty to mark or
remove the underwater structure.3" Specifically, Tew asserted that 14 U.S.C.
§ 86 required the Coast Guard to mark the structure, and 33 U.S.C. §§ 403,
409, 414, and 415 required the Corps to remove the structure.39
The court concluded that 14 U.S.C. § 86 gave the Secretaries of Transpor-
tation and Navy discretion to mark obstructions.' When delegated to the
Coast Guard District Commanders, the authority maintained its discretionary
character.4' Further, the court concluded that the Coast Guard primarily based
its decision to leave the obstruction unmarked on economic considerations. '2
The court held that the Coast Guard properly based its exercise of discretion
on such public policy considerations. 3 Therefore, the Coast Guard's conduct
fell within the discretionary function exception."
The court then reviewed 33 U.S.C. §§ 403, 409, 414, and 415. Section
403 and accompanying regulations prohibit the creation of obstructions in
navigable waters.4' The court concluded that the regulations did not create a
duty to remove obstructions.' In fact, it expressly refused to create a non-
31. Id. at 1004-05.
32. Id. at 1005.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. The Tenth Circuit's decision is in line with the majority of the circuits. Id. For criti-
cism of this imputation, see Nielsen, supra note 22, at 403-14.
36. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
37. Tew, 86 F.3d at 1005.
38. Id. at 1005-06.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1006. The court specifically pointed to the language of the statute which states that
the "secretary may mark... any sunken vessel or other obstruction existing on the navigable
waters ... of the United States in such manner and for so long as, in his judgment, the needs of
maritime navigation require." Id. (quoting 14 U.S.C. § 86) (emphasis in original).








Sections 409, 414 and 415, commonly known as the Wreck Act, prohibit
obstruction of navigable waters and require owners of obstructions to mark
and remove them.' If the owner does not remove the obstruction, the Act
permits the Secretary of the Army to remove it.' The court held that neither
the statutes nor the accompanying regulations created a requirement that the
Army remove obstructions.' Rather, language such as "shall have the right to
remove" and "may undertake to remove" indicated the existence of govern-
ment discretion." Further, the court held that the Corps' decision not to re-
move the obstruction fell within the discretionary function exception since the
Corps based its decision on public policy considerations regarding allocation
of limited resources. 2
The court concluded that since the Corps' and the Coast Guard's conduct
fell within the exception, the district court did not retain subject matter juris-
diction to review the claims. 3 Therefore, the court affirmed the grant of sum-
mary judgment. 4
C. Other Circuits
During the survey period, two other circuits addressed the discretionary
function exception to the FTCA and the SAA. In Baldassaro v. United
States,5 the Fifth Circuit first found that the SAA contained an implied dis-
cretionary function exception. 6 After considering the wording of relevant
statutes, the court determined that the government's decision regarding the de-
sign of bunks in National Defense Reserve Fleet vessels was discretionary.
5
Further, the government properly grounded the decision in public policy."
The court concluded that the plaintiff had failed to rebut a presumption, de-
fined in Gaubert, that the government grounded its decision in the same policy
considerations which underlie the statute authorizing discretion.59
In Glacier Bay United Cook Inlet Drift Ass'n v. Trinidad Corp.,' the
Ninth Circuit also held that the SAA contained an implied discretionary func-
tion exception.6' The court then considered each contested government action
47. Id. ("[Niothing contained in this Part shall establish a non-discretionary duty on the part
of district engineers nor shall deviation from these procedures give rise to a private right of action
against a district engineer.") (quoting 33 C.F.R. § 326.1 (1991)).
48. Id.
49. Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. §§ 414, 415).
50. Id. at 1006-07.
51. Id. at 1006.
52. Id. at 1007.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. 64 F.3d 206 (5th Cir. 1995), cert denied, 116 S. CL 1823 (1996).
56. Baldassaro, 64 F.3d at 208.
57. Id. at 209.
58. Id. at211.
59. Id. at 212.
60. 71 F.3d 1447 (9th Cir. 1995).
61. Glacier Bay, 71 F.3d at 1450.
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separately to determine if government agents possessed discretion.' The
court concluded that where relevant manuals gave mandatory instructions or
required decisions involving the application of objective scientific standards,
the discretionary function exception did not apply.63
D. Analysis
Application of the discretionary function exception within the FTCA high-
lights two conflicting Congressional objectives. First, Congress intended to
provide private parties with a viable remedy when harmed by government
employees.' The FTCA. sought to have the United States treated "in the
same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circum-
stances .. . ." Secondly, Congress restricted government liability through
the discretionary function exception to prevent judicial second-guessing of
legislative and administrative decisions grounded in policy.'
Courts must necessarily balance these conflicting objectives.' In Tew,
the Tenth Circuit chose to limit judicial review of policy-based government
decision making. This conclusion, as discussed above, comports with recent
Supreme Court decisions and those of other federal circuits." -Further, the
relevant federal statutes and regulations clearly defined the removal of obstruc-
tions as discretionary conduct. In addition, the government made decisions
based on the quintessential legislative policy choice of allocating limited re-
62. Id. at 1451.
63. Id. at 1452-53. See generally D. Scott Barash, Comment, The Discretionary Function
Exception and Mandatory Regulations, 54 U. CI. L. REV. 1300, 1327-34 (1987).
64. See Dombroff, supra note 2, at 236.
65. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1994).
66. Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536-37 (1988) (citing United States v. S.A.
Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 814 (1984)); see also
Kratzke, supra note 20, at 7 ("Certainly resolution of political questions or agency policy should
not occur in the context of a negligence suit .... Court scrutiny of government conduct for un-
reasonableness... should occur only in a setting where it will not affect the very essence of
government activity.").
67. For criticism that the scope of the exception is too wide, see John W. Bagby & Gary L.
Gittings, The Elusive Discretionary Function Exception From Government Tort Liability: The
Narrowing Scope of Federal Liability, 30 Am. Bus. LJ. 223, 268-69 (1992); Harold J. Krent,
Preserving Discretion Without Sacrificing Deterrence: Federal Governmental Liability in Tort, 38
UCLA L. REV. 871, 915 (1991); Osborne M. Reynolds, Jr., The Discretionary Function Exception
of the Federal Tort Claims Act: Time For Reconsideration, 42 OKLA. L. REv. 459, 479-81 (1989);
Barry R. Goldman, Note, Can the King Do No Wrong? A New Look at the Discretionary Function
Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 26 GA. L. REV. 837, 858-60 (1992).
68. See generally Richard P. Shafer, Annotation, Liability of United States for Failure to
Warn of Danger or Hazard Resulting from Governmental Act or Omission as Affected by "Discre-
tionary Function or Duty" Exception to Federal Tort Claims Act (28 U.S.C.S. § 2680(a)), 65
A.L.R. FED. 358 (1983); Jean F. Rydstrom, Annotation, Claims Based on Construction and Main-
tenance of Public Property as Within Provision of 28 USCS § 2680(a) Excepting from Federal
Tort Claims Act Claims Involving "Discretionary Function or Duty," 37 A.L.R. FED. 537, 588-91
(1978); Michael J. Kaplan, Annotation, Liability of United States for Injuries or Damage Resulting
from Failure to Establish, or Properly Maintain or Operate, Aids to Maritime Navigation, 19
A.L.R. FED. 297 (1974).
69. See supra notes 41, 48, 52 and accompanying text. After determining that this first prong
of the Berkovitz test was satisfied, the Tenth Circuit could have used the presumption analysis laid
out in Gaubert. The court would have then focused on the sufficiency of the plaintiff's evidence
in rebutting a presumption that the government's acts were grounded in policy.
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sources.70 One may argue that the Corps and Coast Guard should have uti-
lized a safer policy, however Congress did not intend to allow courts to review
such policy decisions under the FI'CA.7




The FTCA allows claims against the United States if a private individual
would be liable to the claimant "in accordance with the law of the place where
the act or omission occurred."' Federal courts must therefore apply the rele-
vant law of the state where the conduct occurred. In Bowman II, the Tenth
Circuit construed Wyoming law regarding an owner's duty toward the employ-
ees of independent contractors."
2. Relevant State Law
Under Wyoming law, an owner may be liable to employees of indepen-
dent contractors for injury caused by an unsafe condition on the owner's pre-
mises.7' However, the law does not require owners to protect independent
contractor employees from hazards incidental to the work performed.75 The
owner's delegated control of the job site to the independent contractor provid-
es the rationale behind this exception. 6 If an owner retains sufficient control
over part of the work, such as directing performance or assuming affirmative
duties for safety,' the exception does not apply.78
70. See Domme v. United States, 61 F.3d 787, 793 (10th Cit. 1995) (concluding that Dept.
of Energy's inspection decisions were based on policy decision of how to utilize limited resourc-
es); Baum v. United States, 986 F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that the National Park Service's
decision on how to best allocate resources was inherently based on economic policy); Johnson v.
United States Dep't of Interior, 949 F.2d 332 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that National Park
Service's decisions to undertake search and rescue missions were properly based on policy con-
sideration of best use of limited economic resources); Bearce v. United States, 614 F.2d 556 (7th
Cir. 1980) (concluding that allocation of funds for construction of navigation aids requires policy
judgments). See generally Kratzke, supra note 20, at 46 (stating that courts are unable to ade-
quately review the reasonableness of government decisions involving the pursuit of competing
goals with limited resources).
71. See Bowman v. United States, 820 F.2d 1393, 1395 (4th Cir. 1987) (no relationship to
Bowman I or Bowman 11) ("What is obvious is that the decision was the result of a policy judg-
ment. One can argue that another policy ... is more desirable. However, by the discretionary
function exception, Congress intended to prevent courts from second-guessing federal policy.").
72. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1994).
73. For other examples of government tort liability as a property owner, see Kathleen M.
Doff, Annotation, Federal Tort Claims Act: Liability of United States for Injury or Death Result-
ing from Condition of Premises, 91 A.L.R. FED. 16 (1989).
74. Jones v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 718 P.2d 890, 894 (Wyo. 1986). For general background
on the liability of owners/employers to independent contractors and the independent contractors'
employees, see THEOPmLus J. MOLL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS
AND EMPLOYERS' LtABILITY (1910); 2 ROBERT W. WOOD, LEGAL GUIDE TO INDEPENDENT CON-
TRACTOR STATUS 325-49 (2d ed. 1996).
75. Jones, 718 P.2d at 894.
76. Id. at 895.
77. Moloso v. State, 644 P.2d 205, 211-12 (Alaska 1982).
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B. Bowman v. United States"
1. Facts
In October 1989, John Bowman, Inc. (JBI) entered into a government
contract with the Air Force to repair historic housing on F. E. Warren Air
Force Base in Cheyenne, Wyoming.' JBI, an independent contractor,"
maintained direct supervisory responsibility over the work and safety of its
employees." The contract required JBI to comply with federal safety regula-
tions, including provision of guards on all circular saws."3 The United States
reserved the right to inspect the job site for compliance with the terms of the
contract." JBI employed Mearl Dean Bowman" as a carpenter on the
project." While attempting to use a saw that lacked a safety guard, Bowman
severely injured his right hand after it became caught in the saw blade."
Mearl Bowman sought damages for his injuries, and his wife sought dam-
ages for loss of consortium." The Bowmans alleged that the United States,
through its inspectors, knew or should have known of the missing saw guard
and negligently failed to take corrective action. 9 The district court granted
the government's motion for summary judgment.
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit first reviewed the extent of the FTCA's waiver of sov-
ereign immunity.9 The court acknowledged that a claimant may sue the gov-
ernment if a private defendant would be liable according to the law of the
place where the act or omission occurred.' The court then continued with a
review of the relevant Wyoming state law.
Relying on Jones v. Chevron,93 the court stated that employees of inde-
pendent contractors may hold a property owner liable only if the owner main-
tained control over the hazard that caused the harm.94 If the owner "retain[ed]
78. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 414 (1965).
79. 65 F.3d (10th Cir. 1995) (Bowman 1/).
80. Bowman I, 65 F.3d at 857.
81. Bowman v. United States, 821 F.Supp. 1442, 1445 (D. Wyo. 1993) ("The contract evi-
dences that the intent of the parties was to create an independent contractor relationship in that
[JBI] obligated itself to perform all operations necessary to repair the housing units under the
language of the contract") (Bowman 1), aff d, 65 F.3d 856 (10th Cir. 1995) (Bowman !/).
82. Bowman 11, 65 F.3d at 857.
83. 1&
84. li
85. No familial relationship existed between plaintiffs and John Bowman of JBI. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Bowman 1, 821 F. Supp. at 1444.
89. Bowman I1, 65 F.3d at 857.
90. Bowman 1, 821 F.Supp. at 1446.
91. Bowman I1, 65 F.3d at 857-58.
92. Id. at 858 (citing 23 U.S.C. § 1346).
93. 718 P.2d 890 (Wyo. 1986) (holding that owner oil company's retention of control over
the deenergizing of power lines created a duty of care to the employees of an independent con-
tractor hired to install the lines).
94. Bowman I, 65 F.3d at 858.
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the right to direct the manner of an independent contractor's performance, or
assume[d] affirmative duties with respect to safety," then the owner sufficient-
ly controlled the worksite to create such a duty.95 However, if the owner
merely reserved and exercised the right to inspect work for adherence to con-
tract terms, or retained only the right to require the contractor to observe safe-
ty rules, then the owner did not have a duty toward independent contractor
employees."
Applying these rules to the JBI contract, the court held that the United
States did not retain control over JBI's work performance or assume affirma-
tive safety duties." Therefore, the United States did not maintain control over
the hazard that caused Bowman's injury and could not be held liable." Al-
though the government retained and exercised the right to inspect the
workplace for adherence to the contract terms, this fact did not create a duty
towards Bowman."
C. Other Circuits
The Eleventh and Fourth Circuits also addressed the treatment of indepen-
dent contractors under the FTCA during the survey period. In Tisdale v. Unit-
ed States,"° the Eleventh Circuit determined that the United States relin-
quished possession and control of property where an independent contractor's
employee suffered an injury. Under Georgia law, therefore, the indepen-
dent contractor assumed the duties for keeping the premises safe."° The fact
that the United States retained authority to ensure performance of contract
obligations did not defeat a finding that the contractor controlled the
property. °3 The court concluded that the plaintiffs could not hold the United
States liable and affirmed summary judgment for the government."°
In Robb v. United States,1°5 the Fourth Circuit affirmed dismissal of
plaintiff's claim against the United States for alleged negligent treatment by
physicians at an Air Force hospital." The court characterized the physicians
as independent contractors, not employees of the United States' °7 Plaintiffs
could not hold the United States liable for the physicians' acts because the
FTCA does not waive sovereign immunity for injuries resulting from the ac-
tions of independent contractors." The fact that the United States reserved
95. Id. at 859 (quoting Jones, 718 P.2d at 896).
96. Id. at 858.
97. Id. at 859.
98. Id. The court also reviewed analogous Wyoming state and Tenth Circuit cases to support
its holding. Id. at 859-61.
99. Id. at 859.
100. 62 F.3d 1367 (11 th Cir. 1995).
101. Tisdale, 62 F.3d at 1373.
102. Id. at 1372-73.
103. Id. at 1372.
104. Id.
105. 80 F.3d 884 (4th Cir. 1996).
106. Robb, 80 F.3d at 886.
107. Id. at 893.
108. Id. at 887.
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the right to evaluate the independent contractor's services did not create a
employer-employee relationship."l
D. Analysis
Bowman II met the FTCA's goal of holding the United States liable to the
extent that a private person would be liable under state law where the incident
occurred."0 Relevant Wyoming law has consistently precluded employer lia-
bility toward independent contractor employees where the employer did not re-
tain sufficient control over the job site."' Wyoming courts have also rou-
tinely allowed employers to inspect performance and require observance of
safety standards without imposing liability."2 The Tenth Circuit's decision
conformed to these principles by recognizing that the United States lacked
control of the job site and was therefore not liable for Bowman's injuries."'
109. lId. at 893.
110. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).
111. See e.g., Abraham v. Andrews Trucking Co., 893 P.2d 1156, 1157-58 (Wyo. 1995)
(holding that defendant employer did not owe employee of an independent contractor a legal duty
because defendant had not assumed control or affirmative safety duties at the job site); Ramsey v.
Pacific Power & Light, 792 P.2d 1385, 1388 (Wyo. 1990) (holding that defendant landowner was
not liable for injury of independent contractor's employee because owner did not have control of
the worksite at the time of injury); Cockburn v. Terra Resources, Inc., 794 P.2d 1334, 1342-43
(Wyo. 1990) (holding that defendant employer was not liable to injured employee of an indepen-
dent contractor because defendant did not have a controlling and pervasive role at the work site);
Hill v. Pacific Power & Light, 765 P.2d 1348, 1350 (Wyo. 1988) (holding that defendant
landowner was not liable for injuries suffered by independent contractor's employee because de-
fendant did not have control over details of the work performed and did not assume affirmative
safety duties); Stockwell v. Parker Drilling Co., Inc., 733 P.2d 1029, 1033 (Wyo. 1987) (holding
that defendant landowner was not liable to independent contractor's employee because no evi-
dence existed that defendant had retained control of the work site or assumed safety duties).
112. See cases cited supra note 114. This view comports with the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 414 cmt. c (1965) ("It is not enough that [the employer] has merely a general right...
to inspect [the independent contractor's] progress .... There must be such a retention of a right
of supervision that the contractor is not entirely free to do the work in his own way.")
113. Bowman H also comports with previous Tenth Circuit opinions. See Flynn v. United
States, 631 F.2d 678, 681 (10th Cir. 1980) (holding that the existence of a government safety pro-
gram did not create liability where the contractor was primarily responsible for safety); Craghead
v. United States, 423 F.2d 664, 666 (10th Cir. 1970) (holding that the government's reservation of
the right of inspection and the right to enforce safety measures did not constitute control); Irzyk v.
United States 412 F.2d 749, 751 (10th Cir. 1969) (holding that the government's right and exer-
cise of inspection of independent contractor's work did not render it liable); United States v. Page,
350 F.2d 28, 31 (10th Cir. 1965) (holding that government's safety program did not constitute
exercise of control); Grogan v. United States, 341 F.2d 39, 43 (10th Cir. 1965) (holding that the
government was not liable because it reserved the right to inspect the work of an independent




Ill. DAMAGES UNDER THE FIrCA
A. Background
1. Damages under the FTCA
The United States is liable under the FFCA "in the same manner and to
the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances, but shall not
be liable for interest prior to judgment or for punitive damages."'"4 The
FTCA grants the jurisdiction to award "money damages.""' 5 As discussed
above, substantive state law where the conduct occurred determines govern-
ment liability."6 Subject to the FTCA's restrictions, state law also deter-
mines the nature and measure of damages."1 7 For example, courts apply state
law to determine the kind of damages recoverable,"' the amount recover-
able,"19 application of collateral source rules,' comparative or contributory
negligence doctrines, 2' damage caps," 2 and indemnity and contribution
rules."' Courts apply federal law, however, when interpreting the FTCA's
prohibitions on punitive damages and prejudgment interest.'24
2. Periodic Payments
Traditionally, the common law allowed for payment of a damage award as
a single lump sum payment, also referred to as the single recovery rule."2
Periodic payment of damages, on the other hand, consists of an "arrangement
to compensate a claimant over time, rather than with a single lump sum. The
term means that the claimant will not receive compensation all at once, but
114. 28 U.S.C. § 2674.
115. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).
116. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). See generally MORRIS, supra note 24, § 4.1 (discussing how local
law applies to the government the same as to individuals under the FrCA).
117. 28 U.S.C. §1346(b); see also, JAYSON, supra note 3, § 226, at 10-12; MORRIS, supra
note 24 § 4.1; Walter D. Phillips, Damages Limitations Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 33
A.F. L. REV. 59, 63-66 (1990).
118. See JAYSON, supra note 3, § 226, at 10-14 to 10-18.
119. Id. § 228.01, at 10-41.
120. See Reilly v. United States, 863 F.2d 149, 161 (1st Cir. 1988); Scheib v. Florida Sanitar-
ium & Benevolent Assoc., 759 F.2d 859, 864 (11th Cir. 1985); Feeley v. United States, 337 F.2d
924, 927 (3rd Cir. 1964).
121. See JAYSON, supra note 3, § 228.04, at 10-51.
122. See Carter v. United States, 982 F.2d 1141, 1143 (7th Cir. 1992); Lozada v. United
States, 974 F.2d 986, 987 (8th Cir. 1992); Lucas v. United States, 807 F.2d 414, 416 (5th Cir.
1986); Hoffman v. United States, 767 F.2d 1431, 1433 (9th Cir. 1985).
123. See JAYSON, supra note 3, § 228.06.
124. Id. § 226, at 10-20 to 10-21.
125. See Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Pheifer, 462 U.S. 523, 533 (1983) ("The award
could in theory take the form of periodic payments, but in this country it has traditionally taken
the form of a lump sum, paid at the conclusion of the litigation."); Frankel v. United States, 466
F.2d 1226, 1228 (3rd Cir. 1972) ("[C]ourts of law had no power at common law to enter
judgment in terms other that a simple award of money damages."); DANIEL W. HINDERT ET AL.,
STRUCruRED SETTLEMENTS AND PERIODIc PAYMENT JUDGMENTS § 1.02[1] (1986); Thomas C.
Downs, Periodic Payment of Claims: New Hope for CERCLA Settlements?, 8 TUL. ENVTL. LJ.
387, 398 (1995); Ralph C. Thomas, Medical Prophesy and the Single Award: The Problem and a
Proposal, 1 TULSA LJ. 135, 136 (1964).
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will receive instead a promise from some entity to make future payments ac-
cording to an agreed schedule."" 6 Most courts apply the single recovery rule
and only reluctantly implement periodic payment of judgments absent agree-
ment of the parties, an overriding need to protect the victim, or statutory in-
struction.127 State legislation requiring periodic payments, however, has be-
come prevalent in recent years, especially in the field of medical malprac-
tice."
Whether the FTCA contemplates periodic payments remains unclear.
Some courts have interpreted the FTCA to allow only lump sum money judg-
ments."2 However, other courts have structured damage awards in certain
situations.' 3 The Tenth Circuit became the first circuit court to address ap-
plication of a state statute mandating periodic payments under the FTCA.
126. HINDERT Er AL., supra note 125, § 1.01[1], at 1-3. The term "periodic payment" applies
to both judgments and settlements; however, this paper focuses only on the periodic payment of
judgments. For general background on periodic payment of judgments and settlements see UNIF.
PERIODIC PAYMENT OF JuDGMENTS Acr, 14 U.L.A. 9 (Supp. 1996); HINDERT ET AL., supra note
125, § 1.02 at 1-6 to 1-7; Brian Brown & Lisa Chalidze, Structured Settlements: An Overview, 22
VT. BJ. & L. DIG. 14 (1996); Richard L. Kligler, Structured Settlements as a Negotiation Tool, in
EvALuATING AND SETrLING A PERSONAL INJURY CASE 1992, at 73 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice
Course Handbook Series No. 438, 1992); Marcus L. Plant, Periodic Payment of Damages for
Personal Injury, 44 LA. L. REV. 1327 (1984); John W. Turk & William L. Winslow, Structured
Settlements in the 1990s, 49 J. Mo. B. 197 (1993); Dirk Yandell, Advantages and Disadvantages
of Structured Settlements, 5 J. LEGAL ECON. 71 (1995).
127. See cases cited infra note 129; Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R. Co., 194 U.S. 120, 128
(1904) (holding that the district court lacked the power to order periodic payment of damages in a
wrongful death case); Gretchen v. United States, 618 F.2d 177, 181 n.5 (2d Cir. 1980) (noting that
it is beyond the power of the court to order periodic payments without legislative authority); see
also HINDERT Er AL., supra note 125, § 1.02[2], at 1-8 ('The ... reasons why courts have not
fashioned periodic payment judgments are practicality and risk."); Downs, supra note 125, at 398-
99 ("An order requiring periodic payments, without specific statutory authority, appears to be im-
proper as a matter of law.").
128. See HINDERT Er AL., supra note 125, § 1.02[3]. For examples of state statutes imple-
menting periodic payments see id. at app. C(2); Russell G. Donaldson, Annotation, Validity of
State Statute Providing for Periodic Payment of Future Damages in Medical Malpractice Action,
41 A.L.R. 4TH 275 (1985).
129. See Reilly, 863 F.2d at 169-70 (affirming the district court's insistence on lump sum
payment absent special circumstances); Frankel, 466 F.2d at 1228-29 (holding that district court
does not have power to make other then lump-sum money judgments absent Congressional autho-
rization); Andrulonis v. United States, 724 F.Supp 1421, 1520 n.616 (N.D.N.Y. 1989) (court lacks
power to enter judgment other than lump sum award contemplated by FTCA), affd in part, rev'd
in part on other grounds, 924 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1991), vacated New York State Dep't of Health
v. Andrulonis, 502 U.S. 801 (1991); JAYSON, supra note 3, § 225, at 10-6.
130. See Hull v. United States, 971 F.2d 1499, 1505 (10th Cir. 1992) ('[Nlothing in the
FICA prohibits courts from exercising their inherent authority to structure awards... to ensure
that the damage recovery is in the best interest of the victim."); Reilly, 863 F.2d at 169 n.16 (con-
cluding that periodic damage awards are permissible if a controlling statute permits, if the parties
in interest agree, or if it is necessary to ensure the victim receives his due); Robak v. United
States, 503 F.Supp. 982, 983 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (allowing creation of a reversionary trust to which
both parties agreed) aff d in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 658 F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1981).
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B. Hill v. United States 3'
1. Facts
On October 17, 1988, the parents of four and one-half month old Tasha
Hill took her to Evans Army Community Hospital in Fort Carson, Colora-
do .' 2 Physicians diagnosed and treated her for spinal meningitis.'33 As a
result of the doctors' alleged negligence, Tasha suffered severe, permanent
mental and physical disabilities." Plaintiffs asserted several claims of negli-
gence, including failure to perform prompt assessment, delay of administration
of medication, absence of appropriate supervision by the attending physician,
unreliable medical records, and failure to treat complications of Tasha's men-
ingitis.
Because the government conceded liability, the trial addressed only the
issue of damages.'" The district court awarded plaintiff damages totaling
$13,528,400.137 The judge placed Tasha's damages in a trust, but refused to
include the government's proposed reversionary clause. 13 The clause would
permit any funds existing in the trust at Tasha's death to revert to the U.S.
Treasury.'39 The district court concluded that it could only implement a re-
versionary trust when considering the best interests of the victim." Since a
reversionary clause would benefit only the defendant, the court denied the re-
quest.'4' The United States appealed the district court's refusal to grant the
United States a reversionary interest.
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the award of damages to Tasha's parents and
reversed on the issue of a reversionary trust. 43 The opinion addressed each
of the United States' arguments in turn.
The government argued that avoidance of the unjust enrichment of
Tasha's heirs necessitated the reversionary trust for Tasha's future damag-
es. 1M Damages compensate Tasha for her expenses only; therefore, funds left
in the trust at Tasha's death should return to the government, not her es-
131. 81 F.3d 118 (10th Cir. 1996) (Hill l1), cert. denied, 117 S. CL 56 (1996).
132. Hill v. United States, 854 F.Supp 727, 729 (D. Colo. 1994) (Hill I), affd in part, 81
F.3d 118 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 56 (1996).




137. Hill v. United States, 864 F.Supp. 1030, 1031 (D. Colo. 1994) (Hill Ii), rev'd, 81 F.3d
118 (10th Cir. 1996) (Hill ItI), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 56 (1996).
138. Hill II, 864 F.Supp. at 1032.
139. Hill 111, 81 F.3d at 120.
140. Hill I, 864 F.Supp. at 1032 (citing Hull v. United States, 971 F.2d 1499, 1505 (10th Cir.
1992)).
141. Id
142. Hill III, 81 F.3d at 119.
143. Id. at 121.
144. Id.
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tare." The government based its argument on two theories: first, the court
can fashion a remedy that approximates a state statutory provision, and sec-
ond, the court retains the inherent power to create a reversionary trust.' 4
The government's first theory relied on the Colorado Health Care Avail-
ability Act (HCAA). ' 7 The HCAA requires trial judges, in civil actions
against health care professionals and institutions,'" to order periodic pay-
ment of future damage awards exceeding $150,000." Payments cease at the
death of the tort victim, except for payment of loss of future earnings.'"
The United States argued that under the FTCA, courts must treat the gov-
ernment in the same manner as a private health care provider under like cir-
cumstances.' 5' Therefore the court should fashion a remedy that would "fur-
ther the intent and approximate the outcome" of the HCAA even though the
statute did not specifically apply to the United States.'52 The government
supported this contention by citing cases that allowed the government to bene-
fit from state damage caps even though the courts did not subject it to the
state statutory scheme. 3
The Tenth Circuit refused to rely on the state damage cap cases cited by
the government. 5 4 In those cases, the state statutes affected the parties in ex-
actly the same manner as they would have if a private individual had injured
the victim. The court concluded that "[n]one of these cases offers direct sup-
port for the proposition that the United States may attempt to create a rough
equivalent to a state statute when they are clearly ineligible for the precise
remedy provided therein."'55 The court stated that the government's proposal
did not promote the FTCA's mandate for like treatment because, unlike the
HCAA, it allowed reversion of future earnings damages."
The court went on to conclude that the district court could create a reme-
dy that did approximate the result that the HCAA contemplated. 5 The
HCAA prevented damages paid for future medical costs from passing to the
victim's heirs at death.'58 Therefore, the government could receive a rever-
sionary interest in the damages awarded to Tasha for "life care costs.'
59
In its second theory, the government argued that the court had the inher-
145. Id.
146. Id. at 120-21.
147. Id. at 120 (citing Health Care Availability Act, CoLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-64-201 to -212
(Supp. 1996)).
148. "'Health care institution' means any licensed or certified hospital, health care facility,
dispensary, or other institution for the treatment or care of the sick or injured." CoLO. REV. STAT.
§ 13-64-202(3).
149. CoLO. REv. STAT. § 13-64-203. If the award for future damages is equal to or less than
$150,000, then the court may order periodic payments. Id. (emphasis added).
150. CoLO. REv. STAT. § 13-64-206(3).
151. Hill 111, 81 F.3d at 120.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 120-21.
154. Id. at 121.







ent power to create a reversionary trust under Hull v. United States. 6 In
Hull, the Tenth Circuit held that the district court had the inherent power to
create a reversionary trust in the victim's best interest. 6' This power ensured
that the victim would receive the benefit of his award.62 The Hill III court
refused to rely on Hull since the reversionary trust clearly did not benefit
Tasha 63
C. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit's decision focused on application of the FTCA's "like
treatment" provision. The court's authorization of a reversionary trust treated
the government in the same manner as a private health care provider. If doc-
tors in a private hospital had injured Tasha, she would have received future
care damages in periodic payments ending at her death. Likewise, the United
States' payment of future damages will end at Tasha's death. The court also
relied on relevant state law to determine the extent of the government's liabili-
ty, as dictated by the FTCA.
The court's opinion, however, did not address the possible conflict of state
periodic payment statutes and the FTCA's grant of jurisdiction to award "mon-
ey damages."'" In Frankel v. Heym,'" the Third Circuit interpreted the
FTCA to allow only lump sum awards."6 If the FTCA's term "money dam-
ages" contemplates only one-time, lump-sum payments, an internal conflict
arises when the FTCA also requires application of state law which mandates
periodic payments. It is unclear whether the "money damages" term or the
incorporated state statute should control. In the only decision to directly ad-
dress the issue, the First Circuit suggested in dicta that the state statute would
control. Considering important policy issues involved in periodic pay-
ments,"6 and the narrow construction required for waivers of sovereign im-
160. Id. (citing Hull v. United States, 971 F.2d 1499, 1504-05 (10th Cir. 1992).
161. Hull, 971 F.2d at 1504.
162. Id. at 1506.
163. Hill!11, 81 F.3d at 121.
164. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1).
165. 466 F.2d 1226 (3rd Cir. 1972).
166. Frankel, 466 F.2d at 1228-29.
[S]ection 1346(b) authorizes district courts to entertain "civil actions on claims against
the United States, for money damages .... " Arguably, this language at least implies
that primary awards in such civil suits must take the form of common law's money
judgments, the only form of "money damages" known to the common law .... [I]n
administering the legislation in question a district court should not make other than
lump-sum money judgments unless and until Congress shall authorize a different type of
award. The relaxation of sovereign immunity is peculiarly a matter of legislative con-
cern, responsibility and policy. If novel types of awards are to be permitted against the
government, Congress should affirmatively authorize them.
Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)).
167. Reilly, 863 F.2d at 169 n.16 ("Periodic damage awards are permissible in lieu of lump
sums ... if a controlling statute permits ... "). But see Phillips, supra note 117, at 65 (con-
cluding that state periodic payment statutes "do not apply to the United States because the FTCA
establishes federal procedural law, which is independent of the FTCA's reliance upon state sub-
stantive law ... .
168. For the pros of structured judgments, see UNIF. PERIODIC PAYMENT OF JUDGMENTS ACT,
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munity,'" other courts may side with the Frankel court and await Congres-
sional authorization to award periodic payment judgments under the FTCA.
On the other hand, considering the emerging popularity of periodic pay-
ments, 7 courts could favor state periodic payment statutes, as the Tenth Cir-
cuit did in Hill III. In addition, future Congressional approval of periodic pay-
ment judgment appears uncertain. Congress recognized periodic payment judg-
ments in at least two instances, childhood vaccinations 71 and the Internal
Revenue Code. 72 However, Congress failed to pass President Clinton's pro-
posed Health Care Liability Reform and Quality of Care Improvement Act of
1992."' This act would have amended the FTCA to allow periodic payment
of future economic loss damages in health care liability actions against the
United States.1 74 Until Congress resolves the issue, federal courts continue to
confront the periodic payment issue.
CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit addressed three different aspects of the FICA during
the survey period. In both Tew and Bowman, the court followed precedent and
maintained a conservative approach in construing government liability. In Hill
III, the court struck new ground by finding that the FTCA allowed the govern-
ment to receive a reversionary interest in future damages awarded to private
commissioner's prefatory note, 14 U.L.A. 10-12 (Supp. 1996); Memorandum by Jeffrey Axelrad
on Structured Settlements (July 1, 1992), in DAMAGES UNDER THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT,
522-89 (Civil Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice 1992); HINDERT ET AL., supra note 125, § 1.03[l] to
1.04; Plant, supra note 126, at 1329-40. For the cons of structured judgments, see Smith v.
Meyers, 887 P.2d 541, 548 (Ariz. 1994) (holding that state statutory periodic payment scheme for
future damages in medical malpractice actions impermissibly limited right of plaintiffs to recover
damages); Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825, 836 (N.H. 1980) (holding that statute requiring peri-
odic payment of future damages violated equal protection clause of state constitution); HINDERT
Er AL., supra note 125, § 1.04; Philip H. Corboy, Structured Injustice: Compulsory Periodic Pay-
ment of Judgments, 66 A.B.A. J. 1524 (1980).
169. See United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111 (1979) ("We should also have in mind that
the [FrCA] waives the immunity of the United States and that in construing... a condition of
that waiver, we should not take it upon ourselves to extend the waiver beyond that which Con-
gress intended."); Soriano v. United States, 352 U.S. 270, 276 (1957) ("Mhis Court has long
decided that limitations and conditions upon which the Government consents to be sued must be
strictly observed and exceptions thereto are not to be implied."). But see Indian Towing Co. v.
United States, 350 U.S. 61, 68 (1955) ("There is nothing in the Tort Claims Act which shows that
Congress intended to draw distinctions so finespun and capricious as to be almost incapable of
being held in the mind for adequate formulation.").
170. States utilize periodic payments in many areas, including child support, workers' com-
pensation, alimony, automotive accident liability, and, of course, medical malpractice. See
HINDERT ET AL., supra note 125, § 1.0213], app. C; Downs, supra note 125, at 399-401.
171. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(f)(4) (1994) (allowing courts to order purchase of an annuity, with
permission of the petitioner, for damages in childhood vaccination cases).
172. 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (1994) (providing that personal injury damages received in period-
ic payments are not included in calculations of gross income). See generally HINDERT ET AL.,
supra note 125, § 2.01.
173. Health Care Liability Reform and Quality of Care Improvement Act of 1992, S. 3387,
102d Cong. (1992).
174. S. 3387 § 402.
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citizens. With a growing number of state tort reform statutes requiring period-
ic payment of damages, future decisions must resolve the conflict between the
FTCA's term "money damages" and the term requiring application of relevant
state law.
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